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... Every man in regard of his intellect is connected with 
Divine Word [logos], being an impression of, or a fragment 
or ray of that blessed nature ... 
–Philo, On the Creation 
And yet He is there, in silence, in filigree.
–Elie Wiesel, in a 1978 interview with
John S. Friedman
To my father,
When your voice pauses my heart,
I remember all the times that you asked me:
“Would you like to read, for me, a tale?”
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Preface
At a time when references to the Holocaust saturate American popular 
culture and the media, and at a time when the so-called Final Solution has 
come to epitomize absolute evil in the United States – a country that 
opened a museum in the heart of its capital dedicated to an event that took 
place, on foreign soil, more than two decades before finally opening one 
dedicated to the history of African Americans – it is difficult to imagine a 
time when the Holocaust was not considered the moral and historical 
touchstone, tout court. In fact, as historian Peter Novick and others have 
shown, the history of the Holocaust – or rather its reception – has a history 
itself: it did not always receive the same level of public or scholarly atten-
tion that it does today. And the same holds true for Germany. Raul Hilberg, 
the late doyen of Holocaust studies in the United States, once observed 
that the genocide of the European Jews attracted some attention in the 
Federal Republic in the 1960s as a result of the Eichmann and Auschwitz 
trials, but was not a focal point of the “sixty-eighters,” i.e., the youthful 
participants in the protest movement that rocked Germany in the latter 
part of the decade by asking their parents’ generation what they had done 
during the Third Reich. It was not until a decade later, in fact, with the 
broadcast of the American miniseries Holocaust in West Germany in 1979, 
that the Final Solution finally entered popular consciousness there; it has 
since become a perennial source of public discussion.
That the reception of the Holocaust has a history that changed over 
time has generally become an accepted idea – one that has also come to be 
accepted with regard to the field of American sociology, as Adele Valeria 
Messina reminds us in this fine study, the first one-volume synthesis in 
English of the history of the sociology of the Holocaust in the United 
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States. But, as the author shows, there was no “delay” in approaching the 
Holocaust: rather, it was a topic that attracted attention in American 
sociological circles immediately after 1945 – and even during the war 
itself. Drawing on an abundance of evidence, Messina not only debunks 
that misperception, but also persuasively describes the reasons how and 
why the idea of a “missing tradition” in American sociology came about.
As a historian of modern Germany, there is another aspect of this 
review of American sociological studies of the Holocaust from the end of 
the Second World War through the present that I find especially attrac-
tive: by alerting us to a number of important studies that have unjustly 
been long neglected, it points to ways in which historians can better inte-
grate the sociological tradition of Holocaust studies into their own field. 
And, as the author herself concludes, her monograph strongly suggests 
the need to revisit the sociological traditions of other countries as well, 
where the study of the Holocaust may very well have an equally rich heri-
tage. By alerting us to this possibility, Messina has performed a valuable 
service to her own field, as well as to cognate ones such as my own.
Andrew I. Port
Professor of History, Wayne State University
Editor, Central European History
Introduction
Just as with many good things that happen by chance, this book has also 
come to be by happenstance: it is a bit associated with a fortunate event. 
When I started to approach the Holocaust topic, by reading Modernity and 
the Holocaust (1989) by Zygmunt Bauman, I sincerely knew almost nothing 
of what it really meant. In my mind, I thought I knew enough about the 
Holocaust: around 6 millions of Jews were killed. That’s all I needed to 
know. But in working with a feeling that I had upon trying to look at it 
more closely, I started to examine any writing related to the topic I could 
find. One day my eyes accidentally fell on an article by Burton P. Halpert: 
“Early American Sociology and the Holocaust: The Failure of a Discipline” 
(2007). I had never read such a thing: it was absolutely new for me. So 
I proceeded with the abstract, and then my eyes ran over this passage:
American sociology, established as an academic discipline in 1905, 
passed through two early developmental stages, Christian reformism 
and sociological positivism, together forming the basis for what was 
taught and researched in the academy. Topics not fitting this reli-
gious and positivistic paradigm were dismissed by the leaders of the 
discipline. Included among the neglected topics was the Holocaust, 
the paradigmatic genocide of the twentieth century. Permeated 
with religious ideology and anti-Semitism, American sociology 
as practiced in the leading universities in the United States 
 institutionalized a professional milieu that precluded recognition of 
the Holocaust, even after World War II.1 
 1 Burton P. Halpert, “Early American Sociology and the Holocaust: The Failure of a 
Discipline,” Humanity & Society 31 (2007): 6. 
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I really understood that something was amiss in my mind and that 
the Holocaust was a more deeply felt question. Contemporaneously I was 
becoming fascinated with Italian book Auschwitz e gli intellettuali by Enzo 
Traverso.2 These two works, like two heavy stones, were making room in 
my consciousness and thought, and “like a beacon in the night” they were 
starting to illuminate my research. Actually, I was finding myself facing a 
new perspective of study. This was my starting point: I wanted to have 
more knowledge of the scholars of sociology and about the failure of 
sociology concerning the Holocaust. 
Halpert’s statement—that “American Sociology permeated with reli-
gious ideology and anti-Semitism institutionalized a professional milieu 
that precluded recognition of the Holocaust”—became a nagging, burden-
some question for me: I continuously asked myself how Christian reformism 
and sociological positivism could be related to the Holocaust. Once more 
conscious of this, I commenced to peruse whatever Holocaust sources 
(symposium publications, papers, articles, books, essays, letters to the 
editor, reviews, and so on) and more and more to look at any writing 
about sociology and the destruction of the Jews. So, step by step, I was 
focusing on the approach sociology adopted in studying the Holocaust. 
Since Halpert’s article seemed to confirm the thesis according to 
which the post-Holocaust sociology started with Modernity and the 
Holocaust by Bauman, I wanted to verify that. Thus this book resulted 
from two questions: Does post-Holocaust sociology only start with 
Modernity and the Holocaust by Bauman in 1989 and after the fall of Berlin 
Wall? This is a concern of my study. The second question has to do with 
the role Bauman’s book played in both American sociology and the wider 
Holocaust discussion, namely, should it be considered an exception in the 
field, as most scholars appear to think it is. In searching for an answer to 
these questions, I started to examine the sociology of the Holocaust and 
its related themes, and I ran into a set of unforeseen and astonishing 
outcomes beyond the Holocaust and concerned with academic realm. 
I hope to make the reader aware of the “Jewish problem” of sociology and 
provide what this academic discipline urgently needs: a one-volume history 
 2 Enzo Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali: La shoah nella cultura del dopoguerra (Bologna: 
il Mulino, 2004 [1997]).
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of the sociology of the Holocaust, that is, a single volume suited for a broad 
audience.3 Moreover, although I run the clear risk of some omissions, I hope 
that my approach will be sufficient to point out the fundamental issues.
Since my original doubt occupied me with reviewing the history of 
sociology, this book is going to offer the first résumé in English of 
up- to-date research on the sociology surrounding the destruction of the 
Jews during World War II: a genocide that did not have its beginning in 
“mobile killing operations” and “killing center operations,” as Raul Hilberg 
states. The destruction of the Jews, between 1933 and 1945, was prepared by 
certain steps: a definition by decree, concentration phases, and deportations.4 
Even if this book affords a guide to the current state of knowledge, it 
does not aim to present itself as the last word on the subject. Filled with 
new elements and aspects that challenge contemporary and common 
scholarly theses, the volume tries to examine, as well as it can, the socio-
logical literature that studied the Holocaust from the end of the conflict to 
the present day. Further, I will investigate the event of the Holocaust by 
retracing some stages of the sociological scholarship. Thus I am going to 
analyze sociology as academic corpus and as a discipline, namely, the 
sociological devices and concepts adopted by sociologists over the years 
in comprehending the Holocaust and the focus of sociological thoughts 
confronted by the event. Additionally, in rethinking the sociology of the 
Holocaust, the book will move across the history of the same sociology. 
However, the focus on almost every page is on the “alleged delay of 
sociology” in the comprehension of the Jewish genocide. 
Before 1989, the year Modernity and the Holocaust by Bauman was 
published, scholars used to speak of a sociological problem, in the sense 
that the sociologists “have been reluctant to study the Holocaust”5 or 
“have so far failed to explore in full the consequence of the Holocaust.”6 
 3 Ronald J. Berger, review of Sociology Confronts the Holocaust: Memories and Identities in 
Jewish Diasporas, ed. Judith M. Gerson and Diane L. Wolf, Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal 
of Jewish Studies 27, no. 1 (2008): 151, accessed October 2, 2009, doi:10.1353/sho.0.0275.
 4 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1961), 43–53, 106–635; 
David Cesarani, Final Solution: The Fate of the Jews 1933–1949 (London: Macmillan, 2016).
 5 Fred E. Katz, “A Sociological Perspective to the Holocaust,” Modern Judaism 2, no. 3 (1982): 273.
 6 Zygmunt Bauman, “Sociology after the Holocaust,” British Journal of Sociology 39, no. 4 
(1988): 469. 
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Briefly put, few sociological works dealt with the Holocaust, with the 
exception of, for example, Accounting for Genocide by Helen Fein in 1979.7 
“The upshot of sociologists’ silence,” in Fred Katz’s words, “is that distinctive 
sociological contributions to knowledge of the Holocaust remain 
 relatively untapped.”8 Hence, the exigency and urgency for a book on the 
sociology of the Holocaust that collects and analyzes sociological works 
(authors and their theories) that have dealt with the phenomenon, 
 especially because things seem not to have changed much since Barry 
Dank stated in 1979 that “there is in essence no American sociological 
literature on the Holocaust.”9 Therefore, this book attempts to solve the 
problem. I will start with an important conference, offering as balanced an 
outline of as many facets of its points as possible.
THE FAMOUS OCTOBER 2001 CONFERENCE:  
THE SOCIOLOGICAL TURNING POINT
An international conference on “Sociological Perspectives on the 
Holocaust and Post-Holocaust Jewish Life” took place at Rutgers University 
in New Jersey, October 25 to 27, 2001. In the working conference, 
 sociologists and specialists well acquainted with Holocaust discourse and 
its familiar topics (from Jewish identity and migration to collective 
memory, by way of ethnicity and so on) participated. 
What mattered, in the eyes of these academics, in those three days of 
the conference, was principally the analysis and the viewpoint of the situ-
ation, that is, sociology’s status in respect to the Holocaust. A big role in 
the satisfactory outcome of the symposium was played, particularly, by 
Judith M. Gerson—associate professor of Sociology and Women’s and 
Gender Studies at Rutgers University, where she is also an affiliate faculty 
 7 Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide: National Response and Jewish Victimization during the 
Holocaust (New York: Free Press, 1979).
 8 Katz, “A Sociological Perspective to the Holocaust,” 273.
 9 Barry M. Dank, review of On the Edge of Destruction: Jews of Poland between the Two World 
Wars, by Celia S. Heller, Contemporary Sociology 8, no. 1 (1979): 129. For example, Bauman 
speaks of a symposium on “Western Society after the Holocaust” summoned in 1978 by the 
Institute for the Study of Contemporary Social Problems, but it was only one episode. See Jack 
N. Porter, “The Holocaust as a Sociological Construct,” Contemporary Jewry 14, no. 1 (1993): 185.
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member of the Department of Jewish Studies and a recipient of a residential 
research fellowship at the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies at the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum—and by Diane L. Wolf, 
professor of sociology and a member of the Jewish Studies Program at the 
University of California, Davis.
Hosted by the Institute for Women’s Leadership of the Rutgers 
University, “Sociological Perspectives” aimed at favoring a scholarly 
dialogue and interchange between intellectuals and researchers working 
in Holocaust Studies and related fields for enhancing Holocaust research 
in sociology and called for a comparative analysis, as evident from invited 
papers and contributions.
Thanks to the support of several organizations (such as the American 
Sociological Association, the National Science Foundation’s Fund for the 
Advancement of the Discipline, the Lucius N. Littauer Foundation, and 
the Research Council of Rutgers University) and the concrete and solid 
work by many scholars, the conference took place and, first and foremost, 
it was possible to address relevant questions surrounding why Holocaust 
Studies programs were considered marginal to most academic disciplines 
and why sociologists had not taken up this issue years before.
During the conference, scholars mostly agreed that there had been a 
delay of sociology in studying the genocide of the Jews—a recurring 
expression was “silence” (of sociology) in relation to the Holocaust—and 
that there was a “dearth of a sociological understanding of the Shoah.”10
In almost a general scholarly consensus, it seemed that only Modernity 
and the Holocaust by Bauman had broken the silence of sociological 
studies on the Holocaust. And this was in 1989, after the fall of Berlin Wall, 
10 Among numerous presentations, I mention the following: “Remembrance without 
Recognition: Jewish Life in Germany Today” by Y. Michal Bodemann; Post-Holocaust 
Identity Narratives: A Sociological Approach to Collective Consciousness, Memory and 
History” by Debra Renee Kaufman; “Availability, Proximity, and Identity in the Warsaw 
Ghetto Uprising: Adding a Sociological Lens to Studies of Jewish Resistance” by Rachel L. 
Einwohner; “‘On Halloween We Dressed Up Like KGB Agents’: Identity Strategies of 
Second-Generation Soviet Jews” by Kathie Friedman-Kasaba; “The Holocaust and Jewish 
Identity and Identification in the United States” by Chaim I. Waxman; and “The Holocaust 
and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory” by Daniel Levy. See Judith M. Gerson and 
Diane L. Wolf, eds., Sociology Confronts the Holocaust: Memories and Identities in Jewish 
Diasporas (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 3, 11.
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when the book was published. Indeed, the fall of the Berlin Wall  constitutes 
a decisive moment in the history of Europe because next the collapse of 
communism, the resulting opening of the archives of the East, and the 
outbreak of civil war in ex-Yugoslavia (1991–95) all led several social 
scientists to reapproach, in their academic discussions and with new 
perspectives, the causes of the genocide of the Jews. It is not an accident 
that, in 1999, a workshop on “The Holocaust and Contemporary Genocide” 
took place at the University of Minnesota: almost as if in response to the 
genocide against Kosovar Albanians in 1998–99. The civil war in the 
ex-Yugoslavia awakened the “historical sociology of genocide.”11 This will 
be more evident in Chapter 3.
Now, Bauman’s wake-up call for sociology’s involvement with the 
Holocaust essentially meant two things: first, that before Modernity and 
the Holocaust only a few sociological works dealing with the topic existed, 
and, second, that these few sociological studies did not contain  appropriate 
sociological tools or a formulation of a theoretical system that analytically 
treated the extermination of the Jews. After the publication of Bauman’s 
study, Gerald E. Markle in 1995 and Debra Kaufman in 1996, for instance, 
tackled the problem.12 
“A ‘glaring paucity’ of sociological scholarship exists on the Holocaust” 
(as stated in the opening pages of Modernity and the Holocaust [xiii]) 
became a kind of call to action for some sociologists:13 thus in the 1990s, 
Jack N. Porter dealt with the presumed delay of the sociological discipline. 
According to Martin Oppenheimer’s speculations, there are specific 
reasons for the lack of sociological studies on the Holocaust. Briefly, 
1. that sociologists avoid “deviant cases”—because these incline them to 
description more than to analysis; 2. that grand narratives lead their 
authors astray methodologically, and evoke harsher-than-usual reac-
tions from competing paradigms (as some of the historians have 
11 Michael Freeman, “Genocide, Civilization and Modernity,” British Journal of Sociology 46, 
no. 2 (1995): 207.
12 See Jack N. Porter, “Toward a Sociology of the Holocaust,” Contemporary Jewry, 17 (1996): 
145–48.
13 Cf. Gerson and Wolf, Sociology Confronts the Holocaust, 11.
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learned); 3. that “big” subjects like these are a poor fit for journal publi-
cation; 4. that American sociologists do not command the relevant 
languages; 5. that there is an uneasy fear of being academically ghet-
toized; 6. or worse, that there is fear of being labeled opportunist, 
for climbing onto the bandwagon of the Holocaust Industry 
(“shoah-business”).14
The October 2001 conference rightly represents a turning point in 
 sociological studies related to the Holocaust: it brought to fruition a 
productive and fertile scholarly movement; since that time the number of 
academic courses and scholarships, in several universities, have grown at 
great speed: indirectly, most of them are a consequence and product of 
that conference. Examples of course offerings included Sociology and the 
Holocaust (fall 2005 at New York University), Sociology of the Holocaust 
(spring 2007 at the University of Nebraska), Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies (in 2009 at Keene State College), and Sociology of the Holocaust 
at the University of Warwick in the same year.
The papers given in 2001 to the scholars of that conference were 
original contributions and resulted in a book: Sociology Confronts the 
Holocaust (2007). However, the contributions to the book are not simply 
from the 2001 conference proceedings: rather, that conference had invited, 
or compelled, a review of the sociological literature, categories, and methods 
and forced scholars to think of the Holocaust in terms of sociological 
devices.15 The book edited by Gerson and Wolf is rooted in this context.
“Whether sociology itself has a ‘Jewish problem,’ or its scholars lack 
the language skills, historical background, or mere interest to study it, 
14 Elihu Katz, review of Sociology Confronts the Holocaust: Memories and Identities in Jewish 
Diasporas, ed. Judith M. Gerson and Diane L. Wolf, Social Forces 87, no. 4 (2009): 2222, 
accessed October 2, 2009, doi:10.1353/sof.0.0198.
15 See the list of scholars “who have read at least one paper in 2007,” http://www.jstor.org/
stable/10.1086/590978?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents (accessed September 28, 2015). The 
conference was in 2001, and the book came from that conference in 2007. The 2001 confer-
ence has compelled many sociologists to deal with or face the Holocaust: for instance, just 
the simple assessment of the papers, by referees, becomes an occasion to speak of the 
sociology of the Holocaust. In reviewing the papers there is already a kind of dissemination 
of the sociology of the Holocaust.
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Sociology Confronts the Holocaust attempts to ‘bring the study of the 
Holocaust and its aftermath up to speed in sociology,’”—so Lynn Rapaport 
began her review of the volume edited by Gerson and Wolf, one year after 
its release.16 For the editors, and not only them, it was necessary to heal 
and to recover the lost time, just as had Bauman and Fein, who were 
greatly appreciated by the academic community for their “heroic efforts to 
approach the horror of the Holocaust sociologically.”17
As stated by Martin Oppenheimer, in their twenty-three-page 
 contribution, Gerson and Wolf outline “some of the strands of research 
that do exist.” Oppenheimer’s “critique” of Gerson and Wolf ’s edition 
weaves a series of relevant issues.18
If the October 2001 conference represents a turning point and if that 
conference came out of the aim to reconsider the status of sociology, the 
2007 book, as a result of that symposium, may be properly conceived as 
the volume opening and inaugurating the sociological scholarship 
confronting the genocide of the Jews.
So, what more can be added to Gerson and Wolf ’s work? Is it possible 
to say something not yet said? The present book accepts the invitation by 
the two editors, in 2007, and by Berenbaum19 in 2010, to “bring together 
what until now have been distant fields of knowledge.”20 At this point, the 
reader might ask: Which questions does this volume intend to answer?
Actually, I will ask myself a series of questions, of which the first is 
this: Does a book on English-speaking sociologists tackling the Holocaust 
exist? Or better: Do we know of a volume that collects and criticizes and 
at the same time, as a compendium, gathers the history of post-Holocaust 
sociology from 1945 to 2016? In other words, is there a book on “sociology 
16 Lynn Rapaport, review of Sociology Confronts the Holocaust: Memories and Identities in 
Jewish Diasporas, ed. Judith M. Gerson and Diane L. Wolf, American Journal of Sociology, 
113, no. 6 (2008): 1794. See Gerson and Wolf, Sociology Confronts the Holocaust.
17 Katz, review of Sociology Confronts the Holocaust, 1.
18 Martin Oppenheimer, “The Sociology of Knowledge and the Holocaust: A Critique,” in 
Gerson and Wolf, Sociology Confronts the Holocaust, 331–36. See Gerson and Wolf, Sociology 
Confronts the Holocaust, 11–3 .
19 Michael Berenbaum, review of Sociology Confronts the Holocaust: Memories and Identities 
in Jewish Diasporas, ed. Judith M. Gerson and Diane L. Wolf, Journal of Contemporary 
History 45, no. 2 (2010): 505–7, doi:10.1177/00220094100450020110.
20 Gerson and Wolf, Sociology Confronts the Holocaust, 9.
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and the Holocaust” criticizing the discipline from within (i.e., sociologists 
who studied the event; concepts, categories, and methods applied to 
analyze it; theoretical system elaborated and so on)? It seems not. Thus, 
this book seeks to fill a gap or to provide a kind of missing link in the 
history of sociology. But, I hope it will also deepen and enhance Holocaust 
Studies (because herein the destruction of the Jews is illustrated  differently, 
namely, with sociological tools not used previously). Finally, it links 
disciplines, such as history and sociology, that often diverge. 
Other questions still arise in my mind—a kind of doubt, such as, has 
sociology really had a “Jewish problem”?21 Has it “been slow to ‘confront’ 
the topic,”22 as affirmed by most scholars? I naïvely ask myself: Is all this 
really true? And more profoundly: Was there really a delay? Have the 
scholars arguing that there was a delay read the entire sociological 
 literature since 1945 connected with the Holocaust? This book intends to 
be a kind of response to Gerson and Wolf ’s volume and to the common 
assumption that there was a delay in post-Holocaust sociology. Therefore, 
at this point the matter is simple: if sociologists did not analyze the entire 
post-Holocaust sociological literature, the problem does not exist (in the 
sense that they only need to read the literature). On the contrary, if they 
have read everything, there may be a problem, because there may not have 
been a delay. In this case, I asked myself why these authors did not realize 
or recognize, reviewing the sociological literature, that there was not a 
delay. And yet: Did they not ask what caused the alleged delay? That is, 
why have scholars been led to speak of “delay,” and even to arguing this 
thesis? Did they not attempt to theorize systematically the origins of this 
alleged delay in any publications? To these and other questions, this book 
tries to give the answer that the delay could be half true. 
I will attempt to explain why authors who did indeed study the 
Holocaust were not considered by other scholars, in their own time and 
later; why observers, over the years, have come to speak of an absence of 
sociology in the study of the Holocaust; and why this sociological  tradition 
is omitted, ignored to the point of creating, for most scholars, “a missing 
21 Berger, review of Sociology Confronts the Holocaust, 151. 
22 Rapaport, review of Sociology Confronts the Holocaust, 1794.
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tradition.” Thus, I endeavor to show in what way we can speak of a missing 
sociological tradition.
METHODOLOGY
The methodological ways with which I approached these matters were 
conceived as a tool that aims principally to answer my questions, and the 
method I adopted shows the liaison between the world of scientific research 
and the construction and dissemination of sociological knowledge in a 
dynamic context profoundly modified by new online multimedia devices. 
In the beginning of my research, there was a timely and simple 
 interrogative: Were there any sociological writings related to the Holocaust 
before the publication of Modernity and the Holocaust by Bauman in 1989? 
In order to clear up my doubts, I decided to peruse everything. To verify 
if, before Bauman’s book, there really was no sociological work dealing 
with the destruction of the Jews and related topics, I poured over—as 
much as I could—the entire sociological literature since 1945.
I did not just look for great theories or eminent names of good 
 reputation, that is, those known to most or all of the academic community. 
Rather, I looked at any book, essay, article, doctoral dissertation, book 
review, paper, letter to the editor, conference announcement, and fellow 
list surrounding and related to the Holocaust. For example, I also investi-
gated the list of the names of the American Journal of Sociology (AJS) board 
and read annotations to the names of the directors of the journal. At this 
point, the reader might ask why I did this. I’d answer by saying that the 
reading of academic positions together with scholarly publications allows 
me to enter into the academic realm and to inter-read the scientific context 
that accounts for the conditions for the dissemination of research topics: 
this will be a key point in understanding the alleged delay of sociology. 
Therefore, some readers may still ask how the research has been 
carried out. I literally browsed and considered all the online academic 
sociological journals: I used EBSCOhost databases, particularly since 
1945, in order to, I repeat, see which authors have written on the genocide 
of the Jews of Europe and its related themes.
This means that I utilized key concepts typical of the sociological 
discipline and those concerned with the Holocaust (such as “movement,” 
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“bureaucracy,” “totalitarianism,” “political violence”). With different 
combinations accommodated by Boolean operators, I researched abstracts, 
titles, articles, reviews of articles, and so on, or I looked for the related 
names of the authors in editorial contributions, letters to the director, and 
conference proceedings.
I’ve stated that I started with 1945 and the end of World War II, but 
actually I went back to 1933 (the year of Hitler’s assumption of power) 
and even to the 1920s to acquaint myself with the academic realm of 
 sociological research and its research funding.
I chose to adopt the method of online academic reviews for two 
reasons: first, because it is highly innovative and accurate—in the field of 
history, this method has recently brought significant relevant results, as 
demonstrated by the researches of Gisella Fidelio, Christian Fleck, Maurizio 
Ridolfi, and Carlo Spagnolo.23 Through the online scientific reviews it is 
possible to contribute to writing history or, in other words, it is possible to 
do history through the reviews. Second, the method of online academic 
reviews provided me innovative interfaces with an  optimization of the value 
of my work along with the breadth and depth of contents. In other words, to 
resolve my doubts and satisfy my curiosity, I had to sift post-Holocaust 
sociology: only such a research method could allow for “premium online 
information resources,” primary sources, and open access to full-text 
searches, in short, a scientific, well-equipped knowledge.24 
There was a conference that showed how this method is a fertile and 
useful tool of investigation that took place in Viterbo, Italy, May 25–26, 
2006, promoted by the faculty of the Department of Political Science at 
the University of Tuscia and under the aegis of the Italian Society for the 
Study of Contemporary History (Sissco), with the organization of the 
Centre of Studies for the History of Mediterranean Europe.25 I imagined 
that sociologists could take advantage of this new historical approach. 
Hence my choice to adopt it for the present work: I pored over writings, 
articles, and dissertations in sociology. However, I have to inform the 
23 See also http://www.technologysource.org/article/free_online_scholarship_movement/ (accessed 
October 28, 2015).
24 See https://www.ebscohost.com/ (accessed February 13, 2016). 
25 See http://www.sissco.it/articoli/la-storia-contemporanea-attraverso-le-riviste-549/ (accessed 
June 28, 2016).
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reader of an important aspect: in going through the literature, I have tried 
to always keep in mind some guidelines that oriented my research: when 
a sociological work was written; who is the author of the piece; to which 
school of thought the author belongs; what is the content of the study; 
which sociological tools have been adopted (such as totalitarianism, 
movement, etc.); was is published after World War II? (in which year? and 
under which masthead?); and, finally, who was the author and when did 
he or she emigrate after Hitler’s rise—keeping in mind the impact of the 
scholarly production of refugee sociologists on American culture. 
It was in this manner that I acquainted myself with works by sociologists 
(by referring to their school, too, when possible) on the destruction of the 
Jews of Europe. I analyzed in which years the studies were published, and 
in which academic reviews, by measuring their productivity and the degree 
of appreciation for their works.26 These measurements, productivity (how 
many written works the scholar has produced), and visibility (how many 
times the name of the authors appear in articles and reviews on EBSCO), 
and also the degree of appreciation of these works (calculated based on the 
number of citations that the academic environment has reserved for them) 
allowed me to verify the alleged delay and why there was said to be a delay.
I considered two broad periods: one from 1945 and following, 
and one that covers the years prior to World War II, examining all the publi-
cations that, at least once, have in the title of the article or book review terms 
related to the Jewish question. This method, halfway between hemero-
graphia and metasociology, allows the measurement of some important 
indexes for this study, such as “the speed of publication” of research and “the 
26 Cf. Maurizio Ridolfi, ed., La storia contemporanea attraverso le riviste (Soveria Mannelli: 
Rubbettino, 2008), 7–11; Christian Fleck, “Per un profilo prosopografico dei sociologi di lingua 
tedesca in esilio,” in “L’Europa in esilio: La migrazione degli intellettuali verso le Americhe tra le 
due guerre,” ed. Renato Camurri, Memoria e Ricerca: Rivista di storia contemporanea 16, no. 31 
(2009): 81–101. On the use of databases, electronic journals, A-Link, and other university 
services in support of research and teaching, see http://www.aib.it/aib/com/bc04/programma.
htm3 (accessed March 29, 2009). The interface of EBSCO research allows interaction with other 
electronic resources present in the collection. There are more than 100 databases both of prop-
erty and of user license and more than 8,000 reviews in full-text, OPAC catalogs, index, and 
abstracts for approximately 12,000 publications and coverage in PDF for 6,000+ titles and 
peer-reviewed journals. See Gisella Fidelio, “La ricerca bibliografica on-line” (2010), http://
www.sssub.unibo.it/pagine_principali/fidelio.pdf (last access March 29, 2009). 
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scientific impact” of it on the academic public. For example, I visited the 
digital library JSTOR, which operates as an “open service,” and that permitted 
me to access to the contents of the archives and of particular publications for 
my research. A wide range of international journals was selected, classified by 
the publishing group and thematic content (to measure productivity and the 
rate of diffusion of the works relating to the matter). Additionally, through 
EBSCO, I could work with different databases, which, by surveying numerous 
international journals, facilitates access to older international publications and 
gives acquaintance with the quantitative diffusion of publications and intel-
lectual quality of the author’s sociological production by electronic catalog. 
I can say that I have conducted a kind of little scientometrical analysis.27 As 
the reader will see in Chapter 1, on the database JSTORE (acronym of 
JournalStorage, listing 85 journals) a research for “total author” allowed me 
to measure the visibility of Hughes and Parsons.
In retracing the entire sociological literature from 1945 on, I touched 
upon previously ignored or marginal subjects of investigation: from 
perusing online academic reviews, unknown papers emerged and cleared 
up my doubts related to the question of the alleged delay of sociology. 
I will attempt to demonstrate all that.
I will describe, decade by decade, and in detail, which works 
concerning the Holocaust were conducted after World War II. Hence the 
more primarily descriptive nature of the book rather than that critical. 
I will also try to explain for what reasons these studies were not considered 
by their own contemporary academy or by later scholars. 
This book aims at unearthing these works and describing their 
themes of focus. I will not criticize them, but I will limit myself to 
presenting and introducing them, organically, to an academic audience, 
because my aim in this book is primarily to demonstrate that it might be 
an error to speak of sociological silence in post-Holocaust sociology. 
I have to say, additionally, that this perusal permitted me to revise several 
important views of sociology: for example, when and how this discipline 
was born in American academies. It allowed me to approach the topic 
using AJS and the American Sociological Review (ASR), the most important 
27 See Fleck, “Per un profilo prosopografico dei sociologi di lingua tedesca in esilio,” 96, table 4.
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sociological academic journals, which founded sociology itself, since they 
disseminate research activities. Meanwhile, I will identify the fathers of 
sociology and the of the American Social Gospel. And still further, I’ll see 
how sociology developed, especially after 1945—since it was my key focus or 
my chronological device—in Europe, the country/place of the destruction of 
the Jews (for example, in Poland by addressing the Pawełczyńska and 
Bauman cases) and in the United States (the destination of emigration 
and the country hosting German refugee sociologists).
Precious for my research were e-mail dialogues that I had with Jack N. 
Porter, Martin Oppenheimer, Rick Helmes-Hayes, Christopher Simpson, 
and Viviana Salomon during my doctorate research, particularly in 
2011, and three Holocaust-survivor interviews conducted with Anna 
Pawełczyńska, Hanna K. Ulatowska, and Zofia Posmysz-Piasecka in 
Warsaw in December 2011.
English-Language Sources
I privileged this research-online-perusing with sources in English: 
I considered above all English papers and writings: the most availability is 
in English and much came out on the discipline of American sociology. 
This perusing through the online reviews permitted me to sift and scruti-
nize the sociological discipline in detail. That several of these writings 
were unnoticed, for different reasons, is what I will attempt to explain.
In particular, I deal with the sociology of English speakers for specific 
functional reasons. First of all because American sociology claims to be 
universal and provide a more complete overview. Second because of the 
visibility and radius of influence it had and still has. I am aiming at creating 
a valid, general, and “immune” discourse, which means that I intentionally 
decided not to initiate a work starting from a particular perspective that 
might be called “German.” I preferred to avoid, for example, all what in 
Italian might defined as “tedesco-foro discourse” (an Italian coinage from 
Greek ϕόρος, “bringing, bearing,” and Old High German theod, “German 
people”).28 Therefore, hereafter, when I speak of sociology I refer above all 
to an “Anglophone sociology,” so to speak.
28 I would like to thank Giuseppe Veltri for the expression “tedesco-foro discourse” and for his 
suggestions.
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Moreover, German sociology makes an inner and indirect discourse. 
Anyway, it does not mean that I will not address German scholars in this 
volume, but simply I do not start from a German viewpoint. The importance 
of German sociology (of the Holocaust), as I will try to demonstrate, 
deserves a separate book, which I intend to tackle in a specific way in the 
near future. Here I will limit myself, for instance, to citing Value-Free 
Sociology by Sven Papcke, a relevant work in German sociology that the 
scholar conducted with Martin Oppenheimer.29
Another reason I thought of has to do with the United States as a 
country (and not only because, at the end of World War II, it needed to 
express itself in the language of the victor). The United States became the 
container-country hosting refugee scholars from Europe: sociologists 
spoke the language of the country in which they were welcomed. In 
Germany, sociology was interrupted in 1933 because the best scientific 
minds were exiled and sociology as theoretical appointment was widely 
discredited. Nationalistic German sociology was born, but I will speak of 
this in another place. However, in postwar Germany, sociology proceeded 
only with difficulties.
Finally, there is a pragmatic reason: it is impossible to sip and taste the 
sociology of any country, after World War II, in any language. It is an ency-
clopedic work, for now, a scholarly prodigy. This reduction, on the basis of 
the language, is guided by a goal: that this new history of sociology, now, 
deserves to be made available and exposed to academic public. In my opinion, 
it is more worthwhile to show the results of my historical  interpretation of 
the status of the sociology, that is, it is not appropriate to speak of an absolute 
silence of sociology in dealing with the Holocaust or to state that the socio-
logical discipline was on delay in addressing the destruction of the Jews.
Rather, I will attempt to demonstrate that the indifference or disin-
terest argued openly since 1989 by the academic field of sociology 
was—as the reader will see later—implicitly or explicitly “prepared”: in 
the academic realm, there were conditions to expel this topic from the 
research agenda.
29 I personally thank Martin Oppenheimer for having recommended to me this study: Sven 
Papcke and Martin Oppenheimer, “Value-Free Sociology: Design for Disaster German 
Social Science from Reich to Federal Republic,” Humanity & Society 8, no. 3 (1984): 272–82. 
Martin Oppenheimer, e-mail message to author, May 31, 2011.
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Chronology
The chronological approach I have adopted for this volume is an attempt 
to better address the facts and to allow the reader to comprehend more 
thoroughly what exactly happened when. This will help the reader with a 
preparatory account leading to the alleged delay of sociology. It will be 
useful to focus attention on sociological traditions (such as the Chicago 
School of Everett C. Hughes) and on how sociology evolved, specialized, 
and differentiated. This is the reason I will touch on the initial interest for 
sociology in “evolutionary theory” and the “economic determinism” 
popular in Europe until the 1980s, American functionalism (debated in 
the 1940s–60s), and the rising partitioning of sociology: as the reader will 
note, it helps to comprehend the context in which the alleged delay was 
rooted.30 I will also touch on the period at the end of the Vietnam War, 
when the legacy of American ameliorism of the early twentieth century—
of which the traces were still strong in 1950s and 60s—and the easy 
consensus in quantitative sociology had come to an end, while theoretical 
and permanent divides arose in the discipline. (There was a decline in 
general theory-building, and a lot of theory-building grew within special-
ties, even if communication among these specialties was lacking, which 
process gave rise to “national methodological preferences,” a continuous 
development locally and temporarily in sociology.)31
This book intends to be just the start of a long research work that 
could be an innovative study in analyzing the sociology of any country 
after the end of World War II: step-by-step, year after year, department by 
department. It wouldn’t be difficult to imagine that sociologists would 
take an interest in this new approach: one that would review French 
sociology, for example, and thus examine which institutions supported 
which research after World War II in France, and which authors wrote on 
the Holocaust. The Polish Academy of Sciences could use this approach, 
or German and Israeli sociology after the Congo crisis in 1960s. Or even 
the sociology in Japan that replaced the earlier philosophical approach 
30 Robert E. L. Faris and William Form, “Sociology,” Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 1–4, 
accessed September 1, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/topic/sociology.
31 Ibid., 8.
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with an empirical research method, or industrial sociology at the end of 
the global conflict. So to speak, it could be of use to any sociological study 
or department across the world. 
This book does not pretend to be exhaustive. It is far from finished; 
rather it hopes to inaugurate and “hug the road” to this kind of strand on 
post-Holocaust sociology. 
Coming back to the timeline, the method of reconstruction of 
events by date allows, one to consider the contextual framework with an 
 interpretative and explanatory clarity. In fact, there is a multiple 
 usefulness in adopting chronological order: by perusing the online 
academic  sociological reviews year by year it is possible to glance at and 
examine who promoted which research project and in which scientific 
reviews. It may monitor how since the 1960s sociology was differenti-
ated and how the editions and publications on the Holocaust increased 
after 1975, when sociology started, as academic discipline, a period of 
segmentation. It can look at when a sociological faculty or the American 
Sociological Society was established, and which arguments were more 
studied (in which country and in which years). As I will attempt to 
demonstrate, a review of these aspects is linked with the aims of this 
book: the origins of the alleged delay. Sociology as discipline is based on, 
depends on, and is built by the scientific reviews and the dissemination 
of works and by the establishment of a faculty at a particular institution. 
It would be very interesting—but this isn’t the right place for it—to 
account for the institution of the Centre for Advanced Study (CAS) in 
Sofia, Bulgaria, since its establishment in 2000: how it was developed 
says a lot about the period of the Cold War and the anti-Semitism still 
present today in Europe.
THE OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
This book results from my doctoral research on sociology with respect to 
the destruction of the Jews from 1933 to the present day. It comprises four 
chapters: Chapter 1, “Sociological Thinking about the Holocaust in the 
Postwar Years, 1945–1960s,” focuses the reader’s attention on a very crucial 
time: the end of the war and the beginning of the Cold War. The chapter 
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will explain how scholars acquainted with sociological tools attempted to 
comprehend just what happened, namely, the destruction of a nation, the 
Jews. Chapter 2, “The Destruction of the Jews in a Sociological Perspective 
during the 1970s,” deals with sociological works written during the 1970s, 
the historical environment in which they were conceived, and the authors 
who were devoted to this theme. A particular focus is on the sociological 
tools they adopted. Chapter 3, “Toward a Sociology of Genocide, 1980–
1989,” addresses post-Holocaust sociology and its noteworthy, 
ever-increasing production in the 1980s. The Chapter 4, “The Problem of 
the Holocaust after 1989,” is rightly dedicated to analyzing post-Holocaust 
sociology after the fall of communism and upon the opening of the secret 
archives in the territories of the former Soviet Union.
Chapter 1. I outline sociological studies related to the Holocaust and 
conducted during and soon after World War II, but, unfortunately, they 
were few. An exception is the open case of Talcott Parsons. I will sketch his 
interest in the Jewish question from his sociological writings related to the 
destruction of the Jews to the silent years after 1948. I will explain the 
academic and cultural circumstances in which sociological researches 
related to the Holocaust formed and the difficulties of different types that 
faced scholars approaching the Jewish question from the end of the war 
until the 1960s, when a turning point took place in the discipline of 
sociology and more sociology scholars started to address specific aspects 
of the destruction of the Jews. I will try to illustrate the reasons why during 
the 1960s scholars were becoming more sensitive to the Holocaust, which 
had been invisible to most intellectuals, and why authors had delayed the 
publication of their works until such a late date. A series of political and 
cultural events (for example, the Six-Day War) will be recalled along with 
some traditions of thought that affected sociology in approaching the 
theme. This chapter aims at illustrating where the alleged delay of sociology 
took root and how academic sociology legitimized the delay. 
These are works whose sociological outlines and concepts—such as 
anti-Semitism, mass ideology, and the banality of evil—even if they 
seem to return in other writings of the Holocaust, present a crucial 
difference between them, a difference apparent on every page. These are 
the studies of the Frankfurt School, Parsons’s writings, the researches by 
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Edward A. Shils and Morris Janovitz related to the Wehrmacht in World 
War II and the study on the NSDAP by Seymour Lipset. Also, the 
conceptual link of totalitarian power seems to bind these writings 
together. Special attention is given to the eight-page essay “Good People 
and Dirty Work” by Everett C. Hughes on the banality of evil. With this 
essay, the sociological  tradition of Chicago School enters into post-Ho-
locaust sociology. Written in 1948, the study was published in 1962, the 
year in which Hannah Arendt prepared her report on the Adolf 
Eichmann trial as a correspondent for The New Yorker, which appeared 
in the magazine in February and March 1963. I will explain how the Jews 
became a social problem by consensus and the difficulties faced by 
sociologists in addressing the Jewish question and publishing Jewish 
works in the postwar years, when intellectuals were strongly influenced 
by the power balance of the Cold War.
Chapter 2. I describe how important the rethinking of post-Holocaust 
 sociology was in the 1970s: especially in the years that the Yom Kippur 
War influenced events and thinking. I will try to explain how the legacy of 
the Six-Day War endured and how echoes were still heard of “The 
Commanding Voice of Auschwitz” by Emil L. Fackenheim:
When at Jerusalem in 1967 the threat of total annihilation gave way 
to sudden salvation it was because of Auschwitz, not in spite of it, 
that there was an abiding astonishment. Nothing of the past was 
explained or adjusted, no fears for the future were stilled. Yet the 
very clash between Auschwitz and Jerusalem produced a moment 
of truth—a wonder at a singled out, millennial existence which, 
after Auschwitz, is still possible and actual.32
I hope to illustrate how in little less than a decade the situation changed: the 
focus on the Jewish question gradually grew as if there was a kind of awak-
ening in sociology. I will present the works characterizing this period, their 
32 Emil L. Fackenheim, God’s Presence in History: Jewish Affirmations and Philosophical 
Reflections (New York: New York University Press, London: University of London Press, 
1970), 95–96.
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common thread, the analytical categories adopted by scholars, and the impact 
on scholarship. Notable will be the sociological analysis of the concentration 
and death camp Auschwitz-Birkenau elaborated by Anna Pawełczyńska: a 
noteworthy work for her original concept of hodological space of Auschwitz 
and for her new conception of resistance, conceived by her in a period in 
which “resistance” in Holocaust Studies was a theme not yet much explored 
or addressed, especially in the literature related to the camps. 
In this chapter, I also outline the original thesis, for social sciences, of 
Celia Heller: in 1977 she unearthed that at the base of genocide of the Jews 
in Poland there was Polish nationalism and anti-Semitism, an important 
thesis that in 2001 would strongly emerge in Neighbors by the historian Jan 
T. Gross.33 Moreover, the reader’s attention will be focused on what 
Barrington Moore means by “surrender to moral authority” in dealing 
with the Jewish question.
Finally, the second chapter will examine Accounting for Genocide, the 
most comprehensive sociological work, even to this day, conceived with 
statistical data. Published by Helen Fein in 1979 and based on crucial 
sociological categories (national anti-Semitism, Nazi control), it deserves 
to be considered post-Holocaust sociology. However, this volume did not 
receive the same plaudits in the academic realm that Modernity and 
obtained in 1989. I will attempt to explain why.
Chapter 3. This chapter addresses the sociological orientation adopted 
by scholars in the nine years before the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989. I will 
outline the sociological shift that characterized sociology in addressing the 
extermination of the Jews in the early 1980s. These years essentially featured 
a noteworthy and ever-increasing production that has to be linked with 
increased and overall attention for what was happening contemporarily in 
several countries on the African continent. The event termed “genocide” 
becomes an analytic tool: I describe how, starting from and around the 
concept or the definition of genocide, a series of sociological writings 
aiming at investigating the extermination of the Jews developed. I hope to 
show how in these years post-Holocaust sociology developed by starting 
33 See Jan T. Gross, Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jews Community in Jedwabne (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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from the juridical definitions of “genocide” and “state.” I will explain how 
authors used the juridical notion of genocide in a sociological way to 
explain the Holocaust. I will also attempt to demonstrate that these scholars 
were active politicians or had a big role in political life of their countries. 
Thus, it is possible to say that Holocaust Studies in these nine years, from 
1980 to 1989, can be labeled more properly as “genocide sociological studies.” 
It will be my intention to put in evidence how some scholars, such Leo 
Kuper and Irving L. Horowitz, acquainted themselves with juridical 
sciences and recognized the centrality of the political dimension following 
a multidisciplinary conference on the Holocaust and genocide in 1982, and 
thus helped to define the concept of “state-sponsored genocide.” These 
scholars contributed to delineating a sociology of genocide or, in other 
words, to defining a sociology of the genocidal state. It follows that these 
studies will affect the political scene, in the sense that several government 
policies will be taken into account with respect to their agenda. These works 
find manifestation in Wolfgang Sofsky’s later work. 
I also aim to trace the sociological frame outlined by Katz, who 
 individuates the “routinization” and the “bureaucratization” phases in 
the extermination of the Jews and the role of Einsatzgruppen and the 
reproposition of banality of evil. 
Additionally, the focus will be on the sociological categories adopted 
by Nechama Tec, who presented her post-Holocaust sociology in 1982 
with her own personal history, Dry Tears, and up through Defiance in 
1993. I illustrate how in her long sociological path she considers basics 
elements of Holocaust Studies (such as Polish nationalism, anti-Semitism, 
resistance, rescuers, survivors, bystanders) and uses tools typical of 
sociology (statistical data, survivors interviews), showing the need of a 
dialogue between sociology and history.
Finally, I will discuss Modernity and the Holocaust by Bauman. I retrace 
his formation, the English exile period, starting in 1968, and how it was 
decisive in his recognition of the negative consequences of anti-Semitism 
in Poland and the recognition of human suffering. This latter becomes, for 
the author, an indispensable sociological notion for analyzing several 
problems of society. The concept of human suffering was studied and 
 classified into four types according to four specific historical periods. For 
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Bauman, at the base of his works there is human suffering. However, I will 
attempt to explain why Bauman, who was a victim of Polish anti- Semitism, 
chose to explain the destruction of the Jews not by referring to this but 
through the category of modernity. This is my open question.
Chapter 4. This chapter is longer than the others because almost 
twenty-five years of post-Holocaust sociology are scrutinized—from 1990 
to the present day. I focus first and foremost on the news and novelties 
sociology dealt with and on the issues the discipline had to confront. 
I especially outline how the era of globalization and the sociological 
 categories related to it changed the sociological approach towards the 
Holocaust, prompting Holocaust Studies and sociology itself into a sort of 
renewal. It will be clearer in the works of Daniel Levy, Natan Sznaider, and 
Jeffrey Alexander. At the same time, it will be demonstrated that since 
1990 the topic of the Holocaust has been approached in different ways, 
with the result of crossing the theme with other, unexpected, categories 
(such as those of gender, collective memory, and collective action) and 
with different issues (such as migration in Israel and the experience of the 
second-generation survivors). I attempt to illustrate how these mixings 
create some confusion in distinguishing the writings proper to the 
Holocaust from those related to affiliated themes and how the introducing 
of the category of gender in these studies brought some innovation to the 
research.
I also trace the passage from collective national memory to cosmo-
politan memory in Holocaust sociology during the age of globalization. 
The conception of the Holocaust in modern society will be confronted 
with the conception of the Holocaust in the new global society, where it 
becomes a “moral touchstone”—a global icon of evil—in a period in which 
everything changes. 
Finally, I outline how Rachel L. Einwohner updates sociological 
studies of the Holocaust thanks to a new conception of the Jewish resis-
tance as social movement. I will focus attention on her three comparative 
cases studies. What has been hitherto lacking is the effort to draw out 
these sociological researches into a synthetic and comprehensive descrip-
tion. It is this mission the present book aims so far as possible to fulfill. I 
hope that through the use of sociology and history I will help render the 
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Holocaust more comprehensible and explain the “sociological delay.” We 
can say that this delay had real and concrete roots.
I will attempt to demonstrate how the alleged delay of sociology was 
rooted in the cultural realm of sociology, or found its raison d’être in its own 
historical development as a discipline, namely, when it set itself apart from 
moral philosophy and evolved into a specialized academic discipline. 
We can see this in sociology in the United States, where the legacy of 
biologism and industrial scientific progress of the early 1920s was 
continuing to endure in the postwar years. 
In covering aspects ranging from the Social Gospel to the Cold War 
by the way of World War II, I will attempt to demonstrate the following: 
(1) it is not appropriate to speak of a “delay of sociology” (and if it is, it has 
to be called a “desired” delay); (2) it is not appropriate to say that since 
1989 the Holocaust has a been a subject of sustained research in sociology; 
(3) it is not appropriate to state that there were not scholarly works written 
related to the Holocaust in the postwar years.
In other words, I hope to help to show that a reassessment of post- 
Holocaust sociology is useful, necessary, and fertile; to start to demolish 
the common misconception that sociology has delayed the study of the 
destruction of the Jews; and, finally, to readdress some of major lines of 
interpretation of important scholars and to encourage more systematic 
research in the future.
Finally, this book illustrates another aspect: how the sociology of the 
Holocaust can be integrated into the discussion of historians. That 
sociology and history were academic disciplines not in close dialogue 
with each other on this topic over these years is evidenced by that fact 
that Holocaust sociology seems not to be affected by the four main 
strands of historiography of the Holocaust: functionalism-structuralism, 
intentionalism, Freiburg School, and recent theories of Otto Dov Kulka 
and Ian Kershaw. Most sociological works seem to handle the Holocaust 
separately. Obviously, there are some exceptions: for instance, Fein was 
affected by Hilberg’s groundbreaking work, The Destruction of the 
European Jews, and by the intentionalist Lucy S. Dawidowicz, in 1975, with 
her The War against The Jews, 1933–1945. But these are special cases. 
Actually, by analyzing any of these sociological works, it is possible for the 
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reader, working backwards, to find traces and references of intentionalism 
or intentionalist theories; however, it is work that the reader can only do a 
posteriori. At any rate, this approach is possible starting from the 1960s, 
when the first publication of Hilberg’s work inaugurated the history of the 
Holocaust and when history as a discipline started to approach the theme. 
This happened because history at first analyzed the event starting from 
perpetrator documents—Nazi papers in German archives, writings of the 
Third Reich, or collections of sources scattered in many different languages 
across Europe—and the main aim was that of preparing the Nuremberg 
case and other cases against Nazi criminal wars. The attention was not 
focused on the victims, but on the perpetrators. This approach led, 
 erroneously, to the idea that only history as academic discipline—by its 
appropriate devices and methods—was able to study and examine the 
Holocaust. It was shaping the event in scholars’ minds. And for many 
years studies on the Holocaust saw the prevalence of historical disciplines, 
even monopolization by historians.34 But, as I’ll attempt to demonstrate 
in this book, several sociologists approached the theme apart from 
historians. Even if I have tried to outline to the best of my possibilities the 
historical and sociological approach, I believe that more than one reader 
will disagree with my assessments or interpretation. I apologize if some-
times, in analyzing the works of individual authors, one has the impression 
of getting lost in sociological devices and explanations. However, this 
method seems to be the most appropriate. In order to test my thesis, it will 
be necessary to enter specifically and singularly into these writings. I aim 
at opening the scholarly mind to debate, and not only to satisfy an intel-
lectual curiosity but also with the goal of continuing the research on what 
happened. And I hope I hit the target.
34 See notes 3 and 5, below (chapter 1).
CHAPTER 1
Sociological Thinking about  
the Holocaust in the Postwar 
Years, 1945–1960s
I heard the Brown Shirts in the streets of Nuremberg in 1930 singing, “The German 
youth is never so happy as when Jewish blood spurts from his knife”; I wrote “Good 
People and Dirty Work” and used it as a special lecture at McGill University where in 




After the end of World War II, when worldwide society came to terms 
with modern civilization, which involved the extermination of inferior 
races, change seemed to happen fast. Nevertheless, a small number of 
scholars or politicians considered the extermination of the Jews as the 
event that, for a variety of factors, transformed the contemporary world: it 
took more than thirty years for the world to become aware of what had 
happened. Social sciences are well suited to describing makeovers of a 
society. In outlining these various sciences all definitions are ideal types, 
and it seems quite impossible to find a completely exhaustive description. 
These sciences investigate the fundamentals, representative manifestations 
of social life, aspects, processes, and structures of social organization. 
Social sciences are all those disciplines with objectives, different areas of 
research, peculiar and specific analysis tools, often complementary, which, 
although having a similar methodological and epistemological horizon as 
background, do not end in a unitary and equal theory.1
 1 Cf. Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper, eds., The Social Science Encyclopedia (London: 
Routledge, 1985), 784; Raymond Boudon and François Bourricaud, “Storia e Sociologia,” in 
Dizionario critico di sociologia, ed. Lorenzo Infantino (Rome: Armando, 1991), 488–95.
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At the end of World War II, although it was difficult to account for, as 
precisely as possible, the complex chain of events that had recently taken 
place, nevertheless, it was necessary to analyze what had occurred. How 
had modern society come to the extermination of the Jews? A set of 
 historical-political situations and strange cultural contingencies led some 
intellectuals to reflect on the experience, touched as they were by the 
 totalitarian Nazi regime, and they were forced to flee Germany and go into 
exile, were direct witnesses of the Nazi massacres, or were Holocaust 
 survivors.2 To examine how these social scientists approached the Jewish 
question and, particularly, the Holocaust after the war, means to analyze 
the procedures and devices through which modern liberal society becomes 
the mirror of a state that has removed moral responsibility from the 
 individual, which places among its projects genocide. Following the insight 
of Maurice Duverger, who considers the social sciences as the study of 
social phenomena in the broadest sense, it may be good to review the ways 
in which these disciplines and scholars have reacted to the  extermination 
of the Jews of Europe. On the basis of (especially) German sources, these 
researchers, convinced that the story of the destruction of European Jewry 
goes through the writings of the Nazi state, focused on the responsibility of 
the perpetrators of the genocide and the way in which the National Socialist 
state came to the annihilation of the Jews of Europe.3 This historical study 
prospective concerned with perpetrators and the German state was 
reflected in the post-Holocaust sociology of the 1950s and 60s, which is 
evident in “The Gleichshaltung” by Hughes (1955) or in Lipset’s work of 
1960.4 Historical attention to the victims, starting symbolically with 
While Six Million Died, in 1967, is rather visible in sociological works of the 
 2 See Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali.
 3 See Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 
1939–1945 (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1953); Joseph Tenenbaum, Race and Reich: The 
Story of an Epoch (New York: Twayne, 1956); Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews; 
Maurice Duverger, I Metodi delle Scienze Sociali (Milan: Etas Kompass, 1967); Karl A. 
Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy toward German Jews, 1933–1939 
(Urbana–Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1970); Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik 
im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1972); Léon Poliakov, Histoire de l’antisémitisme, Vol. 
4: L’Europe suicidaire (1870–1933) (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1977).
 4 Everett C. Hughes, “The Gleichshaltung of the German Statistical Yearbook,” The 
American Statistician 9, no. 5 (1955): 8–11, accessed March 2, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/
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1970s:5 especially in Fein—as one will see—who dedicates a part of her 
Accounting for Genocide to the victims. The founding researches of Léon 
Poliakov, Gerald Reitlinger, and Raul Hilberg, in 1950s to the 1970s, were 
followed by a phase in which historians were more oriented towards 
specific issues and ran the risk of losing sight of the overall context of the 
events. Only in the last two decades has there been a revival of research on 
global dimensions.6 
Here I will not analytically address post-Holocaust historiography: 
this is not my aim; instead I am going to attempt to explore if and how 
post-Holocaust sociological studies were confronted (or not confronted) in 
the postwar period with historical works, since documents in archives and 
collections of sources, scattered across Europe, were mostly monopolized 
by historians. I will briefly focus attention on the historiographical debate, 
within which it is possible to distinguish four research strands, as Yehuda 
Bauer notes in his Rethinking the Holocaust. 
First, the functionalist theory, according to which the Nazi policy of 
annihilation was a mechanism by discontinuous and irregular rhythms 
dictated by a system that moved independently of the people and their 
ideas. The functionalists, called also structuralists, focus on the social and 
economic structures of German society, the mechanism of the regime 
stable/2685502; Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday, 1960).
 5 Cf. Philip Friedman, Their Brothers’ Keepers: The Christian Heroes and Heroines Who Helped 
the Oppressed Escape the Nazi Terror (New York: Crown, 1957); Arthur D. Morse, While Six 
Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy (New York: Random House, 1967); David S. 
Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938–1941 (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1968); Jacob Presser, The Destruction of the Dutch Jews (New York: 
Dutton, 1969); Isaiah Trunk, Judenrat: The Jewish Councils in Eastern Europe under Nazi 
Occupation (New York: Macmillan, 1972); Ari J. Sherman, Island Refugee: Britain and 
Refugees from the Third Reich, 1933–1939 (London: Elek, 1973); Bernard Wasserstein, Britain 
and the Jews of Europe, 1939–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979); Michael R. Marrus and 
Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (New York: Basic Books, 1981); Israel Gutman, 
The Jews of Warsaw, 1939–1943: Ghetto, Underground, Revolt (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1982); Dina Porat, The Blue and the Yellow Star of David: The Zionist 
Leadership in Palestine and the Holocaust, 1939–1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1990).
 6 See Saul Friedländer, The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution 
(Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1995); Yehuda Bauer, Rethinking the 
Holocaust (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).
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machine, on bureaucracy, whose actions are dependent on the objectives 
to be achieved. In this respect, Dan Diner speaks of “a methodological 
retreat into the description of structures.”7 Economic, political, and social 
crises are put at the center of reflection. These crises, starting from the 
last decades of the nineteenth century, transformed Germany into an 
authoritarian regime with a dictator acting as an arbiter between the 
power centers in a struggle between them. Genocide is conceived of as an 
unexpected result. If, on the one hand, functionalism denounces the 
rivalry between different authorities, then, on the other, it emphasizes 
how personal power is established in a cultural context imbued with 
racism and anti-Semitism. According to some of its greatest exponents, 
such as Hans Mommsen, Götz H. Aly, and Karl A. Schleunes, a decisive 
role in the extermination was carried out by the bureaucratic apparatus, 
while political structures and, consequently, the ideology and decisions of 
central government played a most marginal part.8 
Instead, the intentionalist school considers the Nazi anti-Jewish 
policy in a linear manner: by stressing the ideology of the Aryan race and 
the role of the dictatorship. For Eberhard Jäckel, Helmut Krausnick, 
Gerald Fleming, and Lucy Dawidowicz, decisional and intentional factors 
of the central government (personified by Hitler) were essential in the 
extermination of the Jews and Jewry.9 Intentionalist scholars especially 
argue the centrality of Hitler in the anti-Jewish policy of extermination 
and his almost divine role compared with that of the other Nazi leaders. 
The tension between both historiographical schools is clear, and they 
seem to have been superseded by the Freiburg School, for which ideology 
and local collaboration were the main analytical and explanatory keys of 
 7 See Dan Diner, Beyond the Conceivable: Studies on Germany, Nazism, and the Holocaust 
(Berkeley: California University Press, 2000), 165.
 8 See Hans Mommsen, Auschwitz, 17. Juli 1942: Der Weg zur europäischen “Endlösung der 
Judenfrage” (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2002); Götz H. Aly, Hitler’s Beneficiaries: 
Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State (New York: Henry Holt, 2005).
 9 Cf. Helmut Krausnick, “Judenverfolgung,” in Anatomie des SS-Staates, band 2, ed. Hans 
Buchheim et al. (Olten; Freiburg: Walter, 1965), 338–55; Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler’s 
Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1972); 
Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War against the Jews, 1933–1945 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1975); Gerald Fleming, Hitler und die Endlösung (Wiesbaden: Limes, 1982).
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the genocide. Ulrich Herbert, the greatest supporter of this viewpoint 
currently, has studied, along with Christian Gerlach, Dieter Pohl, and 
Michael Zimmermann, the mass killings perpetrated on local initiative 
between the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 in Belarus, Lithuania, in 
eastern Galicia, and in the general government.10 For these authors, behind 
the extermination campaigns carried out for economic reasons (to get rid 
of superfluous mouths to feed) or political-demographic motivations (to 
search for new settlements for German and Polish nationals), there was an 
ideological substratum, powered by an anti-Semitic intelligentsia, who 
considered the projects of the Nazi elite as normal. The transfer of entire 
populations, in the specific case of the Jews, constituted for the central and 
peripheral authorities, always coordinated with each other in the times 
and methods, a major goal in order to obtain a living space in which to 
extend their own national hegemony. In this regard, as Bauer remembers, 
Herbert refers to the continuous communication between Berlin and the 
periphery.11 
Finally, it is relevant to mention the studies of Otto Dov Kulka and Ian 
Kershaw12 to explain which role, especially for Kershaw and the sociologist 
Peter Merkl, anti-Semitism played in extermination: their research shows 
how a high percentage of members of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 
Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP), and a large segment of the German population, 
was not radically anti-Semitic. Rather there were moderate feelings of 
discomfort towards the Jews.13 In its propaganda, the NSDAP never really 
10 See Dieter Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 1941–1944: Organisation 
und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996); Michael 
Zimmermann, Rassenutopie und Genozid: Die nationalsozialistische “Lösung der Zigeunerfrage” 
(Hamburg: Christians, 1996); Christian Gerlach, Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord: Forschungen 
zur deutschen Vernichtungspolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 
1998); Ulrich Herbert, hrsg., Nationalsozialistische Vernichtungspolitik, 1939–1945: Neue 
Forschungen und Kontroversen (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1998). 
11 Cf. Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust.
12 Ian Kershaw, Der Hitler-Mythos: Volksmeinung und Propaganda im Dritten Reich (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1980); Otto Dov Kulka and Eberhard Jäckel, eds., The Jews in the 
Secret Nazi Reports on Popular Opinion in Germany, 1933–1945 (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2010).
13 Cf. Peter H. Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1975).
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pushed the theme of anti-Semitism: its program points were mass 
 unemployment, social and economic crisis, and the defeat of Germany 
during the Great War. But all of these points were in conformity with a 
moderate anti-Semitic spirit present in public opinion, and that had as its 
outcome the removal of the Jews from their economic and political positions. 
Hitler mostly affected false intellectuals or intellectuals of lower rank, namely, 
teachers, students, lawyers, but also Protestant pastors, engineers, soldiers, 
and aristocrats, who, after 1918, found themselves sharing the same social and 
political disappointments. Moved by resentment and eager to occupy the 
positions of the Jews, they saw the NSDAP as a remedy for social diseases. 
What attracted them was the thought that Aryan people could ensure safety 
and be at the center of a global empire.14 
To complete this broad overview, it is proper to remember that several 
sociological writings, in 1960s, were affected by the theological and philo-
sophical reflections of Emil L. Fackenheim and Richard L. Rubinstein.15 The 
elevation of the genocide of the Jews to the rank of metaphysical category 
makes the Holocaust an event that, surpassing human understanding, 
cannot be compared with other historical events.16 Additionally, the 
conceptual category of genocide (typical of the discipline of anthropology) 
plays a sizable role: the literature emerging has allowed the comparison of 
the Holocaust and other genocidal types in history, making it an easier 
event to understand. As Bauer recalls in Rethinking the Holocaust, the 
difference should not be seen in terms of suffering, as suffering cannot be 
measured (namely, there are no differences in terms of numbers, either in 
14 Cf. Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust.
15 Cf. James E. Dittes, review of Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism, by Charles Y. Glock and 
Rodney Stark, Review of Religious Research 8, no. 3 (1967): 183–87; Richard L. Rubenstein, 
The Cunning of History: The Holocaust and the American Future (New York: Harper 
Colophon: 1978); Rubenstein, “Was Dietrich Bonhoeffer a ‘Righteous Gentile’?” International 
Journal on World Peace 17, no. 2 (2000): 33–46; Emil L. Fackenheim, “Jewish Faith and the 
Holocaust: A Fragment,” Commentary, August 1, (1968): 30–36; Fackenheim, Quest for 
Past and Future (Boston: Beacon, 1968); Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and 
Perspectives of Interpretation (London: Edward Arnold, 1985); Hans Jonas, Der Gottesbegriff 
nach Auschwitz: Eine jüdische Stimme (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987); Sebastian Rejak, 
“Judaism Facing the Shoah: American Debates an Interpretations,” Dialogue & Universalism 
13, no. 3/4, (2003): 81–102.
16 See Enzo Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence (New York: The New Press, 2003), 1–12.
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absolute or in percentage), but rather one should understand the causes, 
factors, and procedures separately.17 For an improved comprehension of 
the Holocaust, as total and unique genocide, the science of and on crime 
has contributed since the 1990s.18
It is important enough to remember in which works, for Porter, 
emerged the relevance of sociology or of sociological tools in understanding 
the Holocaust: especially from Rubenstein’s and Hilberg’s studies,19 in which 
a historian and a theologian find fruitful concepts, such as modernity, 
bureaucracy, and authority, in Max Weber’s sociology.20 At this point, one 
may ask if sociology really ignored notions such as the totalitarian regime, 
extermination camps, authority, responsibility, resistance, and so on, and 
reread the Holocaust themes in postwar sociology, which means “sieving 
sociological studies.”21 A review of the thesis supporting the delay of 
sociology in the studying of the Holocaust appears to be indispensable, 
given that, since the rise of Hitler to power, several intellectuals started to 
17 Cf. Christian P. Scherrer, “Towards a Theory of Modern Genocide: Comparative Genocide 
Research: Definitions, Criteria, Typologies, Cases, Key Elements, Patterns and Voids,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 1, no. 1 (1999): 13–23, doi:10.1080/14623529908413932; Stephen 
C. Feinstein, “Art of the Holocaust and Genocide: Some Points of Convergence,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 1, no. 2 (1999): 233–55, doi:10.1080/14623529908413953; Gunnar 
Heinsohn, “What Makes the Holocaust a Uniquely Unique Genocide?” Journal of Genocide 
Research 2, no. 3 (2000): 411–30; Zygmunt Bauman, “Categorical Murder, or: How to 
Remember the Holocaust,” in Re-presenting the Shoah for the Twenty-first Century, ed. 
Ronit Lentin (New York: Berghahn, 2004), 25–40.
18 See Irving L. Horowitz, Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction, 1982); Ryan D. King and William I. Brustein, “A Political Threat Model of 
Intergroup Violence: Jews in Pre–World War II Germany,” Criminology 44, no. 4 (2006): 
867–91, doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.2006.00066.x; Andrew Woolford, “Making Genocide 
Unthinkable: Three Guidelines for a Critical Criminology of Genocide,” Critical 
Criminology, 14 (2006): 87–106, doi:10.1007/s10612-005-3197-7.
19 Cf. Rapaport, review of Sociology Confronts the Holocaust, 1794–96; Rubenstein, The 
Cunning of History; Benno W. Varon, Professions of a Lucky Jew (New York: Cornwall, 1992); 
Porter, “The Holocaust as a Sociological Construct,” 184.
20 See Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978).
21 The expression recalls the metaphor “sieve the history” by Walter Benjamin, used by 
Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 9, 40n1. See Piotr Sztompka, “The Renaissance of 
Historical Orientation in Sociology,” International Sociology 1, no. 3 (1986): 321–37, 
doi:10.1177/026858098600100308; Barbara Engelking, “Reflections on the Subject of Polish-
Jewish Relations during World II,” Polish Sociological Review 137 (2002): 103–7.
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reflect on the crisis of the liberal state in Europe. In accordance with Hilberg 
and Cesarani, the Holocaust actually started in the 1930s with anti-Jewish 
measures. The intellectuals in question were mainly European scholars 
who, forced to leave Germany in 1933, took refuge in the United States. 
Their works, of great interest for analyzing the structure of the National 
Socialist Party, trace the deterioration of liberal values pursuant to the advent 
of National Socialism. Among the works dealing with the promulgation of 
the Nuremberg racial laws, defining fascism, are the researches of the 
Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt. For instance, linking fascism and 
anti-Semitism is Max Horkheimer, while Otto Kirchheimer is distinguished 
for the fact that, in analyzing Nazi criminal law, he suggests two phases in 
legal theory after 1933: one authoritarian and one racist.22 
As concerns concepts like responsibility, democracy, or the banality 
of evil, it is useful to evoke Morris Janowitz’s investigations into the 
Secret Service: from his hundreds of interviews, it emerged that German 
respondents, “aware of the existence” of the concentration camps, “denied 
knowing” what was happening or deviating from their responsibility—
Janowitz reported this in 1946!23 
22 After the Nazi power conquest in Germany in 1933, the Institute was closed for “tendencies 
hostile to the State.” The members of the Frankfurt School—the most famous were Max 
Horkheimer, director from 1931, Theodor L. W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, 
Friedrich Pollock, Leo Lowenthal, and Walter Benjamin—all emigrated to the United 
States, with the exception of the last, who did not leave Europe, but committed suicide in 
1940 while attempting to cross the border between occupied France and Spain; see Max 
Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse, Studien über Autorität und Familie: 
Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1936); Max 
Horkheimer, “Die Juden und Europa,” Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 8, no. 1/2 (1939):115–
37; Otto Kirchheimer, “Criminal Law in National Socialist Germany,” Studies in Philosophy 
and Social Sciences 8, no. 3 (1939), 444–63; W. Rex Crawford, ed., The Cultural Migration: 
The European Scholar in America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953); 
Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute 
of Social Research, 1923–1950 (London: Heinemann, 1973); H. Stuart Hughes, The Sea 
Change: The Migration of Social Thought, 1930–1965 (New York: Harper & Row, 1975); Lewis 
A. Coser, Refugee Scholars in America: Their Impact and Their Experience (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1984); Max Horkheimer and Th. L. W. Adorno, eds., Lezioni di socio-
logia (Turin: Einaudi, 2001 [1956]).
23 See Rudolph Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism: A Regional Case Study on Political 
Parties in Germany (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945); Morris Janowitz, 
“German Reactions to Nazi Atrocities,” American Journal of Sociology 52, no. 2 (1946): 
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1.2. A TOTALITARIAN ORDER
Studying how sociology approached the Holocaust at the end of the World 
War II means to fathom the reaction of intellectuals faced with the 
 genocide of the Jews at a fairly crucial time, not too distant from the events 
from which echoed the dimensions of the Cold War that was to govern 
international relations.24 
When World War II ended, very few people cared about the genocide 
of the Jews: about a destruction process initiated with administrative 
devices, with a definition by decree in April 1933. (As Hilberg states, the 
destruction process starts with the “definition,” which is then implemented 
by a series of decrees). The Holocaust did not occupy an essential position; 
on the contrary, it was secondary in the culture and reality of the postwar 
period, marked by socioeconomic transformations, new definitions of 
boundaries, and regime changes. The legacy of an enduring anti-Semitism 
weighed heavily on this indifference or silence. This is rather evident in the 
field of sociological studies. Retrieving the first attempts to study the 
Holocaust involves searching for exceptions, extra-ordine works: above the 
ordinary, beyond the obvious inconvenience of facing similar issues. It is 
not uncommon to encounter sociologists who faced difficulty in the study 
of the problem and were forced to delay the publication of their research.25 
By the end of the war and throughout the 1950s, one can distinguish 
a period characterized by only a few works, almost all of which dealt with 
the themes of German fascism or militarism or political and ideological 
components of the German state. A turning point came during the 1960s 
when research on specific aspects of the extermination of the Jews 
increased. In this period, especially in the 1960s, more social scientists 
started to become sensitive to this event, which was invisible to the 
majority of intellectuals or, better, more scholars approached the theme 
141–46, doi: 10.1086/219961; Jessie Bernard, American Community Behavior (New York: 
Dryden, 1949); Gerson and Wolf, Sociology Confronts the Holocaust, 14.
24 Cf. Nigel West, Venona: The Greatest Secret of the Cold War (London: HarperCollins, 1999); 
Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 9; Salvatore Zappalà, La tutela internazionale dei 
diritti umani: Tra sovranità degli Stati e governo mondiale (Bologna: il Mulino, 2011), 40. 
25 See Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 9–48.
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with fewer difficulties. To pave the way to this was the Russell–Einstein 
Manifesto, introduced in London on July 9, 1955, by some leading scien-
tists: among them, Einstein and Russell, who, in the center of the Cold 
War, begged the world to avoid more destruction. This meant that several 
sociologists  identified the problem, analyzed it with sociological tools, 
and spread publicly results from their research. It happened because a set 
of events (of cultural order and within the academy) and other factors, 
such as public international policies, were changing. In other words, a 
succession of circumstances allowed it to occur.
At the center of these sociological works, one can find the categories 
of anti-Semitism, mass ideology, social movement, and the banality of 
evil. The greatest innovation that scholarship reached was exactly the 
combination of these concepts with the reality of the concentration camp 
system: it signified that their researches investigated how ordinary or 
good people contributed to the reality of the totalitarian system. 
Among the noteworthy contributions of this period are works by the 
Frankfurt School, Talcott Parsons, Edward A. Shils and Morris Janovitz, 
Seymour M. Lipset, and Everett C. Hughes. What these scholars demanded 
is roughly as follows: What reasons led good people to consent to the 
policy of National Socialist racial hygiene? New interpretations were kick-
started by the Eichmann trial in Israel.26 That is an important theme and it 
is crucial for seeing how quickly the effects triggered by the decision of the 
State of Israel to seize and prosecute in Jerusalem one of the most central 
administrators of the extermination morphed into a serious discussion about 
the Holocaust and human justice, both in historical and in sociological 
scholarship. This demonstrates well the fate of a difficult discussion in the 
academy. 
Once again, it is important to consider the international political 
context, which had profoundly changed by the end of the war: there was 
communism on the one hand and capitalism on the other. Hence a series of 
political and economic policies on behalf of one or the other position, and 
the collaboration of the Western scientific community, especially by the 
26 See Antonella Salomoni, “I libri sulla Shoah: Una guida storiografica suddivisa per periodi 
e per temi,” Storicamente 5, no. 23 (2009): 2, accessed October 24, 2009, doi:10.1473/stor200.
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United States, with intelligence services in the fight against communism, a 
collaboration that exclusively procured the publication of research with a 
focus on these issues. Government and private foundations funding 
 universities had a big role in establishing what and who was to be researched 
within academic institutions, which often needed federal and private 
support to conduct their agenda and research programs. Particularly, 
governmental policies had specific aims: since 1945, Western policy 
 prioritized the defeat of communism. Other topics did not receive sufficient 
financial resources to be addressed and be made public; some issues, such as 
the destruction of the Jews, in sociological research, were set aside. During 
this competitive coexistence, there were other interests in that period and 
“in the name of the Cold War,” but the Holocaust as the object of research 
was not among the key interests of academics.27 In all these studies a shared 
element, “the common thread running through them and unites them,” 
revolved around the concept of “totalitarian power” on which the cited 
authors reflect through the categories of “totalitarian order” and “anti- 
Semitic discrimination.”28 According to the classical literature, the term 
“totalitarian state” appears for the first time explicitly in 1939 during a 
“Symposium on the Totalitarian State.” On the occasion, a group of 
American scholars set in place a set of knowledge, economic, and political 
terms against the dangers of this type of regime. During the World War II 
years, however, the term “totalitarianism,” rather than as a historical 
 interpretive category, was stated as an instrument of moral condemnation 
against another regime. But it was in 1951 that the term received a peculiar 
27 See Christopher Simpson, Blowback: The First Full Account of America’s Recruitment of 
Nazis, and Its Disastrous Effect on Our Domestic and Foreign Policy (New York: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1988); Jon Wiener, “Talcott Parsons’ Role Bringing Nazi Sympathizers to the 
U.S.,” The Nation, March 6, 1989, 309; Sigmund Diamond, Compromised Campus: The 
Collaboration of Universities with the Intelligence Community, 1945–1955 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992); Martin Oppenheimer, “To the Editor,” Sociological Forum 12, no. 2 
(1997): 339–41.
28 Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 15. In general, a conceptual outline of the history of 
the category of “totalitarianism” includes a before, which appears in an elaboration of total-
itarianism intertwined with the kind of fascism—of which the totalitarian phenomenon 
would be a variety—and an after, in which the two categories instead are to separate and 
occupy two different disciplines; see Mariuccia Salvati, “Antifascismo e totalitarismo nelle 
scienze sociali tra le due guerre,” Contemporanea 4 (2002): 623–26. Let me thank Tiziana 
Noce for having suggested Salvati’s work.
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definition by political scientist and philosopher Hannah Arendt. With 
Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft, where Herr means “lord” and 
schaft “power,” she examines what “concern[s] a total lordship.” The next 
year, in London, Israeli historian Jacob L. Talmon gave birth to The Origins 
of Totalitarian Democracy. Through Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy 
in 1956, Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski instead represent the 
totalitarian phenomenon as a form of autocracy centered on modern 
 technology and the legitimacy of the masses:29
The history of the concepts—as J. Petersen recalled in his ground-
breaking paper of 1975 referring back to Begriffsgeschichte initiated 
by Koselleck in Germany—is an invaluable tool for a historical 
approach, capable of returning to us the ways in which political 
passions were experienced, expressed and elaborated in certain 
historical periods. Totalitarianism as an ideal type is that of Friedrich 
and Brzezinski, totalitarianism as a historical concept has a story 
which is more complex and changeable.30 
Among the texts symbolically opening reflections, at the end of the World 
War II, there were the analysis on anti-Semitism in the United States, 
Escape from Freedom by Erich Fromm (1941), and the inquiry on fascism 
written by Adorno starting from a 1942 paper dedicated to Aldous Huxley, 
author of Brave New World (1932). Escape from Freedom, perhaps the best 
29 Cf. “Symposium on the Totalitarian State,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 
82, no. 1 (1940), i–vi, 1–102; Salvati, Antifascismo e totalitarismo nelle scienze sociali tra le due 
guerre, 646–47. See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & Co., 1951); the German edition, Arendt, Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft: 
Antisemitismus, Imperialismus, totale Herrschaft (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanst, 1955); 
Jacob L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Seecker and Warburg, 
1952); Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956); Valerio Marchetti, “Resistenza ebraica, 
antisemitismo, totalitarismo,” in Nazismo, fascismo, comunismo: Totalitarismi a confronto, 
ed. Marcello Flores (Milan: Bruno Mondadori, 1998), 259–88. 
30 Salvati, “Antifascismo e totalitarismo nelle scienze sociali tra le due guerre,” 624, with 
 reference to “La nascita del concetto di ‘Stato totalitario’ in Italia,” in Annali dell’Istituto 
storico italo-germanico in Trento, ed. Jens Petersen (Bologna: il Mulino, 1975), 1:145 (my 
translation).
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known research by Fromm, an exile in the United States since 1934, explores 
the “psychological aspects that have contributed to the crisis of democracy 
and the rise of fascism.”31 As Mariuccia Salvati points out, they are identi-
fied by the author “in the mechanisms of escape from freedom produced 
by insecurity in the modern individual, in search of ‘new secondary bonds’ 
(authoritarianism, for example) instead of lost primary bonds. These 
aspects, aggravated by economic crisis, would have been particularly felt by 
members of the lower middle class who welcomed Nazi ideology with 
ardent support.”32 Instead, as concerns Adorno’s text, it consists of the 
reading of Huxley’s novel in the light of National Socialism: the text, 
devoted to modern mass society, is a laboratory of American capitalism. 
Adorno, who for the first time confronts the Jewish question, expresses 
positive opinions towards Brave New World: in his eyes, it contains many 
interesting elements to analyze the totalitarian German regime.33
Whereas Huxley shows that industrial society ends with a perfectly 
rationalized class system, that is, with planned state capitalism and then 
with a society marked by total domination, in “Aldous Huxley und die 
Utopie,” Adorno argues that the new world, characterized by modern 
technology submissive to the ideology of the new order, leads to a 
 totalitarian society, which is rationalized and industrial.34 His lesson 
seems to be clearer thanks to what Traverso says about it in Auschwitz e gli 
 intellettuali. Briefly, according to Adorno, there is a tight weave between 
the new totalitarian order and modern techniques. The state of Hitler is 
not the natural result of German history or culture, but rather the 
 realization of the most recent trends of Western civilization in which, 
once the contradictions of society are eliminated, a new world occurs, a 
paradise (παράδεισος) where modern technique produces a total and 
perfect order. The author refers to cancellation of individual subjects, and 
to the individual living in modern mass society where there are no partic-
ular differences among individuals and where there is no longer a proper 
31 Salvati, “Antifascismo e totalitarismo nelle scienze sociali tra le due guerre,” 629; see Erich 
Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941). 
32 Salvati, “Antifascismo e totalitarismo nelle scienze sociali tra le due guerre,” 629.
33 Cf. Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 117–18. 
34 Ibid.
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pace for an organic society, with conflicts among social parts. 
As stated by Traverso, Adorno’s essay announces, at last, a “telluric 
catastrophe” from which there is no escape, if human consciousness does 
not intervene to stop these kinds of ideological tendencies. However, the 
catastrophe of telluric proportions mentioned by Adorno is to be fulfilled 
and would take the form of extermination camps.35
1.3.  REFLECTIONS ON ANTI-SEMITISM: FRANKFURT SCHOOL 
REACTIONS TO NAZI ATROCITIES
From 1933, about 500,000 German-speaking people, mostly Jews, expelled 
from Nazified Germany, sought refuge in the United States. Among them, 
although it is problematic to determine the exact number of intellectuals 
who actually reached the United States in those years, the “intellectual 
and cultural avant-garde of the Twenties” were included.36 On the basis of 
a full-bodied literature, as Claus-Dieter Krohn says, this migration 
 constituted the most important movement “of talents and intelligences” 
that has ever occurred in history: this exodus of intellectuals, commonly 
referred to as “emigre German-speaking scientists and scholars” revolu-
tionized American history, its academic culture, and its entire social life.37 
It is remarkable to retrace representations that, through the years, have 
been given to the phenomenon of exile. In the popular imagination, the 
figure of the exile sometimes coincides with that of successful people 
who, in spite of misfortunes, achieve a position of power in a welcoming 
society, but other times being in exile signifies being in a different world. 
This condition is depicted as an experience of detachment from the realm 
in which a person is born and raised and is represented as a situation of 
35 Ibid.
36 See Claus-Dieter Krohn, “L’esilio degli intellettuali tedeschi negli Stati Uniti dopo il 1933,” 
Memoria e Ricerca: Rivista di storia contemporanea 16, no. 31 (2009): 13; Renato Camurri, 
“Idee in movimento: L’esilio degli intellettuali italiani negli Stati Uniti (1930–1945),” 
Memoria e Ricerca, 43. Camurri notes that other than Great Britain and Palestine, these 
intellectuals mostly went to the United States and South America. 
37 Cf. Peter Gay, “Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider,” in The Intellectual Migration: 
Europa and America, 1930–1960, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1969), 12.
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solitude. As Adorno writes, in one of the fragments of Minima Moralia, 
the exile “will always be a nomad, a wanderer,” and his native tongue will 
always be “expropriated.”38
The impact that this shift of knowledge had on American culture 
raised several problematic issues. First, the Frankfurt School, during the 
war years, was forced to revise its study purposes and to redefine the insti-
tutional structure or solve the conflicting positions between Robert 
MacIver and Robert Lynd within the Department of Sociology at Columbia 
University, that is, the internal opposition within the Institute between the 
more speculative vein of the department, headed by MacIver, and the 
empirical antagonists gathered around Lynd.39 These factors internal to 
the Department of Sociology at Columbia University coincided with the 
new phase of the Frankfurt School’s empirical research in accordance with 
the interest of federal and private funding of research. According to the 
letter written by Lowenthal, January 23, 1942, and addressed to Horkheimer, 
the fight would be resolved in favor of Lynd. The director of the Institute 
was in favor of the dissolution of ties between the Institute and Columbia 
University. This fact, namely, the preference for Lynd’s empirical research, 
compared to MacIver’s more speculative approach, accounts for the atmo-
sphere of American sociology in the years in which quantitative research 
projects and those without a real political impact or far from concrete real 
problems were preferred and enjoyed more public space. It is the period, 
for sociology, that Robert E. L. Faris and William Form call one of “explo-
sive growth”40 in which the discipline developed significantly and was also 
preparatory to the its rising segmentation at the end of Vietnam War. 
The chasm between theory and empirical research in sociology endured 
38 “Exile is strangely compelling to think about but terrible to experience. It is the unhealable 
rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home: 
its essential sadness can never be surmounted. The achievements of exile are permanently 
undermined by the loss of something left behind forever”; see Edward W. Said, Reflections 
on the Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 137. See 
Camurri, “Idee in movimento,” 45 with reference to Adorno, Minima Moralia; Enzo 
Traverso, Cosmopoli: Figure dell’esilio ebraico-tedesco (Verona: Ombre Corte, 2004).
39 See Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 219; Halpert, “Early American Sociology and the 
Holocaust,” 6–23.
40 Faris and Form, “Sociology,” 1.
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in the academy and took the shape of a functionalist-conflict debate, that 
one finds, especially starting from 1948, in Talcott Parsons, the scholar 
who epitomized functionalism and gained a successful position among 
scholars. 
Looking back at postwar sociological works, let me be precise that 
although researches such as Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947), Anti-
Semitism among American Labor: Report on a Research Project Conducted 
by the Institute of Social Research of Columbia University (written in the 
years 1944–45, but unpublished), Eclipse of Reason (1947), and, finally, 
Studies in Prejudice (1949–1950) have different focuses, they do, however, 
all share an anti-Semitic view.41 If in 1942 Neumann wrote that the German 
people were “the least anti-Semitic of all,” by the mid-1940s onwards, 
during the exile period, anti-Semitism instead became a central issue, 
which the Frankfurt School would not be able to leave out of  consideration.42 
Thus, in the previous decade, anti-Semitism was an outdated theme for 
the School. As recalled by Traverso, “Anti-Semitism certainly did not domi-
nate the historical scene,” but, above all, “the birth of modern anti- Semitism— 
the transformation of the age-old exclusion on religious grounds into 
racial hatred affirmed in the name of science—attracted minimal atten-
tion from contemporaries or indeed went completely unnoticed.”43 At the 
end of the 1940s, instead, despite the reflections that were facing modern 
mass society and concentrating on the concept of prejudice, the interest 
headed towards the anti-Semitic question in Germany, having the 
American context as an ideal and material laboratory. 
Once arrived in the United States, in contact with the American racist 
and anti-Semitic energies, the Frankfurt School sociologists realized the 
41 Cf. Max Horkheimer and Theodore L. W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, ed. Gunzelin 
Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002 [1947]).
Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947); Max 
Horkheimer and Samuel H. Flowerman, eds., Studies in Prejudice (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1949–1950); Catherine Collomp, “La Scuola di Francoforte in esilio: Storia di 
un’inchiesta sull’antisemitismo nella classe operaia americana,” in “L’Europa in esilio: La 
migrazione degli intellettuali verso le Americhe tra le due guerre,” ed. Renato Camurri, 
Memoria e Ricerca: Rivista di storia contemporanea 16, no. 31 (2009): 121–40.
42 Cf. Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933–1944 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1942).
43 Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence, 6.
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strength of anti-Semitic prejudice in German society. Since the threat was 
the prejudice in itself, what mattered to the Frankfurt School, and also 
concerned them, was the force of prejudice in modern society.
It is on its character that they dwelled, tracing the different expres-
sions, the degree of intensity, and possible explanations. They were certain 
that prejudice could easily be manipulated in favor of a political plan of a 
fascist kind. In the late 1930s, and above all in the early 1940s, the theme of 
authoritarianism began to be read through the phenomenon of anti- 
Semitism. When possibilities of publishing in France began to decrease 
due to the German invasion, and they were forced to publish in English 
(meanwhile the name of their review changed from Zeitschrift fur 
Sozialforschung to Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, and methods 
and perspectives of research turned into other forms), exiles of the 
Frankfurt School finally captured the essence of Nazism and took notice 
of anti-Semitism. Under the Weimar Republic, there had been benefits 
from some situations: there was a set of practices, attitudes, or anti- Semitic 
speeches, but there were few obstacles to the exercise of professions or use 
of services for Jews, a situation that soon changed.
As historian Traverso notes, between 1943 and 1947 the sociological 
theory of the School was “new,” rich in categories pertaining to the process 
of rationalization, of Enlightenment ancestry. It was “new” in the sense 
that, before this time, there was no in-depth theory of the anti-Semitic 
phenomenon; and it was still “new” from a conceptual point of view, 
because the dialectic of the Enlightenment of the Frankfurt School differed 
from the traditional view of anti-Semitism. This theory was developed 
during the exile, at the end of World War II, when the Nazi atrocities were 
well known: they were only new because of the timing—the School had 
not taken the time to reflect on anti-Semitism.44
The Enlightenment leads to modern progress, from an economic, 
political, social point of view, in the broadest sense, and leads to a process 
of rationalization in society. In the 1940s, the notion of the Enlightenment 
underwent a fundamental change, because it was no longer just the 
cultural correlate of the rising middle class, but it tended to include the 
44 Cf. Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 119–21. 
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full range of Western thought. “Enlightenment here,” writes Horkheimer 
to Lowenthal in 1942, “is identical with bourgeois thought, nay, thought in 
general, since there is no other thought properly speaking than in cities.”45 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s theory on anti-Semitism can be traced back to 
the years 1943–44. The text, ready in 1944, and published only in 1947, 
in Amsterdam, was to receive some attention in the late 1960s after its re- 
release in Germany. It is important to understand the reason why an 
important work such this, and above all elaborated by the Frankfurt 
School, remained unnoticed in the late 1940s, both at the time of drafting 
in 1944 and at releasing in 1947. It is relevant since this work was prepared 
in the midst of the war; the scholars of the former Frankfurt School were 
refugee scholars in exile in the United States; there was an inner, well- 
concealed prejudice against the Jews among the nation’s elite colleges; 
and, finally, there was the problem of funding and publishing houses. At 
this point, it is crucial to examine which publishing houses and which 
foundations, at the end of the war, supported them and published their works. 
Actually, this aspect or the locution “at the end of the war” is meaningful and 
evokes another aspect always related to the difficulties in publishing writ-
ings dealing with the recent past, in this case, the Holocaust. 
Thus, there was a delay in the publication of sociological works at the 
end of the war, when one had to come to terms with the destruction of the 
Jews. This notice is well evidenced by Gerson and Wolf. Let me recall it 
briefly. A political Jew, Paul M. Neurath, after his camp experience started 
in 1938 in Dachau and then in Buchenwald, until his escape in 1939, put 
immediately into writing everything that happened, everything he 
 photographed with his eyes, ears, and mind: he recorded in his mind, with 
all his senses, anything that occurred during his internment in order to 
tell every fact to the world at the end of the war when he left the camp. He 
memorized every aspect, especially because he could not write in the 
camp. He became a perfect social observer who participates in the event 
itself:46 unconsciously he became a social scientist, and after the war, at the 
45 Cf. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 258.
46 Paul M. Neurath, The Society of Terror: Inside the Dachau and Buchenwald Concentration 
Camps, ed. Christian Fleck and Nico Stehr (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2005), 286n18, 
Neurath’s letter to Robert MacIver, March 29, 1942.
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university, he would become acquainted with the sociological devices to 
explicate his experiences. It can be said that he grew to be a social scientist 
during his internment. 
Neurath’s work came into being as a doctoral dissertation, defended 
successfully in 1943, but by the end of the World War II, in Neurath’s 
words, “publishers didn’t want to print any more about concentration 
camps without gas chambers.”47 His Society of Terror was published 
 posthumously, in 2005, thanks to Christian Fleck and Nico Stehr, who 
edited the volume. Neurath’s case demonstrates several problems 
 sociologists encounter when dealing with the genocide of the Jews within 
the academy: in his case, Columbia University and the political context of 
the Cold War. His sociological work on concentration camps represents a 
novelty for the innovative sociological method he adopts (he interviews 
“10 former fellows prisoners”48) and for the recounting of “various 
everyday resistances,” “ordinary men,”49 and this during the years of the 
war. In other words, at the end of the war there were several sociologists 
who attempted to account for the Holocaust: Neurath was one of them, 
and his study serves to rethink the so-called sociological delay. 
Coming back to the phrase “at the end of the war,” this means that 
specific political responsibilities (at the end of the conflict) and a public 
admission that the abandonment of the Jews had been allowed and 
prepared over the years, step-by-step, by any country. Therefore, in the 
early 1960s, when Eichmann was on put trial in Jerusalem by Israel’s 
 intelligence agency, Mossad, and he was widely judged and condemned, 
circumstances finally brought notice of the Frankfurt School’s work and 
other related works. The Six-Day War in 1967 also brought such issues to 
the fore, when the fear of another destruction of the Jews came into the 
47 Ibid., 297.
48 Lynn Rapaport, review of The Society of Terror: Inside the Dachau and Buchenwald 
Concentration Camps, by Paul M. Neurath, American Journal of Sociology 112, no. 4 (2007): 
1263–65, accessed March 4, 2016, doi:10.1086/513546.
49 To deal with Neurath’s case goes beyond the scope of my book. To it I will devote a separate 
paper. For additional features, see Andrew Woolford, review of The Society of Terror: Inside 
the Dachau and Buchenwald Concentration Camps, by Paul M. Neurath, Canadian Journal 
of Sociology Online, September-October 2006, accessed March 4, 2016, http://www.cjson-
line.ca/reviews/societyofterror.html.
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consciousness. And, right from that date, many burning questions and 
reflections were raised by Fackenheim: issues that compelled the world, 
the political and scholarly world, to reflect upon what was happening to 
humans. Precisely these events predisposed the reissuing of Dialektik der 
Aufklärung in Germany by S. F. Verlag in 1969. 
Dialektik der Aufklärung, a creative processing and synthesis of 
the interdisciplinary study of the School during the exile period, is 
characterized by the concepts of capitalism-alienation, mass psychology, 
and instrumental-final rationality. The first category, borrowed from 
Marx, interpreted in the light of Lukács, helps to explain the phenomenon 
of a society built “on the mercantile reification of social relations.”50 Thanks 
to a process of economic rationalization, brought forward by capitalism, 
modern industrial civilization is born and the Jews cooperate with it. 
Hitler’s racist anti-Semitism reassumes old religious prejudice and pushes 
to go beyond the traditional Marxist view: precapitalist and archaic origins 
of anti-Semitic phenomenon must be analyzed differently by Marx. 
Starting from the 1940s, the Institute applies less and less Marxist ideology 
in its own studies. This has been linked with the neglect of Marxism by 
American sociology until 1960, when a neo-Marxist phase (an amalgam 
of theories by Marx and Weber) gained approval and corroboration 
among several sociologists until the breakup of communism and “the 
introduction of postindustrial doctrines”.51
Totalitarian capitalism of the Third Reich destroyed liberal society and 
the achievements of emancipation, of which the Jews were protagonists and 
who were considered the “colonizers of progress.”52 Fake modern social 
order attracts a destroying will towards the Jews. In Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer no longer regard the concept of 
class as a form of global oppression, but just that of anti-Semitism, a 
terrible force upon the Jews, the exact opposite of the concentration of 
power, the real focal point of injustice. In other words, the Jews were 
starting to become the new proletariat of the world.53
50 Cf. Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 119–21.
51 Faris and Form, “Sociology,” 2.
52 Cf. Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 119–21, 133n48.
53 Cf. Collomp, “La Scuola di Francoforte in esilio,” 127–28n21.
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The School’s theory on the anti-Semitism of the Enlightenment gets 
at the core of the genocide of the Jews. As evident from the title of 
Horkheimer’s book, the good ideas of Enlightenment are going to be 
eclipsed. Often the reflection of the Frankfurt School on the Holocaust 
devolves to Adorno’s lapidary aphorism with which the author concludes an 
essay in 1949—“to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.” To understand 
this statement, we must remember the context, which is crucial for 
avoiding ambiguity or misunderstanding.54 To put it concisely, the phrase 
belongs to one of the earliest writings that Adorno completed after having 
just returned, in 1949, to Germany, a country ravaged by war and still in 
ruins. The University of Frankfurt facilitated the repatriation of the 
Institute for Social Research, as it believed that it would be able to use its 
contacts with the American academic world, albeit not according to its 
orientation. At that time, Adorno was aware of being an intellectual from 
the outside, a former emigrant now back in Adenauer’s Germany, and he 
was conscious of people living in the 1960s in a country where Auschwitz 
and its horror had been removed: while former Nazis surrounded him, he 
conceived his famous aphorism:
The price paid by Adorno will be—as Günther Anders would have 
reproached him—that of a “double life,” in which a radical thought always 
sublimated by a hermetic language was accompanied by the “rise of 
action,” in other words by political passivity in the face of the reality.55 
Unquestionably, the condition of exiles returning to their homeland 
had specific characteristics. In the 1940s and 50s, while the Frankfurt 
School was in a foreign land it gave the face of mass totalitarian society to 
anti-Semitism. In that context, the individual, when it seems he is enjoying 
maximum freedom or independence is instead deprived of his critical 
thinking and, rather than being a distinguished person among many 
 individuals, he is compelled to share a common mentality, a mutual 
personality to not be an individual anymore.56
54 See Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 109, 130n1.
55 Ibid., 111, 131n13; the author refers to a letter from Anders to Adorno, August 27, 1963 (my 
translation).
56 See Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial 
Society (Boston: Beacon, 1964).
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The Minima Moralia, written between 1944 and 1947, and published 
later in 1951 by Adorno, proposes a reflection on the need to think of 
Auschwitz, and it was then completed with Negative Dialectics in 1966. As 
far as I can see, the two texts, based on Studies on Prejudice, provide 
closure to the lessons of the Institute for Social Research on the Jewish 
question in the late 1950s and up to about the mid-1960s. In this phase we 
can note the idea of a critical theory summed up in Adorno’s words with 
the famous formula “ticket mentality,” emphasizing how after Auschwitz 
the otherness strives to be tolerated or understood.57 The studies of the 
immediate postwar period, especially those on prejudice, the Minima 
Moralia and Negative Dialectics, highlight how, in the context of authori-
tarian regimes, the  individual is withdrawn into the masses and presents a 
mentality unwilling to accept any label against any form of difference. For 
the Frankfurt School, anti- Semitism was an expression of this 
Enlightenment mentality. Humanist and emancipatory aspirations, 
followed by the French Revolution, had promoted equality among human 
beings, but they could not find a rich soil in  bourgeois society: equality is 
supported by the bourgeoisie, but in a  unilateral way that does not allow 
for the recognition of differences and does not create respect for cultural, 
religious, ethnic, or gender  dissimilarities. Anyone who does not come 
under conformist standards of the Puritan and bourgeois ethics, which 
was the dominant order, is cast aside. This form of “repressive” equality 
led to the assertion of the totalitarian principle of identity and then to the 
triumph of totalitarian racism, according to which the principle of equality 
gave way to the discrimination and persecution of those who were 
different. In fascist totalitarian regimes, social plurality is suppressed and, 
due to the mechanism of the authoritarian personality, the crushing of the 
“nonidentical” makes inroads. For this reason, in Minima Moralia Adorno 
pronounces against totalitarian ratio and recognizes the advent of a truly 
emancipated society only when any difference is accepted. However, in 
Negative Dialectics something changes: Adorno states that the concentra-
tion and extermination camp of Auschwitz has confirmed the 
philosopheme of pure identity as death and the end of any contradiction 
57 Cf. Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 124–26.
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through a mass of alienated civilians, unable to rise.58 The involvement 
with Nazi criminals does not require a conscious participation.59 As 
Traverso notes, the research was written in a “hot-formed” period, during 
the destruction of the Jews: that is why it is so significant.
Adorno and Horkheimer conceive Nazism as an incessant self- 
destruction of reason: they pose the representation of the extermination 
as an effect of Western civilization, according to their dialectic intuition. 
In the Western world, that of the UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, a set of elements accumulated in previous decades are brought to light 
in a violent manner. Namely, the Industrial Revolution, the development of 
mass society, the rationalization of public administration within the state, 
the modernization of armies, the progress of sciences and applied 
 technology, all these lead to new uses of rationality. Auschwitz compels us 
to review the power of Western rationalism and the Enlightenment.60 The 
Frankfurt School, especially Adorno, felt the need to think about 
Auschwitz: from Minima Moralia to Negative Dialectics one may find a 
common thread that identifies the social premises at the base of Nazism.61 
Especially because, at the end of the war, there was not a denazification 
process in power institutions. What lacked was a public admission of 
guilt: governments presented no admission of accountability for what 
happened. This meant that destruction against the minorities could 
happen again. 
To examine those elements featuring the Nazi society, these scholars 
use the notions of anti-Semitism, prejudice, and authoritarianism: 
phenomena all present in Nazi and American society, which they adopt as 
a research laboratory (ideal and material), just at the end of the conflict, 
when the extermination was almost completed. Their minds were set on 
avoiding a totalitarian state making inroads in the United States: in other 
words, they wanted to stop a new possible extermination. Hence, their 
attention to American authoritarianism in American mass society. 
58 Cf. Th. Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966).
59 Cf. Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 126, 134n64. 
60 Cf. Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and 
the Third Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
61 See Enzo Traverso, Il totalitarismo: Storia di un dibattito (Milan: Bruno Mondadori, 2002).
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This research started with a focus on American working people: they 
studied the anti-Semitism in American labor. Initially, the study (whose 
result was unexpected and alarming) was spread in a limited manner and 
only in typescript from the Institute. What aroused curiosity was that this 
research had not been considered by labor historians who had studied 
American laborers during and after World War II, nor was it considered 
by historians of Jewish culture in the United States. As Catherine Collomp 
does, it could be asked who commissioned the research and, first and 
foremost, why it has never been published.62 The survey, born from a 
research project on anti-Semitism, saw the program published in the 
summer 1941, in Studies in Philosophy and Social Science (SPSS). It was 
commissioned by the Jewish Labor Committee (JLC) and subsidized 
initially by the American Jewish Committee (AJC).63 This research has 
never been published, even though several attempts were made up to 1953. 
What warrants attention is the research itself, which paves the way for 
studies on prejudice. In the research, the concept of “scapegoat” is clearly 
elaborated, while the prejudice is presented as the element building the 
totalitarian society. For these scholars, what mattered was avoiding 
another Holocaust in an America full of prejudice against the Jews. Hence, 
the cyclic structure of their research accounting for it: from American to 
Nazi society and back again. The research-outcomes are shocking, espe-
cially because in the 1940s America was fighting against Germany and 
above all because Jews were integrated among American labor and within 
the larger society. Most of them were part of the Jewish Labor Movement, 
while the International Ladies Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU) and 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA) were among the 
organizations promoting the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 
the federation that, starting in 1936, organized the factory workers, as 
Collomp remembers. At this point, they measure intensity and visibility 
of prejudice among people: what emerges is that the prejudice is manipu-
lated in favor of a political fascist plan and orientation to absolve social 
and economic tensions. There were the Silver Shirts and German American 
62 Collomp, “La Scuola di Francoforte in esilio,” 122.
63 Ibid., 127–28.
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Bund, both in favor of Nazi ideologies. In 1942, an official revelation of 
what was happening to the Jews in Europe, even if on a delayed basis, 
appeared, but anti- Semitism did not diminish. In public opinion there 
was the conviction that the number of victims was altered and did not 
correspond to the reality. The JLC, caring about the social-democratic 
rights of laborers and aware of tensions among laborers, wanted to avoid 
further tensions and conflicts among them, especially since the end the 
war saw a reduction in the production of arms and, therefore, a reduction 
in the labor force.
The JLC, established in 1934 to fight Nazism in defense of democracy 
and in support of labor and Jews in Europe and in America, was the first 
organization in the United States to publicize the destruction of the Jews 
in April 1945 through a photo exhibition, “Heros and Martyrs of Europe’s 
Ghettos,” in New York, partly dedicated to the Warsaw Uprising.64 At the 
end of the war, another research project on the prejudice against Jews 
appeared, which brought to light social tensions (typical of labor factory) 
stemming from the prejudice itself. The work in question was that of 
Everett C. Hughes of the Chicago School. 
As concerns American Labor, the research was conducted by 
Friedrich Pollock, with the help of Leo Lowenthal, Paul Massing, and A. R. 
L. Gurland, and it surveyed 566 laborers using a sample of five geographical 
areas—the East Coast; the New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia areas; 
Pittsburgh, with the steelworks; Detroit, with war industries (automotive 
industry converted into weapons production); and the West Coast, 
 especially Los Angeles and San Francisco. The research dealt specifically 
with industry laborers, particularly, those in arms and weapons manufac-
turing, where a great number of laborers were employed in a short period 
of time. The selected sample presented a high percentage of unionized 
laborers (23.8% AFL; 38.5% CIO) and a number of white-collar workers, 
small wholesalers, and professionals: 68 percent were manual laborers; 6 
percent managers; 9 percent white-collar employees; 6.7 percent sellers 
and wholesalers; and 8 percent professionals. The development of the 
research was targeted: 270 volunteer laborers were instructed how to 
64 Ibid., 124.
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conduct interviews among other laborers who were not aware of being 
interviewed, avoiding, in this way, certain pressures or conditions. The 
seven questions of the interview verified where episodes of anti-Semitic 
propaganda occurred in the workplace or community. On the basis of the 
answers, the researchers could classify the grade of anti-Semitism into 
eight categories: from an extreme hostility (which precedes the physical 
extermination of the Jews) to a good attitude. The key-answer measuring 
the anti-Semitic grade resulted from the question number 5, which related 
to their personal thinking about Nazis actions against Jews in Germany.65 
The researchers found that 30.7 percent of the population sample had 
strong prejudices, while 30.9 percent were not hostile to the Jews. 
Noteworthy was the third group, representing “uncertain” responders and 
therefore, for scholars, those easily manipulatable and indoctrinable, fit 
for anti-Semitic militancy. This method of hidden interviews allowed for 
simple and candid answers, from which several prejudices emerged. 
Among blue-collar workers, anti-Semitism was stronger, while a high 
level of education was found to lower anti-Semitic prejudice.
1.4.  AN OPEN CASE: TALCOTT PARSONS AND NATIONAL 
SOCIALISM, FROM ACTIVE POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT TO 
THE YEARS OF SILENCE
By stating that sociology was not late in studying the destruction of 
the Jews,66 I mean that there were sociologists who approached the 
phenomenon and studied the event with sociological tools—even during 
the postwar years, and among them Talcott Parsons. Moreover, in 
sustaining that these scholars were unnoticed and their researches were 
ignored by the academy, I mean that, despite their efforts in approaching 
the Jewish question, they were impeded in their attempt to disseminate 
their scientific results: these obstacles and impediments were at the core of 
the so-called absence of sociology in Holocaust Studies. A sociological 
65 Cf. ibid., 131.
66 As Hilberg and Cesarani explain in their works, it is a process that comprehends anti-
Jewish practices in 1930s, a definition by decree, concentration and mobile killing 
operations, deportations and killing center operations. See note 4, above (Introduction).
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tradition emerged that dismissed the study of the Holocaust, namely, it 
created a missing sociological tradition, having in Parsons a significant 
symbol.67 Starting from 1937, as Porter asserts in his 1994 “Sociological 
Forum,” Parsons counteracted German propaganda and Nazism and saved 
various German immigrants and Austrian refugees.68 He “was one of the 
first in the United States to publicly denounce the Nazi movement and call 
for active and unconditional opposition to it.”69 In these years, Parsons 
wrote much about the Jewish question. What is astonishing is that, after 
the war, his stand against Nazism was all but silenced: there then appeared 
a profound silence about Nazism in his work. Reflecting on this, I asked 
myself why. To comprehend better what happened, on the basis of his 
available writings, I divided his approach to the Jewish  question into three 
phases. In the first, from 1937 to 1946, he wrote and disseminated several 
papers against the Nazi movement and its anti-Jewish practices (he was 
acting as a fire-flagman and, having glimpsed Nazi ideology menaces in 
Europe and in America, denounced them). The second phase runs from 
1946 to 1948: in these two years, during which Parsons seems to be a silent 
Calliope,70 he did not deal with the Jewish question, even to the point of 
abandoning any direct engagement in the fight against Nazis. In the third 
phase, (1948–79) hardly widely known, he was an intellectual “bridging 
former Nazis collaborators in the U.S.A.”71 His interest in the Jewish ques-
tion in 1937–46 is very noteworthy because he handled Jewish matters and 
National Socialism during the years of Nazi dominance. These writings 
attest that sociology addressed these themes at the time of events. 
I assert this after reading Uta Gerhardt’s 1993 work about Parsons, 
which is available as a collection of fourteen writings in sociology on 
67 I would like to thank Giuseppe Veltri for the notion on “missing sociological tradition” and 
for his comments on it.
68 See Jack N. Porter, “Toward a Sociology of National Socialism,” review of Talcott Parsons on 
National Socialism, by Uta Gerhardt, Sociological Forum 9, no. 3 (1994): 506.
69 Mike F. Keen, review of Talcott Parsons on National Socialism, by Uta Gerhardt, American 
Journal of Sociology 99, no. 5 (1994): 1359.
70 The expression “silent Calliope” comes out from Traverso’s expression “muse arruolate” 
(“enrolled/enlisted muses”), which he uses in his Auschwitz e gli intellettuali in explaining 
the attitude of some intellectuals during the Nazism; see Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellet-
tuali, 15–18.
71 Wiener, “Talcott Parsons’ Role Bringing Nazi Sympathizers to the U.S.,” 305–9.
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National Socialism. Among these papers, Gerhardt unearthed his wartime 
writings—seven articles diffused in a limited edition and another seven 
articles never published before her edition. Nevertheless, those seven 
published articles did not receive much notice or consideration from 
scholars: they were not disseminated among academics. This is notable 
because these writings provide evidence of some sociologists who dealt 
with the Jewish question, especially during the Nazi era. Yet more worthy 
of reflection is that after 1946, Parsons never wrote anything on Nazism 
and that after 1948, when he arrived in Germany, he actually recruited 
former Nazis. 
However, it is important to introduce his sociological writings related 
to the Jewish question to see how he sociologically understood the 
destruction of the Jews.
Parsons was born in Colorado Springs, Colorado, on December 13, 
1902, and after biology and medical studies at Amherst College he was at 
the London School of Economics until he went to Germany, in 1925, 
thanks to a scholarship in sociology and economics at Heidelberg 
University, where he earned his doctorate with a thesis on the origins of 
capitalism in Weber and Sombart. Back in the United States, he taught at 
Harvard from 1927 to 1973. Now, when I state that he recognized the Nazi 
inferno, I refer to his sociological writings of 1937–46 concerning Nazism 
and its anti-Jewish actions. Gerhardt deserves credit for having unearthed 
these valuable works and then collecting them in one edition. She 
 accidentally discovered this treasure during her personal research on the 
sociology of professions, a theme precious to Parsons: she uncovered his 
writings among Parson’s medical discourses. This is worthy of note: narrative 
medicine was the core of Parsons’s sociology. Medical discourse is the 
sociological key for reading his work because the devices typical of medical 
discourse led Parsons to tackle the social problem of totalitarianism in 
society and to offer a solution. He acts as the doctor who analyzes people 
affected by some evil and makes a diagnosis: against totalitarian pathology, 
he offers a recipe to the patient faced with the (social) evil and how to 
overcome it. How he approached the destruction of the Jews is clearer in 
these fourteen writings gathered by Gerhardt. To understand what I mean 
when I state that he was among the first sociologists dealing with the 
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Jewish genocide, it is proper to identify a common thread among them 
that underlines the sociological categories he adopted.
1.4.1. Parsons’s Seven Published Papers 
On April 25, 1942, when Parsons for the inauguration of the Eastern 
Sociological Society gave a speech titled “Some Sociological Aspects of 
the Fascist Movements.” In the discourse, first published in 1942, in 
Social Forces, he uses typical elements of the sociology of Durkheim to 
expose the rise of the political fascist (mass) movement in modern society, 
both in Italy and in Germany. His “ongoing” analysis continues in “Max 
Weber and the Contemporary Political Crisis,” the sixth article, according 
Gerhardt’s order in the 1993 edition. Some of its parts appeared in the 
fourth volume of Review of Politics, in 1942, where, by using tools and 
concepts of Weberian sociology, Parsons elaborates a long examination of 
National Socialism and its consequences after the rise of the NSDAP. Also 
in 1942, he recognized, in “Propaganda and Social Control,” that the 
NSDAP had risen to power thanks to propaganda, a “kind of attempt to 
influence attitudes, and hence directly or indirectly the actions of people, 
by linguistic stimuli, by the written or spoken word.”72 It seems that in 
wartime Parsons stood as a sentinel in the academic realm, especially in 
understanding that propaganda brought the Nazis to power and social 
control. He returned to Nazism in the following years. He participated in 
a conference in New York, in May–June 1944, during which a group of 
psychiatrics, anthropologists, sociologists, and other scholars attempted 
to comprehend the role played by institutions in the maintenance of social 
order. (Previously there was the Tehran Conference and its political 
discussions about combating National Socialist Germany. This meeting of 
the Allied powers constituted a kind of turning point, corroborated his 
antifascist cause, and validated his ideas about the importance of having 
democratic social institutions that would collaborate in the fight against 
authoritarianism and anti-Semitism.) At the New York conference, 
72 Uta Gerhardt, Talcott Parsons on National Socialism (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993), 
243. See Talcott Parsons, “Propaganda and Social Control,” Psychiatry 5 (1942): 551–72.
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Parsons prepared a rapport, published for the first time in Psychiatry in 
1945 with the title “The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change,” 
where much of this material was reproduced, with the exception of the 
analytic introduction appearing as appendix 5 of the same piece.73 As the 
war was coming to an end, he was dealing with the problem of the collapse of 
modern democracy and the rise of the mass socialist movement owing to the 
lack of valid institutions capable of resolving the social tensions of modern 
society and integrating its deviant components. In his introduction, he 
focuses on the role of “institutional patterns”: the “‘backbone’ of the social 
system.”74 When, in 1944–45, Parsons asks himself what one needs do in 
the face of the collapse of democratic and liberal organisms, and 
 investigates which social tensions led to the fall of the democratic regime 
in Germany after the Great War, he clearly shows his interest in and 
 appreciation for the Jewish question and its related consequences. For 
Parsons, the cause of the democratic crisis, at the end of the Great War, 
was the difference in the way of thinking, attitudes, or culture existing 
within German society, where there were idealistic, romantic, and 
 antisocial components together with parts methodical, gregarious, and 
submissive. For him, National Socialism harnessed emotional tensions of 
romanticism towards political objectives that were clearly nationalist, 
with expansionist ambitions and legitimated by use of violence. 
Unlike the United States, Germany failed in a natural development 
of democratic institutions: this led to the rise of National Socialism, a 
charismatic movement with an ideological structure. He had already 
spoken of the conditions of democracy in 1942 when he analyzed the 
social structure of pre-Nazi German, a theme better developed (namely, 
that National Socialism was a movement resulting from modernization) 
in “Certain Primary Sources and Patterns of Aggression in the Social 
Structure of the Western World,” elaborated for the occasion of the 
 conference on “Science, Philosophy and Religion” in Chicago in September 
1946 and published in Psychiatry in the following year.75 At the basis of the 
text again was National Socialism as a movement that harnesses the 
73 See Gerhardt, Talcott Parsons on National Socialism, 322.
74 Ibid., 292. 
75 Ibid., 325–47.
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tensions of the Western modernization process. He introduces a topic 
familiar to the Frankfurt School, namely, the authoritarian structure of the 
German family (the authority of pater familias and women’s submissive 
attitude). Instead, in “Racial and Religious Differences as Factors in Group 
Tensions,” published in 1945, he exposes, using the categories of Durkheim, 
how the end of solidarity among groups, integration, and the social 
tensions between religious groups or ethnic minorities degenerates into 
forms with no democratic structure or legitimate sources of power.76
1.4.2. The Seven Unpublished Writings 
Parsons can be seen as a standard-bearer for the fight against Nazism with 
his seven unpublished writings. As a prominent booster of Harvard 
University, he became inextricably linked with the democracy program. 
In 1940 Parsons elaborated a very long text that precociously offered 
surprising intuition concerning the control exercised against dissidents 
during the war: “Memorandum: The Development of Groups and 
Organizations Amenable to Use against American Institutions and 
Foreign Policy and Possible Measures of Prevention,” prepared for the 
Council for Democracy. Through some sociological categories, such as 
social stratification, social mobility, ethnos, and social movement, Parsons 
analyzed the situation both in Germany and in the United States, which, 
like Germany, presented a strong social and economic insecurity with a 
strong nationalist component. Given that in Germany these factors had 
contributed to the rise of Nazism, Parsons’s problem dealt with the 
comprehension of how to avoid the rise of fascist movements in the United 
States. The central question of his article was simple: What political attitudes 
do people have to adopt to impede the rise of totalitarian movements? 
Hence, the memorandum to remember to maintain liberal institutions. 
According to him, both international politics and social measures play a big 
role. Especially, social system stability depends on the level of integration 
among individuals belonging to it. Already in 1940, Parsons had 
76 Cf. William Buxton, review of Talcott Parsons on National Socialism, by Uta Gerhardt, 
Canadian Journal of Sociology 19, no. 3 (1994): 426–27.
 | American Sociology and Holocaust Studies32
enumerated the features of National Socialism: those concerning race, 
socialism, anti-intellectualism, militarism, and particularism, even if its 
fundamental components remained propaganda and ideology. It is proper 
to stress that Parsons studied the economic problems that affected 
American society in the early twentieth century: sounding the warning, 
he perceived that a totalitarian movement could arise in the United States, 
as it did in Germany. For this reason, for him, it was important to address 
the problem of anti-Semitism and its horrendous consequences. 
Nevertheless, “The Sociology of Modern Anti-Semitism” only appeared in 
an edited version not authorized by Parsons in Jews in a Gentile World 
(1942), edited by Isacque Graeber and Steuart H. Britt.77 We can recall that 
in the 1930s, America was in the grip of the Great Depression, and both 
intolerance and anti-Semitism were ordinary. When Parsons received the 
draft for the release of the text, he disagreed with the revisions of the two 
editors and gave them an accurate version, but they did not take it into 
account. Despite that, Parsons did not prepare further errata corrigenda 
after publication of the Graeber and Britt edition.78 I will limit myself here 
to underlining some differences between the two versions: they are evident 
in the last periods of the essay. In the original text one may read: “In other 
words, it is by means of serious study, by means of an objective analysis, 
and not through emotional thinking that a successful tackling of the 
problem may be attempted.”79 In the Graeber and Britt edition it reads: “In 
other words, a rational policy toward anti-Semitism cannot consist in 
suppressing and punishing its expressions, but only in some analogous 
way in an attempt to control its deeper causes. Mere indignant repression 
of an evil is the treatment of symptoms, not of disease.”80 
Parsons had raised a real problem for America. His position was such 
a multidimensional topic that everyone could read and deal with it. Gerhardt 
77 Gerhardt, Talcott Parsons on National Socialism, 131; Isacque Graeber and Steuart 
Henderson Britt, eds., Jews in a Gentile World: The Problem of Anti-Semitism (New York: 
Macmillan, 1942); Porter, “Toward a Sociology of National Socialism,” 507–8n4.
78 See Buxton, review of Talcott Parsons on National Socialism, 425; Porter, “Toward a 
Sociology of National Socialism,” 507.
79 Gerhardt, Talcott Parsons on National Socialism, 150–51.
80 Graeber and Britt, Jews in a Gentile World, 122.
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recovered the original title and versions of Parsons’s manuscript.81 In the 
text, the principal subject was an anti-Semitism that stemmed from 
 disorganization and modern insecurity. But the context in which Parsons 
wrote was not easy for him: 
In 1979, Parsons, troubled by the original article, wrote a postscript 
to the article that addressed the problem of Germany’s change since 
1945 and noted that the horrendous scope of Nazi atrocities had 
become known only after his article had been published. According 
to footnote 106 in Gerhardt’s book, the manuscript carried a 
 handwritten note by Victor Lidz, Parsons’s literary executor, that the 
essay should be “edited and prepared for publication by S. Z. 
Klausner after T. P.’s death.” That essay, along with Samuel Klausner’s 
commentary, did in fact appear in Contemporary Jewry (1980).82 
As concerns “National Socialism and the German People,” it is instead a 
transcription of a 1942 broadcast. Parsons, after he introduces National 
Socialism as a problem, explicates some of the possible causes of German 
fascism:83 first and foremost, social insecurity resulting from the rapid 
industrialization; second, the role played by Junkers, in whom converged 
a militant tradition and authoritarianism, and, finally, the Volksgeist.84 
Parsons in the war years recognized, thanks to notions of social anomie, 
class, tradition, and social movement, that Nazism constituted a specific 
aspect of modernity. National Socialism was not an invention of a few 
men: it was rooted in the culture and tradition of Germany. “But what of 
the situation,” he asks, “when the Nazi movement is broken?”85
Worthy of attention is “Nazis Destroy Learning, Challenging 
Religion,” which appeared on November 23, 1938, in Radcliffe News. 
81 This reconstruction work has been possible thanks to manuscripts and notes in archives at 
Harvard University (42.41, box 2: “Unpublished Manuscripts”). Cf. Gerhardt, Talcott 
Parsons on National Socialism, 131.
82 Porter, “Toward a Sociology of National Socialism,” 508n4.
83 Cf. Gerhardt, Talcott Parsons on National Socialism, 219n (reference to radio broadcast, 
WRUL, May 21, 1942).
84 Cf. ibid., 222–24.
85 Ibid., 219. 
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Although it is the shortest among Parsons writings, it actually illustrates 
the risks of Nazism very well:
In my opinion, National Socialism is far more than a “political” 
movement in any narrow sense. It reaches down to the deepest 
foundations of institutional structure generally. Seen in this 
perspective the treatment of the Jews, tragic as it is for the victims, 
is only a small part of the significance of the movement, perhaps 
even more of symptomatic importance than itself the major danger.86 
Parsons recognized the Jews as victims of Nazism and perceived the threat 
and tragic consequences of this movement—it was “far more than a ‘political’ 
movement.” It moved against science and knowledge, democratic institutions 
and religious universalism: it pierced the fundamental values of reason 
and ethics, putting in crisis the concept of authority and the universalism 
of values on which democratic institutions depend. 
“New Dark Ages Seen If Nazis Should Win” appeared in a limited 
edition on September 28, 1940, in the Boston Evening Transcript as an 
analysis of National Socialism.87 But the more innovative text seems to be 
“Academic Freedom” (1939), which Parsons wrote at the moment World 
War II broke out. It was an important piece, never published, in which he 
put into discussion the quality of academic research under Nazism: 
freedom of thinking and teaching were particularly in peril. To some 
extent, Parsons reexposed what his friend and colleague Hartshorne had 
denounced in the late 1930s:
Corresponding to the freedom of inquiry in investigation is the 
freedom of teaching. If the academic man is to transmit to his 
students the genuine results of academic work, of liberal analysis 
and investigation in his subject, he must clearly be free, within the 
86 Ibid., 82.
87 There was a limited edition of two articles: “Nazis Destroy Learning, Challenging Religion,” 
Radcliff News, November 23, 1938; and “New Dark Ages Seen If Nazis Should Win,” Boston 
Evening Transcript, September 28, 1940. Cf. Gerhardt, Talcott Parsons on National Socialism, 
81–83, 153–57.
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technical part of his field, to carry the argument wherever objective 
considerations may lead. Within the limits of what is truly technical 
in this sense clearly only academic experts in the field in question 
are qualified to decide what should and should not be taught. Once 
the legitimacy of academic treatment of the subject be granted all 
this follows.88
More urgent for Parsons was a sociological definition of the democratic 
state in the light of European events. This was evident in “Sociological 
Reflections on the United States in Relation to the European War”—which 
institutions to be defended, in America and Europe, was the Parsons’s 
problem.89 
I decided to focus attention on the 1937–46 writings because these 
address burning topics related to Jews and their destruction with the 
end of democracy and its negative consequences. They deserve to be 
reconsidered and brought back to scholarly attention. Parsons was a 
sociologist famed for other sociological theories. Thanks to his own 
sociology of Nazism, the discipline seems not to have been late in the 
study of the destruction of the Jews. Parsons recognized Nazism as a social 
evil from the outset: he analyzed it sociologically. Moreover, if he had 
spread his results, the path of the sociology of Nazism would have been 
different since other scholars would have benefited from his ideas. 
His sociology dealing with Nazism concerned the genocide of the 
Jews: the Holocaust resulted from Nazism, which, for him, was a social 
movement in reaction to modernization. When he analytically explained, 
step-by-step, how German society prepared itself for Nazism’s rise in 
 reaction to modernity and other innovations, he clarified that the Jews 
were considered supporters of modernity since they practiced all the 
professions typical of modernity and, consequently, they were an ongoing 
social problem. In 1942, he illustrated that in pre-Nazi Germany many 
political factors, religious sentiments, and social and economic tensions 
led in the Weimar Republic to the rise of Nazi power and consequently to 
88 Ibid., 96.
89 Ibid., 189–90.
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the collapse of the republic and the establishment of the Third Reich. 
Seeing in this works Weberian sociology traces, it seems appropriate to 
look at the thesis of historian Jeffrey Herf of “reactionary modernism,” in 
1984. What is important is that Parsons aimed at recognizing the theoretical 
import of Nazism, its nightmarish results, and that it was a social deviance, 
hitherto unknown. He aimed that other scholars would be able to recognize 
it and thus oppose it.90
To some extent, Parsons seemed to be a social psychologist analyzing 
all German society with its structure of evil. After Horkheimer and 
Fromm, Parsons stands as the third sociologists who links National 
Socialism with anti-Semitism.91 Let me underline a point here. When 
Parsons wrote these articles, there was not an academic audience able to 
welcome these contributions, even if he was president of ASA (1949) and 
head of the Department of Social Relations at Harvard (1946–56). 
I wondered why they were not disseminated; and I noted that Carnegie 
had established the Russian Research Center at Harvard, of which I’ll have 
more to say later, and financed some research by Parsons in that period, 
and after the war, too; nevertheless, for research related to the burning 
questions of the time, support was not offered.92 Parsons’s wartime writ-
ings were not disseminated or, more precisely, some were not published, 
but even those that were published were not properly disseminated. This 
seemed to happen as a matter of course, since attention after World War II 
was reserved for themes (as we will see below) aimed at creating an 
America perfectly functional and, primarily, devoted to the fight against 
communism. In fear of the Red menace, the academy closed in on itself by 
pressuring scholars, directly or indirectly, to divert any investigation or 
research project concerned with the truth about the Holocaust or what 
had happened in Europe during the war. It was an attitude that arose in 
the face of accountability for what had occurred. Let me highlight here 
90 Porter, “Toward a Sociology of National Socialism,” 506, 509, 510.
91 See ibid.; Buxton, review of Talcott Parsons on National Socialism; Keen, review of Talcott 
Parsons on National Socialism, 1359–61.
92 Cf. Jennifer Platt, A History of Sociological Research Methods in America, 1920–1960 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Franz Neumann et al., Il nemico tedesco: 
Scritti riservati sulla Germania nazista (1943–1945), ed. Roberto Laudani (Bologna: il 
Mulino, 2012).
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that Parsons’s writings were finally noticed through and after the 1993 
Gerhardt edition. What is interesting is that, starting from this edition, a 
Parsons controversy commenced. Seeing the debate that took place in 
1996 led me to review Parsons’s approach to the Holocaust theme and to 
subdivide his sociology (concerning the Jewish question) into three 
periods, which I now delineate.
1.4.3. Years of Silence (1946–1948)
When I assert that the so-called delay of sociology has been constructed 
in the realms of sociology, step-by-step and over the years, my mind runs 
to those Parsons writings that, though dealing with anti-Semitism, racism, 
and totalitarianism, have not been published; or those published that have 
not been adequately disseminated among scholars. This is astonishing. 
I observed that in 1946–48 Parsons ceased to say anything about what 
happened in Europe, after his long period as a political activist engaged in 
denouncing Nazi perils. Why did Parsons stop addressing the Jewish 
question? I wondered if there was a personal episode, linked with this 
cessation, that could explain what happened or if something occurred in 
sociology to stop Parsons from treating these issues. Thus we need to ask: 
What were the main research themes in those years and who decided the 
research agenda? 
After Gerhardt’s edition, an all-time debate started, and it is still 
ongoing, with no resolution in sight: the problem concerns with the 
postwar years. Something of personal nature seemed affect him over the 
tragic death of his young colleague, Edward Y. Hartshorne, Jr., in 1946, 
when he was shot to death on a German motorway near Nuremberg, 
Germany, by bullets fired from a moving car; the assailants were never 
identified and no details were disclosed. Porter’s take:
A young colleague of Parsons, a sociologist by the name of Edward 
Yarnall Hartshorne, Jr. (1912–1946), was shot to death in a bizarre 
“drive-by” shooting on the German autobahn. Parsons never wrote 
about national socialism, not even about Germany, after 1948. 
I discuss this in my earlier review. There are many questions. Who 
 | American Sociology and Holocaust Studies38
shot Hartshorne? What effect did his death have on Parsons? Was 
there a connection between Hartshorne’s death and Parsons’ search 
for “consultants” to the Russian Research Center?93
What is strange is that from that moment Parsons rarely returned to 
writing anything or to giving seminars on Germany and National 
Socialism.94 Hartshorne was the sociologist who had studied Nazi control 
of German universities, and he was also a close friend of Parsons. With 
the publication of Hartshorne’s German Universities and National Socialism 
in 1937, Parsons was profoundly affected by his friend’s book. 
Parsons’s sociology, the most prominent in postwar American sociology 
(with its structural and functional emphasis), encountered much success in 
academic circles after the war, when other schools of thought, such as those 
of Simmel or Sorokin related to the moral reconstruction of society, were set 
aside in favor of a functionalist and systemic sociology in agreement with the 
dominant power centers or advocates of the status quo, into the late 1960s or 
at least until at the beginning of the 1970s. Sorokin, for example, dedicated 
himself in the postwar years to the study of social phenomena and the moral 
reconstruction of humanity. Thanks to funding from Eli Lilly, a U.S. philan-
thropist, in 1946 he began studying altruistic love in rebuilding human 
society by publishing in 1948 The Reconstruction of Humanity. The following 
year, he founded the Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism. Such 
interventions raised disagreements and dissensions by a number of sociolo-
gists, including, especially, Parsons, for whom Sorokin, in 1956, wrote Fads 
and Foibles in Modern Sociology. Some years later, in 1959, he published 
Public Power and Morality, a kind of indictment against the governments 
and ruling classes of the world, with a copy to Dwight D. Eisenhower and 
Nikita Khrushchev.95 These were the years of a thaw in the Cold War. 
But, coming back to the reasons why Parsons’s studies about totalitar-
ianism were dismissed, I investigated how much the international 
93 Jack N. Porter, “Talcott Parsons and National Socialism: The Case of the ‘Ten Mysterious 
Missing Letters,’” Sociological Forum 11, no. 4 (1996): 609.
94 Cf. Porter, “Toward a Sociology of National Socialism,” 506.
95 Cf. Pitirim A. Sorokin, Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery, 1956); Pitirim A. Sorokin and Walter A. Lunden, Power and Morality: Who 
Shall Guard the Guardians? (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1959).
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relations between the U.S. and Soviet blocs affected decisions after World 
War II, when any aspect of public life was reinterpreted in the light of 
the Cold War. In many ways competitive coexistence seems to explain 
the delay in studying the Holocaust. The sociological thought of Parsons’s 
friend Hartshorne had often affected his research time and methods: he 
particularly had understood the dangers and threats that intellectuals 
were forced to suffer under National Socialism:96
On the occasion of Parsons’s farewell dinner at Harvard in May 
1973, he paid tribute to their friendship by saying that Hartshorne was 
“one of our real stars.” Hartshorne had successfully masterminded the 
reopening of German universities in the American occupation zone 
in 1945–1946, and had deeply influenced Parsons’s thinking on 
German going back to the late 1930s.97
Richard J. Evans has recently brought attention to the mysterious disap-
pearance of Hartshorne.98 However, to date, very little is known about the 
case. Hartshorne in his German Universities and National Socialism had 
denounced the limits of university research under the Nazis. Born in New 
Hampshire in 1912, he was far outside the German and European mentality. 
In the 1930s he was an entry-level instructor in sociology at Harvard 
University. During his doctorate work at the University of Chicago’s 
Department of Anthropology and Sociology, he was interested in German 
history and in what was happening in that context. His love for liberalism 
and for an academy free from governmental control in the United States, 
and Condorcet’s ideas about equal rights and public education and thanks 
to a scholarship funded by the Social Science Research Council in 1935–
36, led him to assess the autonomy of research within universities and 
academies in Germany. As a traveling sociologist in a strange country, he 
could look at the reality with extreme objectivity and avoid any suspicion 
 96 Cf. Porter, “Toward a Sociology of National Socialism,” 509.
 97 Ibid., 507.
 98 Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich at War (New York: Penguin, 2009); Evans, review of The Night 
of Broken Glass: Eyewitness Accounts of Kristallnacht by Uta Gerhardt and Thomas Karlauf, The 
Guardian, April 11, 2012, accessed May 8, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2012/
apr/11/night-broken-glass-kristallnacht-review. 
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from the Nazi powers. But why were Hartshorne’s studies important? His 
formation at Harvard and the Chicago approach let Hartshorne analyze 
official sources, such as laws, decrees, statistical data, and accounted for 
the collapse of German universities under Nazism, where professors 
and students were selected in the name of racial ideology: after a long 
examination, he concluded that 1,145 professors and 539 assistants were 
eliminated from universities at the end of 1936, and the Berlin and 
Frankfurt universities both lost one-third of their faculties, and Heildelberg 
lost a quarter. New programs were planned in accordance with Nazi ideals, 
faculties were repopulated, and Party celebrations in honor of Hitler were 
established, while unjustified dismissals became a daily routine:99
“It is the task of the German universities,” declares an unpub-
lished Ministerial decree of November 24, 1934, “to put scientific 
research into the closest possible relationship with the national 
political needs of our people.” To this end the administration was 
reorganized, the faculty reconstituted and retrained, the student 
body newly disciplined, and to this end the academic curriculum 
was remodeled.100 
Hartshorne, close to the Frankfurt School and the psychoanalytic 
approach, provided a rationale for a set of farewells to the main German 
Institutes not in accordance with Nazi policies, such as the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Institute case:101 
Admission to the university and even more, the selection of 
professors is based upon “non intellectual” criteria of physical, 
political, and “racial” fitness. Independent research is destroyed; 
under the slogan “All for the Fatherland,” a monopoly of the party 
is established. On the other hand, the fight against Einstein is not 
sufficiently described. The name of Theodor Lessing is missing. It 
 99 See Edward Y. Hartshorne, Jr., The German Universities and National Socialism (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1937), 36, 85.
100 Ibid., 106.
101 Ibid., 135.
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is characteristic that a foreigner did not hear that this important 
German professor was murdered by the Nazis.102
What is interesting is that, together with the historian Sidney Fay and 
the psychologist Gordon Allport, Hartshorne gathered personal stories 
of refugees from Nazi Germany after Kristallnacht. From this came a 
competition, Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach dem 30 Januar 1933, 
with prize money of $1,000 for the best account.103 By April 1, 1940, more 
than 250 manuscripts were received: 155 from the United States, 31 from 
Great Britain, 20 from Palestine, and 6 from Shanghai. The authors were 
mostly Jews who escaped from Germany after pogroms; particularly, 
academics, professors, doctors, and lawyers from Berlin and Vienna.104 
In 1940s, when sociology underwent a period of consolidation, 
Hartshorne and Parsons, together with Abel, worked together on the Nazi 
question at the Harvard School of Overseas Administration.105 Well, it is 
again the sociologist Gerhardt who unearthed Parsons’s and Hartshorne’s 
writings.106 Hartshorne taught about his project on Nazism at Harvard in 
1939: in his view, the Nazis were criminals able to tyrannize a silenced majority. 
He also conceived the title of the volume that gathered together the 263 essays: 
Nazi Madness. But the collection, which was supposed to appear in 1941, was 
never published because—according to some sources—Hartshorne was 
called upon at the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) of Office of the 
Coordinator of Information (COI) when the United States entered the war (as 
were Neumann and Kirchheimer in the role of political analysts), and he did 
102 Walter Hirsch, “The Autonomy of Science in Totalitarian Societies,” Social Forces 40, no. 1 
(1961): 19, doi:10.2307/2573466.
103 See Detlef Garz, Sandra Tiefel, and Fritz Schütze, “‘An alle, die Deutschland vor und während 
Hitler gut kennen’: Autobiographische Beiträge deutscher Emigranten zum wissenschaftli-
chen Preisausschreiben der Harvard University aus dem Jahr 1939,” Zeitschrift für Qualitative 
Forschung 8, no. 2 (2007): 179–88; Friedrich Wissmann and Ursula Blömer, hrsg., “Es ist Mode 
geworden, die Kinder in die Lesslerschule zu schicken”: Dokumente zur Privaten Waldschule 
von Toni Lessler in Berlin Grunewald (Oldenburg: BIS-Verlag, 2010).
104 Cf. Karl Löwith, Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933: Ein Bericht (Stuttgart: J. B. 
Metzler, 1986).
105 Cf. Uta Gerhardt, Talcott Parsons: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 90–91, 108–9.
106 See Uta Gerhardt and Thomas Karlauf, eds., The Night of Broken Glass: Eyewitness Accounts 
of Kristallnacht (Malden, MA: Polity, 2012 [2009]).
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not have time to review the material. Gerhardt and Thomas Karlauf selected 
and published twenty-one of these essays in 2009. According to other sources, 
the essays were never disseminated because Harvard University would not let 
Hartshorne do it, and he therefore abandoned Harvard for the R&A Branch 
of COI, where he did not face any restrictions or pressure concerning his 
publications. But his case is still open at this date and research is ongoing.107
Nazi Madness was intended to be a contribution in opposition to U.S. 
isolationism, and many times Hartshorne had invited the government to 
abandon this stance and to intervene against the Nazis.108 Before Hartshorne’s 
death, Parsons also stood against American isolationism and for a possible 
intervention in Europe. We can read his opinions in the letter addressed to 
Fraser Taylor on September 28, 1939. Hartshorne, as a convinced anti-Nazi, 
after the United States entered the war, followed U.S. troops in Europe, 
prepared reports, and was dedicated to the postwar denazification process 
in several German schools, until 1946, when he was shot. 
What it is surprising is that for decades these accounts remained unno-
ticed in Harvard’s archives and that they were brought to light only after 
1989, just as happened for Parsons writings. Some of Hartshorne’s essays, 
unearthed by Gerhardt in 1995, were gathered in Nie mehr zuruck in dieses 
Land and edited by Propylaen Verlag in 2009. Their importance lies in that 
they are part of a research sociological project on Nazism, and on some of 
the German people who rescued Jews (as in the case of Marie Kahle).109 
To give a more complete overview of the work of Hartshorne, let me 
remember that in 1943 Hartshorne became a professor at the Psychological 
Warfare Branch of the Office of War Information (OWI)—an agency of 
107 Cf. Evans, The Third Reich at War; Evans, review of The Night of Broken Glass. See James F. 
Tent, ed., Academic Proconsul: Harvard Sociologist Edward Y. Hartshorne and the Reopening 
of German Universities, 1945–1946. His Personal Account (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag 
Trier, 1998).
108 In Parson Papers, 42.8.2, box 3, quoted in Gerhardt, Talcott Parsons on National Socialism, 
65n58; in “New Dark Age Seen If Nazis Should Win,” which appeared in a limited manner, 
on September 28, 1940, in the Boston Evening Transcript; in “Memorandum” (in which he 
speaks of prevention); and in “The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change: An Essay 
in Applied Social Science,” Psychiatry 8 (1945): 79–101.
109 Cf. Neil J. Smelser, “Psychological Trauma and Cultural Trauma,” in Cultural Trauma and 
Collective Identity, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2004), 31–59.
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the U.S. government during World War II from June 1942 to September 
1945—to consolidate information services, and, in particular, to track the 
presence of foreign spies in the United States. The Research and Analysis 
Branch collected and investigated tactical and political information. 
It was directed by William Langer of Harvard University and established 
by Col. William Donovan, and for which Hartshorne had been in service. 
It was a total war and “the intelligence also has to be total”).110 After the 
assassination attempt against Hitler on July 20, 1944, Hartshorne was 
transferred to London and then back to the United States. At the end of 
the war, he was the main person responsible for reopening German 
universities in the occupation zone. In 1945, he was at the Psychological 
Warfare Division, a U.S. division of Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) under General Eisenhower. And before the 
reopening of the German university system, in April 1945, he returned to 
Marburg, Germany, because he was on the trail, along with an investigative 
team, of the SS-Obergruppenführer Max Amann. He was committed to 
denazification and to reopening all seven universities in the U.S. occupation 
zone, and he oversaw the process in Bavaria, especially after the American 
newspapers, in the spring of 1946, reported on the failure of the program, 
as is evident in an interview conducted by Marcuse with Jürgen Habermas in 
1978. In the piece, he said, “Those whom we had listed first as ‘economic war 
criminals’ were very quickly back in the decisive positions of responsibility in 
the German economy. It would be very easy to name names here.”111
Always on the move, Hartshorne, while at the service of Office of 
War Information, did not remain for more than four days in the same 
place. But when he discovered that the U.S. government was allowing 
former Nazis to enter the United States illegally, as a radical anti-Nazi, 
he informed Moscow of the ratline designed to help war criminals. 
110 Reference to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, Functions of the OSS, in War 
Report of the OSS (New York: Walker and Co., 1976), 2:348, quoted in Neumann et al., Il 
nemico tedesco, 11–12. See Allan M. Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War 
Information, 1942–1945 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978); Bradley F. Smith, 
The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
111 Charles Reitz, “Marcuse in America—Exile as Educator: Deprovincializing One-Dimensional 
Culture in the U.S.A.,” Fast Capitalism 5, no. 2 (2009), accessed June 30, 2016, https://www.
uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/5_2/Reitz5_2.html.
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These actions in divulging the ratline were fatal for him.112 To the 
Counter Intelligence Corps, the passing on of such information was 
quite uncomfortable.113 As Porter has said concerning Hartshorne’s 
death, several hypotheses have been advanced: it remains a mystery 
whether Hartshorne was a CIA agent shot dead by the Soviet secret 
police or was murdered by Nazi sympathizers, or some other scenario, 
and very little is known about the causes of the end of his career at 
Harvard.114
1.4.4.  The Parsons Controversy over His “Role in Bringing Nazi 
Sympathizers to the U.S.”
Porter states: “In short, I found many issues unresolved in the Cold War 
years from 1946 to 1954 at Harvard University, especially the role of Talcott 
Parsons and Clyde Kluckhohn in allegedly bringing Nazi collaborators to 
the United States.”115
The controversy is related to the so-called delay of post-Holocaust 
sociology since 1948; following the death of Hartshorne, Parsons 
completely modified his sociological method of research, passing from a 
valutative sociology dealing with burning topics to an a-valutative one 
that marked the entire path of the sociological tradition for almost two 
decades, well known as “systems theory.”
112 The meaning of the term ratline is significant and is appropriate if one thinks of the sense 
of the corresponding Italian, grisella, a marine term: a cord stairway that leads to the peak 
of a ship, the last refuge when it sinks.
113 See Robin W. Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961 (New York: 
Morrow, 1987); Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood: Soviet 
Espionage in America—The Stalin Era (New York: Random House, 1999); Philip Deery and 
Mario Del Pero, Spiare e tradire: Dietro le quinte della guerra fredda (Milan: Feltrinelli, 
2011). See Evans, review of The Night of Broken Glass. Thanks to Laudani, today it is known 
that, for some time, Neumann was, during his service at the OSS, also an informer for the 
KGB under the code name of “Ruff,” making available to Soviets top-secret material; 
everything was known to U.S. intelligence services through the Venona project. See 
Neumann et al., Il nemico tedesco, 20–21.
114 See Porter, Toward a Sociology of National Socialism, 506–7; Martin Oppenheimer, “Social 
Scientists and War Criminals,” New Politics 6, no. 23 (1997), accessed May 31, 2011, http://
nova.wpunj.edu/newpolitics/issue23/oppenh23.htm.
115 Porter, Talcott Parsons and National Socialism, 603. Cf. Wiener, “Talcott Parsons’ Role 
Bringing Nazi Sympathizers to the U.S.” 305–9.
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The unresolved Hartshorne episode invites scholars to investigate the 
background of sociological research in the United States after World War 
II. This exploration is going to involve another aspect: his “ten mysterious 
letters,” which emerged after Gerhardt’s 1993 edition. Here we want to 
examine Parsons’s role [in] bringing Nazi sympathizers to the United States. 
This aspect broadens the overview of the role sociology played after the war 
and during the Cold War. Concerning this period, only selected topics will 
be addressed. Arguments not concerned with the fight against communism 
are dismissed. Hence, in this context, my thesis that scholars were impeded 
in their study of some themes and prevented from disseminating freely 
their views and research results takes its root. Sociologists were not free to 
approach the Holocaust with its related themes, such as anti-Semitism. In 
this way, they had to delay disseminating their views on the Holocaust.116 
The Parsons debate is an issue deserving particular attention and reflection. 
Here, I will attempt to consider just those elements useful to my aims in 
this book.117 
Everything starts with the release of the 1993 Gerhardt edition. After 
the commendations in Sociological Forum by Porter for the attention with 
which Parsons addressed sociologically National Socialism, the same 
Porter, in 1996, put in evidence other aspects of Parsons’s case.118 As 
Oppenheimer observes: “Porter was unaware of Wiener’s Nation piece at 
the time and when he found out about it (from me), he was understandably 
upset. He (and I) tried to have a correction to his review published.”119
This opened up a lively academic dispute on Parsons’s papers that 
were edited by Gerhardt and on the sociology of Parsons concerning 
National Socialism, termed the “Parsons controversy.” The discovery of 
his having provided safe haven for Nazi collaborators inflamed the debate 
surrounding the political significance of his sociological theories. The value-
free sociology of Parsons dominated in the field until the end of 1960s and 
116 See Edward A. Shils, “Limitations on the Freedom of Research and Teaching in the Social 
Sciences,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 200 (1938): 
144–64, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1022348.
117 I am preparing a more proper essay about the Parsons controversy.
118 Porter, “Toward a Sociology of National Socialism”; Porter, “Talcott Parsons and National 
Socialism”, 603–11. 
119 Oppenheimer, “Social Scientists and War Criminals.”
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the early 1970s when a new generation of sociologists understood and 
declared that the neutral sociology of Parsons did, indeed, hide the 
 political status quo and the ideology of the Cold War. The discovery at 
the end of 1980s of Parsons’s engagement in bringing Nazi sympathizers to 
the United States legitimated the position of these sociologists. The rising 
intellectual turmoil, to some extent, recalled the Arendt controversy at the 
publication of her Banality of Evil in 1963.120
Opening the debate was a letter sent by Oppenheimer to Porter, dated 
February 8, 1995, in which he says that Gerhardt, in her edition, did not 
mention “controversial issues” concerning Parsons and omitted “the case 
of ten mysterious missing letters,” from which could be seen Parsons’s role 
in bringing Nazi sympathizers to the United States to hold academic 
appointments and the Harvard Russian Research Center (HRRC).121
Porter immediately tried to review his previous version, but the editor 
of Sociological Forum rejected the debate, suggesting as “inappropriate” 
letters exchanged between Porter and Oppenheimer and that the journal 
was not fit for addressing the question.122 “The sociological establishment 
then circled the wagons to protect Parsons. The journal refused to publish 
any amendment to Porter’s review, much less any letters about it, for about 
two years.”123 Only in December 1996, with the new editor, Richard Hall, 
was Porter able to report, in Sociological Forum, the attention on Parsons, 
answering publicly the brouhaha. In Porter’s view there was no attempt to 
sully Parsons, rather he intended to bring to light “the bluteh (Yiddish for 
“mud”) of Cold War politics” a politics that led him to abandon any kind 
of research with practical feedback in political and social life.124 
I decided to briefly report this debate because it accounts for how 
the strategies of the Cold War affected research projects and community 
research. Also, the controversy raised other tensions: in the same number 
in which Porter was edited, “two lengthy defenses of Parsons”—in 
120 Talcott Parsons, Professioni e libertà, ed. Marco Santoro (Rome: Armando, 2011).
121 Cf. Porter, “Talcott Parsons and National Socialism,” 603, 611. Oppenheimer sent another 
letter to Porter, January 31, 1995, and one to Gerhardt, November 13, 1995. See Oppenheimer, 
“Social Scientists and War Criminals.”
122 Cf. Porter, “Talcott Parsons and National Socialism,” 603.
123 Oppenheimer, “Social Scientists and War Criminals.”
124 Cf. Porter, “Talcott Parsons and National Socialism,” 604, 609.
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Oppenheimer’s words—appeared: “Truth, Misinterpretation, or Left-wing 
McCarthyism?” by Dennis H. Wrong, and “Scholarship, Not Scandal” by 
Gerhardt.125 Well, the Porter and Oppenheimer criticisms hung on the 
studies of Thomas Charles O’Connell, the outstanding researcher, with 
Christopher Simpson, who read the famed missing letters. His studies were 
gathered in his dissertation “Social Structure and Science: Soviet Studies” 
(1990). I personally tried to consult this thesis, and in 2001 I requested it 
from Ann Arbor, Michigan, according to standard e-mail procedure, but I 
never received an answer.126 Parsons and his sociology of Nazism deserve a 
separate study. The controversy arose because his initial interest in the 
Jewish question changed at the death of Hartshorne and, definitively, 
during the Cold War. Two works explain the context, one by Christopher 
Simpson and one by Jon Wiener,127 as mentioned by Oppenheimer: 
University of California (Irvine) historian Jon Wiener stumbled 
upon Charles O’Connell’s doctoral dissertation, then still in draft 
form, and wrote an article for The Nation (March 6, 1989) describing 
in some detail Parsons’ involvement with trying to smuggle “Nazi 
collaborators” into the U.S. as Soviet studies experts. Gerhardt, it 
turns out, was aware of Wiener’s article when she wrote her book.128
The key words seem to be “Soviet” and “experts.” Parsons recruited 
Nazi sympathizers since they were Soviet experts, and this Soviet 
expertise was particularly requested by the U.S. government to help 
fight the Red menace. 
When Winston Churchill, in a speech on March 5, 1946, gave us the 
term “Iron Curtain,” all research thereafter was directed to the contest 
125 Dennis H. Wrong, “Truth, Misinterpretation, or Left-wing McCarthyism?” Sociological 
Forum, 11, no. 4 (1996): 613–21; Uta Gerhardt, “Scholarship, Not Scandal,” Sociological 
Forum 11, no. 4 (1996): 623–30; Oppenheimer, Social Scientists and War Criminals.
126 On the O’Connell dissertation—Charles O’Connell, “Social Structure and Science: Soviet 
Studies” (PhD diss., UCLA, 1990)—it can be consulted at UCLA, Department of Sociology, 
or it can be requested from University of Microfilms International of Ann Arbor. See 
Oppenheimer, “To the Editor”; Porter, “Talcott Parsons and National Socialism,” 609.
127 Cf. Simpson, Blowback; Wiener, “Talcott Parsons’ Role Bringing Nazi Sympathizers to 
the U.S.”
128 Oppenheimer, “Social Scientists and War Criminals.”
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against the Soviets and their sphere. The Nazi sympathizers in question, 
such as Nicholas Poppe, were aware of the murder of the Jews. This is 
important. The historian Wiener wrote: “Poppe defected to the Nazis in 
1942, the day they arrived in the Caucasus town where he was teaching. 
Simpson reported that Poppe ‘actively collaborated in the creation of the 
quisling government’ in one of the ethnic minority areas, an administra-
tion that promptly expropriated Jewish property and murdered the 
region’s Jews.”129 In 1948, Parsons received his assignment to recruit 
Poppe, known for his expertise on the Caucasus, Soviet ethnics, and 
Jewish communities in the Soviet Union. In the name of the Cold War 
and to obtain information or insights concerning the Soviet Union, 
anything useful for unearthing Soviet operations became precious, and 
thus questions about or investigations into what happened to the Jews 
(even in those areas) were overshadowed. As for intelligence sources, a 
plan labeled “secret” was prepared on Soviet social scientists in 1948 by 
Norman Davies:
The Davies project fit in well with what the Carnegie people had 
in mind for the Harvard Russian Research Center. A reconnais-
sance of various potential sources of data (the refugees) needed 
to be undertaken. Shortly after the formalization of the HRRC, 
Director Kluckhohn dispatched Executive Committee member 
Talcott Parsons to carry out this mission. Parsons travelled in 
Germany, Austria, England and Sweden from June to August 
1948, during which time he was in touch with diplomatic and 
military officials, intelligence personnel, scholars, and a few 
Soviet displaced persons in order to identify those who might be 
useful in various ways to the HRRC. He also wrote approxi-
mately ten letters to Kluckhohn describing his travels and his 
contacts. (Two scholars have seen these letters and quote from 
them in their work: O’Connell, and Sigmund Diamond, the 
Columbia sociologist and historian, whose Compromised Campus, 
129 Wiener, “Talcott Parsons’ Role Bringing Nazi Sympathizers to the U.S.,” 306.
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1992, devotes several chapters to the HRRC). Some interesting 
names appear in these letters. Nicholas Poppe is one of them.130
For the U.S. fear of a second Red threat was in play above all by the end of 
the 1940s until 1953, when the Thaw era commenced with Stalin’s death, the 
know-how of these informers constituted a golden basis of information 
against the Red menace, and “Nicholas Poppe, a sophisticated intellectual 
well-versed in Soviet affairs was a star in this respect.”131 It is essential to say 
that he was not accepted immediately by the U.S. Department of State. 
Edward Mason, professor at Harvard, helped with his entrance into the 
United States, and he was contacted by Parsons. Mason, as a member of the 
executive committee of the Russian Center and a consultant for the 
Department of State, kept in touch with political executives of the Warfare 
division of the State Department, particularly with George F. Kennan, 
author of the policy of “containment.” Thanks to the friendship between 
Mason and Kennan, Poppe arrived in Washington in 1949, under the false 
name of Joseph Alexandros.132 At the end of the war, Poppe was a refugee 
in Britain, to the embarrassment of the military government, since he is 
wanted as a war criminal. But as can be seen by reading the Wiener and 
Oppenheimer pieces, the Army Counter Intelligence Corps was asked “if 
it is possible for U.S. intelligence authorities to take him off their hands and 
see that he is sent to the U.S. where he can be ‘lost,’” as stated in a secret 
memorandum of May 1947 and rediscovered by Simpson.133 After the end 
of the war, Parsons worked at the Harvard Russian Research Center: he 
130 Oppenheimer, “Social Scientists and War Criminals,” 5.
131 Ibid. On the Dudin Group, Nazi collaborators of the Vlasov army, and the Cold War, see 
correspondence between Martin Oppenheimer and Jack N. Porter (January 31–February 8, 
1995), and letters of Martin Oppenheimer to Uta Gerhardt (November 13, 1995). Cf. Simpson, 
Blowback; Wiener, “Talcott Parsons’ Role Bringing Nazi Sympathizers to the U.S.”
132 Cf. Wiener, “Talcott Parsons’ Role Bringing Nazi Sympathizers to the U.S.,” 306–9; 
Oppenheimer, “Social Scientists and War Criminals.” For the relationship concerning 
Parsons, Poppe, the Russian Research Center, the academic realm of Harvard, and the 
Carnegie Foundation, see “Social Network Diagram for Talcott Parsons,” last accessed 
May 17, 2011, http://www.namebase.org/cgi-bin/nb06?_PARSONS_TALCOTT_.
133 See Wiener, “Talcott Parsons’ Role Bringing Nazi Sympathizers to the U.S.,” 306; 
Oppenheimer, “Social Scientists and War Criminals”. 
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had the mission on behalf of army intelligence officers and State Department 
officials to flush out some former military Soviet supporters of Nazis: 
Talcott Parsons knew that the man he called “our friend Poppe” had 
collaborated with the Nazis. . . . The work Parsons did on Poppe’s 
behalf indicates his willingness to overcome moral objections to 
collaboration, as well as his self-proclaimed “value-neutrality” in 
scientific norms, in the name of cold war activism.134
I cannot discuss the entire case here, but I direct the reader to pieces 
by Oppenheimer, Porter, and Wiener, scholars well acquainted with 
the facts. I shall limit myself to looking at the sociology of Parsons 
during the Cold War years. By examining Wiener’s and Oppenheimer’s 
writings, I learned about O’Connell dissertation, “Social Structure and 
Science: Soviet Studies,” and about Parsons’s postwar activities. Let me 
stress that in the Harvard archives, O’Connell found the ten letters 
mentioned above. Parsons wrote them to a colleague, Clyde Kluckhohn, 
head of the Center. These letters show that the main man among 
Russian contacts was Nicholas Poppe, an expert on the languages of 
Soviet areas: he was a professor at the University of Leningrad from 
1925 to 1941 and knew “the location and size of Jewish communities in 
the Soviet Union.”135
Parsons, in the ten letters of the summer of 1948, says he did know 
Poppe and “dedicated himself to obtaining a U.S. entry visa and a Harvard 
appointment” for Poppe—a difficult task, since Poppe “was not only a Nazi 
collaborator but had been banned from entering the United States and had 
recently been the object of a U.S. manhunt in Germany for extradition to 
the Soviet Union.”136 
Parsons’ German summer of 1948 tells us a great deal about the 
historical role of liberal scholars in the early Cold War as well as the 
academic liaison with covert CIA operations, contacts with fugitives 
134 Wiener, “Talcott Parsons’ Role Bringing Nazi Sympathizers to the U.S.,” 308. 
135 Ibid, 306. Poppe’s case is reported in the U.S. General Accounting Office Report of 1985. 
136 Ibid., 306. See Porter, “Talcott Parsons and National Socialism,” 605–6.
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hiding underground on forged documents, desperate to escape either 
Soviet or Nuremberg Tribunals.137
Everything seems to be linked with the establishment of Harvard 
Russian Research Center. What I intend to underline, remembering my 
focus (that the sociological delay, in the approaching the Jewish question, 
occurred in the name of the Cold War politics), is that these Nazi 
 collaborators, wanted by the Soviets, entered United States thanks to 
Harvard, with academic appointments in exchange for collaboration: “In 
the war against the Communists, anything and everything went, even 
morality. It is in this convoluted atmosphere that the story begins.”138 
In this context we see that a sociological thinking free from political duties in 
relation to communism never took root. In the name of fighting communism 
and of individualistic ethics, collaboration with former Nazis was able to 
provide useful information on the Soviet system.
These Soviet experts passed information about the Soviets on to the 
Harvard Russian Research Center in order to save their own lives. The 
letter, a “smoking gun,” in Porter’s words, is on page 223 of O’Connell’s 
doctoral dissertation and is based on Parsons’s letter to Kluckhohn of 
June 30, 1948, in which “Parsons tells Kluckhohn of meeting with a 
British intelligence man named Rhodes, who had Poppe’s dossier, 
marked ‘Top Secret’ on his desk. Parsons tells Kluckhohn that if a way 
can be found to get Poppe into the U.S., the British will take care of 
letting him out of Germany.”139 
Parsons’s letters to Kluckhohn led Porter to raise many interesting 
questions: “(One intriguing question I have: How did Parsons’ letters to Clyde 
Kluckhohn come to be controlled by Merle Fainsod and his daughters?) 
Indeed, Parsons’ letters to Kluckhohn reveal a mixture of certainty and 
ambiguity regarding the exploitation of former Nazi collaborators as 
137 Porter, “Talcott Parsons and National Socialism,” 607. “Parsons developed relationships 
with other former Nazi collaborators on his German trip in 1948” (Wiener, “Talcott 
Parsons’ Role Bringing Nazi Sympathizers to the U.S.,” 308). On his contacts with Leo 
Dudin of the Vlasov army, and Vladimir Pozdniajov, former lieutenant colonel of Red 
Army, and on army intelligence officers and Harvard, see ibid., 308–9.
138 Porter, “Talcott Parsons and National Socialism,” 604.
139 Ibid., 606; Oppenheimer, “Social Scientists and War Criminals.” 
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scholarly resources for Harvard.”140 Porter, in an e-mail to me on May 31, 
2011, writes that “it is a fascinating mystery.” What presses me to reflect 
upon this case, or on what happened to those letters, is the way he 
informed me: “The ‘ten letters’ exist but are sealed by the Fainsod family,” 
and “the Parsons family (especially, son Prof. Charles Parsons who is a 
prof of philosophy at Harvard) and Harvard are both sensitive to this 
matter and how it can be misused by Leftists who may be anti-Parsons.” 
In Porter’s article, he says:
I waited in order to get hold of “ten mysterious letters” that show 
Parsons’ role in all this. They can be found in the Merle Fainsod 
Collection of the Harvard Archives, but it was taking a great deal of 
time to get permission from the archives and from Fainsod’s two 
daughters. I could not wait any longer. I also waited to find the 
article by Jens Kaalhauge Nielsen in Robertson and Turner (1991), 
and I urge everyone to read it and to compare it to the Jon Wiener 
(1989) essay in The Nation. 
The entire issue revolves around certain individuals who may 
or may not have been Nazi collaborators. At a curious juncture in 
history, two things happened: one, many post–World War II refu-
gees were trying to get into America, some of them Nazi 
collaborators; and two, Harvard University was trying to recruit 
refugee scholars for their new Russian Research Center. There was 
bound to be a collision.141
From O’Connell’s information, it is evident that after 1951, “Harvard appears 
to sever its ties with them [Soviet displaced persons].”142 Nevertheless, this 
debate, far from resolved, is now useful for understanding the status of 
sociologists in a “wider perspective,” that is, when academic research is 
not free and unfettered, but rather conditioned by political intentions. 
140 Porter, “Talcott Parsons and National Socialism,” 606, reference is to O’Connell, “Social 
Structure and Science,” 223.
141 Ibid., 604. See Wiener, “Talcott Parsons’ Role Bringing Nazi Sympathizers to the U.S.,” 
308–9.
142 Porter, “Talcott Parsons and National Socialism,” 606.
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Briefly, the main American universities, as with the HRRC, could not deal 
with the Holocaust theme, which concerned a matter of accountability 
and a very recent event calling for political accountabilities or for a kind 
of public admission of guilty. Behind Parsons’s a-valutative sociology (for 
which political issues are not addressed and considered of no importance 
and not fit for social sciences) lies the purpose of maintaining the status 
quo. A liberal Harvard in fighting communism accepted the collaboration 
with Nazi collaborators or Nazi sympathizers after the Holocaust. 
I can now focus attention on criticisms directed at Parsons after the 
Gerhardt edition came out. To be more precise, I have preferred to divide 
them into two main currents: on the one hand, those pro-Parsons, namely, 
those, such as Gerhardt, Wrong, and Nielsen, who ignore his political activ-
ities during the Cold War years. On the other, scholars, such Simpson, 
Wiener, O’Connell, Oppenheimer, and Porter, who, on the contrary, put 
into light a hitherto less well-known aspect of his European missions at the 
end of the war. Among pro-Parsons scholars, for example, Jens K. Nielsen, 
in 1991, introduced the sociologist of Harvard as a clear and passionate 
opponent of fascism, Nazism, and McCarthyism, criticizing strongly the 
1989 positions by Wiener. I suggest the reader examine his assumptions.143 
To acquaint us better with the facts, as suggested by Porter, the answer can 
be found only in the Fainsod Papers, never seen by Nielsen, but seen by 
O’Connell, who examined them for his doctoral dissertation.144 What strikes 
my eye is that Parsons, during 1947–49, was head of the Department of 
Social Relations at Harvard, and in 1949 he was  president of the American 
Sociological Society, later American Sociological Association (his colleague 
Kluckhohn was president of the American Anthropological Association in 
1947). This means that Parsons had relevant positions at Harvard and that 
he had financing so he could have publicized and disseminated his writings 
about National Socialism if he had wanted to. I reflect on this because 
143 Cf. Jens K. Nielsen, “The Political Orientation of Talcott Parsons: The Second World War 
and Its Aftermath,” in Talcott Parsons: Theorist of Modernity, ed. Roland Robertson and 
Bryan S. Turner (London: Sage, 1991), 217–33; Porter, “Talcott Parsons and National 
Socialism,” 605–7; O’Connell, “Social Structure and Science,” 222–24.
144 Porter, “Talcott Parsons and National Socialism,” 608, reference to O’Connell, “Social 
Structure and Science,” 233–36.
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scholars became aware of these pieces only thanks to Gerhardt in 1993. The 
Carnegie Corporation founded the HRRC, and Parsons, in 1949, needed 
$10,000 to reestablish the American Sociological Association, and $25,000 
for his book Toward a General Theory of Action (1951). In 1961, he received 
$30,000 for his other personal research. Also, his department received the 
amounts of $150,000 and $125,000 from the Carnegie Corporation.145 (This 
is found in the interview with Talcott Parsons, March 22, 1967, at the 
Carnegie Oral History Project, Columbia University Archives.) 
I attempted to find some answers to unresolved questions, exploring, 
even if briefly, the realm of Harvard, in the pre–World War II years, in the 
voices of some scholars. What helped me was a Norwood essay written in 
2004 dealing with the academic conditions facilitating some strands of 
research. In blocking the approach to the Holocaust, some attitudes and 
views assumed by academics and alumni of Harvard at the time, such as 
the “dismissal of Jews from the professions,”146 played a relevant role. The 
anti-Semitic mentality and outrage in the prewar years discouraged 
scholars from treating Jewish themes and the Holocaust during and after 
the war. Illuminating is the following piece:
President Conant remained publicly indifferent to the persecution 
of Jews in Europe and failed to speak out against it until after 
Kristallnacht, in November 1938. He was determined to build 
friendly ties with the Universities of Heidelberg and Goettingen, 
even though they had expelled their Jewish faculty members and 
thoroughly Nazified their curricula, constructing a “scholarly” 
foundation for vulgar antisemitism, which was taught as “racial 
science.”. . . President Conant’s behavior was certainly influenced by 
the anti-Jewish prejudice he harbored. His predecessor as Harvard’s 
president, A. Lawrence Lowell, had voiced his antisemitism publicly, 
notably during the controversy in 1922 surrounding his proposal 
that Harvard introduce a formal quota to reduce Jewish enrollment. 
145 Ibid., 607; Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951).
146 See next note.
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In justifying a quota, President Lowell, a vice president of the 
Immigration Restriction League, had declared that “a strong race 
feeling on the part of the Jews” was a significant cause of the “rapidly 
growing anti-Semitic feeling in this country.”147
In the postwar period, in an atmosphere of great tension between the two 
main world powers, what happened to the Jews in Europe was “frozen”: 
Harvard, as did other American universities, reduced the importance of the 
analysis of Nazism in favor of other questions privileged by the ruling class: 
Parsons’ 1948 German trip raises some larger questions about the 
relationship between academic sociology and political life: Is there 
something about ahistorical social theory that leads its practitioners 
to “forget” the history of the Nazis’ crimes? Is there something about 
“value-free” social science that leads its practitioners to ignore the 
value of bringing collaborators to justice? In the end, Parsons proves 
to be another case in a depressingly familiar story: that of leading 
liberal scholars in the United States making political commitments 
in the name of the cold war, blinding themselves to moral issues and 
making a mockery of their claims to objective scholarship.148 
Several researches of this period were conducted by the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS), which were aimed at defeating of communism.149 Today 
the “Parsons controversy” is largely well known: it is important because it 
brings to light the status of post-Holocaust sociology, illuminating why 
this event was studied, but rather dismissed, but then, finally, research 
pathways were opened to investigate it adequately. It recalls international 
147 Stephen H. Norwood, “Legitimating Nazism: Harvard University and the Hitler Regime, 
1933–1937,” American Jewish History 92, no. 2 (2004): 190.
148 Wiener, “Talcott Parsons’ Role Bringing Nazi Sympathizers to the U.S.,” 309. Cf. Abbott 
Gleanson, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995); Salvati, Antifascismo e totalitarismo nelle scienze sociali tra le due guerre, 627.
149 Cf. Martin Oppenheimer, “Footnote to the Cold War: The Harvard Russian Research 
Center,” Monthly Review 48 (1997): 7–17. Several scholars and intellectuals entered OSS 
and OWI to help identify vulnerabilities in the war against communism.
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relations during the Cold War and the difficulties liberal Harvard faced 
when handling the Nazi question and anti-Semitic issues: 
The matter of Talcott Parsons’s “missing years” is known, but not 
widely. It would seem that there are people who prefer to keep it 
that way. Still, what harm would it do to satisfy historical objec-
tivity nearly years later? Is it that Parsons’ many sociological 
disciples, people whose careers are based on “Parsonian sociology,” 
are embarrassed by these disclosures and feel they must therefore 
either deny Parsons’ role, or somehow justify it as a matter of 
saving face? Or are Parsons and the HRRC really not the issue? 
Does a description of power structure networks and their respon-
sibility for formulating university research agendas, and the 
interlock between those networks and “top” universities and intel-
ligence and other “defense” agencies, get too close to undermining 
the myth of scholarly objectivity and thereby the respectability of 
the university, a status that has been in careful repair since the end 
of the Vietnam War?150 
Only free access to the ten missing letters could enlighten us on forgotten 
aspects.151 The publication of these letters, to date inaccessible, would not 
only settle the inflamed debate but would also reveal further issues related 
to post-Holocaust sociology:
However from my knowledge of the Holocaust, Poppe is defini-
tively a Nazi war criminal. . . . Poppe worked for the notorious 
Wannsee Institute and gave of his talents and skill as an SS research 
social scientist to help round up Jews and other ethnic groups inside 
the Soviet Union. In short, he was a kind of “Nazi sociologist” (my 
phrase). He would have been convicted of war crimes and sentenced, 
if not to death, then to a long prison sentence if caught. He would 
150 Oppenheimer, “Social Scientists and War Criminals.”
151 See Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005); Judt, 
Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin, 2008).
Sociological Thinking about the Holocaust in the PostwarYears, 1945–1960s   | 57
have been placed on a watch list like Kurt Waldheim and never 
allowed into this country. He slipped through, however, as did 
hundreds of other collaborators during the Cold War. Look at the 
case of Paul de Man and Mircea Eliade, two accomplished academics 
who were also later found to be Nazi collaborators.152 
1.5. THE GERMAN ARMY IN SHILS AND JANOWITZ
At this point, it is important to stress that 1948 was a crucial year for 
post-Holocaust sociology. In that year, Edward A. Shils and Morris 
Janowitz, members of the Chicago School, conducted a survey on the 
social structure of the German army. It comes as no surprise that the 
work had its origin in Chicago. Far from being a military history, as 
the title “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World 
War II” might suggest, in the article various aspects of Nazi policy are 
exposed along with the social construction of prejudice. Let me retrace 
what these scholars of Chicago elaborate and in which sociological 
way they link the German army to Nazism and the Holocaust. When, 
in the text, we read that the “passionate aggressiveness” of the 
Wehrmacht was used to protect a Germany that considered itself 
surrounded by dark and threatening forces (with reference to 
Bolsheviks, Jews, and blacks), it is clear that it refers to the image of a 
country that is defenseless and in danger. Although most of the 
German soldiers had no interest in the Nazi political system, condi-
tions to discredit the Jews arose.153 At the end of the 1940s, the topic of 
the Wehrmacht occupied a secondary position in postwar culture and 
this marginalization, in some respects, continued in the later years, 
especially owing to the common opinion that the army belonged only 
slightly to National Socialism and was a military body in itself, distinct 
and intact. Shils and Janowitz instead study organic solidarity within 
152 Porter, “Talcott Parsons and National Socialism,” 608-609, reference to O’Connell, “Social 
Structure and Science,” 217–18.
153 Cf. Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht 
in World War II,” Public Opinion Quarterly 12 (1948): 303.
 | American Sociology and Holocaust Studies58
the German army to understand what prompted the army to continue 
fighting despite the defeat of Germany. The authors found the “hard 
core” explaining the ideological nature lying behind the Wehrmacht 
and, principally, the force of Nazi ideology.154 
Here some sociological key factors are highlighted: precisely, how 
both researchers of Chicago identify interesting elements helping to 
understand the process of Nazification and subsequently the destruction 
of the Jews. For example, the following phrases help to acquaint us better 
with the connection between Nazi Party and the army:
Even before the outbreak of the war, the Nazi party took an active 
hand in the internal high policy of the Wehrmacht and in the selec-
tion of the Chief of Staff and his entourage. From September 1939 to 
the signing of the capitulation in May 1945 this process of Nazification 
continued steadily until the Wehrmacht was finally rendered 
powerless to make its own decisions. Nazi party control over the 
Wehrmacht was designed to insure (1) that Nazi strategic intentions 
would be carried out, (2) that capitulation would be made impos-
sible, and (3) that internal solidarity down to the lowest private 
would be maintained.155
When Shils and Janowitz, diverging from the common contemporary 
opinion, state that the Wehrmacht did not exhibit typical features of 
Wilhelmine military ethics, because it was to be a mass that did not 
embrace the values of the German nation as such, they stress a particular 
feature of the Nazi propaganda—some fanatics were seeking to obey an 
authority in the name of the Second Reich’s honor code. The Wehrmacht 
soldiers were recruited on the basis of “ethical or political loyalties”: to be 
part of this military organization was to be an aggregation of individuals 
who were not nationalized according to Wilhelmine military ethics. 
Rather, joining the army were adults with economic difficulties during 
the Weimar Republic who hoped to find, with the advent of National 
154 Ibid., 304. See Murray I. Gurfein and Morris Janowitz, “Trends in Wehrmacht Morale,” 
The Public Opinion Quarterly 10, no. 1 (1946): 78. 
155 Shils and Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” 306–7.
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Socialism, a solution to their material problems, or young people, between 
twenty-four and twenty-eight years old and easily indoctrinable. Shils 
and Janowitz unearthed the role played by the ancient German military 
code in the formation of social cohesion of the Wehrmacht and how it 
favored the advent of Nazi power.156 Written perhaps only to account for the 
trauma of the World War II, however, the article is much more. It combines 
elements drawn from many fields of the social sciences: from psycho-so-
ciology to international relations, by way of comparative politics and urban 
studies. Acquainted with the concepts of “armed forces” and “civil–military 
relations” and with the international context of World War II, the authors 
show the importance of social control over civilian institutions. After 
denouncing what the Wehrmacht was, the text is a real invitation to civic 
consciousness. It may be considered a pioneering work both in post-Ho-
locaust sociology, because the Wehrmacht is presented as a “primary 
social group,” and in sociology in general, since the University of Chicago 
in the 1940s was specializing in quantitative research of social groups. In 
addition, it offers a great contribution to social sciences in the field of 
military studies: Shils and Janowitz propose an original explanation of the 
reasons that led the Wehrmacht to support Hitler and his policies during 
World War II:157
For the authors, in attempting to determine why the German Army 
in World War II fought so stubbornly to the end, have made an 
intensive study of the social structure of this army, of the symbols 
to which it responded, of the Nazi attempts to bolster its morale, 
and the Allied attempts to break it down.158 
156 Cf. ibid., 284, 292–97, 303–5; Aly, Hitler’s Beneficiaries. See Eric Dunning and Stephen 
Mennell, “Elias on Germany, Nazism and the Holocaust: On the Balance between 
‘Civilizing’ and ‘Decivilizing’ Trends in the Social Development of Western Europe,” 
British Journal of Sociology 49, no. 3 (1998): 339–57.
157 Cf. Ernest M. Doblin and Claire Pohly, “The Social Composition of the Nazi Leadership,” 
American Journal of Sociology 51, no. 1 (1945): 42–49, doi:10.1086/219712; Robert J. 
MacCoun, Elizabeth Kier, and Aaron Belkin, “Does Social Cohesion Determine 
Motivation in Combat? An Old Question with an Old Answer,” Armed Forces & Society 32, 
no. 4 (2006): 646–654, doi:10.1177/0095327X05279181.
158 Shils and Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” 280.
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Starting from the initial theme of the Wehrmacht, Shils and Janowitz 
explain in an early and alternative way what Hitlerism was and how “the 
ignorance of the German troops about important military events” was “a 
part of Nazi policy.”159 Terror and elimination of the opposition and, espe-
cially, the meaning of Gemeinschaft were among the elements typical of 
National Socialist ideology and of the old Prussian military code. What is 
 interesting is that the Wehrmacht operates with the sociological notions of 
authority and obedience to authority that Shils and Janowitz adopt in 
their examination. 
Their sociological innovation was also that they advocated, among 
other scholars, for the prompt recognition or public admission of 
 massacres committed in regions in the East: they examine the differences 
between fighting methods on the Eastern Front and that of Western 
 occupation. Behind the term “brutality” lies the executions committed in 
the Soviet areas to the east. In fact, “The experience of the German soldiers 
in Russia in 1941 and 1942 increased this repugnance by direct perception 
of the primitive life of the Russian villager. But probably more important 
was the projection onto the Russians of the guilt feelings generated by the 
ruthless brutality of the Germans in Russia during the occupation  period.”160 
According to the authors, the Wehrmacht did not play a mere secondary 
role in the Third Reich policies of extermination: 
When the Nazi party salute was introduced in 1944, it was accepted as 
just one more army order, about equal in significance to an order 
requiring the carrying of gas masks. The introduction of the National 
Socialistische Fuhrungsoffizierte (Guidance, or Indoctrination 
Officer), usually known as the NSFO, was regarded apathetically or as 
a joke. The contempt for the NSFO was derived not from his Nazi 
connection but from his status as an “outsider” who was not a real 
soldier. The especially Nazified Waffen SS divisions were never the 
object of hostility on the part of the ordinary soldier, even when the 
responsibility for atrocities was attributed to them. On the contrary, 
159 Ibid., 300.
160 Ibid., 301.
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the Waffen SS was highly esteemed, not as a Nazi formation, but for 
its excellent fighting capacity. Wehrmacht soldiers always felt safer 
when there was a Waffen SS unit on their flank.161
What is relevant is the sociological way in which Shils and Janowitz 
present the structure of this military body: first, they define the institution 
of Wehrmacht as a primary social group, putting the social cohesion at the 
center of the analysis. Following a functionalist and microsociological 
approach, they study—with close attention to inside roles and attitude 
patterns—how the Wehrmacht functioned. As concerns the National 
Socialist society, they introduce it as a “secondary group,” organized and 
regulated. Their institutional perspective allows for the consideration also 
of a set of interinstitutional relations. Namely, it helps to compare this 
body with Nazi German society and to understand the relationships 
between the several institutions in National Socialist society—how they 
functioned and what caused their disorganization. What is so remarkable 
is their multilevel analysis that reflects not only the sociology of William 
I. Thomas (visible in the similarity that they trace between primary groups 
and institutions in society) but also that of Durkheim, according to which 
any primary social group is held together by ties of solidarity, defined as 
moral bonds of solidarity.162 
There are rules or principles to which members of the group obey and 
for which the group remains alive in a cohesive way. Therefore, the 
elements that hold this military group are strong social ties, guaranteeing 
in turn the “soldier’s company.” 
Shils and Janowitz identify two broad categories within the infantry: 
on the one hand, the faithfuls, those who fight until the end of the conflict, 
and second, the deserters, the few who defect. 
Since the authors were interested in understanding what  underpinned 
social cohesion in the Wehrmacht of the faithful who fought until the end 
of the war, and what instead favored the disruption causing others to 
161 Ibid., 303–4.
162 See William I. Thomas, The Unadjusted Girl: With Cases and Standpoint for Behavior 
Analysis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1923); Shils and Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in 
the Wehrmacht in World War II,” 280.
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defect, they resorted to the sociological concepts of social cohesion and 
social disintegration.163 Indeed, behind the two types of attitudes (loyalty 
and desertion) was the willingness on the part of Shils and Janowitz to 
confront strategies adopted by the Third Reich. 
Very interesting in their research is the method they used to conduct 
interviews among prisoners of war and their data analysis of combat 
observers. It was an entirely new method of investigation for scholarship 
on the Jewish question and reflected the typical approach of the Chicago 
School. It can be said that with Shils and Janowitz—and as it will late with 
Hughes—the Chicago School made room for the studying the Holocaust.
Coming back to the interviews, it turns out how the Wehrmacht, a 
modern military body, was a primary social group, like the family or a 
community of friends. By reading that the Wehrmacht was the only 
community, it is clear that for both authors the characteristic of uniqueness, 
representative of a primary social group, is the element that gives identity 
and stability to the group.164 What makes it without parallel is the idea of 
Gemeinschaft: the soldiers of the Wehrmacht felt the duty to fight, live, and 
die for their land.165 Here is what emerged from an interview:
Thus wrote an idealistic German student in the first world war. A 
German sergeant, captured toward the end of the second world war, 
was asked by his interrogators about the political opinions of his men. 
In reply, he laughed and said, “When you ask such a question, I realize 
well that you have no idea of what makes a soldier fight. The soldiers 
lie in their holes and are happy if they live through the next day. If we 
think at all, it’s about the end of the war and then home.”166
When Shils and Janowitz notice that “the primary group continues to 
be the major source of social and psychological sustenance through 
163 Shils and Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” 280.
164 Ibid., 283.
165 Ibid., 286: “These were, on the whole, young men between 24 and 28 years of age who had 
had a gratifying adolescence in the most rewarding period of National Socialism. They 
were imbued with the ideology of Gemeinschaft (community solidarity).”
166 Ibid., 284.
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adulthood,”167 it is evident that the Wehrmacht, like the family, had the 
function to raise the individual: it played a fundamental role in the process 
of formation of persons until maturity. This process of primary education, 
which forms individual identity, generates affection, loyalty, and in some 
respects even addiction of the individual to the group. Since persons take 
shape in the group, they identify themselves with the group. In other 
words, the primary group of the Wehrmacht is cohesive and has a unique 
feeling, an idem sentire, like a feeling in the gut. In other words, an ἀλλὰ 
φρονεῖν. It is continuously indoctrinated in the same values and beliefs as 
those of National Socialist ideology:
This extraordinary tenacity of the German Army has frequently 
been attributed to the strong National Socialist political convictions 
of the German soldiers. . . .
The capacity of the primary group to resist disintegration was 
dependent on the acceptance of political, ideological, and cultural 
symbols (all secondary symbols) only to the extent that these 
secondary symbols became directly associated with primary 
gratifications.168
As a child feels attitudes of total trust towards his own mother and family, 
in the same way those who served in the Wehrmacht exhibited attitudes of 
loyalty and trust, mutual respect, love between individuals, to the point of 
putting the interests of the group—the German Gemeinschaft—before 
those of the individual. Shils and Janowitz’s study is based on the idea of a 
substitution of the Wehrmacht, which educates the soldiers, for the family, 
which educates children. The attentions they gave to the psychological 
aspect brought them close to the Frankfurt School approach. Moreover, 
when they speak of a forced socialization based on a social control 
 exercised among members of the Wehrmacht, they evidence the role of 
ideology, indoctrination, and propaganda: “In order to strengthen the 
traditional Wehrmacht indoctrination efforts, the Nazi Party appointed in 
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid., 281.
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the winter of 1943 political indoctrination officers, called National 
Socialistische Fuhrungsoffiziere (NSFO), to all military formations.”169
Shils and Janowitz can measure the social cohesion level within the 
group since this element is the basis of unconditional loyalty or of military 
defection. Among the factors that ensure maximum cohesion are language 
and belonging to the same ethnic group, the Volksdeutsche, that is, cultural 
variables encouraging social integration. When a large number of soldiers 
share them, the social cohesion is greater and the degree of disintegration 
or defection from the army decreases. On the contrary, ethnic language 
and age differences among soldiers limit the process of assimilation, to 
which must then be added factors of a personal nature, such as the insta-
bility of the individual, or deviant people. In fact, “In the Wehrmacht, 
desertions and surrenders were most frequent in groups of heterogeneous 
ethnic composition in which Austrians, Czechs, and Poles were randomly 
intermixed with each other.”170 On this kind of solidarity, the political 
indoctrination of National Socialists ran its course. The cohesive strength 
of the group creates an experience of community in order to minimize or 
completely eliminate disagreements in the group, creating a corps without 
differences, that is, an amorphous mass of great force, and where the ties 
of solidarity depend on the construction of the “other” as an enemy to 
eliminate: 
The factor of spatial proximity in the maintenance of group soli-
darity in military situations must not be underestimated. In 
February and March of 1945, isolated remnants of platoons and 
companies were surrendering in groups with increasing frequency. 
The tactical situation of defensive fighting under heavy American 
 artillery bombardment and the deployment of rear outposts forced 
soldiers to take refuge in cellars, trenches, and other underground 
shelters in small groups of three and four. This prolonged isolation 
from the nucleus of the primary group for several days worked to 
169 Ibid., 307.
170 Ibid., 285. In the campaigns of North Africa (1943) and France and Germany (1944–45) 
defections were attributable, according to interviewees’ answers, to the coerced condition 
and the lack of the feeling of empathy among Germans in army units.
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 reinforce the fear of destruction of the self, and thus had a disintegrative 
influence on primary group relations.171
As scholars of the Chicago School, Shils and Janowitz knew well that phys-
ical distance creates social distance, and, therefore, moral detachment 
ultimately causes the disintegration of social relations. For them, fear, 
growing stronger in the last few months of the war, disintegrated the 
group: loyalty and trust in Hitler failed; faced with the evidence of the loss 
of the war, the first signs of crisis in the Hitler myth came into view: 
An intense and personal devotion to Adolph Hitler was maintained 
in the German Army throughout the war. There could be little 
doubt that a high degree of identification with the Fuhrer was an 
important factor in prolonging German resistance. . . . The trust in 
Hitler remained at a very high level even after the beginning of the 
serious reverses in France and Germany . . . Even when defeatism 
was rising to the point at which only one tenth of the prisoners 
taken as of March 1945 believed that the Germans had any chance 
of success, still a third retained confidence in Hitler.172
From interviews conducted with German prisoners, for older men, Hitler 
was the one who could ensure economic security after the difficult period 
of the Weimar years: he was seen as the only one capable of protecting 
against uncertainty, and this made the strength of his charisma under-
standable.173 According to the concept of the authoritarian personality, we 
can see how the Wehrmacht took the place of the father figure in society 
for the younger Nazi fanatics. This community educated, disciplined, and 
trained the impulse of its devotees. At the same time, it constituted a factor 
of discontinuity with the familial authority, with the tradition in the 
German patriarchal family. There was a component, immediately 
suppressed, that would never identify with Hitler, nor consider him as a 
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Janowitz this aspect depended on the different symbolic meaning given to 
authority.174 
1.6.  THE NSDAP AND THE CONSENSUS: BETWEEN  
HEBERLE AND LIPSET 
In scrutinizing the sociology of 1940s to 1960s—in the years during which 
several sociologists tried to intensify empirical research and quantitative 
analysis—we can notice that some relevant works approached the Jewish 
question with measurement, data, and detailed studies. These works 
resulted from interest in historical and political sociology that grew after 
the war. Due to the sociological categories and contents used, post- 
Holocaust sociology could have benefited from these studies, if they had 
spread or noticed. 
To start, in thinking of national party consensus, the mind immediately 
runs to Political Man by Seymour M. Lipset and his study of the people 
who voted for Hitler, ensuring his electoral success in 1933. Actually, five 
years after Hitler’s rise, in 1938, another sociologist, Theodore Abel, dealt 
with the growing popularity of the Nazi movement in When Hitler Came 
to Power. 
Here, before analyzing Lipset’s work or before trying to better under-
stand his research, it is important to introduce one more sociologist, the 
émigré scholar Rudolf Heberle, who addressed some key questions for the 
causes of the success of the Hitler movement, before and after 1933, by 
explaining how the perception of the Nazi movement changed over time. In 
the wake of Hans Gerth’s studies, Heberle was interested in understanding 
the reasons that led to the birth of the Nazi Party and accounting for how, 
within the NSDAP, support for the Führer was maintained.175 
Heberle’s From Democracy to Nazism appeared in 1945 when the war 
was coming to an end.176 Following the ecological approach of the Chicago 
174 Ibid., 305. 
175 Cf. Theodore Abel, Why Hitler Came into Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1938); reprinted as The Nazi Movement: Why Hitler Came into Power (New York: 
Atherton, 1966); Hans Gerth, “The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Composition,” American 
Journal of Sociology 45, no. 4 (1940): 517–41, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2770263.
176 Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism.
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School, Heberle analyzes the NSDAP’s growing consensus in the region of 
Schleswig-Holstein, a rural area of Germany. At the base of the Jutland 
Peninsula, between the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, Schleswig-Holstein 
is a very wide region, which includes the present-day Schleswig-Holstein 
and the Danish county of South Jutland. Since 1920, the former Duchy of 
Schleswig, Sønderjylland in Danish, was divided between Germany and 
Denmark: particularly, North Schleswig was yielded to Denmark after a 
referendum held at the end of the Great War, following the German defeat. 
The term Holstein comes from Old Norse and Saxon, Holseta Land, “land 
of the woods,” while the term Schleswig corresponds with the name from 
the town of Schleswig, from Schlei, “inlet in the east,” and from vik, “settle-
ment” in the ancient Saxon. This “land of the woods,” rich in plains and 
without mountains (the highest point is the Bungsberg, with a height of 
only 168 meters), with many lakes, especially in the eastern part of 
Holstein, called “Holstein Switzerland” (Holsteinische Schweiz), was 
studied by Heberle to examine the collapse of electoral support for the 
democratic parties. From Democracy to Nazism arises as an experimental 
study on political parties in Germany and the rise of National Socialism, 
starting with a regional case, where it was easier to record the changing of 
the electorate in favor of the Nazi totalitarian party. 
As a student of Ferdinand Tönnies—Heberle was his son-in-law, 
too177—at the University of Kiel, Heberle inherited from the master the 
theoretical-sociological approach together with a predisposition for field 
research, the so-called socio-geography (Soziografie). These elements made 
him absolutely the first author able to apply social ecology—as an analysis 
system pertaining to sociology and geography—to the study of the NSDAP. 
With a multifaceted education (from 1926 to 1929 he was a researcher at the 
Rockefeller Foundation and maintained study relationships with Deutsche 
Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft), he defended his research: a 
case study representing a bulwark no one could disregard, neither the 
method adopted nor the information contained therein. In a period very 
close to the conflict, Heberle excelled in analyzing social attitudes, the 
psychological conditions of the residents in Schleswig-Holstein, their 
 electoral behavior, and the link between environmental factors and the 
177 See Papcke and Oppenheimer, “Value-Free Sociology,” 279.
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structure of society. We read that Hitlerism influenced countryside dwellers 
especially:178 electoral support came from the middle class, which included 
small holders and small entrepreneurs, social groups remaining on the 
margins and not part of the leading sectors in modern industrial economy.
The case of Schleswig-Holstein explains how NSDAP’s support 
was given by parties that, prior to 1933, had nationalist positions: the 
subdivision of the land of the woods, that is, the partition of the borders 
of Schleswig-Holstein, was one of the major points of NSDAP’s program. 
In addition, Lipset, a scholar of movements and political parties, was 
profoundly influenced by Heberle’s study:
The German-American sociologist Rudolf Heberle has demon-
strated in a detailed study of voting patterns in Schleswig-Holstein 
that the conservatives lost the backing of the small property owners, 
both urban and rural, whose counterparts in nonborder areas were 
most commonly liberals, while they retained the backing of the 
upper-strata conservatives.179 
Some years later, in 1960, in Lipset’s Political Man, particularly in the 
section devoted to the conditions of the democratic regime, when he 
parsed the fascism of right, left, and center wings, he attempted above all 
to fathom the reasons or, rather, the conditions that encouraged and 
prepared the breeding ground for the authoritarian turn within a liberal 
political system. In this regard, Lipset writes that extremist movements 
have many points in common: “They appeal to the disgruntled and the 
psychologically homeless, to the personal failures, the socially isolated, 
the economically insecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated, and authori-
tarian persons at every level of the society.”180 As Heberle states, such 
movements were sustained and carried by “those who for some reason or 
other had failed to make a success in their business or occupation, and 
those who had lost their social status or were in danger of losing it. . . . The 
masses of the organized [Nazi] party members consisted therefore before 
178 Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism, 32.
179 Lipset, Political Man, 142, with reference to Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism.
180 Ibid., 175. 
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1933 largely of people who were outsiders in their own class, black sheep 
in their family, thwarted in their ambitions.”181 
Forced to immigrate to the United States in 1938 with his family, 
Heberle succeeded in publishing his research only in 1945, followed by the 
1970 and 1971 editions, in a period when the Khrushchev Thaw, from the 
early 1950s to the early 1960s, still echoed with its benefits. It is crucial to 
remember this political turning point that changed public consciousness, 
allowing more scholars to approach burning political issues, such as the 
consensus to NSDAP. 
In the second edition of the book, Heberle points out the connection 
between his work and certain political trends or movements, called the 
extreme Right in the United States.182 Nevertheless, his work remained 
largely unnoticed: it was mainly due to Lipset, who in Political Man quoted 
different parts of his study, if critics paid attention to From Democracy to 
Nazism. Among Heberle’s and Lipset’s studies, despite of some years 
between them, it seems there was a sociological continuum that marks the 
transition from democracy to Nazism. Thus, in 1960, Lipset deepened the 
discourse, initiated by Heberle, trying to figure out which political parties 
guaranteed the political victory of the National Socialist Party. Nevertheless, 
above all, they explored the community basis of party election by handling 
ideological arguments differently from the scholars prominent in structural 
theories. One has to remember that these pieces were written in a period 
in which the “functionalist-conflict debate” was strong.
Like Abel, Lipset immediately showed his interest in knowing who 
voted for Hitler: What slice of the German population was in favor of his 
policy and the destruction of the Jews? The point from which Lipset starts 
is the analysis of Hitler’s electoral constituency in the years 1928–33. This 
choice has its own explanation: according to Lipset, popular legitimacy is 
a key element, which cannot be ignored in trying to understand the nature 
of the social strata that supported Hitler, ensuring a lasting consensus. He 
studied the social bases of electoral support for the NSDAP, allowing him 
to identify “who voted for Hitler” and to fathom the ways in which 
181 Ibid. quoting Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism, 10.
182 Here I focus on the second edition of scholar’s work; see Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism: 
A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany (New York: H. Fertig, 1970), vii.
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common citizens and ordinary people supported Nazi totalitarianism and 
its policy of racial hygiene. Hence it becomes essential to explore political 
orientations prior to 1933 to apprehend the reasons that prompted the 
electorate “to move” their vote in favor of the NSDAP. Therefore the 
author’s choice of speaking, from the title, of “social bases” (of consensus). 
Lipset’s research followed the work of Abel (1938)—according to 
whom the support for the NSDAP did not come from the so-called 
middle class, but from the upper class—and of Heberle (1945). Lipset 
deserves credit for having incorporated the assumptions of both of his 
guides. What is  interesting is that he took into account more case studies 
about the social causes of obedience to Hitler. His study completed 
aspects that Heberle only hinted at. To crown it all, Lipset was the best 
critic of Heberle: he was the one who appreciated the work to the point of 
resuming his thesis, supporting it, and making it more convincing. 
Lipset’s rediscovery of these works deserves much appreciation: if Abel’s 
and Heberle’s researches were noticed among their contemporary 
scholars and within their academy, maybe these works could have estab-
lished good  scholarship on the social bases (of consensus) for a totalitarian 
power in a modern society. However, again, this scholar opportunity was 
missed.183 Moreover, this inattention in subsequent years finds a possible 
answer within segmentation of the discipline that arose in the 1970s and 
that let sociologists abandon matters concerning voting and party studies 
(that instead became the research object of political  scientists). In other 
words, Lipset’s study seems not to belong to sociology but to the polito-
logical realm. This shift removed the attention of sociologists to Lipset’s 
work, letting the field forget his analysis for the NSDAP and his interest 
in the Jewish question. 
1.6.1. The Modern Society behind the Political Man
Once a politically active middle class is in existence, the key distinction 
between “left” and “right” political tendencies no longer suffices as 
a means of differentiation between supporters and opponents of 
democracy. As Chapter V shows, the further distinction between 
183 Cf. Papcke and Oppenheimer, “Value-Free Sociology,” 279. 
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left, right, and center, each with a characteristic ideology and social 
base, and each with a democratic and an extremist tendency, clarifies 
the problem of “authoritarianism,” and its relationship to the stage 
of economic development.184
To make the issue clearer, it is crucial to analyze Lipset’s research in detail. 
Briefly, his study begins with a question concerning the constituency of 
the German electorate. The survey, mainly based on the voting results and 
the election, was conducted in two precise historical periods: the pre-Nazi 
period (1928–32) and in 1933, when the NSDAP political victory occurred. 
He examines the voting behavior of Germans, but, unlike Heberle, he 
does not only consider the case of the rural state of Schleswig-Holstein 
(a region on the edge of the rest of the country, i.e., occupying a position 
that is geographically on the borders). This element of extremity, to which 
we will return, is one of many characteristics on which National Socialist 
policy relied by supporting the autonomy of regionalist positions against 
Berlin-centric positions of Prussia. This aspect explains that Lipset’s most 
important priority concerns the changing of electoral support among 
Germans. If we come back now to the previous question, it can be said 
that he also examines Lower Saxony (a northwestern state of Germany 
and a noncentral region by its geographical position) and Bavaria. 
In his research, halfway between an ecological approach and a  statistical 
method (with the adoption of concepts such as ideology, social and political 
movement, social class, and authority), the most important tool is the cate-
gory of mass: the most irrational social force of modernity. In measuring the 
NSDAP’s consensus through correlation coefficients, with regard to the vari-
ables that contributed to the popular legitimacy and National Socialist 
influence during the Weimar Republic, he refers to the factors of religious 
nature (Protestants supported the National Socialist policy to a greater extent 
than did Catholics) and gender (among men the consensus was higher).
What is of account is the relevance Lipset attributes to masses. After 
completing a historical analysis of modern society and its evolution, Lipset 
deals with the important sociological notion (related to the Holocaust) of 
mass. He identifies two types of it. The first is of the “popular” kind and is 
184 Lipset, Political Man, 95–96.
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characterized by a political activism that goes against people’s rights (the 
frame of reference is the United States in the late 1950s). The second type, 
based on what occurred in South Africa during Apartheid, takes the name 
of “working” (mass) for the fact that it goes against the freedom of the indi-
vidual. In his ideal types of mass as indistinct collectivity, he also includes 
commercial and industrial employees, lower officials and workers. It has to 
be said that Lipset, choosing as analytical tool that of mass, reproposes, in 
1960s, the lesson elaborated many times by the Frankfurt School and not 
widely shared, in a time that the first backlash against the functionalism of 
Parsons was starting to become more evident. Lipset’s lesson reformulates 
the fact that inside of the mass forms the  prejudice and is established and 
nourished—as in the case of South Africa by ethnic nationalism—a fertile 
ground in which the roots of forms of racist discrimination are shaped by 
maintaining the power of the current class. The attention to the South 
African case is useful for Lipset in explaining what happened in Nazi 
Germany: when he refers to Tingsten’s search on South Africa, he puts in 
evidence the strength of racism and the role of the masses that in South 
Africa were related to processes of industrialization and capitalist trade.185 
His discourse becomes more interesting in his use of categories of move-
ment and social class, when he defines what National Socialism was and 
what its policy of extermination was: specifically, National Socialism is 
presented as a revolutionary social movement as a working-class authori-
tarianism along with a right-wing fascism. Lipset (interested in the political 
behavior of the individual in modern mass society) is intent on asserting 
his own preference for a democratic society.186
In the shadow of totalitarianism, past and present, Lipset tries to 
discover the conditions necessary for maintaining a stable democratic 
government: he repeatedly returns to the social reasons that lead to the 
formation of extremist political movements threatening democratic 
 institutions. His effort to retrieve data in support of his thesis, seeing 
that there is a connection between certain socioeconomic conditions 
and the occurrence or duration of democratic regimes, has to be inserted 
185 See Lipset, Political Man, 130.
186 See Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Paradoxes of Democracy: Fragility, Continuity, and Change 
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999). 
Sociological Thinking about the Holocaust in the PostwarYears, 1945–1960s   | 73
into the wider discourse of democracy in general.187 Lipset immediately 
presents Nazism as a right-wing fascism, an extremist form of middle- 
class spirit. For the most part, this form is suggested by the lower layers 
(small holders, small traders, small artisans, and small farmers) of 
society, and it will stand out for its extremist positions: this class will 
vote for Hitler for social and economic reasons, related to the evolution 
of industrial and capitalist society.188 In reading this piece, one remem-
bers what the sociologist Martin Trow maintained, namely, that the 
middle class living in an  industrial society of full maturity expresses 
feelings of frustration, to which National Socialism seemed to search for 
a cure: Hitlerism enjoyed a broad consensus because it offered neither 
moderate nor reformist  solutions, but rather it ensured economic secu-
rity and favorable situations by limiting the power of monopoly capital 
and the action of labor unions.189 What matters is that Lipset’s analysis 
focuses on the extreme power of fascism with its social roots, produced 
by a process of rapid industrialization or, on the contrary, by its slow 
development. 
If in some ways Lipset reconstructs Heberle’s thesis, in other ways he 
overturns Abel’s ideas, according to which the Nazi variant is not an 
expression of the middle class, but rather of wealthy industrial capitalists.190 
Despite the divergence between Lipset in 1960 and Abel in 1938, the 
 attention to the Nazi movement is almost new in the sociological scholarship 
approaching these similar themes. Again, let me stress that Abel, Heberle, 
187 Lipset’s sociological interest focuses on man living in the polis. Lipset devotes four broad 
sections to these politician’s conditions. For example, in the first, “The Conditions of the 
Democratic Order,” he tackles working-class authoritarianism and fascism of the Left, 
Right, and center. There are at least four socioeconomic requirements favoring the emer-
gence and maintenance of democracy, namely, the degree of urbanization, the level of 
industrialization, the degree of education, and per capita income. However, Lipset warns 
against believing that democracy can be considered consolidated in the absence of a polit-
ical culture made up of attitudes of tolerance, acceptance of dissent, and criticism of the 
rulers. See Lipset, Political Man, 15.
188 See Lipset, Political Man, 135, 136n3, with reference to Harold Lasswell, “The Psychology of 
Hitlerism,” The Political Quarterly 4 (1933): 374.
189 Cf. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944); Martin 
Trow, Right-wing Radicalism and Political Intolerance: A Study of Support for McCarthy in 
a New England Town (New York: Arno, 1980). 
190 Cf. Fritz Thyssen, I Paid Hitler (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941); Louis P. Lochner, Tycoons 
and Tyrants: German Industry from Hitler to Adenauer (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954). 
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and Lipset could be seen as early scholarship that paved the way for 
post-Holocaust sociology. 
Looking back at nationalism, it is presented as an opportunist 
phenomenon, able to grasp the contradictions of Weimar modern 
society and then turn them to its favor. During the years 1928–33, the 
NSDAP seems to have been a defense against existing institutions and 
arose as a “reactionary” fascist party compared to industrial capitalism 
and the Marxist Left. In fact, Lipset examines the electoral support that 
parties obtained in the regions of Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, 
and Bavaria. These regions are areas of Nazis feuds and constitute a 
representative sample. These regions are similar to the fiefs of medieval 
times: they are veritable feuds over the support of Nazis. The first two 
regions were on the borders of Germany, not in the least irrelevant in the 
Nazi political agenda. But the Bavarian case is different. Lipset examines 
the election results of the right-wing Liberals (DVT), of the Left (DDP), 
of the Wirthschaftspartei; of the Conservative Party (DNVP), of the 
center-Catholic party; of the Socialists (SPD), Communists (KPD), and, 
finally, of the NSDAP. These are the electoral votes of thirty-five election 
districts, which come from that crucial year of 1932, when the balance of 
consensus shifted and leaned in favor of the NSDAP. This recalls what 
Cesarani stated, namely, that there was an evolution of anti-Jewish 
policy in the 1930s.
The variables, causing an increase of the electoral consensus for the 
NSDAP are, for Lipset, essentially of four types. These are mainly (1) 
socioeconomic factors, which have to do with the processes of industrial-
ization and modernization. Then, of an (2) ideological type, which means 
that voters hostile to Marxism vote more favorably for the NSDAP. Also, 
of a (3) political-nationalist kind: persons who are not in favor of the 
process of Prussianization or Berlin-centric positions, by autonomist 
positions, vote for the National Socialist Party.191 Finally, the dependent 
variable of a (4) religious nature shows how Protestants are more favor-
able to the rise of the NSDAP.
191 This is the voice of federalists: the support comes from border regions. 
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1.6.2. Lipset’s Election Analysis
Lipset is best known as a passionate teacher and scholar at many universities 
(from Stanford to Harvard, Columbia to Toronto, to cite a few). He is cele-
brated in many realms and noted for numerous works, but his name is not 
considered when speaking of the Holocaust: and yet his Political Man 
concerns the Jewish question. For instance, one of his biggest Italian critics, 
Gianfranco Pasquino, although he presents the work as controversial, but 
also emphasizing its profound subtlety, does not cite Lipset’s attention to 
Jewish matters. To Pasquino, Lipset (influenced by Adorno’s famous study 
on the “authoritarian personality”) goes in search of social conditions that 
favor authoritarianism. The authoritarian tendencies he identifies depend 
on a low level of education; lack of political participation of political 
 organizations or voluntary associations; social isolation resulting from the 
type of activity; economic insecurity; and, finally, the authoritarian 
 footprint of the family life. Pasquino finds this list debatable, because the 
listed factors are inappropriate to the working class, organized in trade 
unions or political parties: namely, the components share a subculture of 
community work. A second discrepancy concerns relationship between 
religion and democracy: Lipset’s hypothesis does not seem reliable, says 
Pasquino, since the various and numerous varieties of Protestantism 
provide the first impetus to the democratization. 
This provides Lipset with a comprehensive framework: the studies on 
Protestant reformism and relationship of these high-level officials with 
Hitler and his followers should be kept in mind.192 This examination of 
Lipset’s analysis helps to comprehend the failure of Prussian policies and 
politics, the Nazi ideology, their ability to create political networks in the 
society, obtaining the social consensus to the power rise. In 1960, such a 
political analysis as this, and directly connected with the Holocaust theme, 
was without precedent. 
192 Cf. Gianfranco Pasquino, “Democrazia ed eccezionalismo,” review of Istituzioni, partiti, 
società civile, by Seymour M. Lipset, New York Review of Books, March 2010, accessed May 
2, 2010, http://www.larivistadeilibri.it/2010/03/pasquino.html.
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The first thing Lipset did was to count how many voters the mentioned 
parties lost and how many votes the NSDAP gained due to their decline. 
In this manner he could demonstrate that as votes in favor of the NSDAP 
grew, the percentage of votes in support of liberal parties decreased 
proportionally. The parties in this period that lost votes were the Catholics, 
the Marxist Left, and the nationalist conservative right wing, for example, 
the DNVP. The result of the analysis is particularly significant as it indicates 
that the Nazis were supported by former liberals, according to Günther 
Franz, a German political scientist, in conclusion to analysis on voting 
trends in Lower Saxony, a state in which the Nazis were very strong. He 
reported similar patterns: in other words, in the main Nazi voters had 
bourgeois center parties as their origin.193 Nevertheless, Lipset became a 
larger-than-life figure in post-Holocaust sociology for having shown that 
deserter voters belonged to liberal parties. He sums the votes that the 
NSDAP obtained and establishes a connection between the number 
obtained and losses incurred by electoral parties: the percentage result 
achieved was 0.46 percent. Then he estimates the relationship between the 
votes obtained by the Nazis and the losses suffered by the DNVP: the result 
that emerges is 0.25 percent. From a comparison of the two percentages it is 
evident that the voters who left the DNVP for the NSDAP are less than 
voters abandoned the liberal party. This analytical element on generations 
of politicians and scholars acquainted with politology was immense, but 
unfortunately it did not affect sociologists studying the Holocaust.
In dealing with the conceptual category of border (limen), Lipset 
examines the border regions and states, and through an analysis of 
electoral votes, as in the period 1928–33, he shows that the electoral success 
of the Nazis was greater in those regions. It thus appears that these regions 
were among the most conservative and nationalist and, finally, the most 
resistant to the Treaty of Versailles. This signifies that not only the liberal 
parties lost many voters, but also the federalist parties of the middle classes 
or autonomous regional parties. At the base of defection, as in Lower 
Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein, there was above all the disapproval of the 
process of national unification. In the same regions, it is possible to 
193 Lipset, Political Man, 143, with reference to Günther Franz, Die politischen Wahlen in 
Niedersachsen 1867 bis 1949 (Bremen-Horn: Walter Dom Verlag, 1957).
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observe middle-class discontent, especially in cities and in rural areas, 
because of modern bureaucratization and industrialization. The National 
Socialist policy was the mouthpiece of all these forms of social discontent, 
promising regional autonomy, decentralization, and the end of economic 
insecurity. The autonomist tendencies (it is no coincidence that regionalist 
parties’ programs were inspired by the same economic values pursued 
by the Nazis) meet the favor of social strata threatened by liberal and 
monopolist capitalism. In the wake of the Chicago School, Lipset recalled 
the spatial relationship between the environment, the economic sectors in 
which they develop, and typical cultural characteristics, explaining how in 
the border regions, on the edge of national territory, the sense of social and 
economic insecurity increased together with the possibility of being 
conquered. Already in 1893, the historian Frederick J. Turner had indicated 
the meaning of “the frontier” as a passable border to be overcome for 
American history and at the base of two of the nation’s founding values, 
namely, those of democracy and individualism.194
Albeit in a completely different context, the Nazis turned those 
borderlands of high ethnic nationalism into conquerable ideological 
lands, in which to pass the new National Socialist ideology of power, that 
not only denied but also went against national unification of Germany, 
with Berlin at the center. In the light of what Heberle had written before—
“The craftsman [artisan] has to be protected on the one hand against 
capitalism, which crushes him by means of its factories, and on the other 
hand against socialism, which aims at making him a proletarian wage- 
laborer. At the same time the merchant has to be protected against 
capitalism in the form of the great department stores, and the whole retail 
trade against the danger of socialism”195 Interesting is the fact that these 
phrases are a speech by a farmer named Iversen-Munckbrarup at 
Rendsburg. It was released on January 21, 1921. The language of the 
National Socialist movement with its lack of coherence and clearness was, 
Heberle stated, in 1945, “itself a sociologically significant phenomenon.”196
194 Cf. Frederick J. Turner, The Frontier in American History (Tucson: University of Arizona 
Press, 1986).
195 Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism, 47, quoted in Lipset, Political Man, 145. 
196 Ibid., 47n45.
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Lipset emphasizes the close relationship between the regionalist 
ideology, opposing centralization, and the special interests of small 
 business, especially by parliamentary alliance of the two most important 
regional parties, the Deutschland-Hanoverischen Partei of Lower Saxony 
and the Bauern und Mittelstansbund of Bavaria, with the Wirtschaftpartei 
as the party representing small business. There were at least three main 
aspects of their programs: first, an aversion to Prussian policy; second, the 
refusal to consider Berlin as the center of German culture; and, finally, 
the privileges to residents of the place in recruitment of labor. Behind the 
disapproval of Prussian policy hid the hostility to industrial capitalism; in 
the 1924 elections, the regionalist parties, which were responsible for these 
programs, were preparing the way for National Socialism. From the 
 election results, Lipset notes that the NSDAP obtained the most votes, 
especially in small rural communities or communities not very urbanized, 
jealous of the development of large cities. The environment of the small 
communities, like the narrow rural environments and the National 
Socialist circles, was more conducive to NSDAP policies, because it was 
contrary to the modernization accomplished in large urban areas. Lipset 
arrives at the claim that the lower part of the middle class, composed of 
small landowners in rural areas and of the urban petty bourgeoisie, 
supported the Nazis. 
What follows is a significant statistical correlation concerning the 
numerical density of population and the percentage of Nazis votes. This 
relationship was being studied in 1932, when, following the outcome of 
the election ballots, in German cities with more than 25,000 inhabitants it 
was found that the percentage of Nazis votes was inversely proportional to 
the number of people present in the urban area. This means that in cities 
with more than 25,000 inhabitants, the NSDAP reached a lower percentage 
of votes than the Catholic Party and the DNVP, which received, on the 
contrary, the most votes.
The only exception, and here the religious variable came into play, was 
the city of Berlin, a large conurbation, but also with a unique Protestant 
election district, where the Nazis, in July 1932, won less than 25 percent of 
the votes, which explains how Nazi theory clashed with the positions in 
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favor of Berlin. A further correlation concerns the middle class of wage 
earners or of small owners: as the index of economic crisis increased, the 
percentage of votes in favor of the Nazis rose in direct proportion, while the 
percentage in favor of liberal parties decreased, always in a direct and 
proportional way. Still, Lipset noted here that men voted more than women.
He also studied the “percentage of the members” of the Nazi Party in 
relation to the rest of the German population, divided by categories. From 
the comparison conducted in 1933, one can see that it was the skilled 
working class, independent workers, and domestic staff who supported 
the Nazis, as they had been ideologically influenced by the family in which 
they lived. So, as Abel did in 1938, Lipset prepared the Nazi ideal-type 
voter of 1932: “a middle-class self-employed Protestant who lived either on 
a farm or in a small community, and who had previously voted for a 
centrist or regionalist political party strongly opposed to the power and 
influence of big business and big labor.”197 
Small wonder that not every Nazi voter possessed all the features put 
together: as each party undertook to procure votes, the NSDAP also strove 
to reconcile interests within the electoral district. This signifies that among 
Nazis voters were both the middle class and the unemployed. Additionally, 
Lipset presents Nazism not as a class  movement, using a variable from 
Bendix’s studies: it was the abstainers, the uninterested in politics, young 
voters, and, again, those who had never voted or had unclear political 
positions who increased the percentage of the Nazi vote: 
Geiger, Bendix, and others who concluded that the Nazis derived 
their early backing from traditional nonvoters based this opinion 
on the overall election figures which showed an enormous increase 
of Nazi votes simultaneous with the sudden participation of over 
four million previous nonvoters.198 
Lipset’s lesson concerns the pivotal role of democratic organizations. 
Lipset investigates authoritarianism of the middle class, particularly 
197 Lipset, Political Man, 149.
198 Ibid., 151. Recall that Bendix’s opinion changed later. Cf. ibid., 150n32.
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its causes and its origins and the fact that extremism is a choice. 
Specifically, he refers to the workers organizations with liberal 
 positions belonging and opposed to communism and demonstrating 
in favor of a  democratic regime:
In Germany, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, individuals 
who support the democratic left party are more likely to support 
civil liberties and democratic values than people within each 
 occupational stratum who back the conservative parties. Organized 
social democracy not only defends civil liberties but influences its 
supporters in the same direction.199
In his research, many times the categories of election and electoral 
 participation recur to clarify the importance of the election at the base of 
democratic life of a country. Moreover, “a number of sociologists in 
pre-Hitler Germany suggested that the concept of the ‘generation’ had to 
be added to such structural categories as class or ethnic group to explain 
political behavior.”200 It can said that fifty years after the publication of The 
Political Man, Lipset’s text is still new in some respects. 
1.7. “GOOD PEOPLE AND DIRTY WORK”: HUGHES
Now, let me introduce one of the central works under consider in my 
study here. That in a factory the division of labor is combined with the 
rationalization of time was a well-known truth to Everett C. Hughes, 
author of two misunderstood essays, “Good People and Dirty Work,” 
written in 1948 and only published in 1962, and “The Gleichshaltung of 
the German Statistical Yearbook” at the end of 1955. In the form of a letter, 
in “Good People and Dirty Work” he dealt in an early way with the banality 
of evil, during a seminar at McGill University, while the scenarios of 
World War II were still in everyone’s eyes, and an intense revival of 
199 Ibid., 128.
200 See Lipset, Political Man, 265n2. Age also constrains the type of voting or preference, an 
analytic factor considered previously by Abel.
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sociology was underway.201 It is interesting to notice that, whereas “Good 
People,” relating to the Holocaust, was neither published nor discussed in 
the academic media, “The Gleichshaltung,” concerning the Third Reich 
and highlighting political manipulations of the Reich in the compilation 
of statistical yearbooks of the German Departmental Offices, was indeed 
published but not adequately disseminated among scholars.202 This latter 
essay did not meet any delay in publication, above all because the title 
does not address political issues and the methodology was consistent with 
the teachings of U.S. academic positivism. Nevertheless, it did not receive 
critical attention. In a postwar Europe, the title of the piece, “Good People 
and Dirty Work,” was too close, from a political point of view, to the Jewish 
question. This strongly influenced the reception of his work, delaying its 
publication for fourteen years. Therefore, the critical review of his study is 
scarce and quite recent. 
“Good People” may be considered a work inaugurating post- Holocaust 
sociology has more than one reason. First, in the essay, published in Social 
Problems, social causes lead good people (specifically the German SS and 
the common people) to practice or simply to allow the dirty work—the 
social dirty work of exterminating the Jews—and these are analyzed in a 
very early way, in 1948. Second, among the key issues are the legitimacy of 
the German National Socialist government; the internal administration of 
the SS; and the social dirty work, which includes both organized and divided 
labor in the concentration camp, and the work of single individuals, morally 
201 See Hughes Papers at Boston College, Burns Library, classified as BC Faculty Papers (private-fa-
miliar documents, manuscripts, acts of government), and at the Regenstein Library in Chicago. 
Hughes archive must be visited, because in 1938–61, in conducting his research on the Jewish 
question and teaching in Chicago, he could not publish his results. About Hughes as father of 
the category of banality of evil, see Subseries 6, Manuscripts, Box 109 Folder 4 “Good People 
and Dirty Work,” 1948–1963; Series X Oversize, Box 145–147, last accessed March 8, 2016, 
https://www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/scrc/findingaids/view.php?eadid=ICU.SPCL.
ECHUGHES#idp151097072. See further Arendt papers at the Library of Congress, Manuscript 
Division in Washington, DC, last accessed March 8, 2016, https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/
arendthtml/arendthome.html, to compare the years in which both Arendt (1963–75) as 
professor and visiting lecturer, and Hughes (1938–61) taught in Chicago. 
202 “The wissenschaftliche Soldaten or ‘soldiers of science,’ as the Third Reich dubbed statisti-
cians, neither conceived nor were responsible for Nazi policy, but they were its instrument” 
(Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence, 43). 
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separated in society. Properly, this dirty work of violence and indifference 
against Jews is defined as “social” by Hughes: it means that the destruction 
was possible because that society was devoid of moral obligations.
To illustrate the operation of the National Socialist state, Hughes uses 
the concepts of “division of labor,” “modern industry,” and “alienation.” His 
categories of “dirty work” and “good people” are directly borrowed from 
industrial environments of the city of Chicago and recall the mainstream 
of the Chicago School.203 Concerning the “dirty work,” Hughes reveals, in 
the National Socialist state, a specialized division of tasks among the struc-
tures of the army, Nazi Party, bureaucracy, and economic apparatus, which 
immediately recalls the dirty work practiced in modern industry, based on 
the principle of rational and uniform organization of labor. As for the 
“good people,” there is a lot in common between the good people of the 
National Socialist society and that of the modern factory, where the crafts-
person ceases to exist: instead of him, in contemporary industry, there is a 
wage-earning mass, unqualified and always replaceable. Apropos of this 
idea, Traverso speaks of an “intelligent gorilla,”204 of a worker without intel-
lectual autonomy and one able to perform merely standardized actions. 
Thus, in this environment there is only room for a man without a brain or 
imagination, who, because of the delegation of functions and obedience to 
a head, resulting from the division of labor, loses any responsibility and 
accountability for his actions. Good people are thus shaped: subject to a 
social division of labor in the factory, they also experience a moral  division 
in everyday and social life. Such are the good people of the National 
Socialist state: common people, banal, indoctrinated, and terrorized, but 
also uncritical and unreflecting, who obey the leaders and perpetrators of 
violence, all driven by extreme anti-Semitic hatred.
1.7.1. Beyond the Banality of Evil
When I argue that post-Holocaust sociology might have commenced with 
“Good People,” I put into evidence a worthy aspect concerning the 
203 See Subseries 6, Manuscripts, on unpublished articles about the problems of sociology: 
especially, Box 108, Folder 20–21, Special articles and lectures, list, manuscripts, 1926–1961; 
Box 109, Folder 5, Race, unpublished manuscripts, lectures, 1948–1964.
204 Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence, 39. 
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academic status of sociology and its increase of publications, that is, with the 
stages of research and the time and manner of publication of sociological 
works. This may be perceived as a kind of a normative symbolic system of 
power into which several sociologists were placed and indeed invested: 
this signifies that, if “Good People” had been published right away, it 
would have been counted in post-Holocaust sociology, inaugurating 
therefore this strand of Holocaust Studies. 
The case of Hughes is significant. During a seminar at McGill University 
in 1948, he discussed normal people, concentration camps, and the dirty 
work of extermination, in the presence of a very attentive audience. But his 
paper was only published in a scientific journal about fourteen years later: 
the summer of 1962, in Social Problems (it would be presented again, in 
the winter of 1963, with even greater emphasis in a conference).205 At that 
date, Hughes received little critical notice for his studies related to the 
Jewish question: attention that he has finally obtained for his Holocaust 
research is not only recent but scarce. Even when it was published, scholars 
undervalued its aims and targets. This argues for a sociological delay in 
the study the Holocaust, but it misses an important point about the roles 
of sociologists.
In the early 1960s, his shift toward publication of “Good People” was 
linked, first, to the English-language version of Elie Wiesel’s Night (1961), 
and then to the advent of the trial of Adolf Eichmann. However, there is 
another reason, too: it deals with the contemporary politics of John F. 
Kennedy and the movement for civil rights for blacks. Nevertheless, 
Hughes’s recognition among scholars came in the 1970s, when a set of his 
sociological works were gathered and published together under the name 
of The Sociological Eye (1971): a direct result of the Six-Day War and other 
political events changing civil and cultural world scenarios. These were 
the years in which the Holocaust could have been conceived of in a 
different way and related to other events. Moreover, in those years, the 
205 See Subseries 5: Visiting Seminars and Lectures; in particular, Box 83, Folder 16, McGill 
University, Post War Housing and Community Planning Lecture Series, lecture, March 14, 
1944 (it contains data on the postwar period at McGill University where he teaches a 
course of study on the Holocaust under a different name, as evident from Box 77, Folder 1, 
Sociology, 325, “What’s in a Name?” lecture, notes, correspondence, 1950). See also Box 87, 
Folder 11, War propaganda, publications, 1940–41.
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thought of Fackenheim, who shaped theoretically the relation between 
the Holocaust and the State of Israel, emerged as a milestone: ideas issued 
originally in 1974 and reproposed in the 1997 edition of God’s Presence in 
History.206 It was a theoretical watershed in which the Jewish philosopher 
strongly noticed the importance of the peace among the Jews and in Israel 
to account for what happened to the Jews during the World War II. It was 
a landmark work that cleared the ground for Holocaust thought in general.
The starting point for Hughes’s reflection was a trip to Germany in 
1948, when on a train full of people, back to Frankfurt after a hike in the 
Taunus Mountains on the occasion of the Feast of the Ascension, a woman 
standing beside him said, “But, Mein Herr, you are not an average 
American; that is, racially. I would have said an Englishman or a man 
from Hamburg.”207 The thought, repeated several times and expressing 
much more than a simple impression, drove him back to the subject of 
racial prejudice and the consequence of such ideas as “the Nordic ideal.” 
He had already denounced the strength of the ideology of race as the 
cause of social disintegration in modern industrial environments of the 
early twentieth century in “The Knitting of Racial Groups in Industry.” 
This essay of 1946 puts together the themes of industrialization, division 
of labor, and racial prejudice and was a preparatory work to “Good 
People,” especially because Hughes deals with two consequences of racial 
prejudice:208 the isolation between individuals of the same society, regard-
less of organic solidarity, and then social anomie, which slowly leads to 
the unjust social division of labor. What he stresses is precisely how racial 
attitudes and predispositions assume specific connotations in industrial 
206 Cf. Richard L. Rubinstein and John K. Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz, Revised Edition: The 
Holocaust and Its Legacy (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2013), 446n69.
207 Everett C. Hughes, “Innocents Abroad, 1948, or How to Behave in Occupied Germany,” 
Sociologica 2 (2010): 1, accessed March 28, 2012, doi:10.2383/32715. See Series II, 
Correspondence; Series IV: Writings and Research Material, Subseries 1: Travel Diaries 
and Memoranda, Box 96 Folder 4-8 (to comprehend political events in 1948–58); Subseries 
2, Research Materials, Box 99 Folder 23, Germany, Frankfurt diary, Spring 1948 (to 
acquaint better with his stay in Germany: this diary served as the basis for the conference 
on the banality of evil then became the essay “Good People”); Box 100, Folder 7, Germany, 
“Innocents Abroad, 1948, or How to Behave in Occupied Germany,” 1948. 
208 Everett C. Hughes, “The Knitting of Racial Groups in Industry,” American Sociological 
Review 11, no. 5 (1946): 512–19. See Box 100, Folder 9, Committee on Human Relations in 
Industry, Race Relations in Industry, notes, manuscripts, 1944–1945.
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environments. In 1946, when Hughes wrote (while the World War II dead 
were still being counted), employee rights and workplace safety were not 
fully established, and they were by no means a certain eventuality. In an 
environment where guaranteed rights or medical insurance coverage were 
rare, it is obvious that workers felt increasingly threatened and, for that 
reason, they tended to coalesce with their peers (by age, gender, or race) 
against those perceived as different.
At the time that Hughes returned to reflecting on the strength of 
racial prejudice, the extermination of the Jews, the product of the 
ideology of the Aryan race, was very recent. Hughes warned that racial 
prejudice, once rooted, takes deep root and is difficult to dislodge. It had 
already resulted in the destruction of the Jews, but in postwar Germany 
after the Holocaust, it continued to live. On that train to Frankfurt, 
Hughes realized for the first time that the extermination had not only 
been practiced by those who directly killed the Jews. It was and would 
be made possible by all those “good people” who used to nickname the 
Jews “Kikes” in a derogatory way, and that with their manners they 
had consented and still consented in making them a subrace to be 
exterminated. 
Hughes tackled the operating mechanisms of prejudice and espe-
cially its method of deployment that, if at in the first instance it led to the 
Holocaust, it would subsequently lead to a lack of accountability, by 
making those who had not directly taken part in the killing feel like 
strangers to the extermination and thus innocent. In 1945, Karl Jaspers 
focused attention on the “question of German guilt.” For Hughes, the 
temptation to feel, on that train, “without fault,” namely, unconnected 
with the facts, in the same way that Peter denies knowing Jesus (“the Peter 
temptation is there”), was strong.209 However, the American world in 
which he lived and where prejudice against blacks was strong drove him, 
at the end of the 1940s, to denounce the consequences of racial prejudice. 
As a sociologist observing the social reality contemporary to him, 
Hughes addressed what happened to the Jews. What led him to study such 
a delicate issue were incidents of racism occurring in his American context 
209 Hughes, “Innocents Abroad, 1948,” 4.
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and familiar to him: he wanted to prevent other “good people” behaving 
towards blacks in the United States in the same way that banal persons 
had behaved towards the Jews in Europe. It can be said that Hughes’s 
sociology is a metasociology in the sense that, through the notions of 
anti-Semitism and racism, he explains the Holocaust in order to denounce 
the new forms of American racism against blacks, Japanese, Canadians, 
and others. 
Hughes, half American and half French, was a scholar with a dynamic 
personality and multifaceted training,210 and, often on the road to Germany, 
he wrote a piece that may be defined “by many issues.” In his study, 
questions of great value (which would be recovered and analyzed with 
greater passion by other authors in subsequent decades) arose. The 
three central aspects in “Good People” are (1) the role of the German 
National Socialist government, since without a legitimate government 
there would be no mass extermination; (2) the army of the SS; and (3) 
the social dirty work, which included not only organized and divided 
labor of the concentration camp, but also that practiced by individuals 
in modern society without moral obligations, in step with the rhythms 
and times of industrial capitalism sine ira ac studio: “Max Weber real-
ized that moral indifference constituted an essential feature of modern 
bureaucracy, which was specialized and therefore irreplaceable, but 
separated from the means of work and unaffected by the final outcome 
of its actions.”211 This social dirty work of annihilation, indifference, 
and violence against Jews was indeed social since it was only possible 
because in Nazi society the universe of moral obligations was untied 
to, and without any moral cogency of, the individual. 
The short but intense eight pages of “Good People” describe how the 
persons were unable to control the process of their actions in the same way as 
factory workers, for whom only the principles of calculation and segmentation 
of skills counted. In similar environments, conditions increasing phobias 
against enemies (to be eradicated) develops easily. Therefore, it was in late 
210 Although known as a Chicago sociologist, he taught in a number of universities, from 
McGill University to Boston University, passing through the Chicago School (1938–61) 
and Brandeis University (1961–68).
211 Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence, 42.
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nineteenth-century France that Édouard Drumont was among the first to 
oppose the “Israelite” merchant, “cerebral, and calculating,” to the “Aryan” 
farmer, heroic and creative.212 The context in which the Nazi belief took 
root formed a fertile ground for modern phobias and stereotypes. Under 
the Nazi violent terror, the population easily accepted the  messianic 
 promises of the ideology with its mythical traits and reassurance for the 
fortunes of Germany. The society of good people is the society in which 
the individual believes, wrongly, that the other is dangerous. This 
dichotomous definition between Aryans and Jews constitutes the basis 
of nationalist culture, based on the construction and negative stigmatization 
of the other, considered an enemy, which first resulted in the persecu-
tion of the “other-Jews,” and ended with the phases of ghettoization, 
concentration, and extermination. The distinction “we–they,” between 
“ingroups” and “outgroups,” is the initial ring of nonexistent solidarity 
among individuals of the same society and passes for a denied identity 
called racism.213
According to Hughes, and unlike that affirmed later by Bauman, the 
action of the single individual matters greatly in anti-Jewish policy: 
virtuous and individual cruelty (possible because of the ideology of racial 
superiority and purity) has to be adjoined to extermination practices in 
the gas chambers. To understand the nature and roots of prejudice, 
Hughes writes that it is necessary to go through the issue of guilt. His 
reflection is essentially this: Is the population in postwar Germany able to 
come to terms with what has happened and with the prejudice? At the 
base of the work, he places witnesses’ experiences (specifically, he asks if 
“they knew something”) and traditional concepts of sociology, such as the 
division of labor and organic solidarity.
In the early 1930s, Hughes had already visited Germany, the land of 
the fathers of sociology. During his stay in 1948, he publicly reflected on 
the causes that led ordinary citizens to share the work of extermination, in 
modern society, in accordance with the rules and rhythms typical of the 
modern factory. Especially, he wondered why the Jews, who were German 
212 Ibid., 131.
213 See Arnold M. Rose, “Comment on ‘Good People and Dirty Work,’” Social Problems 10, no. 
3 (1963): 285–86; Renate Siebert, Il razzismo: Il riconoscimento negato (Rome: Carocci, 2003).
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citizens, were not defended or protected by their fellow compatriots. 
When Hughes uses the term “good people,” he refers both to those who 
practiced the work of extermination in Vernichtungslagers, easily willing 
to exercise a power legitimized by violence, and to those who perpetrated 
the killing from a distance, leaving it to be done without intervening or 
ever entering the death camps. Focusing on the reasons pressing good 
people to conduct extermination or to allow others to do it, he deliberately 
ignores the presence in Germany of an age-old anti-Semitism, atavistic 
and stubborn, a thesis instead widely supported in the following decades 
by other authors, such as Daniel Goldhagen.
The witnesses with whom Hughes talked, and thanks to whom he 
sustained his own thesis, were very different from each other: he found 
himself faced with individuals who had made an admission of guilt 
(albeit quickly), ones who had removed everything violent from their 
recollections, completely ignored the reality of genocide, or were 
silent. Finally, he talked with people who claimed to know nothing or 
who did not believe, at the time of National Socialism, that the Nazi 
extermination program could actually be realized. Faced with these 
cases, Hughes questioned if they knew the truth:
The architect: “I am ashamed for my people whenever I think of it. 
But we didn’t know about it. We only learned about all that later. 
You must remember the pressure we were under; we had to join the 
party. We had to keep our mouths shut and do as we were told. It 
was a terrible pressure. Still, I am ashamed. But you see, we had lost 
our colonies, and our national honour was hurt. And these Nazis 
exploited that feeling. And the Jews, they were a problem. They 
came from the east. You should see them in Poland; the lowest class 
of people, full of lice, dirty and poor, running about in their Ghettos 
in filthy caftans. They came here, and got rich by unbelievable 
methods after the first war. They occupied all the good places. Why, 
they were in the proportion of ten to one in medicine and law and 
government posts!”214
214 Hughes, “Good People and Dirty Work,” Social Problems 10, no. 1 (1962): 5, http://www.
jstor.org/stable/799402.
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What is interesting is that he introduces, for his own study, the interview 
method, a clear novelty in post-Holocaust sociology of the 1940s and a 
common sociological device for the Chicago School. In his dialogues with 
witnesses, he can stress that among the factors pushing for the “dirty 
work” of extermination in Nazi society, there was above all the strength of 
racial prejudice. Einstein said many times that “it is more difficult to break 
a prejudice than an atom.”215 Hughes realizes the terror practiced for years 
(degenerated into collective guilt, removed at the end of the war) only 
when one of his witnesses, an architect, suddenly stops talking and goes 
into confusion:
He continued: “Where was I? It is the poor food. You see what 
misery we are in here, Herr Professor. It often happens that I forget 
what I was talking about. Where was I now? I have completely 
forgotten.”216
On one side the forgetfulness shows how the human mind struggles to 
accommodate some situations, while on the other it reveals the stubbornness 
of “those who have seen” in not admitting the truth. Jaspers has also 
acknowledged that it was easier to remove everything that they could not 
accept or that for which they did not want to take responsibility: “How 
hard it is to believe that men will be as bad as they say they will. Hitler and 
his people said: ‘heads will roll,’ but how many of us—even of his bitterest 
opponents—could really believe that they would do it.”217
There are also those who, like the professor in the interview, were 
willing to publicly break the silence about Nazi atrocities with articles or 
speeches at seminars. Hughes, however, ignores the number of people 
ready, like him, to tell the truth or the way in which the events actually 
happened. For him, every society has some good people when the power 
falls into the hands of fanatics, and social order is constructed on the basis 
of false promises. It is not a radical evil against which nothing can be done. 
Rather, faced with the irresponsibility of the “good people,” Hughes 
215 See Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions (New York: Random House, 1954).
216 Hughes, “Good People and Dirty Work,” 5.
217 Ibid., 6.
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suggests encouraging the formation of public opinion capable of sharing 
the same values, weaving networks of solidarity among people, a concept 
(that of solidarity) that Hughes mainly derives from Der SS-Staat by 
Eugen Kogon. Here it is possible to notice the influence of functionalism 
of historians and their thought and the mechanisms through which the 
morality of the individual and the moral solidarity of society are destroyed 
within the camps. These aspects, introduced by Hughes, would also be 
studied by Arendt, Fein, Bauman, and Gamson at a later time.
1.7.2. The Theory of Flow and Empirical Evidence at the Basis  
of Hughes’s Thinking 
Going beyond his multiple-level reading, Hughes observes critically 
the social reality and builds a new sociological knowledge through 
which he explains historical phenomena. It is an in situ observation, 
which is both a sociological concept and an analytical method. This 
emerges when, for instance, he employs some sociological categories 
(such as class, division of labor, career, ethnicity, institution, function) 
to explicate other notions. In “Good People,” he uses the concepts of 
division of labor, modern industry, and alienation: his aim is that of 
illustrating the structure of the National Socialist state. This means we 
have to consider two levels of interpretation: namely, the immediately 
sociological signifier (i.e., modern industry) —the container of the 
discourse—and then the “meaning” of the signifier (i.e., the sociological 
notions to which Hughes wants to refer). Behind the “dirty work” and 
the “good people” of the modern industry (two conceptual moments 
that refer to different situations) there are obviously modernity, industry, 
the division of labor, and the alienated class of the factory, but there is 
above all the “dirty work” and the “good people” of the National 
Socialist state. The “good people” are the normal people, ordinary and 
common, while the concept of “dirty work” results from the entire 
reference model of Hughes, who combines the classical ecology of Park 
with functionalism and the structuralist interactionism. The sociolog-
ical institution of a “going concern” and dealing with human ecology 
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shapes his approach and his work on the Holocaust.218 The “dirty work,” 
a term that in Hughes’s studies translates the concept of division of 
labor, represents a dynamic institution, which evokes, on the one hand, 
the concept of struggle and competition for survival, and, on the other, 
it refers to the tensions that are generated in the modern factory. It is 
this “dirty work,” namely, this struggle for survival in the working 
environment of the modern factory, that creates the “good people” 
(normal and banal) performing simple mechanical work without 
reflecting on their actions. To illustrate his thesis, Hughes refers to the 
environment of modern industrialization in which the division and 
specialization of labor in the factory generate moral and social division, 
especially between those belonging to diverse sex, social class, and 
ethnic backgrounds. In this context, the organic solidarity among 
similars, and of which Durkheim speaks, disappears or thins out because 
of the absence of solidary norms, typical of modern society divided 
morally before and socially after. Hughes’s theoretical assumption, 
which comes from the environments of modern industry of the city of 
Chicago, constitutes his sociology as a practice of thought that is at 
once both “interpretative and ecological.” At the basis of the essay 
there is his sociological eye and investigation of reality in a critical 
way: he analyzes social phenomena within the institutional scenarios 
and across social processes. In other words, the individual empirical case 
is just the starting point for addressing more general issues, which are 
mutually comparable: for example, Hughes moves from the definition of 
the individual situation towards an institutional scenario. His observation 
operates on two levels interacting with each other, namely, subjec tive-
individual and institutional, where the subject is placed. The individual 
is conditioned by the institution, which in turn influences the same 
218 Rick Helmes-Hayes, who has recovered many of Hughes’s works along with his several 
fragments, gives this reference model the name of interpretative institutional ecology. Any 
institution is constantly changing and is called a “going concern” and has, or rather is made 
up of, tasks and roles established in constant flux. Institutional change is due to the inter-
action between people within the institution and in the struggle waged by these in order 
to survive. The struggle for survival with all its consequent adaptation takes the name of 
“human ecology.” 
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individual. To interpret the Nazi state, Hughes, able to grasp the dynamics 
that exist between the various institutions, relates the individual self with 
the personal institution, nested in a competitive ecosystem, explaining 
that good people exist because mechanisms of competition are created 
within the society. Analyzing the practices of the division of labor in 
which he encounters situations of rivalry between individuals, he 
introduces the modern industrial society as the ideal laboratory and, 
at the same, as the perfect sociological concept for describing the 
nature of the National Socialist state. The general division of labor of 
the modern factory affects the social and intimate sphere of the 
common people, their principles of moral solidarity: it is related to the 
struggle for social survival and has several repercussions among 
 individuals, producing social anomie as a result. This society, modern 
and industrialized, exhibits new social phenomena, such as extracon-
tinental immigration, the influx of a new workforce belonging to 
different ethnic groups, and minorities. 
What Hughes stresses is that the new realities are perceived as social 
threats to be fought immediately as insidious and dangerous; and the Jews 
are depicted as the biggest target of social hate: this explains the speed 
with which the totalitarian ideology of a better and perfect society, which 
legitimates genocidal practices, takes root. 
Hughes’s methodology, in many aspects “Simmelian,” equates the 
“micro” establishment of divided labor of the factory with the “macro” estab-
lishment of the division of political labor in society. “Good People” comes 
from an empirical background, when he gives birth to the concept of “more-
so” and studies labor relations of racial and ethnic type. It reflects a 
competitive ecosystem that dominates structures and affects common habits. 
A significant concept he adopts is that of “moral-spatial competition.” When 
I argue that his essay is a chef d’oeuvre in post-Holocaust sociology, I refer 
also to his methodology in understanding a social fact, that is, when he 
combines an empirical case. It is a set of concepts with the mind of a marginal 
man (called by him “outsider”) who observes, working for associations in a 
free manner, but who is always guided (without getting caught) by absolute 
theories. In this manner, the theory is not the mere result from combined 
data and ends with producing others: on October 19, 1977, at the Round 
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Table at the University of Toronto, Hughes expounded the methods of this 
sociological process. In the author’s eyes, it worked well in Nazi society. 
1.7.3.  Halfway between Modern Industry and  
National Socialist Society
Is it proper to say that dirty work is an immoral division of labor? Hughes 
pools factory work with the dirty work of the National Socialist state, and 
the workers of the modern factory with the people who live under 
the Nazi regime. Affiliating the ecological aspect of institutions and the 
sociopsychological features of collective behavior, he prepares a theoretical 
transposition with a double meaning, already explicit in the title. 
Consisting of two parts, it contains the metaphor of the dirty work of the 
factory and that perpetrated by the Nazis. The concept of division of labor 
that lies behind the expression “dirty work” is primarily a social institution 
(“a going concern”). 
Hughes uses the institution of factory work category because this 
concept is meaningful sociologically and important to his aim of 
explaining how Nazi society works with its various offices and specialized 
division of tasks and functions. This guarantees the order and control of 
economic production, and it also produces people-merchandise, employed 
persons whose interests are not clear even to themselves. For Hughes, the 
social division of labor in the factory reproduces alienated people who do 
not have a consciousness of their own in society and whose benefits are 
mantled by ideologies that justify existing relations, represented as carriers 
of universal interests, finishing with legitimating forms of social command 
and control of the totalitarian type. Similarly, the Nazi state, based on 
fundamental structures, such as the army, the NSDAP, bureaucracy, and 
the economic apparatus, organizes the economic life and every other 
aspect of society, of both a political and cultural nature, thanks to a 
specialized division of tasks and charges.
Clearly, if the city of Berlin inspired Georg Simmel to write Die 
Grosstädte und das Geistesleben, the conditions of modern industrial 
Chicago stimulated Hughes in the late 1940s to talk about the social 
disorder of the Nazi state, through the ideal laboratory of the dirty work 
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of the factory. He explained, first during his lectures in 1948, and then in 
his writing, how in the Third Reich’s society the division of labor was a 
process used to build a totalitarian state. In other words, Hughes through 
the explanatory model of the modern factory (which he knows and sees 
as similar to that of Nazi modern society) is able to describe how the 
 totalitarian society arose in Germany. In essence, the realm of the modern 
factory constitutes an organized and structured system where things 
become more efficient and, in a sense, more controlled by instrumental 
logic, according to which the superiors have to be followed. Environments 
exposed to threats and therefore in dangerous conditions voluntarily 
predispose people of these places, alienated from the working practices 
and set aside economically and socially, to a struggle for social survival 
against foreigners, immigrants, or, more simply, against those who do not 
share the same cultural heritage. The alienation of labor affects the moral 
solidarity among individuals who live in the same town. The competitive 
mechanisms or pressures of a selective nature leading these wage earners, 
who are normal and common people, to be willing to do anything to 
count for something and deserve some greater social recognition, are not 
few. It is a social instinct that regulates survival and that Hughes calls the 
“ecology of modernity.” 
Normal and ordinary were people indoctrinated by the Nazi myth that 
promised the creation of a perfect society. Once the bonds of solidarity 
between counterparts loosen, people are easily more willing to follow 
leaders and to agree to be part of a system that monitors and ensures 
public order. Unable to develop their own vision of the facts that are 
antagonistic to that of the ethical state to which they belong, they are more 
easily indoctrinated. Banal people slowly educated to hate practice 
extreme acts of violence. The Third Reich existed and survived thanks to 
the good people too: some societies, such as Nazi society, arose by 
performing tasks of organizational rationality and producing a collective 
will compliant in their work, like that of the good people. At the same time 
that strategies for social adaptation are adopted, particularly genocidal 
practices by the state to solve issues of public importance, conceived in 
terms of human ecology, make people feel protected. This means that 
concepts such as “natural selection,” “survival of the fittest,” of “adaptation 
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of the best species” to the environment are transferred in the social field 
and filled with political content. Therefore, a rational selection organized 
by the state replaces the natural selection of the best.
As wage workers compete with each other and fight for social survival 
owing to the contingent conditions of insecurity, similarly, for Hughes, in 
the pre-Nazi society there were situations that threatened the existence of 
the Germanic culture, issues of human ecology that led ordinary persons 
to fight among themselves. In this totalitarian society, where social order 
alienates ordinary people, acting without thinking and obeying only the 
authorities, they practiced hate crimes. 
Starting from the study of special collections of Hughes’s Papers, at 
Regenstein Library at the University of Chicago and the J. J. Burns Library 
at Boston College, Helmes-Hayes sheds light on the peculiar nature of 
Hughes’s “sociological eye,” which exceeds the purely naturalistic, descriptive, 
 ethnographic explanation of interactionism and absolutely does not 
ignore the ecological dynamics of interinstitutional relations.219
1.7.4.  “Good People” according to Critical Essays and Reviews
To comprehend what Hughes elaborates sociologically, we should analyze 
what scholars understood about it and how his work affected the academic 
realm, that is, how his sociological knowledge of the Holocaust was reached 
in scholarship. By reading “Good People” through the academic critical 
reviews—an expedient approach in post-Holocaust sociology—it is possible 
to handle the contemporary assumption of the sociological delay. 
First, criticism of “Good People” can be divided into two distinct 
blocks: that of immediate criticism, following the publication of the piece, 
and that of distant criticism, which instead comes much later. The initial 
discovery of this author begins in 1971, after the republication of some of 
his essays into a single volume titled The Sociological Eye. At this point, it 
is important to underscore that the early 1970s were for sociology fruitful 
years characterized by a kind of a reawakening of the discipline in which 
219 Let me thank Rick Helmes-Hayes for some relevant information about Hughes’s papers; 
Helmes-Hayes, e-mail message to author, September 17, 2011.
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along with the sociological researches there gradually developed relevant 
sociological reviews and journals. It is in this renewed context, cultural 
and political, that Hughes’s work was revalued.220 In several fields of 
knowledge, mostly what unlocks the broad silence for the accounting for 
the Holocaust is, first, the fear for another destruction after the 1967 
Six-Day War, when another Holocaust seemed to be possible again, this 
time in Israel. Second, as a result of the war, the attention that the Jewish 
philosopher Fackenheim was able to channel into the Holocaust. His 
614th commandment—“Thou shalt not give Hitler a posthumous 
victory”221—would always mark his thought in general: it is going to kick 
off a new period, paving the way for free thought, and that would not 
cease, especially, after the end of the Vietnam War, when the image of a 
democratic America changed. 
As Fackenheim said in 1968, “Only after many years did significant 
Jewish responses begin to appear. Little is and can be said even now.”222 In 
the words of Amos Kenan, “I want peace peace peace peace, peace peace 
peace,” written immediately after the war in “A Letter to All Good People.” 
Both statements were heard clearly.223 
Looking back to Hughes, perusing of the academic journals means 
examining the appreciation for his work. Among the criticism is the 
 positive kind, which commends Hughes’s work of putting collective 
behavior at the center of the study of the Holocaust; and the negative 
kind, which, on the contrary, regards “Good People” as too anecdotal 
and with an inadequate thesis. Hughes is criticized for having excluded 
from among the Holocaust’s causes the thesis according to which in 
Germany there was an atavistic racism. At the time that he talks of “good 
220 The Sociological Eye contains the sociologist’s masterpieces and accounts for his 
methodological choices. From a perusal of reviews on the EBSCO database, it may be 
noted that there are more critics after 1971: after that date I found more reviews than those 
following the 1962 edition. 
221 See Emil L. Fackenheim, The Jewish Return into History: Reflections in the Age of Auschwitz 
and a New Jerusalem (New York: Schocken, 1978), 23–24; Fackenheim, To Mend the 
World: Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1982); Rubinstein and Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz.
222 Fackenheim, Quest for Past and Future, 18.
223 Fackenheim, God’s Presence in History, 91, 103, fns. 50 and 54. See http://circle.org/jsource/
a-letter-to-all-good-people-by-amos-kenan/ (accessed, February 13, 2016). 
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people” who act without thinking and on behalf of their own interests, 
he creates a gap between his assumption and traditional theory. For 
instance, Arnold M. Rose, the first scholar who wrote a comment on this 
essay, in Social Problems in the winter of 1963, shows his considerable 
misgivings. For him, the thesis of racism in reverse, anticipating in some 
respects what Goldhagen will make his own in 1990s, is instead funda-
mental in the sense that anti-Semitic racism is a specificity of Germany 
and has a national character. For Rose, who argues that the highest levels 
of anti-Semitism were recorded in Germany just after the Napoleonic 
period, the national-German racism is at the base of the Holocaust: it 
means that the thesis of atavistic anti-Semitism functions well. However, 
Hughes’s thesis does not affect Rose’s way thinking or that of later 
scholars: for most of them, the Holocaust was the result of a millennial 
German anti-Semitism. Moreover, to Rose, Hughes’s assumption is 
easily confutable. 
The Montreal businessman Rose’s question, “Why don’t we admit 
that Hitler is doing to the Jews just what we ought to be doing?,” leads 
Hughes to demonstrate that even in America there was a strong feeling of 
anti-Semitism, but for Rose it is not very significant.224 Rather, what he 
praises of Hughes is the combination of psychological tools with specific 
issues of sociology, such as the authoritarian personality, racial ideology, 
and nationalism: these elements inaugurate, in 1948, a new path in 
Holocaust Studies. Nevertheless, many sociologists were disappointed in 
the interpretations of Hughes. In part, the success of Bauman’s Modernity 
and the Holocaust can demonstrate this.
Hughes replies in a very simple way to the criticisms raised by Rose: 
that racial and anti-Semitic hatred, atavistic and stubborn, leads to the 
destruction of an entire people, through a state law that legalizes mass 
killings within a country. In Germany this occurred at the end of the Great 
War and during the crisis of the Weimar Republic. Thanks to the public/
academic dialogue between Rose and Hughes, the dangers of a racial 
ideology returning became evident. In the United States during World 
War II, racism against blacks in its various forms (from defamatory 
224 Rose, “Comment on ‘Good people and Dirty Work,’” 285.
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campaigns to lynchings) urged Hughes to rediscover the racism of the 
National Socialist Germany: he sadly discovered that “the today” and “the 
yesterday” are not different—“so things are.”225
Looking at the second block of criticism (termed “distant”), there was 
a series of reviews following the publication of The Sociological Eye of 1971, 
which is really a collection of “selected papers,” fifty-eight to be precise, 
written between 1927 and 1969, mostly essays “reworking” important 
issues, including the social conflicts between different ethnic groups. 
About a year later, in September 1972, a book review by Arlene Daniels 
appeared in Contemporary Sociology: here she sees in Hughes’s “sociolog-
ical third eye” a view beyond the ordinary and usual “on” and “toward” the 
society. She stresses the intuition of Hughes, who adopts the division of 
labor as an analytical category for understanding the Holocaust.226 
Hughes—Daniels explains—tries to measure the level of social integra-
tion, which, for him, is possible because of the study of the practices, tasks, 
and rituals in a society. For example, “dirty work” indicates that in the 
post–Great War Germany, there were some dysfunctions at a political 
level that blew up moral solidarity or social responsibility: Jews, despite 
being integrated citizens, were regarded as a rival group that could not 
enjoy the solidarity of other fellow citizens. It is important to ask how the 
National Socialist society was held together. In the society of dirty work 
the groups that maintain order are no longer based on values such as 
universal citizenship, but on purely biological elements (specifically, the 
Aryan race). The National Socialist leaders who exercised a totalitarian 
power over the rest of the people personified them. Hughes considers the 
National Socialist government as the starting point of his discourse. Next 
to these leaders, then, the lower part of society places itself.
Daniels asks if it would have been possible to avoid the “dirty work,” 
and what did not occur that instead should have occurred. Hughes reflects 
225 See Everett C. Hughes, “Rejoinder to Rose,” Social Problems 10, no. 4 (1963): 390.
226 Richard Robbins refers to “the third eye” by borrowing a famous metaphor of Reike, who, 
however, spoke of a “third ear”; see Theodor Reike, Listening with the Third Ear: The Inner 
Experience of a Psychoanalyst (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1948); Richard Robbins, review of 
The Sociological Eye: Selected Papers, by Everett C. Hughes, British Journal of Sociology 23, 
no. 3 (1972): 362-3. Cf. Arlene K. Daniels, review of The Sociological Eye, by Everett C. 
Hughes, Contemporary Sociology 1, no. 5 (1972): 402–9.
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on the conditions allowing the break of universal solidarity: for example, 
the SS man’s desire for having advancing his own career and obtaining 
honors.
Also in September 1972 another critique appeared: a positive 
comment by Richard Robbins, who revaluates “Good People,” high-
lighting how there is an analytical combination of “race and work” at the 
base of the Hughes’s sociology. Robbins stresses that Hughes peruses 
statistical yearbooks—a theme to which we will return to later. Indeed, the 
aspect is notable because his examination opens a view to a comprehensive 
frame of Nazi policies, given that they oversee every aspect of daily life, 
from art to culture, from the economy to education, and so on. Without 
forgetting that such consultation of a statistical yearbook helps Hughes 
measure the level of democracy in Nazi society. 
In the wake of Robbins’s positive opinion, a series of reviews came 
out in 1972. Ida H. Simpson and Ely Chinoy, who reevaluated most of 
Hughes’s work, finally proposed a rereading of them through new analyt-
ical keys and edited them.227 Just as Durkheim did, Simpson, after focusing 
on decisions and intentions of central power, quickly highlights how the 
category of moral order is at the center of the essay: every society main-
tains itself on the basis of specific institutions and thanks to the moral 
division of work and consensus (“satisfaction of people’s wants”). The 
immoral work (“dirty”) instead is established from above and is managed 
according to the rules of the head people, specifically, the Nazi leaders that 
defined Jews as different people, “outgroups,” depriving them of citizen-
ship rights, and that institutionalized an immoral division of labor (“dirty 
work”), which destroyed any form of opposition by means of terror and 
indoctrination practices.
When Simpson writes that dominant groups conceive ideologies 
to maintain their power, she also sheds light on the behavior of the SS, 
which acted like a secret society, in the sense that, when they were 
placed at higher levels, they justified themselves in behaving irrespon-
227 See Ida H Simpson, “Continuities in the Sociology of Everett C. Hughes,” review of The 
Sociological Eye, by Everett C. Hughes, Sociological Quarterly 13, no. 4 (1972): 547–58; Ely 
Chinoy, review of The Sociological Eye, by Everett C. Hughes, Sociological Quarterly 13, no. 
4 (1972): 559–65.
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sibly, precluding normal people from any possibility of rebellion. 
By analyzing the social relationships between individuals, or among 
groups, Simpson notes that in societies where dirty work is practiced, 
the system is amoral, that is, the groups are geared toward themselves: 
the social dirty work is possible because there are barriers to organic 
solidarity or cracks within citizenship bonds of an economic or polit-
ical nature. 
On the one hand, an adaptation of institutions to an immoral  division 
of work took hold, on the other, there was no growing awareness of the 
situation by good people, who were unable to organize forms of resistance 
or develop groups of organic solidarity (“alter-ego interaction model”). 
Simpson’s study on Hughes is very special because she does not only 
review the essay, but she even tries to delve into the issue of the society of 
dirty work. In her opinion, against terror and indoctrination there have to 
be responsible people who are able to remove institutional barriers 
imposed from above. What is interesting is that Simpson identifies the 
thread passing through Hughes’s works, recovering, for example, several 
elements that join “Good People” and “The Gleichshaltung,” where 
Hughes explains how National Socialism flattened every aspect of social 
life in the light of totalitarian principles.
Ely Chinoy was another participant in the symposium of critics on 
Hughes, if it can be defined it in this way. For him, the dirty work society 
is an unfree society: only a “free association” is the basis for a healthy 
 development of social institutions, and it can take hold only if the 
 individual is capable of self-determination under the presence of a “moral 
constitution.” Unlike Hughes, according to whom good people are not 
deviant, but normal, Chinoy thinks instead that “bastard institutions” 
lead to the destruction of society.228 
Reviewer David S. Davis returned in 1984 to the pathogenic nature of 
moral institutions in Nazi society: by departing from the approach proposed 
by Hughes, he conceives dirty work and good people just like degeneration 
cases. His consideration results from his reflection on the immoral division of 
228 See Series III: Course Material, Subseries 2: University of Chicago, 1938–1961, box 79, 
folder 1, Sociology 350, “Bastard Institutions,” lecture, 1951.
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labor. Placing employment at the center of his  analysis, Davis introduces dirty 
workers as workers who toil, slave laborers and socially isolated, corrupted, 
and often men who provide lower services for others (“bail bondsmen”). 
These good people practice dirty work that becomes a kind of release from 
the condition of social inferiority with which they are faced and an escape 
from such situations. However, Hughes, unlike Davis, does not believe that 
dirty workers are deviants, but, rather, that they are people well integrated into 
society. What Davis aims to state is evident from the title, “Good People Doing 
Dirty Work.” His review deserves more attention.229
Bernard Goldstein’s 1986 article also belongs to the second stage of 
criticism. The scholar immediately defines The Sociological Eye as a set of 
writings closely linked between them (“paperbound edition”). In his 
review published in AJS, Goldstein emphasizes the concept of the banality 
of evil and how dirty work is repeated over time in society:
Hughes developed the concept of “dirty work” in his analysis of 
work and occupations; he put it to good use in “Good People and 
Dirty Work.” It becomes a perspective from which to understand 
both the Germans who did the dirty work in the death camps and 
the good people who permitted them to do it. Under appropriate 
circumstances and relevant incentives, any society will yield people 
willing to do its dirty work—incarcerate Japanese-Americans or 
cause Argentinians to disappear. The banality of such dirty work is 
illuminated in the movie Shoah, which in turn underlines the rele-
vance of this essay written more than 30 years ago.230
For Goldstein, at the base of Hughes’s essay are the role of the self and the 
concepts of work-self, emergency, and routine, which show how the 
immoral division of work, among citizens of the National Socialist society, 
was the result of arrested development of the consciousness of the 
 individual. In the wake of Simpson, Goldstein also intercepts a subtle 
229 See David S. Davis, “Good People Doing Dirty Work: A Study of Social Isolation,” Symbolic 
Interaction 7, no. 2 (1984): 233–47, doi:10.1525/si.1984.7.2.233.
230 Bernard Goldstein, review of The Sociological Eye: Selected Papers, by Everett C. Hughes, 
American Journal of Sociology 92, no. 2 (1986): 459, doi:10.1086/ajs.92.2.2780158.
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connection between Hughes’s texts: both in “Good People” and in “The 
Gleichshaltung” the totalitarian power of the National Socialist govern-
ment makes good people terrified and easily indoctrinated. 
Following the publication of “Good People” in Classical Tradition in 
Sociology (1997), a critique finally appeared, written by Anselm Strauss, 
who highlights the Hughes’s mission. Hughes, interested, like Park, in 
the complexity of social relations (especially between different ethnic 
groups), industrial labor relations, or urban space, puts in writing, with 
an informal linguistic style, important concepts regarding the destruc-
tion of European Jews.
At the conclusion of this brief critical overview, one can make two 
observations: first, the criticism came late; second, reviewers often reversed 
the contents of Hughes’s researches. What is certainly curious is the delay in 
publishing his essay, because between 1938 and 1961, Hughes conducted his 
own research while at the Chicago School. Why didn’t he publish his work 
in those years? This is a crucial question, especially because Hughes’s work 
broke the stereotype of the “backwardness of sociology” in the study of the 
Holocaust: if it had been published in 1948, it could have paved the way for 
a long series of works about the Jewish question.
1.7.5. “The Gleichshaltung”
“The Gleichshaltung” appeared in The American Statistician in December 
1955. By reading the article, it is possible to understand what there is 
behind a name231—first, because Hughes dealt with the Jewish question 
according to a different approach from that used in “Good People”; 
second, because the research was not issued in the official review The 
American Journal of Sociology, published by the University of Chicago. 
The work starts casually when Hughes looks at the first page of the 
Statistical Yearbook of the Third Reich (1941–42), the last statistical 
 yearbook published by the National Socialist regime, and the table titled 
“Racial Classification of People Who Married in 1938.” After perusing the 
classic publication of the Statistical Office of the State reporting the social 
231 See note 205, above.
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and economic life of the German Nation, based on an enormous amount 
of statistical data collected in areas subject to survey, Hughes unveils how 
important a statistical yearbook is that relates numbers and percentages, 
and how statistical data provides information on the social, political, 
economic, and cultural life of a people or the quality of life of a state. “The 
Gleichshaltung” is a kind of news where facts and events are transformed 
into numbers to be easily measured and read. It received a greater  scientific 
consensus than “Good People” would later receive, in 1962, and this is 
because of the title. 
“What changes did the statistician of the German Reich have to make 
in his official Yearbook when the Nazis came to power?”232 Ten years after 
the end of the World War II, in the middle of the Cold War, Hughes 
accessed documents of the National Socialist state, and published during 
the Thaw era, in 1955, the results of his research in the quarterly of the 
American Statistical Association in Washington, DC. Although at the 
beginning Hughes does not adopt a quantitative approach for his research 
and escapes from the principles of sociological positivism and statistical 
research of the early century, at the end he does not only choose the 
 statistical way, to deal with the Jewish question, but he is also interested in 
methodological discipline. “What we count” and “how” can be very 
important. Hughes uses statistical tools to describe some of his theories 
that otherwise he would not have been able to explain. Through numbers, 
he elaborates a new way to tell the reality, and it proves that he is a pioneer 
in sociological studies on the Shoah. The main goal of his work is to 
emphasize the nonindependence of scientific research. Particularly, he 
denounces each time data are not reported accurately because of the 
dependence of the Department of Statistics on the government. Before 
1933, terms such as “Jew,” “Jewess,” and “Jewish” did not appear in any 
yearbook. In 1934, a census was conducted according to criteria that were 
never used before. Especially, a series of tables to record the place of birth 
of the Jews and the percentage of those who had German origin was 
prepared: everything needed to take the census of “persons belonging to 
the religion of Israel.” In that occasion, the locution Glaubensjuden, “Jew 
232 Hughes, “The Gleichshaltung of the German Statistical Yearbook,” 8.
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by faith” (a phrase that would acquire a racial meaning with legal value as 
of the Nuremberg Laws), appeared in the yearbook. The Third Reich 
developed its own language because it changed the meaning of terms, 
creating new meanings with different intentions for political use. Jews 
were a race, not a religious group. German statistical segregation was also 
complete. Jews were seen nowhere in tables as simply another category of 
people, which included other Germans.233
In essence, the statistics of the Third Reich had to put Hitler’s regime 
in a good light, showing progress in the economic field together with 
territorial conquests: in the yearbooks, the Endlösung, or “project,” to 
liberate Germany from “Jewish blood” was never mentioned (neither in a 
graph nor in a table of contents). For Hughes, consulting the yearbooks of 
the Nazi dictatorship is useful to explain that German “good people” were 
gleichgeshaltet, “coordinated.” From his perusal, two important issues 
emerge. First, both the Catholic and Protestant churches, considered by 
the Party as moral enemy agencies, were silenced, albeit with partial 
results. The Catholic Church underwent a minor reduction in its obedi-
ence to the pope; while the Protestant church, divided into different 
denominations, partially aligned with the NSDAP with the creation of the 
“Protestant Reich Church, headed by Ludwig Müller. Second, the policy 
of Gleichschaltung refers to a leveling policy, of equalization, synchroniza-
tion, and coordination, which, having as its goal that of putting every type 
of institution (political, religious, and so on) under Nazi authority and 
control, deleted all kinds of specificity, both national and cultural.
In many ways, “The Gleichshaltung” and “Good People” can be consid-
ered as a single work. “Most of what follows was written after my first 
postwar visit to Germany in 1948,” Hughes writes in his “Good People.”234 In 
reviewing the salient years of his academic activity and the tradition of the 
Chicago School, one may argue that Hughes’s writings (especially if “Good 
People” would have been published on time) show that speaking of the 
“delay of sociology” in Holocaust Studies is inappropriate.
233 Ibid.,10.
234 Hughes, “Good People and Dirty Work,” 3.
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At this point, it is decisive to count the works conducted by Hughes 
and the Chicago School on the destruction of the Jews and then analyze in 
which years these researches were published and in which reviews. To place 
them in the most general view of sociological studies on the Holocaust, 
I measured the productivity of authors writing about the Holocaust and the 
degree of appreciation for their works. I considered two broad periods—(1) 
after 1945 to the present day and (2) the years before World War II—in order 
to examine as well as I could all the publications that, at least once, contained 
in the title of the article or book review terms related to the Jewish question. 
The aim was to measure “the speed of publication” of Hughes’s research, his 
scientific impact, and his productivity, specifically, Hughes’s visibility. In 
1948, upon his return from Germany, Hughes put his experience in writing, 
introduced in the form of a seminar at McGill University:
Shortly after my return from my first visit to Germany since 1932, a 
student asked me whether a certain German, who was to be one of 
the first to visit the University of Chicago after the war, was a good 
man. I said I was sure he was, but wanted to know why she asked. Her 
answer: “Well, he’s still alive, isn’t he?” I replied rather sharply that 
although quite a number of Negroes had been lynched in this country 
that year, she appeared in good health and unruffled. My answer was 
as much an accusation of myself as of her. The effect of visiting 
Germany was not to make me—at the moment—inquire why the 
Germans did what they did, but to marvel at the fact we have not 
quite done likewise and to ask what any of us does to prevent it.235
After a decade, 1928–38, spent at McGill University, Hughes worked at the 
Chicago School until 1961, and then moved to Brandeis University as a 
professor of sociology until 1968, when he arrived at Boston College. 
In the years of the Chicago School, which provided publication of research 
on contemporary society in AJS, the bimonthly founded by Small in 1895 
(the same year in which Durkheim founded the Année sociologique in 
235 Hughes, “Rejoinder to Rose,” 390.
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France), the essay “Good People” was never proposed for publication 
there, not even during the years of Hughes’s stints on the editorial board, 
from 1952 to 1957, and again from 1959 to after 1960.236 In 1943, Glenn E. 
Hoover wrote that there were about a dozen writings on political issues 
that had been accepted by top journals to be circulated, addressing the 
difficulties, for some academic researches, of being published. He dealt 
with the content of the research, its time of dissemination, and the media 
used to spread the topic in question, referring to a close connection 
between politics and society, academia and media.
Hughes was studying the Holocaust in 1948, but his essay was 
published only in 1962 and not in AJS, but in Social Problems, a quarterly 
that, starting from June 1953, on behalf of the University of California 
Press, officially published the works of the Society for the Study of Social 
Problems, founded in 1951 by Elizabeth Briant Lee and Alfred McClung 
Lee. Social Problems followed the bimonthly of the Chicago School in 
both its issues and methodology.237 When “Good People” was published, 
236 William Rainey Harper, president of the University of Chicago from 1891 to 1906, wanted 
the AJS to disseminate the research of the sociological discipline. This journal, which thus 
founded sociology itself, publicized research activities, promoted organizational elements, 
and founded the resources to start research, legitimizing the discipline in the eyes of the 
public. It played a cultural hegemonic role in American sociology, especially until 1936, 
year of foundation of the American Sociological Review. 
237 In 1962 the director of AJS was Peter Blau (1960–66). Social Problems offered space to 
research on conflict, action, and social change, on poverty, inequality, and ethnic minori-
ties. It has only recently been surveyed by JSTOR. Herbert Blumer was director of Social 
Problems in 1954–55, when Hughes was instead at the head of the AJS. The Society for the 
Study of Social Problems (SSSP) was presented as a community of scholars, lawyers, and 
students interested in studying the problems of society in a critical, scientific, and human-
istic manner. Blumer dealt with the Jewish question. In this period, but also in subsequent 
years, in which both the comment and the debate of “Good People” were reported, 
Marshall B. Clinard (1961–62) of the University of Wisconsin, Marvin B. Sussman (1962–
63) of Western Reserve University, and Jessie Bernard (1963–64) of Pennsylvania State 
University supervised the editing of articles. To verify the reasons for the surrender of 
Hughes in publishing his work, which was irreconcilable with traditional academic 
thinking and the positivist quantitative approach, see the Hughes manuscripts on labor 
relations with the AJS and policies internal to the University of Chicago and Brandeis 
University. Also see Neurath, The Society of Terror, 286. To understand better his studies in 
the postwar period in Germany, see lectures, lecture notes, syllabi, course profiles, mimeo-
graphed leaflets, diaries of courses, memoranda, manuscripts of other authors and 
students, reprints, newspaper clippings for instance in Series II: Correspondence, Box 4, 
Folder 9; Box 19, Folder 17; Box 68, folder 6-11; and of Series III: Course Material, “Subseries 
2: University of Chicago, 1938–1961.”
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the direction of Social Problems was supported by scholars not engaged 
with the ideal of the progressive and reformist “good deal,” which interested 
the Chicago School. 
According to my perusal conducted in EBSCO, “Good People” 
received some comments and opinions from some critics, but all were 
concentrated in the first years following publication of the article. 
Although this “Good People” broke the sociological silence concerning 
the Holocaust, it did not earn huge acclaim from academics. 
What deserves more attention is the title of the article. Let me say that 
it is credible that its nonpublication in 1948 and the carelessness of the 
work in 1962 depended on the choice of the title, which with Arendt found 
its fortune. Despite being an important member of the Second Chicago 
School, in 1948 Hughes presented a title that clashed with the positivist 
orientation of American sociology of the 1930s and 40s, a discipline also 
imbued with practices of anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, Hughes’s interest 
in the Jewish question was not curbed by the missed issuance of “Good 
People”: between 1948 and 1962, he published a remarkable paper with a 
“more agreeable” title based on an analysis of a quantitative kind. When 
Rose, wrote in 1963 in Social Problems that Hughes had some hesitation in 
publishing the piece of 1948, he also highlighted how his thesis would 
have overturned traditional literature of historians and psychologists. 
More curious is that the works subsequent to the publication of 
Hughes’s essay did not confront his statements, but only rehashed academic 
stereotypes. For instance, Goldhagen did not consider the novelties intro-
duced by Hughes, especially, the condoning of Nazi massacres: the dirty 
work of Nazis. “Good People” was only published in the Chicago School 
review in 1997, eight years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in the second 
volume of Classical Tradition in Sociology, when the entire body of Hughes’s 
works, his sociological tradition, following a new study of the Chicago 
School, had begun to be revisited, thanks to Helmes-Hayes.
1.7.6. A Self-Coördination Case
Hughes’s research on the banality of evil was published at the beginning of 
the 1960s, when the thinking of critical sociology changed, that is, when 
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the legacy of positivism was at its end. A series of things varied and pierced 
or, better, uncovered the limits of some of the ideologies that dominated 
the world. While the limits of Soviet ideology were emerging, the limits of 
American individualistic ideology were also coming to light. In addition 
to the Korean War (1950–53) or the arrest of Eichmann in Buenos Aires, 
on May 11, 1960, or other events that might come to mind, it is crucial to 
remember that the Thaw started with Stalin’s death in 1953, and was 
propelled on February 25, 1956, in the Twentieth Party Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union with the denouncing of Stalin’s 
crimes by Khrushchev. Nevertheless, what modified profoundly the situa-
tion was the Vietnam War. Thanks to a complex variety of circumstances, 
the publication of “Good People” became possible. Hughes’s publication 
was helped by these all events and coincided with the release of Arendt’s 
articles on the Eichmann trial for The New Yorker, and then collected in 
book form the following year in The Banality of Evil: the two texts, that of 
Hughes and that of Arendt, meet on many points. Fairly similar in content 
(in that the people of whom the two texts speak are “good” or “banal,” 
both are concerned with “normalcy” or the “ordinary being”), both essays 
conceive the evil perpetrated under the Nazis not as radical, but as a thing 
of the everyday, not of a faraway world: it belongs to the ordinary people, 
is common, and is practiced among neighbors. If, on the one hand, the 
meaning behind the phrase “good people” is not immediately clear, on the 
other hand, Hughes seems with his focus on banality to argue for the absence 
of anti-Semitism in Germany. However, more disconcerting, upon publi-
cation of “Good People,” was his movement away from the methodological 
positivism that had characterized the Chicago School, which had begun 
in the second half of the 1920s with William Ogburn. To better under-
stand the situation, it is relevant to remember that in the late nineteenth 
century, but especially at the beginning of the twentieth century, under 
the influence of American progressivism, sociology, founded as a secular 
religion to study the problems of modern American society, tended to 
become for all intents and purposes a positive discipline. Meanwhile, 
numerous quantitative researches with a positivist approach, able to give 
an account of economy and finance in American society, were subsidized 
by some philanthropic foundations, such as the Rockefeller Foundation 
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and the Russel Sage Foundation. For instance, in 1923, Rockefeller funded 
the University of Chicago, a private school and with a liberal tradition, as 
Edward A. Shils noted.
If a university did the research a foundation wanted because it 
wanted the money, clearly the foundation is setting the agenda—but 
universities did not only do the research the foundations wanted, 
when they did have clear wants, because of the money. The 
University of Chicago is an interesting case because it has been 
accused of being unduly dependent on Rockefeller money.238
Thanks to the provision of a large amount of funds for research, the Sage or 
the Rockefeller philanthropic foundations ensured the development of 
American sociology as a discipline and as an academic corpus. In the United 
States of the 1930s, when the ideology of progress and scientific achieve-
ments of the natural sciences went hand in hand with the devastating effects 
of the 1929 economic crisis, for sociology, the need to mimic the positive or 
natural sciences became more urgent than ever, and this required a specifi-
cally methodological approach. Sociology did not only tend to become a 
science in all respects, but, especially, it also aimed at finding solutions to 
the long list of new modern social problems. Positivist teaching had a long-
term effect on U.S. academic research. Its echo can be clearly seen in Parsons, 
the “towering figure in the social sciences,” as defined by the New York Times 
in his obituary, “who was responsible for the education of three generations 
of sociologists,” especially in the decade 1950–60, and after that the limits of 
the legacy of American positivism came to light.239 In 1946, two years after 
becoming director of the Department of Sociology at Harvard University, 
Parsons transformed it into the Department of Social Relations, remaining 
director there for many years. As recalled by Marco Santoro, there “were 
assigned to the Department, during the first ten years of its life, eighty 
doctoral positions, most of them to students of the same Parsons, who 
thus sees his social capital growing tremendously, i.e. the network of rela-
238 Platt, A History of Sociological Research Methods in America, 1920–1960, 173–74.
239 New York Times obituary quoted in http://biography.yourdictionary.com/talcott-parsons 
(accessed March 28, 2012).
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tionships on which he could count in the American academic world.”240 It 
was another way to create consensus to present sociology in accordance 
with political and governmental ideas.
Some attitudes and practices in academia led Hughes, in 1948, not 
to publish his essay. In 1943, the scholar Glenn Hoover wrote that “ques-
tions are never settled until they are settled right.”241 Hoover shows the 
complicated relationship between scientific research, social and 
economic sciences, and the dissemination of their findings: he centers 
on the difficulties encountered while writing a research paper and 
publishing it. To Hoover, the research does not always receive proper 
editorial attention from the scientific community, for various reasons. In 
essence, from Weber onward the values-free method became an indis-
pensable prerequisite to ensure scientificity in research, and under the 
wave of positivism it marked American sociological reflection for nearly 
three decades, from the 1920s to the 1950s. As remembered by Enzo 
Trapanese, it was combined with ameliorism: a kind of ideology that 
aspires to achieve the status of scientificity for American sociology (as 
natural sciences) and the perfect social order, a golden age for American 
society. In 1938, Shils spoke of the nonautonomy of research. Professor 
of Social Sciences at the University of Chicago, in Limitations on the 
Freedom of Research Shils provided data and information on the restric-
tions to which scientific research is subject for reasons of political or 
cultural interest and about sanctions against scholars, whose scientific 
writings run “counter to the evaluations dominant in their  institution or 
in the wider community.”242
When Hughes, in 1948, seemed to be reticent about the publication of 
his essay and, in the end, decided to not submit it for publication, he 
avoided those penalties commonly practiced in academic circles. Shils 
had exposed the deeply rooted conflict in the culture of his time between 
the positivist scientific model and society, with its ethnic relations and 
riven by racism. Shils shed light on the contradictions of the social 
240 Parsons, Professioni e libertà, 123 (my translation).
241 Glenn E. Hoover, “The Failure of the Social Sciences,” American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology 3, no. 1 (1943): 91.
242 Shils, “Limitations on the Freedom of Research and Teaching in the Social Sciences,” 144.
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sciences, for example, when reporting the statement of Louis Levine 
related to “the prohibition against publication of his taxation study”: 
Chancellor Elliott did not claim that his new policy gave him the 
right to forbid me to publish my monograph privately. He argued 
with me that it would be better for me not to publish it. He told me 
that “The Interests” were determined to crush out all liberal thought, 
and that if I published the monograph, an attack would be made on 
me generally: that the newspapers of the State would not give me a 
fair hearing.243
An atmosphere of tension enveloped the researchers who did not follow 
the orthodoxy of the department, and discarded works continued to 
remain as such for a long time while sanctioned researchers remained 
marked. Hughes was aware of the forms of obstruction to research that 
mainly occur during campaigns for research funds: especially when the 
department is in financial straits or in more precarious institutions, that 
is, those in which the need for money is higher and the directors are 
obliged to protect the interests of those who funded the research. 
Between 1919 and 1953, U.S. government funding was mainly addressed 
to  guarantee social policies for solving practical  problems after World 
War I, and then came the New Deal programs in the 1930s, and there-
after, in relation to these projects, the collaboration between state 
agencies and universities multiplied. As Jennifer Platt notes, the  agencies 
dealing with the  collection of funds for research projects were power 
entities, and the universities had a big weight in society: “The  foundations 
did play a significant role in the funding of quantitative work, and of the 
development and diffusion of quantitative methods.”244 In the face of 
intimidation and threats, several researchers left their research (“self-in-
timidation”) or abandoned it to teach other topics (“coördination”).245 
However, both the dismissal itself and the threat of being expelled from 
243 Ibid., 155, with reference to the newspaper The New Northwest (Missoula, Montana), 
March 14, 1919.
244 Platt, A History of Sociological Research Methods in America, 1920–1960, 189.
245 See Shils, “Limitations on the Freedom of Research and Teaching in the Social Sciences,” 161.
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the academy served as a wake-up call. That is what Hughes highlighted, 
in 1955, about German universities. 
Hughes’s case might be an instance of self-alignment (“self- coördina tion”), 
in 1948, when he decided not to publish his work, because it was irrecon-
cilable with traditional academic thinking and because it was absolutely 
“new” at a methodological level, that is, far from the quantitative positivist 
approach, he avoided the restrictions or penalties that could have been 
inflicted on him. From the 1930s to the 1950s, American sociology 
underwent a paradigmatic conflict between a human ecology almost at 
sunset and a Parsonsian functionalism in its infancy. These two interpretative 
models of reality bracketed other theories, such as symbolic interactionism 
and Freudianism. Hughes lived in this very eclectic stage for the academy.
1.7.7. Hughes’s Delay Roots in the American Sociological Tradition
More can be said about Hughes’s delay. It was not only an academic 
self-alignment: as I was able verify, starting from Halpert’s study, Hughes’s 
delay was prepared in several academic realms where topics related to 
Jews were undervalued. The reasons why Hughes did not publish his essay 
in 1948 may be found in the first decades of the twentieth century, when 
sociology was established as an academic discipline. 
In the introduction, I said that after reading Halpert’s article, I started 
to examine the academic realm of sociology and themes related to Jews, 
especially because the primary goal of Halpert was to understand the 
failure of the social sciences in the study of the Holocaust, which led him 
to study the history of American sociological thinking, focusing on the 
early years of academic research in the United States. Specifically, Halpert’s 
article highlights social change and the development of industrial-urban 
Chicago at the turn of the century, together with the role played by the 
academic, political, economic, and military elite in society. He explains 
how in those years academic research was “permeated” by ideologies, 
such as Christian Reformism (a movement that had taken root in the best 
universities on the U.S. East Coast of between 1905 and 1930) and 
 sociological positivism. When research was not conducted according to 
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the canons of positivist thinking or not characteristic of Protestant 
Christian values, it was discarded.
It is proper to recall, even if briefly, that faced with disruptive 
modernization and its consequent problems, the founding fathers of 
American sociology, from Lester F. Ward to Charles Horton Cooley, 
from Franklin H. Giddins to Edward A. Ross, were distinguished then 
for the belief they held, a kind of “Social Gospel,” which promoted 
Christian principles in sociological environments; and which had, 
 ultimately, as its aim that of making modern America better at the turn 
of the century. Among the Christian moral values, oriented to reforming 
America, there was also that of considering the Jews as enemies, because 
they were god-killers:246 “Considering Jews to be ‘insoluble clots,’ Ross 
wanted to cleanse America of these people, thereby creating a racially 
pure country composed of the descendants of early settlers and Nordic 
immigrants.”247
Let me summarize what Halpert underscores. When Hitler came to 
power, Ross argued the doctrine of racial superiority. These anti-Semitic 
sentiments were widespread in the Northeast, where most of the population 
was from Northern Europe. National Socialism was regarded positively across 
the ocean and thought able to boost the economy. The founding fathers of 
American sociology of the 1920s had a phobic and ethnocentric approach in 
solving the problems produced by modernity: hence, the ease with which 
they built, in many ways, a Social Gospel characterized by stereotypical fears 
and prejudices. This acontemporary and apolitical  procedure, far from real 
social problems, prevented them from recognizing the roots of National 
Socialism. There were few who identified Nazism as a totalitarian political 
phenomenon. The 1929 financial crisis and the rise of Hitler were linked with 
the phase of the demagogues who spread their anti-Semitic feelings in a 
period of economic and military downturn. A large majority of Americans 
were against the increasing the number of German Jews resettling in 
246 To examine the question further, see Anders Gerdmar, Roots of Theological Anti-Semitism: 
German Biblical Interpretation and the Jews, from Herder and Semler to Kittel and Bultmann 
(Leiden: Brill, 2008). I would like to thank Giuseppe Veltri for the reference.
247 Halpert, “Early American Sociology and the Holocaust,” 9.
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the United States. This explains the ease with which news that there was a 
Jewish conspiracy at an international level (which also had the aim of 
de- Christian izing America) spread and took root. Hitler’s policy of ethnic 
cleansing, built to solve the problem of the Jewish question, was looked upon 
with favor in anti-Semitic areas of the United States. Under Hitler, anti-Semi-
tism in Germany attained its acme. Halpert argues that American sociologists’ 
 fallback towards positivism was used only to cover their anti-Semitism. 
It is important to consider that in the 1940s and 50s a majority of American 
sociologists were entrenched in a deep cultural oblivion, while those who 
tried to deal with the Jewish question, such as Hughes, were unable to do so. 
Several presidents of the associations of sociology showed anti-Semitic 
 leanings, and few scholars contradicted them. Halpert reports the instance of 
Robert K. Merton, president of the ASS, who recognized in 1957 the danger of 
science “in service” or “in the hands” of the state—as occurred in Germany 
with Hitler. 
Looking back, according to the hitherto known literature, the topic 
remained vague until, in the 1960s, sociology opened itself to themes no 
longer positivist. It was the end of the Parsonian era, and for the issue of 
the Holocaust there was still plenty of space, as for Hughes’s article, which 
was not commented on in a timely manner by the international critics. 
Actually, Hughes opted for a historical reconstruction of sociological 
sources, which forced him to examine society by trying to capture those 
social arrangements that led to the Holocaust in the German Gesellschaft. 
When I argue that Hughes was influenced not to publish any writing 
directly related to the Holocaust, I recall that his other writings were 
published on time. Hughes conducted other research in those years that 
was published and in several academic journals. By perusing the official 
review of the Chicago School, some of his speeches on the issue of racism 
emerge. For instance, the name of Hughes appears for the first time in AJS 
as the reviewer of Modern Industry by Ernest L. Bogart and Charles E. 
Landon in 1928.248 To give an answer to the question of who writes what 
on the Jewish question and when, we can make a distinction in broad 
248 See, for example, Hughes, review of Race, Nation, Person: Social Aspects of the Race 
Problem: A Symposium, by Joseph M. Corrigan and G. Barry O’Toole, American Journal of 
Sociology 50, no. 4 (1945): 320–21.
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terms on the basis of visibility given to the research over the years in AJS. 
One can read articles with a positivist bent and essays on topics related to 
the race question and eugenics, such as Making the Fascist State by Herbert 
W. Schneider, reviewed by Charles A. Ellwood—or reviews of some 
studies on anti-Semitism.
At the end of the war, there were only three reviews on the Jewish 
question. The most exciting work appeared in January 1957, Status, 
Authoritarianism, and Anti-Semitism. Written by Walter C. Kaufman 
according to the quantitative approach, the book relates the phenomena 
of “social-state,” “authoritarian personality,” and “anti-Semitism” through 
precise parameters or scales of sociological methodology.
A historical turning point in the post-Holocaust sociological litera-
ture occurred after the arrest and trial of Eichmann, namely, after 1961, a 
period in which the theme of Jewish resistance also began to be enhanced. 
The word “holocaust” appears for the first time among the titles of AJS in 
1983, in The Holocaust and the German Elite, while “Good People” 
continued to be ignored. Instead, journals such as American Sociologist or 
Social Problems housed Hughes’s discussions. 
Hughes is well known as an exponent of the Chicago School, but he 
is hardly ever remembered as one of the earliest sociologists to study Nazi 
Germany. 
The problem of the ghettoization of the Jews crosses the centuries. In 
1928, thanks to Louis Wirth, one could read The Ghetto: the first attempt to 
address the sociological history of the Jewish people and one of its specific 
situations. If Hughes’s work is explained by the division of labor, The Ghetto 
instead places categories of isolation, of physical distance, and, therefore, of 
social distance at the center of reflection. The isolated individuals belonging 
to different ethnic groups are classified as dangerous “outsiders” from 
whom it is necessary to defend oneself, and legitimized, according to 
Wirth, is the physical distance, which, in turn, promotes and legitimizes 
the cultural one, until it becomes social discrimination. The mechanism 
of self-engulfment or self-phagocytization that is set in motion slowly 
erodes the organic solidarity among individuals of the same society. This 
distance, analyzed in The Ghetto, starting from the definition of “outsider,” 
reaches its culmination in the Nazi society that destroyed the Jews in 
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Europe. Moreover, the physical distance serves to legitimize the practice 
of discrimination and violence perpetrated by neighbors, making them 
normal. Moreover, the distance described in The Ghetto allows the banality 
of the actions of “good people,” their “dirty work.” Through the analysis of 
the social function of the ghetto, compared to the areas that form it, the 
differentiation of modern urban interests in the community and then the 
corresponding function of the “division of labor” appear. This means that 
the category of the social division of roles, first, in The Ghetto and, then, in 
“Good People,” is a normal category, close to the thought of the Chicago 
authors: indeed, they assume that starting from the reality of the city it is 
possible to tell what happens to its inhabitants. And it is possible to 
comprehend the modern home of Jewish immigrants in the Western 
world. On the one side, it is an institution, on the other, it is a process; 
however, both aspects emphasize the modus vitae of ethnic groups.
The establishment of the ghetto returns over time and space along 
with the stereotype of the Jew who lives separately from other citizens. 
Between The Ghetto and “Good People” one can draw a thin line. In the 
first work, the Jewish question is addressed, but the war had not started 
yet. In the second, this view is instead filtered through the extermination 
of the Jews, a topic not easily treated at an academic level in the postwar 
period. The two works can be seen as a sort of continuum in the sense that 
The Ghetto prepares the theoretical level for what then happens with 
“Good People” in dealing with the completion of the “discrimination-ghet-
toization” foretold in The Ghetto. That is to say, in time and space the 
aptitude of nonthinking is prepared by unclean legal practices, that is, by 
dirty social work. 
However, Hughes’s ideas were never taken into account in Holocaust 
Studies. I have tried to demonstrate that here. But, at this point, it is proper 
to ask whether the evil is really banal. What exactly does it mean to be a 
superficial person and practice death? Is not evil radical? What are its 
roots, and where are they? In other words, why does a person decide—if 
he does indeed decide—to stop thinking and commit crimes? Hughes’s 
case leads us to ask what is good and what is evil in human beings.
It is pertinent to introduce how attention to Hughes’s studies (espe-
cially to “Good People”) can move scholarship on the subject forward. 
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Recently, the last trial concerning whether evil is banal or radical was a 
debate of a historical-philosophical nature between the historian Richard 
Wolin and the American philosopher of Turkish origin Seyla Benahbib, in 
the Jewish Review of Books, and added to the English edition (2014) of the 
original German Eichmann vor Jerusalem (2011) by Bettina Stangneth.249 
Stangneth studies the period before the Eichmann trial (exile notes 
combined with the German Nazi Willem Sassen interviews). From her 
examination (of the unpublished and previously never seen writings of 
Eichmann, written during his exile), an anti-Semitic Eichmann who plans 
the extermination of the Jews arises, a fanatical believer in extermination 
rather than simply an unthinking bureaucrat. In this manner, Stangneth 
dismisses the concept of banality of evil and trounces Arendt’s theory. 
Hughes’s case provides us with the reexamination of the banality of evil 
question posed by Arendt, especially after the calling into question of her 
theory. After having done numerous readings and reviewed several criti-
cisms, I underline a research space that will allow those types of strands of 
thought to flourish. Meantime, the discovery of Hughes restores value to 
the thesis of a banality of evil not committed by monsters.
Hughes was a social observer contemporary to events when he 
 elaborated his thesis: he observed what happened during and after the 
war. (Hughes based much of his work on his own experience in Germany.) 
So, if on one side, the eight pages written by him appear few compared to 
those of other sociologists, in reality, the speed with which he analyzed the 
Holocaust and conceived the category of banality of evil—which was 
affirmed in the scholarly literature after the Eichmann trial and with 
Arendt’s book—put sociology onto the study of the Holocaust. 
Let me be precise in a last point. When Hughes speaks of the banality 
of evil, he refers exactly to banality of evil. It is not of a signifier (banality 
of evil) that alludes to another meaning. At times, it happens that the 
same categories may be used to signify others: this is not the case here. 
249 See Richard Wolin and Seyla Benhabib, “Eichmann, Arendt, and ‘The Banality of Evil,’” 
Jewish Review of Books, accessed November 2, 2014, https://jewishreviewofbooks.com/
articles/1317/eichmann-arendt-and-the-banality-of-evil/. See also Bettina Stangneth, 
Eichmann before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass Murderer (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2014 [2011]).
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Like Bauman and Fein, Hughes earned his pariah status within the field of 
the Holocaust Studies. Nevertheless, unlike them, there has never been any 
attempt to reassess soberly Hughes’s work. This consideration can highlight 
how the category of the banality of evil returns in certain historical periods 
and how scholars use it to read and interpret current events of contemporary 
world. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the opening of the archives of the 
East, and the outbreak of civil war in ex-Yugoslavia (1991–95), a return 
was made in philosophical-historical academic discussions to the causes 
of the genocide of the Jews (and therefore of all genocides): again, is evil 
banal or radical? In addition, Hughes’s research calls into play a number 
of concepts that open the way to further research (a rethinking of the 
Holocaust and the postwar period and the modern labeling of contemporary 
violence). Especially, it leads scholars to return to the archives. In 1963, 
when The Banality of Evil by Arendt was published, there were many public 
and conflicting critics both in Israel and in the United States.250 It was a 
debate that divided the thinking of politicians, philosophers, historians, and 
sociologists, involving the international media (New York Times, Der 
Spiegel, and so on) in addition to academic journals, the educated public, 
and the more casual observer. The controversy sometimes seems to have 
been extinguished for certain periods (1966–69; 1970–77; 1978–85) but 
then reignited in crucial periods, leaving the dispute without a definitive 
answer. For instance, in the functionalist-intentionalist debate in the 
1960s, the functionalists found support for their thesis in the category of 
the banality of evil.
The Arendt controversy was rekindled in something like a trial or 
“question-and-answer” mode just after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when 
the banality of evil lent itself as a historical category to explain genocides 
and wars in the Balkans.251 Again scholars are forced to take the side of 
Arendt and to reconsider the final solution, the concentration camp 
system. Or they openly oppose the scholar’s thesis, as did Goldhagen, who 
250 See Leora Bilsky, “The Arendt Controversy 2000: An Israeli Perspective,” Arendt’s 
Newsletter 5 (November 2001): 41–46; Michael Ezra, “The Eichmann Polemics: Hannah 
Arendt and Her Critics,” Democratiya 9 (2007): 141–65.
251 See Richard Cohen, “Arendt Controversy,” in Encyclopedia of the Holocaust (New York: 
Macmillan, 1990), 1: 80–81.
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opened further debate in 1996.252 At the beginning of the millennium, in 
the context of an increasingly globalized world, the controversy persists 
under a different guise: the question of a radical or a banal evil is used to 
interpret the concepts of international political responsibility.253 
The debates for and against Arendt continue, and innovate research 
sheds light on the World War II in a broad sense. Historians rethink the Third 
Reich’s anti-Semitism, for instance. Through the category of “good people” 
they revisit the genocides of the twentieth century, and in a comparative way. 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the positions of Lozowic and 
Cesarani led to the abandonment of the previous argument in favor of 
Arendt and a total reconsideration of the banality of evil.254 
Here, Hughes’s case can demonstrate how the ongoing debates opened 
around the banal or radical nature of evil serve to further reconsider such 
concepts as modernity, atomization, and mass society, all inherent in the 
Holocaust and generating in turn other thinking tools to read the postwar 
period. Additionally, it demonstrates the polysemic capability of this 
 category, which in relighting durable diatribes opens new archives or reopens 
old ones. The category of the banality of evil returns in various studies for 
reading contemporary events and, in particular, new contemporary violence. 
At this point, it is essential to follow the scholars Ulrich Herbert and 
Bettina Stangneth for having tried, through their studies, to give in-depth 
answers, which can only emerge after consulting the archives, by allowing 
a dialogue between disciplines, such as history, sociology, and philosophy. 
It is decisive to return to the Arendt and Hughes archives. In bringing to 
light unpublished works, rediscovering Hughes’s researches, and reflecting 
on the reception of these works, it updates the various currents of the 
Chicago School by reconsidering the overall history of sociology and 
252 See Daniel J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996); Israel Gutman, “Goldhagen—His Critics and His 
Contribution,” Yad Vashem Studies 26 (1998): 329–64; Avraham Barkai, “German 
Historians Confront Goldhagen,” Yad Vashem Studies 26 (1998): 295–328.
253 Cf. Idith Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood, trans. Chaya Galai 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
254 See Yaacov Lozowick, Hitler’s Bureaucrats: The Nazi Security Police and the Banality of Evil 
(London: Continuum, 2002); David Cesarani, Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, 
Crimes, and Trial of a “Desk Murderer” (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2006); Deborah 
Lipstadt, The Eichmann Trial (New York: Schocken, 2011). 
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academic policies revolving around the research. As Helmes-Hayes told 
me in an e-mail on March 8, 2012, in speaking of the Hughes papers, “It is 
truly a treasure trove of materials.” For example, the rediscovery of ignored 
correspondence with Goffman unearths that Hughes had a dispute with 
his disciple because of the category of “total institution,” which Goffman 
had appropriated from him.255 
In the same way, the category of the banality of evil, which affected 
the research paths and historiography of World War II, in general, is still 
attributed to Arendt. Hughes’s case can rebuild the so-called Arendt 
controversy and explain how scholars resort to it to understand precise 
political situations, ranging from state crimes to events of new violence to 
international politics.
To sum up, in 2010 Bernard Wasserstein and David Satter inaugu-
rated the debate on evil and whether it was “banal or radical.” Both 
Wasserstein and Satter wondered if Arendt’s concept was still relevant. 
The debate has had positive results because it renews the discussion with 
Stangneth, whose research using the archives of the German state, which 
had never been consulted before, allowed her to systematically and thor-
oughly study a number of other issues related to the Holocaust, leading to 
sensational truths (the open letter of Eichmann to Adenauer, the reluc-
tance to sue him in Germany because of the Nazi past of Globke, director 
of the German Chancellery in 1953–63), forcing scholars to begin other 
investigations (the 3,400 folders on Eichmann stored by the German 
Intelligence Service [BND] have yet to be declassified) and to review 
certain issues that have reopened unresolved cases (international networks 
that protected Eichmann, the communist threat, and relations between 
Israel and Germany, for example). 
255 See Everett C. Hughes, “Memorandum on Total Institutions, Sociologica 2 (2010): 1–5, accessed 
March 28, 2012, doi:10.2383/32719; Philippe Vienne, “The Enigma of the Total Institution: 
Rethinking the Hughes–Goffman Intellectual Relationship,” Sociologica 2 (2010), 1–5, accessed 
March 28, 2012, doi:10.2383/32720; Vienne, “Introduction to Everett C. Hughes’ ‘Memorandum 
on Total Institutions,’” Sociologica 2 (2010), 1–5, accessed March 28, 2012, doi:10.2383/32718. For 
a detailed study on the sociology of Everett C. Hughes, see Richard Helmes-Hayes, “Studying 
‘Going Concerns’: Everett C. Hughes on Method,” Sociologica 2 (2010): 1–27, accessed February 
23, 2016, doi:10.2383/32714. I would like to thank Richard Helmes-Hayes for directing me to the 
articles about Hughes in Sociologica edited by Marco Santoro and him. 
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Hughes’s thesis shows that the extermination of the Jews was possible 
thanks to the “grey-collar” class, as Allen explains, starting from 1997, 
reopening a debate in sociology. They have a “gray” collar because as blue 
collars they practice a manual work that is dirty; because they execute—
they put in practice, into execution—a work directed from above, on the 
part of leading persons, white collars, who order the dirty, gray work, that 
is, of practicing the injustice and committing the death. In this way, they 
can be labeled as gray collars. Their attitudes are also gray, and recall the 
color gray, because they are not well defined, they are not clear in them-
selves: their attitude is not white, but it is not perfectly black, it is gray, a 
color as confused as their action, mixed in a way that evokes death or gray 
ashes. It is gray, intermediate between white and black, indeed, it is good 
people.
1.8. SUMMARY
Contrary to general opinion, it was not the Frankfurt School alone that 
approached the Jewish question. In this chapter, I have recalled the main 
sociological traditions, especially the Chicago School, and have tried to 
give an account of post-Holocaust sociology until the 1960s. Next, 
I analyzed with which categories and sociological devices they reached 
the objective of publicizing and publishing studies on the Holocaust. One 
could reflect on which factors (structural, political, academic) led to the 
delayed publication of these works; and we saw the factors (anti- Semitism, 
political agendas) that set up the famed sociological delay. This chapter 
has tried to demonstrate that this delay did not exist—as the Parsons, 
Hughes, Hartshorne, and Neurath cases, for instance, demonstrate. 
Meantime, it sought to prove the factors that did create this delay and 
which elements led to people to speak of the delay of sociology in 
approaching the Holocaust. The attention to historical facts and the 
consideration with which they were approached accounted for the trials 
and troubles post-Holocaust sociology experienced. In this chapter, 
Traverso’s lesson in dealing with Auschwitz and intellectuals and Nazi 
violence is evident.
CHAPTER 2
The Destruction of the Jews 
in a Sociological Perspective 
during the 1970s
Do not do unto thy neighbor what thou wouldst not like to have done to thyself. 
The rest is commentary.
—Hillel
Do not harm your neighbour and, if at all possible, save him . . . What doomed that 
experiment to fail was the fact that the Nazi mind had not considered the possi-
bility of psychological resistance in extremity or the various forms of struggle and 
solidarity in self-defense.
. . .
Conspiratorial organizations in Auschwitz were closely linked to clandestine orga-
nizations outside the camp and historians will have to give their views (as precisely 
as the documents that have been preserved will allow) on how the foundations of 
organized conspiracy in the camp were laid.
—Anna Pawełczyńska, 1973
2.1. PREFACE 
The echo of the Third Arab–Israeli War, and above all the image of 
Jerusalem bombarded on June 5, 1967, continued to resound in the world 
during the 1970s. The fear of another Holocaust, after only twenty years, 
scared, unnerved, and impelled people to stand up against another 
destruction: “At Auschwitz in the 1940s, and at Jerusalem in 1967, Jews 
were singled out and alone.”1 Especially the Jews, but all humans, are 
called to remember what the Holocaust was and to hold it tight in memory: 
“Today, no Jew, however deeply involved in universally human concerns, 
 1 Fackenheim, Quest for Past and Future, 3.
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can go on pretending to himself that he is a man-in-general. The universal 
and the particular are inextricably intertwined; he cannot be present at 
Selma and Hiroshima unless he is present at Auschwitz and Jerusalem.”2 
In 1968, when the Jewish thinker Fackenheim said these words, he revealed 
in advance what Levy and Sznaider would elaborate in the 2000s, namely, 
the cosmopolitanism of the Holocaust. Under the ringing of deaths in 
Vietnam, “the commanding voice of Auschwitz bids Jews, religious and 
secularist, not to abandon the world to the forces of Auschwitz, but rather 
to continue to work and hope for it.”3 In any here and now. In these years, 
“a commanding voice is heard, and that is being heard with increasing 
clarity.”4 The post-Holocaust commandment, the so-called 614th command-
ment by Fackenheim, slowly took its shape: “For two long weeks in May 
1967 the world-wide Jewish community perceived the spectre of a second 
Jewish holocaust in a single generation. . . . In May 1967 Jews heard the 
commanding voice of Auschwitz.”5 In the summer of 1967 it was clear that 
“Jews are not permitted to hand Hitler posthumous victories.”6 In protecting 
Jews from another extermination, increasing attention, or, rather, open 
attentiveness, was reserved for the Holocaust. The issue began to be dealt 
with more freely and without reserve in more scholarly disciplines. “The 
Commanding Voice of Auschwitz”7 as a shofar summoning the Hebrews 
to battle or worship, seemed to be a political-moral warning that opened 
the brackets in which the Holocaust, and its discourse, had been put. It 
seemed to be the needed gate to the Holocaust question in the academy. It 
became a daily matter of discussion, for instance, when, at the University 
of Michigan in 1970s, Fackenheim presented in a seminar to Jewish 
students the question of the memory of 6 million Jews killed in the 
Holocaust. Fackenheim’s discourses prepared new thinking grounds in 
general environments.
 2 Ibid., 4.
 3 Fackenheim, God’s Presence in History, 87.
 4 Fackenheim, Quest for Past and Future, 20.
 5 Ibid., 24–25.
 6 Ibid., 20. See Emil L. Fackenheim, “Jewish Values in the Post-Holocaust Future: A 
Symposium,” Judaism 16, no. 3 (1967): 266–69.
 7 Fackenheim, God’s Presence in History, 67.
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Looking at the overall development of post-Holocaust sociology 
between 1970 and 1979, it is striking how profoundly it changed in little less 
than a decade. These years can be described as a period of public “awak-
ening” in the sense that the sociology profession as a whole updated itself on 
this topic. For many years, the Holocaust could not be prominent on the 
agenda of academic sociologists, and this delayed the spread of influential 
studies. What happened at the international level, resulting also from Willy 
Brandt’s genuflection at Warsaw on December 7, 1970, was a rebound in 
sociological studies. Both historical works and sociological research, even if 
in a parallel way, sought the same aim: the accounting for what occurred in 
Europe to the Jews. These approaches could be made sociologically, since in 
the 1970s sociology was called to new challenges in passing to new develop-
ments as an academic discipline. This discourse varied from country to 
country, but what matters is that it was always far from functionalist assump-
tions. Above all, the Vietnam War with its oppositional dynamics between a 
liberal and socialist world ricocheted in sociological thought, leading to 
conflict sociology, a neo-Marxist view. Sociology of the 1970s also went 
through a phase of  divisions within the discipline as a result of interdisci-
plinary influences, leading sociology to sectorialize itself in more strands 
and to the birth of new fields of sociology. Particularly, in this period 
emerged the importance of the sociology of organization and movements of 
social stratification, which resulted also from the historical movements of 
1968 and the early 1970s that changed the history of many countries. 
However, primarily, general conflict theory—evident in the studies of Anna 
Pawełczyńska, Celia S. Heller, Barrington Moore, and Helen Fein, the 
outstanding researchers of Holocaust scholarship of the 1970s—allowed the 
reestablishment of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. Principally, 
the negative conclusion of the Vietnam War for the United States, that is, the 
defeat for liberalism and the liberal world, permitted the termination of an 
era of liberal optimism sustained by functionalist thought. Meanwhile, the 
increasing specialization of sociology in several areas, concerned with 
methodology and approach (of gender, race, and so on) had as a result the 
introduction/revaluation of sociological journals, such as Social Forces or 
Social Problems, academic reviews perused for the occasion of rethinking 
post-Holocaust sociology. 
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In the 1970s, attention to microsociological issues came to dominate 
post-Holocaust sociological issues: they dealt with the Shoah and 
addressed basic sociological tools, such as movement, organization, 
group, mass, solidarity, ethnos, obedience, and revolt. A broad-ranging 
work on the Nazi concentration camp system appeared in 1973, coinciding 
with the outbreak of the war on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish 
calendar. Meanwhile, as a result of the international economic crisis, the 
growing sociological shift toward research related to economic and 
government data, or attention to econometric devices and statistical 
methods, was seen in Accounting for Genocide by Fein in 1979. A concrete 
knowledge of the Holocaust became ever greater in the subsequent years. 
2.2.  AUSCHWITZ IN THE LIGHT OF ANNA PAWEŁCZYN ´  SKA: 
FROM VIOLENCE TO VALUES
To acquaint us better with the topic, my examination of post-Holocaust 
sociology follows a chronological order. At this point, it may be said that 
Values and Violence by Pawełczyńska inaugurated the post-Holocaust 
sociology of the 1970s. Being a work on post-Holocaust sociology was 
twice as great a charge as being a simple sociological piece. Starting from 
her original research and from what violence and values meant at Auschwitz 
for her, it is possible to delineate the prominence that sociological concepts 
such as movement and organized group have: 
While observing the shapes of the chimney smoke from the crema-
tory, and without losing one’s identification with those who died, 
one might envision little angels in flight and imagine the shape that 
one would take oneself at the appropriate time. Such a defense 
mechanism helped to lessen the camp terrors and the feeling of 
guilt toward those perished, as it also set a limit to Nazi power: what 
more can you do to me—I’ll fly out through the chimney. So what?8
 8 Anna Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz: A Sociological Analysis, trans. 
Catherine S. Leach (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 132; Polish edition is 
Wartości A Przemoc: Zarys socjologicznej problematyki Oświęcimia (Warsaw: Państwowe 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1973).
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Pawełczyńska, a political prisoner at Auschwitz-Birkenau, described 
the structure of the largest death camp, the Vernichtungslager of Auschwitz, 
correctly and in a timely manner. “The writing of this book,” she 
commences in Values and Violence in Auschwitz, “needed the perspective 
of thirty years. Only historical distance, long reflection, and the calm of 
approaching old age made it possible to consider the concentration camp 
in objective categories.”9 Her written work is the careful, factual account of 
a witness who experienced Auschwitz; it is not the result of a process of 
revision of the collective memory. Despite being the result of a subjective 
experience (“a writing of memory [that] needs loneliness to account for 
the desolation of the lived experience”),10 Pawełczyńska’s analysis does not 
present smudges whatsoever attributable to imprisonment in the camp. 
This is due essentially to Stanisław Ossowski’s teachings, which allow her 
to reach, starting from personal experience, a global perception of the 
concentration camp system.11
 9 Ibid., 1.
10 See Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 20.
11 Stanisław Ossowski’s sociological theory contributed significantly to the drafting of Values 
and Violence. He completed his studies in Warsaw, Paris, and Rome, and under the influ-
ence of Jan Łukasiewicz and Tadeusz Kotarbińki’s Polish School of Logic. At the end of the 
World War II, he taught at the University of Łódź, eventually to hold, from 1947 onwards, 
the chair of sociology at the University of Warsaw. In 1957, he established the Polish 
Association of Sociology, of which he was president until his death. His masterpiece, 
Struktura kłasowa w społecznej świadomości (1957), represents one of the most important 
attempts to compare the theoretical positions of Marxism with those of non-Marxist 
sociology. 
 Cf. Stanisław Ossowski, “Prawa ‘historyczne’ w socjologii,” Przegląd filozoficzny 37 (1935): 
3–32; Ossowski, Struktura kłasowa w społecznej świadomości (Łódź, Wrocław: Zakład 
narodowy imienia Ossolińskich, 1957); Ossowski, O osobliwościach nauk społecznych 
(Warsaw: PWN, 1962). As Catherine Leach notes in her introduction to Pawełczyńska’s 
book: “From Ossowski, Pawełczyńska learned to combine a precise conceptual framework 
and expository style with rigorous inductive analysis, and to view the results from a broad 
historical and cultural perspective. This method has made it possible for her to come to grips 
with a problem few scholars have been able (or willing) to tackle. It has enabled her to present 
the problems of the concentration camp in social categories familiar to everyone, while the 
richness of documentation (see Polish edition), which includes specialized scholarly studies, 
guarantees that her experience of the facts can be compared and expanded to the point 
where generalization becomes possible. What sets her study apart are the precise distinctions 
on which she bases her judgements—her analyses, for example, of spatial factors and 
communications, of the role of small groups, of the behaviour of the Muselmänner, of the 
function of the camp market. Through her complete avoidance of naturalism (which, by 
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Applying the lessons of “Prawa ‘historyczne’ w socjologii” (The Laws of 
Historical Sociology (1935) by Ossowski, she especially combines theoretical 
concepts and an analytical explanation typical of sociology with the 
inductive process, according to a perspective that takes account of events 
in general. This method not only allows her to confront problems that few 
scholars had been able to deal with,12 but more importantly it helps to 
represent the environment and the situations of the concentration camp 
with categories familiar to readers, while the wealth of sources, especially 
in the Polish edition, is a guarantee of the quality of her research. Thus, 
when, thirty years later, Pawełczyńska put in writing and into perspective 
her own personal experience, that of a political prisoner, she transformed 
herself into a scholar of resistance:
Pawełczyńska herself soon became a member of the Resistance and 
acted as a carrier for the underground press and also as a liaison for 
one of the officers of the Home Army in the Warsaw district. In 
addition she attended clandestine study sessions to prepare for her 
final examinations. Such illegal educational activity was carried on 
at great risk by school and university authorities throughout the 
occupation. While the author was taking her exams, the Gestapo 
arrested the group of instructors.13
Born in 1922 to a Polish family belonging to the middle class, soon after 
the German invasion of Poland in 1939, Pawełczyńska organized a 
sparing the mind the paralyzing effects of horror, enables it to penetrate to inner laws) and her 
perspective as a cultural anthropologist, she succeeds in viewing the concentration camp in 
the context of the most basic values of European culture (or ‘Western civilization’). And thus 
she brings her subject out of its isolation and neglect into the realm of contemporary social 
awareness” (Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, xxi).
 See also Miroslaw Chałubiński, “The Sociological Ideas of Stanisław Ossowski: His Life, 
Fundamental Ideas and Sociology in Polish and World Science,” Journal of Classical Sociology 
6, no. 3 (2006): 283–309, accessed November 24, 2010, doi:10.1177/1468795X06069679.
12 Cf. Olga Wormser-Migot, Le système concentrationnaire nazi (1933–1945) (Paris: PUF, 
1968); Falk Pingel, Häftlinge unter SS-Herrschaft : Widerstand, Selbstbehauptung und 
Vernichtung im Konzentrationslager (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1978); Jane Caplan 
and Nikolaus Wachsmann, eds., Concentration Camps in Nazi Germany: The New Histories 
(London: Routledge, 2010).
13 Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, xiv.
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program of humanitarian aid to the Polish soldiers wounded in war. Her 
very timely reaction to the invasion helps us understand how she was part 
of that generation of young people who glimpsed a further confirmation 
of the tragic history of Poland in the outbreak of the conflict and a return 
to foreign domination and dependence. 
Values and Violence in Auschwitz is a sociological masterpiece, almost 
a treatise on sociology, through which it is possible to read the history of 
Poland. In the text, the echoes of the master Ossowski are noticeable: 
Pawełczyńska makes each historical and political background not just a 
digression or presentation of knowledge, but a rich source of information 
to explain how the events at Auschwitz have to be put into relation with 
the Polish past. In this way, important and original aspects on the Jewish 
question are highlighted.
Pawełczyńska did not write about Auschwitz during the war or even 
at its end, but only after thirty long years of silence, during which she 
acquired the basic concepts of sociology, criminology, and history:14 
“It was my friend and colleague Stanislaw Kłodziński, of Krakow, who 
encouraged me: he said that to write down my experience not only would 
help me to rearrange my life, but it would also serve others: a ‘story for the 
whole society,’ he meant it in this way, and that is a sociological lesson 
after Auschwitz; on his insistence I convinced myself to do it.”15
14 The author spent the Stalinist years completing various studies “in the field,” in particular 
dealing with juvenile delinquency. In this regard, she was part of a research team in the 
Criminology Section of the Polish Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Legal Studies. In 1956, 
the so-called Thaw year, she was in France as a visiting sociologist at the Institute of 
Demography and Public Opinion Research. This latter Institute resulted from the strong 
development sociology had in France after 1945. Through her multifaceted training, she 
was also an expert in statistics, ecology, and urban studies (her works on the relationship 
between the environment, society, and territory are remarkable), and together with the 
scientific activities in the field of empirical social research and public opinion, she was able 
give a sociological explanation of Auschwitz, putting aside the way of religious naturalism; 
see Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, xxi–xxii.
15 My interview (Warsaw, December 20, 2011) with Anna Pawełczyńska, “Nel campo 
di Auschwitz,” Free Ebrei: Rivista di identità ebraica contemporanea 4, no. 2 (2015), http://
www.freeebrei.com/anno-iv-numero-2-luglio-dicembre-2015/nel-campo-di-auschwitz-a-
cura-di-adele-valeria-messina; republished with further presentation in DEP 30 (2016): 
202–26, http://www.unive.it/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=200057. I particularly thank Hanna K. 
Ulatowska for the translation from Polish into English during the interview.
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When Pawełczyńska joined the underground army against the 
Nazis, her political objectives were, like those of all other resistant Poles, 
strongly characterized by feelings of a patriotic nature, focused on the 
fight for the independence of the country. After her arrest, on August 15, 
1942, she found herself locked up for nine months in Pawiak prison.16 
Resistant to torture during interrogation and, although she did not 
receive any condemnation, she was sent, on May 13, 1943, to Auschwitz-
Birkenau, where she was recorded as a political prisoner, number 44764. 
From May 1943 to October 1944, she remained in Auschwitz and took 
part in the resistance movement inside the camp, being part of the 
command of the women’s camp. Particularly, she profited from favorable 
situations that arose when, together with some prisoner detachments, 
she went to work in the subcamps outside of the main camp. As the 
result of a disease, she was then housed in the “sick bay for prisoners” 
until the late fall of 1943. 
As a political inmate, she was in a privileged position to analyze the 
functioning of the Lager and the changes within it. Along with Zofia 
Brodzikowską-Pohorecka, Janina Tollik, Zarzycka Anna (Eva Agapsowicz), 
and Maria Mazurkiewicz, she put her own life at risk to fill in secret lists 
of women and children transported to Auschwitz in August and September 
1944, following the repression of the Warsaw Uprising.17 These lists are, in 
many cases, the only documents that can prove the presence of an indi-
vidual at Auschwitz. She was transferred at the end of October 1944, in 
Dresden, to one of the Auschwitz subcamps at the Flossenbürg factory of 
the Zeiss-Ikon group, then in April 1945, during the evacuation of the 
subcamp, while she was close to the front, she fled from the marching 
columns and found refuge in the forests, where she remained until May 7. 
From here, and throughout the month of June, she prepared an assistance 
program for Poles returning home. 
At the end of the war, like many survivors, or rather like all those who 
passed through the experience of Nazi totalitarianism, Pawełczyńska also 
16 Cf. Julian Hirshaut, “Paviak Memoirs,” in Anthology on Armed Jewish Resistance 1939–1945, 
ed. Isaac Kowalski (Brooklyn, NY: JCPH, 1991), 493–506.
17 Pawełczyńska speaks of it widely in the interview with me mentioned above. 
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fed her desire to work towards a better society.18 She realized this aspira-
tion through the study of society. Back in Warsaw, in fact, she attended 
sociology courses with Stanisław Ossowski and Maria Ossowska and Jan 
Strzelecki, and, in 1960, she obtained her doctorate under the supervision 
of Ossowski, from whom she inherited the refusal of a rigid Marxism and 
mechanical assimilation of Marx’s axioms. 
Values and Violence in Auschwitz: A Sociological Analysis is the literal 
translation of the Polish Wartości a przemoc: Zarys socjologicznej prob-
lematyki Oświęcimia.19 This was the first sociological analysis of the Nazi 
concentration camp system—after Abel’s analysis of the concentration camps 
(1951)—centered on its social organization, relations between prisoners, 
 strategies of survival, and inner resistance.20 Values and violence are 
construed as social forces that coexist with each other, albeit in the oppo-
site way, in the Lager. In many ways it also appears as a study of philosophy, 
politics, law, medicine, and psychology, of great importance because the 
author was a survivor, who moreover addressed the issue of resistance 
practiced in the camps at a time when it was not discussed at all, not to say 
that it was explicitly denied.21 In 1973, when during the Yom Kippur War 
the vulnerability of Israeli army led to the collapse of the myth of an 
ever-victorious Israel, in the collective thought the ideology of military 
force began to slowly crack, giving rise to a new idea of resistance, in 
which weapons or physical force lost their centrality.22 In this sense, it 
spoke of a change of perspective from armed resistance to unarmed resis-
18 Cf. Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, xviii–xix. Bauman belongs to 
Ossowski’s school too.
19 The first English edition translated in place of “violence,” “coercion,” and proposed as a 
subtitle An Outline of the Sociology of Auschwitz instead of A Sociological Analysis. See 
Pawełczyńska, “Values and Violence Sociology of Auschwitz,” Polish Sociological Bulletin 3 
(1976): 5–17.
20 Cf. Theodore Abel, “The Sociology of Concentration Camps,” Social Forces 30, no. 2 (1951): 
150–55, doi:10.2307/2571626.
21 She received the Book Award in the field of Scientific and Popular Research of Modern 
Polish History in 1974 and won the prize dedicated to Ossowski (Stanisław Ossowski 
Award) by the Polish Sociological Association. The American edition appeared in 1979, and 
the German, Werte gegen Gewalt, in 2001. 
22 See Jeffrey C. Alexander et al., Remembering the Holocaust: A Debate (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 182–83, 191.
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tance. The picture offered by Pawełczyńska did not find a receptive 
 international audience: it was not possible to conceive any action of resistance 
within the Auschwitz camp, and this especially because, in the period in 
which the scholar published, there was still a tendency to think of resis-
tance as only armed resistance.23
2.2.1. Inside the Time and Space of Auschwitz
Every manifestation of resistance, even though reprisals (and guilt 
by association) threatened those who took part in it, cracked the 
structure of terror, proved to those who had lost hope that hope existed, 
showed that there were indeed ways out of a dead-end situation, and 
they were various. Every method of opposition—no matter whether 
it increased the survival odds for a group of prisoners or a particular 
person, or was the immediate cause of death for the resister—
expressed a protest against violence.
Every manifestation of loyalty and cooperation was proof that 
terror liberates the strength to resist and produces attitudes of 
self-reliance. This self-reliance was expressed not only through the 
struggle for life but also through independent choice of the type of 
death. This struggle for life and self-reliance was also waged in the 
sphere of values. Every gesture of loyalty, of sympathy, and of organized 
resistance was an externalization and a defense of the basic values of 
European civilization against the terrorism of those who denied the 
existence of those values. . . . This common system of values united 
23 On resistance without weapons, see Henri Michel, The Shadow War: European Resistance 
1939–1945 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Bruno Bettelheim, Surviving and Other Essays 
(New York: Knopf, 1979); Vittorio E. Giuntella, Il nazismo e i Lager (Rome: Studium, 1979); 
Jacques Sémelin, Senz’armi di fronte ad Hitler: La Resistenza civile in Europa, 1939–1943 
(Turin: Sonda, 1993); Abraham J. Edelheit and Hershel Edelheit, History of the Holocaust: A 
Handbook and Dictionary (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994); Antonio Parisella, Sopravvivere 
liberi: Riflessioni sulla storia della Resistenza a cinquant’anni dalla Liberazione (Rome: 
Gangemi, 1997); Dan Michman, Pour une historiographie de la Shoah: Conceptualisations, 
terminologie, définitions et problèms fondamentaux (Paris: In Press Éditions, 2001); Howard 
Blum, La brigata: Una storia di guerra, di vendetta e di redenzione (Milan: il Saggiatore, 
2002); Robert Rozett, “Jewish Resistance,” in The Historiography of the Holocaust, ed. Dan 
Stone (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 341–63.
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prisoners and their nations and strengthened their resistance, 
thanks to the sense of support. The Germans who resisted the 
turning of their government into a terroristic Nazi gang during the 
period 1933–39 did not have such support.24
Values and Violence constitutes another piece refuting the thesis of the 
sociological delay. In some ways, reading Values and Violence means to 
enter the Auschwitz camp, the life of the community of prisoners. The 
book is divided into twelve chapters that provide an in-depth analysis of 
the reality of Auschwitz, focusing on the relationship between the phys-
ical place and natural body of any inmate. The object of research is the 
group-community of prisoners, with its determinants and especially the 
relationships that are formed among the residents in that delimited 
space and at that time. Values and Violence highlights, on the one hand, 
the values that are at the basis of human behavior, which are also found 
in Auschwitz, and on the other, it emphasizes the consequences of Nazi 
violence. 
Pawełczyńska, concerned about placing Auschwitz geographically, 
establishing where it is and what there is outside of it, presents the outside 
world, in its position and in its structure, before investigating the inner camp. 
In the wake of the Chicago School, the concepts of space (physical and social) 
and of time are central from the beginning. The constant reference to the 
physical-spatial element is needed to consider the attitudes assumed by the 
inmates and to assess their chances of survival. Her intensely factual written 
account almost seems like an autopsy examination, which captures the 
subtle relationship between environment and person, exploring in depth 
the community of prisoners and mechanisms of functioning of the 
Auschwitz system.25 Blocks, barracks, crematoria: all places dominated by 
the same principle of closure and total control of space and time. This is the 
first definition that the author gives about Auschwitz: it is primarily a 
24 Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 121–22. 
25 See Hans G. Adler, “Ideas toward a Sociology of the Concentration Camp,” American 
Journal of Sociology 63, no. 5 (1958): 513–22; Christian Fleck and Albert Müller, “Bruno 
Bettelheim and the Concentration Camps,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 
33, no. 1 (1997): 1–37, doi:10.1002/(SICI)1520-6696(199724)33:1<1::AID-JHBS1>3.0.CO;2-Y.
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concentration camp. Now, in the physical sciences, the camp is a region of 
limited space, under observation, where physical quantities behave as 
forces. For Pawełczyńska, inside the Auschwitz camp two types of forces, 
interacting in the opposite view to each other, unfold. On the one hand, a 
destructive force, to which the author gives the name of violence (przemoc), a 
term consciously adopted in the singular. On the other, a defense mechanism, 
always a force that reacts to violence, a reactive force made up of bonds of 
solidarity, which takes the name of values (wartości), a term used in the 
plural and placed first in the title of the volume, almost emphasizing the 
victory of good over evil. The reference is clearly to Durkheim, who 
explained several times in his writings that holding a society together is a set 
of values, which he called “morals.” 
As regards the Nazi terror and violence, Pawełczyńska, a Polish 
 intellectual and against any kind of totalitarian power and knowing well 
the consequences in her country that resulted from the suppressing of the 
Prague Spring, when the Polish People’s Army participated in repressing 
the 1968 democratization process of Czechoslovakia, in her book stresses the 
relevance of communities of solidarity to pierce and fight totalitarianism. 
And in Values and Violence she reports the cases in which certain 
moral values prevailed among the prisoners that led to the formation of 
communities of solidarity: through small and “stubborn” acts of resistance 
and friendship, prisoners at Auschwitz fought against the authority of the 
legitimate terror and against all forms of demoralization. The contemporary 
political facts of her native Poland helps her account for her past in Auschwitz, 
and her past in Auschwitz allows her to denounce Polish totalitarian power 
and limits of socialism with a human face. Values and Violence is almost 
in a way written to fight communism and to stop totalitarian power. 
Nevertheless, some events helped set the stage for her work: in December 
1970, Willy Brandt knelt down at the monument to victims of the Warsaw 
Uprising, asking forgiveness for Nazi crimes. This public asking for 
forgiveness and reconciliation, and the treaty with West Germany, initiated 
five years earlier with a “Letter of Reconciliation of the Polish Bishops to 
the German Bishops,” in 1965, supported her return to her past in 
Auschwitz, in accounting for what happened in a Poland of the 1970s, 
building positive relations with Germany. To construct a human society 
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in post-Holocaust Poland, to build a democratic liberal future between 
the two countries, it was crucial to return to the past and step-by-step to 
recognize publicly what had occurred: including guilt and accountability. 
For Pawełczyńska, encouraged by her friend Klodziński, the time to write 
her experience had arrived.
Returning to the construct of “camp,” and even more the general 
meaning of “field theory,” it provides insight into the specifics of a social 
phenomenon. One can understand in what sense Pawełczyńska conceives 
Auschwitz as a social phenomenon thanks to what Durkheim said, when, 
in his Les règles de la méthode sociologique, he defines the social fact as any 
attitude, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external 
constraint, or as any general manner within a given society, since it has its 
own existence, independently by individual events.26 Focusing attention 
on the adjective “social,” meaning a phenomenon (social), an anonymous 
and impersonal end that stands above all particular consciousness and 
therefore can serve to unite them, one may understand how Pawełczyńska 
explains the constitution of community of solidarity in Auschwitz. 
Actions, beliefs, values, languages, patterns of behavior, in Durkheim’s 
language “facts” or “social phenomena,” in Values and Violence are all 
reinterpreted on the basis of a fundamental norm:
In every camp situation there would be prisoners forming into 
groups—though continually fragmented by the camp system—
uniting together in the practice of the basic norm, “Do not harm your 
neighbour and, if it at all possible, save him,” even in the most oppressive 
conditions. It was the prisoner’s most important field of battle.27
“Do not harm your neighbour and, if it at all possible, save him” was the 
moral norm that had supported in the Auschwitz system small solidarity 
groups of an organic type, ensuring the continuation of human society.28 
For this reason, the camp in her work is dominant. It is a dynamic system 
in which laws do not hinge on the individual characteristics of the elements 
26 See Émile Durkheim, Les règles de la méthode sociologique (Paris: F. Alcan, 1895).
27 Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 144.
28 Cf. Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Berlin: Karl Curtius, 1912).
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involved (in the specific case, of individuals), but on the configuration and 
the movements of the forces acting on its inside. Because the events that 
occur in a given area and at a given time do not have another explanation 
than that which arises from the properties of the field itself, the configuration 
and properties of Auschwitz allow the deployment of two types of forces 
that, in their interacting, determine a phase of equilibrium:
Prisoners’ individual reactions, their reactions as members of small 
spontaneously formed (and frequently fragmented) groups, and their 
organized reactions were expressions of their outlook on life and 
their values, which changed under the influence of the relations and 
conditions in the camp. . . . Every prisoner had his own “neighbors.” In 
the midst of the fight against a world of hatred, as a reaction to a 
degenerate system of terror, a world of friendship came into being. 
And precisely in this sense, regardless of prisoner conduct that did 
not harmonize with the standards of free societies, the concentration 
camp established a basic norm, the observance of which is everywhere 
indispensable, and it created a new moral value: that bond with the 
wronged which demands the greatest renunciations.29
In accordance with the principle of temporal causality, she moves towards 
an explanation of the facts that focuses on the dynamics of the system and 
that puts together all the elements involved, namely, the inner world 
(subjective) of inmates with that outside. This approach conflicts with the 
principles of Nazi totalitarian politics, which tend to atomize individuals 
and make them an amorphous and total whole. Cognitive, emotional, and 
environmental factors, in their interdependent system, clarify which laws 
govern life in a concentration camp, ensuring its subsistence.
2.2.2. The Hodological Space in the Structure of Terror
Extremely complex issues are presented in a simple way, as evidenced by the 
substantial bibliography in the original Polish edition, which accounts for a 
29 Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 101, 144.
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debate and a school of thought, which was largely unknown to German- or 
English-speaking readers. The examination is original, first because the 
author is an Auschwitz survivor, an eyewitness to what happened. Second, 
she had been deported for having joined the Home Army (Armia 
Krajowa). Finally, in the book published in Poland in 1973, for the first 
time she introduced sociological categories that helped to analyze the 
specific fate of women, an issue that until then had nearly no place in 
Holocaust Studies.
Inside the camp, intended as “a totality of social facts coexisting in their 
social interdependence,” Pawełczyńska identifies some subfields of study 
corresponding, in the physical space of Auschwitz, to four subsections.
(1) A “living space” where the individual prisoner moves: the physical 
environment in which he lives and the psychological one with which he 
perceives things. This living space includes needs, motivations, moods, 
fears, goals, ideals, and the reactions of those who find themselves within 
the camp. “Yes, the humor: for me it was vital; I have felt that it was the 
only way to survive,” she says in an interview in Warsaw in December 
2011.30 (2) The multiplicity of processes that unfold in the physical and 
social world of the major camp. (3) The third zone is not well defined and 
it is called “boundary.” It is one in which the individual prisoner builds her 
own camp structure (hence the extensive and very detailed analysis by the 
author of maps, photos, measurements in height and width) and absorbs 
the social processes that develop. In this frontier space each force converges: 
the physical world, social phenomena, and the nervous structure. Here the 
behavior of inmates unfolds as an extension of the relationship between 
environmental factors, camp conditions, and values of a personal kind. 
However, above all, in this area with uncertain borders, the individual has the 
opportunity to start resistance defense mechanisms against terror. (4) The 
perceptual process determined by external physical stimuli, that is, by that 
part of the physical world that directly affects the sense organs; it is closely 
connected to the world of interpersonal relationships among prisoners and 
determines the execution of action. 
Pawełczyńska, faithful to Weber’s idea of social action motivated by 
and oriented to the attitude of other individuals, seeks to outline what 
30 See note 15, above.
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type of social action has been produced in Auschwitz.31 As Floyd H. 
Allport already wrote in 1924, the meaning of social behavior is the same as 
the nonsocial;32 in this case, for Auschwitz prisoners, biological individual 
maladjustment determines social action. 
However, the study of a dynamical system understandably includes 
environmental factors and social facts but also strictly individual elements, 
such as the nervous structure of a person. Pawełczyńska focuses just on 
the system of physical-social relations that unfold in the Lager, on all the 
factors that come into play, and they are related in the same physical space. 
Therefore, she proposes a particular idea of social camp to appreciate how 
social phenomena not hinging on single individuals were deployed in 
Auschwitz.
This camp is seen as an experimental field, a social experiment that 
requires, like physical-mathematical sciences in the early stages of testing, 
submission to precise physical laws in order to ensure the success of the 
experiment in progress. In the Lager, the major law is the ideology of 
physical and mental terror, applied through technology and social 
engineering. In essence, obedience and willing acceptance prevail. On the 
limits of Auschwitz’s space, Pawełczyńska elaborates a very precise, 
refined, almost geometric, analysis. 
Auschwitz is a historical fact, a social phenomenon and a physical 
reality: it is a structured space, finished and at the same time composed of 
parts infinitely divisible into several subcamps, yet spaced among them. 
Pawełczyńska, partly conditioned by her past as a member of the 
Resistance requiring a specific knowledge of a topological nature and a 
practical expertise typical of topography, represents the most likely spaces 
and times of Auschwitz as an “hodological space.” Namely, she alludes not 
only to the geometric characteristics of the place, but also to the type of 
relationships that take shape inside the same, among prisoners (analysis 
from the individual-social point of view) or among several subcamps 
(from the systemic-spatial point of view)33:
31 See Weber, Economy and Society.
32 Cf. Floyd H. Allport, Social Psychology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1924).
33 See Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science (New York: Harper & Row, 1951); 
Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 24–43. Pawełczyńska describes the plan of 
Auschwitz I, but she also presents the photographs, the internal divisions, geographical 
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The dimensions of concentration-camp space: the length of the 
road to work, the size of the subcamps, the barracks, and the bunks 
and “roosts,” were radically transformed in the consciousness of the 
prisoners living in that space. Because of the prisoners’ physical 
deterioration, the way to work felt like a march many dozens of 
miles long—the onerousness of that walk was intensified by shoes 
that were suited neither for such purposes nor for the prisoners’ 
foot sizes. The subcamp seemed like a large city divided up by a 
main artery and side streets.34
Not surprisingly, the paragraph of the third chapter of “Living Space” 
(Przestrzeń do Życia) begins with the words “At home” (W domu), which, 
in a lapidary way, refer to how totalitarian power penetrates into the inner 
personal life of the individual, transforming Auschwitz into a daily 
 environment where intimacy, made public, loses any value. The choice of 
the term “home” rather than “house” (stressing the family environment 
rather than the brick building, the building itself), on the one hand, 
accounts for the pervasive and total power of Nazi coercion that 
encroached upon family life, and on the other, it highlights the opposite 
meaning. Namely, that in Auschwitz even forces of solidarity and solid ties 
of friendship, typical of a warm environment and family, unfold. In 
explaining the dynamics of opposed social forces, Pawełczyńska, when 
introducing the categories of opposites (“open-inner/open-closed” and 
“whole–part”), lets Values and Violence become a treasurable work in 
Holocaust Studies.
The first category of “open-inner” dominates the entire first chapter, 
“The World outside the Camp,” (Świat poza obozem—Układy odniesienia) 
where the Lager is presented as an organized structure of power according 
to the bureaucratic model of the German state. The author speaks of the 
world outside Auschwitz always referring to the German state system 
locations, the site of the Auschwitz II-Birkenau, the size of bunk beds, roosts, the sketch 
plan of the crematory III in Auschwitz II-Birkenau, the distances to work sites outside the 
camp in kilometers, and, finally, some photos from the archives. What is striking is her 
perfect description.
34 Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 41–42
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that allowed Nazi violence. Hodological opposition space, based on 
“inside–outside” directions, recalls the concept of relationship among 
individuals belonging to the inner world and those forming part of the 
outer world. Particularly, “external” direction among inmates refers to 
their thoughts, which lead them to escape, at least in dreams, from the 
camp. This is not a simple removal from reality but, rather, a complex 
defense mechanism that serves to enter life within the camp. Through the 
binomial of the opposites “whole–part,” she refers instead to how, facing 
the total system of terror, the part of values unfolds. The tension between 
the “whole” of terror and the “part” of values clearly causes an unbal-
anced situation. Faced with the threat of terror, the strength of resistance, 
applied to violence, increases: “natural need” spreads the bonds of soli-
darity also, and, as Pawełczyńska says, “the mechanism of individual and 
organized resistance in extremity—the inner resources which man, under 
extreme conditions, is capable of bringing to bear against crime.”35 It is 
also in the wake of concepts of social distance, ecological space, and 
border from the Chicago School that Pawełczyńska provides her descrip-
tion of Auschwitz:
If one interprets the site of the main camp, the subcamps, the 
construction and use of the residential dwellings in spatial terms, 
then considering the function served an analogy can be made with 
certain types of colonial settlements. The subcamps numbered, on 
the average, several tens of thousands of prisoners; they formed 
peculiar city-states set apart by boundaries, the crossing of which 
was prohibited to their inhabitants and carried penalties similar to 
those attached to an illegal crossing of national boundaries. 
Lengthier contacts, in situations where men and women were 
working in close proximity or where a work crew under the 
 supervision of an SS officer was sent onto the grounds of another 
subcamp, made possible not only the exchange of information but 
also the transmittal of things. In this way the crisscrossing of two 
divisional systems extended living space by breaking through the 
35 Ibid., 2.
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boundaries of isolated city-states and creating a system of commu-
nication among them.36
2.2.3.  Resistance as Defense of the Dimension of Life by  
Group Dynamics
Resistance can be expressed in many ways. Not every situation affords 
the chance to give open battle, or even to make a passive protest. 
Under the circumstances at Auschwitz, maximum adaptation had to 
be achieved. Resistance was expressed in the constant effort to 
maintain inner freedom while outwardly adapting. In the battle for 
this freedom prisoners gave each other mutual assistance.37
Pawełczyńska’s book is significant for post-Holocaust sociology since it 
addresses the discourse of resistance in a period, the 1970s, in which this 
topic was not well known or discussed. Let me focus, here, on what 
Pawełczyńska refers to when she tackles the theme of resistance. For her, 
“to resist” essentially means “to rescue,” that is, an act of defense of human 
life. This type of social action that puts everything into play, even the  possibility 
of losing one’s own life, brings to mind the concept of “sanctification of life” 
usually attributed to Yitzhak Nissebaum, the rabbi of the Warsaw ghetto, 
but it dates back to earlier times and is used to define Jewish survival. 
Beyond characteristics and definitions, she clearly returns to the theme of 
the Amidah, which, in this context, can be translated as “upright,” meaning 
that “to resist” basically means “to stand.” How did they remain standing 
at Auschwitz? How was sanctification of life possible? The Jews undertook 
to continue a civil life under conditions imposed upon them by a force 
that had abandoned all previous humanistic tradition, an effort based on 
an instinctive impulse to move forward, both through the traditional way 
of life based on religion, in most cases, and through the most ancient 
traditions combined with modern humanism, liberalism, or socialism.38 
When this occurred, either individually or through solidarity acts by the 
36 Ibid., 30, 42.
37 Ibid., 127.
38 See Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, 119–66.
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group, the Jewish community managed to survive Auschwitz. “These were 
the most strenuous tests of human feelings; they were ultimate decisions—
love or death,” which explains the basic meaning of social action in the 
eyes of Pawełczyńska.39 Many forms of resistance in the Lager are possible, 
because a bond of feeling (an “optimistic bond among prisoners” that 
makes them a unified group) unites many inmates.40 At stake is not armed 
victory, but the triumph of humanity in front of an inhuman world.41
At the root of every act of resistance are found elements of love and 
compassion: “No one ever knew the price that might have to be paid for 
such an act of friendship, of solidarity, of duty, and many a time we paid very 
dearly. Yet this, too, was taken into account.”42 Pawełczyńska emphasizes a 
specific form of awareness, linked to what happened on September 1, 1939, 
when the Germans entered Poland: from that time, a history of violence and 
attacks on national independence began for Poland. Facing the threat of 
invaders, several situations of cohesion, circumstances, and places of unity 
arose; and the first clandestine organizations of resistance and underground 
movements took shape. Experiences from outside the camp, before 
Auschwitz, therefore made the building of unbreakable bonds possible 
within the camp, where Tönnies’s idem feeling, which unites individuals 
against Nazi terror and against the loss of national independence, in spite of 
the atomization that German policy, resounded as “an unbreakable bond”:
Every show of aid counteracted the prisoners’ isolation, which 
formed a necessary part of the Nazi plan of extermination. The need 
to minister to those in prison broke every ideological barrier and 
created a platform for organized cooperation between the various 
groups of the Polish Resistance. Those who took part in relief 
39 Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 96.
40 Ibid., 97.
41 See Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 6, with reference to Tadeusz Strzembosz, 
Odbijanie i uwalnianie więźniów w Warszawie, 1939–1944 (Warsaw: PWN, 1972).
42 Ibid., 13. Pawełczyńska recourses to Strzembosz’s testimony to better explain the risks of 
those who decided to resist: “Every camp, every prison in Poland was surrounded by a 
similar atmosphere of fraternal support. Prices for those acts of friendship and loyalty were 
paid on both sides of the barbed wire; both the givers and the receivers perished in Nazi 
reprisals” (ibid., 14).
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actions—underground organizations, families and friends of prisoners, 
local residents in the vicinity of camps situated on Polish territory—
were people not indifferent to misfortune, who risked their lives 
neither for fame nor reward but in simple response to a heart that 
was sensitive to pain and the dimensions of that pain. A broadly-based 
moral community grew up, bringing together people of various 
social strata, people in various life situations; the awareness of this 
community constituted a great strength which made it possible for 
prisoners to mobilize various defense mechanisms to resist Nazi 
terror. Regardless of what form the relief actually took—from 
gestures of friendly greeting to aid in organizing escapes—every bit 
of help from the outside bolstered not only the physical stamina of 
a concrete individual, but helped many prisoners to muster their 
psychic forces, something that would have been beyond the means 
of a person deprived of hope and support.43
Between the inside and the outside of the camp there is a continuous line 
exceeding the barbed wire and connecting the world of the Lager with 
civil society. If, in the totalitarian Nazi order the same social groups and 
aggregates of people present in the traditional civil society are suggested, 
within the camp any element of distinction between an individual and the 
other is cleared, in particular national identity, with the last consequence 
of deleting any form of social differentiation, and then the person itself:
This badge marked people of Jewish origin, regardless of their citi-
zenship or national sentiments. Culturally many of these prisoners 
were incomparably closer to prisoners who came from the same 
country as themselves than they were to the mass of prisoners 
marked with the yellow triangle. This symbol was worn by people 
transported from Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Greece, Austria, and 
Germany, and no criteria exist (but the Nazi) that would enable all 
of them to be treated as a homogeneous group.44
43 Ibid., 12.
44 Ibid., 91.
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At the base of national identity there are common values among individuals, 
such as language and culture. Although the Nazi violence tended to 
destroy national groups, inside the camp the various national identities 
are involved in the same social actions: driven by the same need to resist 
the terror, they cooperate with each other in front of the totalitarian whole. 
Pawełczyńska also proposes an ethnogenic analysis. Where are the places 
to practice solidarity and to shape homogeneous groups? To prepare for 
resistance there are, first, social adaptation, as a reduction of material 
needs, self-control of goods, food, and clothing, which the author calls 
“inner resistance”:
Inner resistance took various forms. One could eat the desired piece 
of bread immediately. Or one could, though feeling hungry, keep 
part of it in one’s pocket, conscious of freedom won: I am not eating 
it all, because I choose not to. This form of self-defense, however, 
was related to the tolerance of hunger, which varies widely among 
individuals.45
Second, knowledge of Lager laws is essential: the understanding of inner 
mechanisms of the camp helps to move with ability, facilitating resistance 
acts. The inmates who are in the same subcamp for a long time have better 
knowledge of the SS-functionaries’ (Posten) action and break times, their 
spaces and turnovers. The control under the spaces and times of the camp 
means to be aware of all possible movements, opportunities, and hidden 
dangers; for that reason prisoners are subject to continuous transfers.46 
Similar to what happens in an experimental field, even in Auschwitz, 
similar conditions for survival are created in order to resist. Here, it is 
possible to retrieve an echo of the justice and suffering theory resulting 
45 Ibid., 128.
46 Cf. ibid., 119, 134. At Auschwitz two types of criteria were used in dividing prisoners into 
groups: on the one hand, the criterion of residence, which served to form “residential 
groups” subject to constant change, on the other, that of the place, which served to divide 
the place of residence and then the prisoners: “Crossing a camp section from one end to the 
other was perceived as a distance crossed on foot in a rather large city—in the prisoner’s 
mind that distance was increased by the swampiness of the terrain, which added to the 
effort of getting around” (ibid., 42).
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from iniquity, according to which the prisoners come together to act 
together as a united body, starting from a similar conception of justice, by 
the same social suffering:
In this gamble for life over which the prisoners had no influence, 
fate, like a roulette ball, would come to rest on the black or on the 
red—the red meant living to see the end of the Nazi era and realizing 
one’s dreams of a normal life; the black meant the end of one’s own 
life and the chance for others to survive.47
2.2.3.1. Resistance as Communication
Pawełczyńska’s work is extraordinary because in 1973 she introduced 
the notion of resistance in post-Holocaust sociological literature in an 
unprecedented way. She specifies a series of unusual places where detainees 
practice resistance acts. For instance, in bunk beds (places where  prisoners 
belonging to the same ethnic or social origin often found themselves), it is 
easier because they speak the same language. It is in these “bed places,” 
which become common spaces since inmates share similar experiences, 
that a first collective feeling is made, one that motivates prisoners to 
communicate with each other and form collaborative groups. These places 
are unique opportunities to pass information about forms of resistance 
they want to arrange. Since these areas are beyond the total control of the 
SS, there are many suspects. For these reasons, the guards repeatedly 
 practice continuous transfers of detainees, from barrack to barrack, in 
order to limit any kind of collaboration, break the bonds of solidarity, and 
prevent any forms of community survival. 
For Pawełczyńska, another place of resistance is the space between 
the barracks; actually, it is an artery of communication, still subject to the 
Nazi guards’ control, but to a lesser extent than the main road of the camp. 
In this place, the prisoners can build bonds of friendship or business, but, 
more importantly, they can also exchange information or consult 
regarding resistance initiatives. 
47 Ibid., 132.
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The bathrooms are also points of contact and communication where 
news and alerts can be passed along. Next to the barbed wire, which 
isolates the subcamp of women at Birkenau, there is a narrow strip of bare 
earth, called the “meadow.” It is a space of relative rest and a meeting place 
where prisoners, forcibly brought from the barracks for disinfestation, can 
communicate. There is also a railway platform, enclosed by barbed-wire 
cordons, placed at the center of the subcamp of women and of a section of 
the subcamp of men: “During periods of relaxed supervision people could 
meet their loved ones at this spot, letting themselves be seen, and in this 
way telling them that they were still alive.”48 However, the prisoners are 
put in that condition to prepare their defense actions mainly thanks to a 
ban (the so-called Blocksperre), which prevents them from leaving the 
barracks. Precisely in virtue of this prohibition, they learn the selection 
times for gas chambers. If, at first glance, this refusal to leave the barracks 
seems to interrupt communication lines, it actually informs about internal 
events in the camp. In other words, the Blocksperre functions as a sentinel, 
warning the prisoners and alerting them to different times of events in the 
camp: from the arrival of new transports to every possible destination. 
Another time or place in which resistance can be organized is in food 
transportation.49 Nevertheless, it is mainly the work camps that provide 
daily spaces where inmates can transmit news and receive information:
The work sites, besides consolidating the work crew, performed still 
another function (thanks to the prisoners’ heightened ingenuity) 
which had nothing to do with the work performed. All cracks and 
holes, sometimes even larger hiding-places, could serve to keep 
various necessaries with which prisoners could increase their 
chances of survival (e.g., food, clothing, medicine) and the crews’ 
occupational contacts constituted a communication network used 
for transmitting these things to other prisoners, or for exchange. 
Things connected with the organized resistance movement in the 
camp could also be kept in these hiding-places.50
48 Ibid., 35.
49 Cf. ibid., 69.
50 Ibid., 40.
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Even the work teams become places to pass information. If the division 
“for teams” and that “for barracks” are specially designed to break the 
links between prisoners, continuously limiting their ability to form any 
kind of relationship, the continuing divisions among prisoners facilitates 
lines of communication as they widen contact points between different 
prisoners, by passing information along a larger number of prisoners. 
The information then passes through the organized labor of prisoners:
After some time, thanks to the organized work of prisoners, certain 
key points in the camp’s framework of terror began to crack; the 
doctors were able to obtain by “illegal” means some medicine and 
nourishment for the prisoners—minimal, of course, in relation to 
the need—and they also received necessary information for saving 
the sick from other forms of terror.51
The same travel conditions are excellent opportunities to form identities 
and bonds of organic solidarity: prisoners traveling in the same carriage 
easily aggregate into small groups to exchange news and facts. Finally, an 
unusual form of resistance comes from the power that some prisoners are 
able to acquire from their superiors. This strategy allows them to overcome 
the barrier that separates prisoners from the camp authorities, but it is 
especially conducive to the development of various forms of organized 
resistance: “It is a little what happens to Martha and Liza, the protagonists 
of Pasażerka: the strong personality of Martha, Polish political prisoner in 
Auschwitz, influences Liza, the German SS, who, indubitably, does not 
want to save Martha. Rather than using the carrot and the stick, she aspires 
to become an accomplice of her crimes and to keep her a slave obedient 
and submissive.”52
The prisoners, who were usually more intelligent than their overseers, 
knew how to observe and make use of their supervisors’ weaknesses 
51 Ibid., 73.
52 My interview with Zofia Posmysz-Piasecka, Warsaw, December 19, 2011. I particularly 
thank Hanna K. Ulatowska for translation from the Polish in English.
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like laziness, desire for advancement, greed, desire to insure their 
family’s material well-being, desire for great riches, fear of other SS 
officers, desire for a professional approval of their performance 
from a superior.53
2.2.3.2. The Market as Defense Mechanism Par Excellence
Pawełczyńska’s work deserves attention especially for her sociological 
ability to examine some situations in Auschwitz in an unpredictable 
manner: starting from elements typical of ordinary life, like the market, 
she describes forms of resistance entering life at Auschwitz:
At Auschwitz the prisoners, or at least some of them, won greater real 
chances for survival from the moment when the “market” began to 
function and, together with it, the laws of the market place.54
Within the camp, there are spaces, circumstances, or situations in which 
prisoners can exchange goods. Marketplaces are used to keep morale up 
and to break the order of terror of the concentration camp, emanating out 
from the place of concentration. In addition to being a psychological 
mechanism of self-defense, a form of survival, it is a true economic 
exchange whose intensity depends on the influx of goods, while prices 
obviously vary, hinging on the amount of available goods:
Collective defense also depended on the influx of various goods to 
the camp market and on certain symptoms of demoralization 
among the camp officials and functionaries that could be used to 
the prisoner’s advantage, such as the lack of solidarity, greed, bribe-
taking and, in the criminal groups who lacked inner cohesion, 
specific enmities and accounts to settle between members and jealousy 
over the distribution of profits.55
53 Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 71.
54 Ibid., 101.
55 Ibid.
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Like any market, even that of Auschwitz takes place in a space where actors 
exchange goods: on the one hand, there are prisoners who offer food rations 
(obviously not those appropriated for personal use, but rather expropriated 
or surplus food), on the other, there are prisoners who request it:
Simultaneously, farm crops (raw potatoes, carrots, etc., depending 
on the season of the year) acquired by the crews working out in the 
fields came on the market. Some prisoners were bold enough to eat 
their acquisition during work hours; some dared to bring it through 
the camp gates (risking severe penalties) in order to trade it for 
something else, or for a friend who lacked such possibilities.56
The market helps inmates to survive: the so-called talk business among pris-
oners or with the SS allows for the retrieval of traits of humanity; the rules of 
the market, of which Simmel and Weber spoke, allow prisoners to resist 
anonymity.57 Meantime, these exchange places create all the necessary 
conditions for a material type of resistance: prisoners exchange all kinds of 
information on actions to be undertaken. Behind the initial exchange of 
goods and commercial speculation of products, first, it is possible to identify 
areas in which prisoners communicate, make plans, and turn the situation 
to their advantage; moreover, to discover the birth of a social opinion, which 
involves both the prisoners and the SS. In fact, the market—as Simmel noted 
in Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben—in addition to being the place that 
blurs differences between goods (allowing everything to become exchange-
able, due to economic interest situations that are created), it is also the place 
where they can break down the barriers between the supervised and guards. 
It makes the prisoners, in some cases, superiors able to exert some authority:
In this way some of the SS officials came to depend on prisoners, who 
could in turn skillfully make demands of their own. A currency strong 
enough to buy the services of SS officials and prisoner- functionaries 
had made its appearance inside the camp. New groups of interests 
56 Ibid., 102.
57 See Max Weber, Die Börse, 1894, accessed February 15, 2012, http://www.zeno.org/
Soziologie/M/Weber,+Max/Schriften+zur+Soziologie; Georg Simmel, Die Großstädte und 
das Geistesleben (Dresden: Petermann, 1903).
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arose, linking particular officials with prisoners who were no longer 
anonymous. . . . This activity considerably weakened the effectiveness of 
some SS officers. For many of them getting rich had become their main 
objective, and striving toward it consumed some of the energy which 
had formerly gone into winning a promotion in the official hierarchy.58
Alongside the terror system, different struggles for power coexist in the 
camp. It is possible to distinguish a first phase, that of taking advantage, 
from a second, in which cooperation among prisoners leads to the 
formation of pressure groups; the latter, by pressing directly on prisoner- 
functionaries, limits the actions of violence towards their fellows. The 
pressure groups, however, continue to involve the same SS, sometimes 
even making the prisoner become the ally of the SS officers, and thus 
breaking the boundary between the human and the inhuman:
And with this the prisoners further extended their influence to having 
a say in the filling of camp functions with prisoners who were capable 
of resistance. At a certain point the stage was set for the operation of 
an organized resistance movement, which had already acquired a 
certain influence inside all the separate subcamps. The mechanisms 
of self-defense began to function, not only in the formal structure of 
the resistance movement but also through the energetic behavior of 
informal prisoner groups loyally cooperating with each other. In spite 
of the continuing terror and violence, a unique double authority 
became operative, as a result of which prisoners in a certain area 
(though a relatively small one) were able to resist. . . .
Outside help—contacts with the resistance movement outside 
the camp and with the population who lived in the vicinity—was part 
of the odds favoring the resistance movement, as was the awareness 
that the era of concentration camps had to end, regardless of who 
would be granted individual survival. The vision of another life—a 
free, normal life—injected energy. . . . 
A corruptible guard, or an SS officer who represented a higher 
authority (and thus offered more possibilities), was often very useful 
58 Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 105.
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for the prisoners’ organized resistance. They could “sell” their real 
knowledge about dangers within the camp and about the political 
situation. . . . 
The business arrangements which made many SS officials dependent 
on prisoners had further consequences: there were cases where the 
sense of community with other SS colleagues clearly broke down 
and confidence in a prisoner (or prisoners) known from everyday 
contacts took its place.59
2.2.3.3. Resistance as Movement and Organization
What does it mean when Pawełczyńska defines “resistance” as a sponta-
neous movement but also she speaks of organized resistance? To ask if 
resistance is a movement or an organization is not naïve because, in the 
sociological literature, the use of the first category rules out the second. 
Here is the novelty of Pawełczyńska’s work contributing to the status of 
sociology in Holocaust Studies. Studies of movements (from Durkheim’s 
and Marx’s classic contributions to the contemporary theories by Alberto 
Melucci, Alessandro Pizzorno, Francesco Alberoni, or Alain Touraine) 
define them, in general, as forms of innovative solidarity, of a collective 
kind, and essentially spontaneous due to their fluid form. They aim at 
changing a given historical situation and the existing institutional appa-
ratus, in such a way as to replace the traditional values with those 
experienced in the new group.60 A common feeling upon which a different 
collective identity forms is typical of movements, which act to achieve 
specific objectives. “Incipient state,” for Alberoni, or “society in nuce,” 
according to Pizzorno, in any case, means that a movement ceases to 
exist when it is being institutionalized. In Auschwitz, forms of resis-
tance exist with all the features of a social movement: according to these 
59 Ibid., 108–10.
60 See Alaine Touraine, Production de la société (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1973); Francesco 
Alberoni, Movimento e istituzione (Bologna: il Mulino, 1981); Alessandro Pizzorno, Le 
radici della politica assoluta e altri saggi (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1993); Alberto Melucci, ed., Fine 
della modernità? (Milan: Guerini Studio, 1998).
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definitions, the actors of the “resistance movement” are the inmates. 
What is at the base of this “spontaneous” aggregation among prisoners 
are the three principles of identity, opposition, and totality, proposed by 
Touraine. In essence, the actors-detainees, first, are able to self-define; 
second, able to give a name to their opponent, specifically the SS-Nazis, 
and to enter into conflict with them; finally, both the inmates and the 
Nazi guards, who occupy opposing positions, contend for control of the 
domain.
Faced with the necessity for common defense, prisoners aim at 
rescuing the life of their own fellow prisoner in order to bear witness to 
the nature of violence deployed in Auschwitz.61 For Pawełczyńska the 
movement is spontaneous because the prisoners spontaneously decide to 
unite and fight together to change the existing apparatus of terror. 
However, in Auschwitz, there are also already existing forms of resistance, 
such as that of Polish political groups, imprisoned because they belong to 
a conspiratorial organization.62
The term “organization” means a set of actors who act in a rational and 
structured way in the name of certain goals.63 This concerns a community 
with specific purposes, formal, in the sense that rules governing actors’ 
behavior are formulated in a precise and explicit manner. Pawełczyńska 
speaks of “resistance as an organized movement” in reference to formal 
organizations of resistance and types of inmates’ cooperation of conscious, 
deliberate, and coordinated nature with precise aims to gain.64
61 Cf. Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 113.
62 Cf. Józef Garliński, Fighting Auschwitz: The Resistance Movement in the Concentration 
Camp (London: J. Friedmann, 1975).
63 Cf. Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
64 Cf. Chester I. Barnard and Kenneth Thompson, Organization and Management: Selected 
Papers: Early Sociology of Management and Organizations (London: Routledge, 2003). See 
Herbert A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
69, no. 1 (1955): 99–188, doi:10.2307/1884852; Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of 
Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization (New York: Free Press, 1976); 
James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993). 
According to Amitai Etzioni, organizations are social units that are deliberately constructed 
and reconstructed to achieve specific purposes; see Amitai Etzioni, The Monochrome 
Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
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For reasons that it is necessary to explain briefly and for which it is 
possible find many justifications, Poles mainly become part of the collective 
resistance. Since 1939, in Poland, there were organized forms of resistance 
against the Nazi invasion and for the fight in favor of national independence 
to the extent that, as Pawełczyńska recounts, the existence and function of 
Polish conspiratorial organizations in Auschwitz deserved a separate 
chapter in a reconstruction of the battle against Nazism. For Pawełczyńska, 
an organized resistance movement is a community whose participants 
share an interest, namely, the survival of the system, and they engage in 
informally structured collective activities to achieve this goal.65 From this 
point of view, the organized resistance movement is similar to the “natural 
system” proposed by Alvin Gouldner in 1959.66 At Auschwitz, the prisoners 
are rooted in the environment with which they interact or to which they 
adapt; however, they form communities that are trying to survive, creating 
activity systems. Finally, Pawełczyńska stresses how in the Lager there is an 
organized resistance due to its geographic position: “That Auschwitz was 
situated on Polish territory (and the Poles living in the vicinity of Auschwitz 
were not all deported) gave to prisoners of Polish nationality the best chance 
to make contacts outside the camp; and to the conspiratorial organizations 
in Poland it gave the best chance to get through to their imprisoned 
comrades. At the same time the organizational structure of some of clan-
destine groups advocating Polish independence (e.g., the Polish Home 
Army) enabled information to be transmitted to countries or territories not 
occupied by the Nazis.”67 By speaking of the organized resistance move-
ment, Pawełczyńska alludes to the role of conspiratorial organizations in 
Auschwitz and their links with clandestine organizations outside the camp: 
For certain, the activities of the organized resistance consisted in 
establishing all contacts with organizations outside the camp 
and transmitting documents through them that communicated 
what was going on in the camp; also, the collecting, transferring 
65 See W. Richard Scott, Le organizzazioni (Bologna: il Mulino, 2005), 45.
66 See Alvin W. Gouldner, ed., Studies in Leadership: Leadership and Democratic Action (New York: 
Garland, 1987).
67 Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 114.
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and delivering of these documents were organized activities, as 
were the frequently successful destruction or falsification of 
documents directly threatening to the life of individual pris-
oners. Their activities also included operations requiring great 
skill and coordination on the part of their members living in the 
various subcamps: such as, for example, the planning of a 
strategy for defense in the event of all-out danger, or the revolt of 
the Sonderkommando—long in preparation but prematurely set 
in motion—that resulted in the destruction of two crematories 
and an attempted mass escape. The same coordination and 
careful preparatory work (which required making connections 
with local residents and conspiratorial organizations outside the 
camp) were also indispensable for arranging escapes from the 
camp. Information concerning the existence and functions of 
the Nazi concentration camp, including partial lists of prisoners, 
was transmitted to countries not occupied by the Nazis, thanks 
to the activity of the camp  organizations. Red Cross intervention 
and the packages streaming into the camp in response to that 
information sowed panic among the planners and administra-
tors of the extermination camps, because their strictly secret 
operation had been exposed.68
It is very difficult, if not impossible, to clearly distinguish resistance as a 
“spontaneous movement” from resistance as “an organized form.” The two 
forms run into a block of resistance, sometimes unique, against the system 
of terror and violence in the camp; and this union is revealed as perfect, 
since the first is able to move better than the second:
Doubtless they will never enable all the phenomena of conspirato-
rial work in the camp to be established with complete precision, 
much less the phenomena of spontaneous resistance among people 
loyally working together in response to specific situations.69
68 Ibid., 115. I have omitted the author’s in-text citations.
69 Ibid., 114–15.
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This is because resistance functions as structured groups, due to the 
action of people who are in interaction with one another with conti-
nuity, according to relatively stable schemes. It provides the passage of 
news and information from one part to another of the camp. This 
happens in the case of the formation of small groups that transmit 
received information. Each group is appointed to receive data, according 
to which it is informed about the action that must be completed. It is 
important that each group follow the provided instructions to ensure 
the success of the action. In this human chain of information, the 
element of trust between prisoners and between groups of prisoners 
engaged in resistance is essential. Gradually, a structure in resistance 
action comes about: a hierarchy between those who resist, with rewards 
and greater privileges to those who contribute to conspiracy forms or 
who have experiences of clandestine activities.
2.2.4. The Institutions of the Criminal State
In the years in which New Deal legislation, in general, grew, along with 
the increasing request for social-democratic rights, especially starting 
from 1970, contemporarily, there developed a sociological interest in 
juridical or legal issues. This is evident in Values and Violence too. What 
matters is the attention that Pawełczyńska reserves for themes dealing 
with law or constitutional rights. What is more is the way she adopts, by 
speaking of crime, a new analytical category in the 1970s for Holocaust 
sociology. In essence, for Nazi leaders, several economic logics justified 
the genocide. What was prepared and perpetrated by National Socialist 
policy, she defines it as an organized power structure. The camp of 
Auschwitz existed only because the Third Reich existed. It operated 
because of a legal system that ensured totalitarian plans of government 
through bureaucratic institutions placed under its orders and through a 
military system in charge of complying with them. Moreover, the bureau-
cracy organized the application of the Nuremberg Laws, the census of 
Jews, and Mischlinge, expropriations against them in the context of the 
measures of Aryanization of the economy, their ghettoization and then 
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their deportation, and the management of concentration and extermina-
tion camps. This multifaceted bureaucracy was one of the cornerstones of 
the execution of Nazi crimes.70 
Like the modern bureaucratic state in Weber, the Third Reich was a 
modern state in which power passed through legal and rational channels, 
and it only worked because there was an apparatus performing certain 
offices. However, Auschwitz was not only the result of projects by political 
circles, but it was possible due to the mentality and attitudes of good 
people. When, in her second chapter, Pawełczyńska speaks of “Institutions 
of State Crime,” (Państwowe Instytucje Prezestępcze) all structures of 
 extermination are presented, which operated at several levels. Particularly, 
she focuses on the bureaucratic structure, the military establishment, and 
the economic system. For her, the genocide of the Jews was a state crime, 
made legal by laws prescribed and guaranteed.71 
What matters is that Nazi organizations are defined as criminals 
in the same way Hartshorne did thirty years earlier.72 In Values and 
Violence the topic of the composition of the Nazi Party returns: it is 
made up of border people, squads, and of people belonging to the 
upper classes:73
It must be clearly emphasized that every successively higher link in 
the chain of command, up to the top leadership of the Nazi party and 
government, was part of that group responsible for these crimes and 
that this group included numerous tycoons of industry and their 
subsidiary organizations, as well as some members of the health-care 
field. Besides this, some parts of German society at large performed 
functions which contributed to the existence and operation of 
70 See Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence, 42–44.
71 See note 15, above.
72 See Hartshorne, The German Universities and National Socialism; Hartshorne, “The 
German Universities and the Government,” Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 200 (1938): 210–34.
73 Cf. Karl O’Lessker, “Who Voted for Hitler? A New Look at the Class Basis of Naziism,” 
American Journal of Sociology 74, no. 1 (1968): 63–69; William I. Brustein, “Who Joined the 
Nazis and Why?” American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 1 (1997): 216. 
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concentration camps, and some consciously enjoyed advantages from 
the continuous criminal activity carried on in the camps.74
Referring to the studies of the Chicago School on juvenile delinquency, 
Pawełczyńska defines the followers of the Nazis as a social “gang” because 
of the methods used and above all for their moral bearing: they belong to 
the organized proletariat or simple working class, and, in any case, these 
people consciously obey the orders of the German machine, supported by 
a sizable part of society:
The SS functionaries employed in the camp were recruited from various 
social milieu and, on close examination, can be seen to have reflected a 
cross-section of society. Although persons from the lower classes with 
lesser education predominated, we also encounter among the SS in 
Auschwitz, and among persons who worked closely with them, people 
who rank very high on the level of education and training (e.g., doctors, 
school teachers, and even university professors).75
The one thing that really moves the wires of the criminal state is the 
authority of terror, which found, in the crisis of modern society, a fertile 
ground especially among young people: lacking in a strong moral iden-
tity, they are easily indoctrinated. Symbolically Auschwitz represents 
the suicide of German society.76 According to Pawełczyńska, who exam-
ines how criminal the military establishment operating at Auschwitz 
was, the stages of Nazi criminal institutionalization are at least five. First, 
the Nazis violate the principles of international law. Second, Nazi power 
is not based on laws that take into account the needs of the German 
people. Third, the Nazis destroy the evidence of their crimes, and the 
criminals erase the evidence of their felonies.77 Fourth, in occupied 
74 Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 22.
75 Ibid., 20.
76 Cf. Friedrich D. Weil, review of The Holocaust and the German Elite: Genocide and National 
Suicide in Germany, 1871–1945, by Ranier C. Baum, American Journal of Sociology 89, no. 3 
(1983): 751–54.
77 Cf. Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 83. “Owing to the secret nature of the 
majority of directives, concentration-camp personnel are obliged to falsify general reports 
and the records pertaining to the causes of prisoners’ deaths” (ibid., 17).
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countries, National Socialist activities are considered “criminal actions.”78 
Finally, this gangster state, to function, needs institutions applying the 
genocidal program: 
An attitude of this sort inclined the functionary to take advantage of 
privileges either within the bounds established by regulation or 
outside of those bounds, all the while maintaining caution and 
restraint lest excesses diminish one’s opportunities.
Acceptance of the job itself in Auschwitz for its special advan-
tages—it was a shelter from military service at the front; it was 
secure; for those who stuck to the rules it furnished a large number 
of opportunities; for those who did not, it provided the chance to 
thieve on a grand scale and, thanks to this, a life that was alluring 
while on the job plus considerable material resources for the future. 
Such a motivational pattern arose out of the need for physical secu-
rity (an escape from the danger threatening combatants) and the 
ambition to acquire the greatest number of material goods, assuring 
a prosperous and comfortable life in the future.79
. . .
There also exists detailed documentation on the way in 
which the victims’ possessions were plundered; these goods were 
viewed as the property of the Third Reich and were sorted by 
prisoner work crews. . . . Some of the victims’ property, useless in 
camp, but posses sing great value in the categories of a free 
society, will end up in pri soners’ hands and will serve to bribe 
the SS and their functionaries.80
The exchange of goods and economic institution in the broadest sense 
guarantees the exercise of totalitarian power within the camp. If, on the 
one hand, the advantages that Nazis reached by their criminal actions 
atrophy prisoners’ morale, on the other, the tendency to identify with the 
78 Ibid., 47: “The terror and physical violence which accompanied the performance of work 
was also an element of this system, as was the murdering of those prisoners who were not 
up to the work, or upon whom the overseers vented their sadism.” 
79 Ibid., 19.
80 Ibid., 78, 80.
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aggressor (with the Nazi state, at every level of the pecking order), contributes 
to the perfect terror system. The prisoners, classified and numbered, 
distinct in social classes, are forced to become an appendix of the work 
and bureaucracy machine of the German system within the camp. In this 
regard, the author speaks of “degeneration of authoritarian power”: some 
prisoners are assigned typical tasks of leadership, or are given higher 
powers than other inmates. But the detainees often turn these special 
functions to their own advantage, allowing the “higher” prisoners to help 
their fellows: “Despite their complete submission to the existing power 
structure and their choice of the Nazi value system, many of them did not 
banish all human responses; these they expressed by aiding the few prisoners 
who aroused those feelings in them.”81 Such a division of labor always 
involves the organization of forms of terror. It is crucial to think again 
about the detainees who are entrusted with the execution of a part of the 
genocide, namely, the task of accompanying other prisoners to the gas 
chambers. This is the extreme form of terror: the division that the Nazis 
establish not between “fellow-prisoners” and “killers,” but between the 
“powerful” as such and the defenseless.82 “At the extreme of this terror,” 
explains Pawełczyńska, “there is just the élite, the one mentioned by the 
sociologist Vilfredo Pareto.”83 
The establishment of industrialized mass murder is the finest structure 
of the organization of terror in the camp. The actors of this organization, 
both bureaucratic and industrial at the same time, do not control the process 
as a whole, but they execute orders without having to be accountable for their 
actions. For Weber, moral indifference is a  constitutive feature of modern 
bureaucracy, and thus Pawełczyńska is able to explain—reformulating the 
concept of organization—the system of the death factory at Auschwitz:
The operation of industrial genocide was familiar to the inmates of 
the camp. Only the appearances of secrecy were maintained in front 
81 Ibid., 50.
82 Ibid., 49. “Besides the organized terror, another, more elemental terror came into being: of 
the stronger over the weaker. This was the inevitable consequence of the whole camp situ-
ation” (ibid., 66). 
83 Pawełczyńska, my interview.
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of the prisoners. As a rule the women prisoners in camps a and b at 
Auschwitz-Birkenau (separated from the men’s camp by two bands of 
electrically-charged barbed wire, between which ran the railroad 
platform used for unloading the transports and the road leading to 
crematories II and III) and the men in the camps on the other side of 
the platform were witnesses to the process of selection for the gas 
chamber. The road leading to crematories IV and V separated two 
men’s camps in Birkenau, and the prisoners in these camps could see 
it. All the prisoners in Auschwitz-Birkenau saw the crematory chim-
neys, and they knew what the smoke from those chimneys meant.84
2.2.5. Auschwitz as Modern State
Throughout her account, Pawełczyńska continually states that Auschwitz, 
in the same way as a modern nation-state, is marked by well-defined 
national boundaries, by a political community, the detainees, and by 
sovereignty exercised in a total and concentrated way by Nazi authority. 
Like in the modern Weberian state, there is a monopoly of violence, and 
power is organized and operated thanks to an administration based on 
the principles of specialization, calculus, segmentation of responsibili-
ties, and distribution of tasks in a variety of activities, apparently 
autonomous but actually coordinated. Within the two types of state, the 
concentration camp and the modern, lies an indistinct mass of individ-
uals. Undoubtedly, the two cases have many differences, but what they 
obviously have in common is that both the members of the modern 
nation-state and the prisoners of the concentration- camp state are indi-
viduals alone, placed close together from the point of view of time and 
space, but, ultimately, people in their own right, foreign, and, therefore, 
nicknamed “atoms.” Briefly, the process of national unification in the 
modern age is born from the need to create an entity state based on the 
commonality of language and cultural values of the inhabitants. The 
major difference is that in the modern nation-state, individuals, concen-
trated, all belong to the same country, speak the same language, and 
84 Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 79.
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share the same culture, while inside the concentration camp the national 
identity is barely scratched. The distinction according to nation is 
deleted at the same time that prisoners belonging to different nationali-
ties are confused with each other and put together without distinction. 
Only rarely are the prisoners divided according to national ethnic group: 
this is visible when a letter is affixed to their uniforms, in addition to the 
numbers tattooed on arms and representing an identification code, a 
sort of anonymous name, impossible to pronounce and, more impor-
tantly, it does not consider the personality of the prisoner. Since in the 
same space there is a very diverse mix of people, who share neither 
language nor beliefs nor, again, belong to the same nation, prisoners are 
prevented from communicating with each other. In fact, language is a 
social phenomenon, even before an analytical category, which creates 
identity, bonds of solidarity; in order to avoid the formation of chains of 
solidarity, capable of defeating terror, the prisoners are precluded from 
any form of communication.85 Let me, finally, focus on the last point 
distinguishing Pawełczyńska’s book. Like every modern state, the camp 
of Auschwitz is based on a statute, that is, it provides a regime of gover-
nance. In Auschwitz, there is an order of values, a “common law,” in 
which the old principles of equality, fraternity, and liberty are revisited 
and the Ten Commandments are readapted to the camp. The “do not 
harm,” “do not bear false witness,” or “do not steal” are words or norms, 
the author explains, that have to be revisited in the context of a new 
totalitarian state. The reinterpretation of moral standards is performed 
on the basis of a minimum of morality, one that let Auschwitz survive 
and tell the truth, namely, “Do not harm your neighbour and, if at all 
possible, save him” is the adaptation of the principle of universal broth-
erhood and the most profound “love your neighbor as yourself.”86 The 
final lesson of the author, a witness and survivor, claims a philanthropic 
obligation: both ordinary citizen and the most complex institutional 
political structure must keep civil society alert against any breach of 
human rights.
85 Cf. David Rousset, L’univers concentrationnaire (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1946).
86 Cf. Pawełczyńska, Values and Violence in Auschwitz, 140–44.
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2.3. JEWS IN POLAND
Always keeping in mind chronological order, in this reconsideration of 
post-Holocaust sociology, it is crucial to explain the novelty of Celia S. 
Heller’s contribution. Let me articulate the fundamental points of her 
work. When the scholar, after several works on Polish society and its 
historical development (attempting to understand the differences and 
similarities between diverse cultures in Poland), published On the Edge of 
Destruction, in 1977, the genocide of the Jews was a little more than thirty 
years old.87 The term “edge,” which immediately recalls the limit, a territorial 
division, in other words, the edge of a border, highlights the central theme 
of her book, which, for the author, is the main cause of the destruction of 
the Jews in Poland—Polish nationalism or, better yet, the national claims 
of various ethnic groups present in the area. To the Polish sociologist, the 
origins of the genocide were in the national boundaries and ethnic pride 
of the Poles. The physical destruction of about 3,000,000 Jews in Poland, 
who were approximately 10 percent of the population and represented the 
oldest Jewish community in Europe, did not have Nazi ideology or 
German racism as the only reason. As Heller explains, in the eastern 
region there was no need to educate Poles in hatred of the Jews: genocide 
was not only the product of National Socialism, it was also the result of an 
ancient local anti-Semitism. Nazism just completed, refined, and extended 
existing anti-Semitic practices and policies and, finally, put in place one of 
the major targets of the same Polish nationalism, that is, the end of the 
Jews and their influence in Poland.88 This is very evident from the “Poland 
in 1938” map on the expansionist aspirations of the country reported by 
Heller. 
In 1937, Otto D. Tolischus, correspondent of the New York Times, 
denounced the dangers of modern anti-Semitism, which, in his opinion, 
would result in a tragedy of huge proportions: “Turning the recurrent 
Jewish tragedy in that biggest Jewish center in the world into a final 
87 See Celia S. Heller, On the Edge of Destruction: Jews of Poland between the Two World Wars 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
88 Cf. David Cymet, “Polish State Anti-Semitism as a Major Factor Leading to the Holocaust,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 1, no. 2 (1999): 169–212.
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disaster of truly historic magnitude.”89 Concerning his prophecy, or, more 
simply, his ability to read the present, Heller speaks of Tolischus as a 
“sentinel of the night” who guards the society in crisis caused by major 
changes and a world war of which it was still possible to count the ruins. 
If there were other observers like him, maybe the destruction could have 
been avoided.
Trained as an ethnologist, Heller especially explores social, political, 
and cultural aspects of the Jews in Poland between the two world wars: 
she involves herself in the study of kinship, social structures, traditions, 
customs, rituals, religion, and even the Polish adaptation to the  environ ment, 
from food to clothing, for her interest in the assimilation of the Jews.90 
Hence, her ten interviews with assimilated survivors. Then there are diaries, 
memoirs, autobiographies. Through newspapers broadly distributed in 
Yiddish and in Polish, she is also able to make a type of census of the Jews, 
recording the places where they live. The assumption from which Heller 
starts is that the majority of Poles, as Catholics, treat Jews, a minority 
group, in the same way that blacks were treated in Mississippi before the 
civil rights movement. When the author writes of the cultural and national 
history of Poland in the period before the Great War, she also focuses on 
the situation of the Jews, particularly, on how they were socially defined 
(as Bolsheviks, the enemies of Poland). In the Polish territory there coex-
isted positions in favor of the Jews and an irreducible anti-Semitism: 
tolerance and hatred (for the latter a party is even organized) become 
hopelessly mixed.91
If, in the first chapter, Heller is essentially concerned with bringing 
together all the violent attacks suffered by the Jews, in the second, she instead 
describes their political activism, or, rather, when they demonstrate for claims 
of Jewish equality against the nationalist positions of fellow Poles. The pattern 
of oppression legitimated by a gradually increasing popular support advances 
on a very simple fact, namely, that the Jews were foreigners since their arrival 
89 Otto D. Tolischus, “Jews Face Crisis in Eastern Europe,” New York Times, February 7, 1937, 
quoted in Heller, On the Edge of Destruction, 10.
90 See Celia S. Heller, Mexican American Youth: Forgotten Youth at the Crossroads (New York: 
Random House, 1966).
91 Cf. Heller, On the Edge of Destruction, 83, 133.
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in Poland. Nevertheless, if at first they are considered outsiders because they 
belong to a different religion and culture, then later they are labeled as 
extra-individuals (obcy), outside the Polish culture since they do not share 
blood (krew) with the Polish people. The element of blood is of great 
 importance, even at the basis of the concept of nation, and comes before, in 
many ways, the other constituent factor, that of ground or soil (ziemia). 
Using surveys conducted on the activities of the Polish workers and 
their distribution in urban and rural areas, Heller notes that the sense of 
belonging to the same lineage is strong enough to limit the development of 
values and cultural beliefs among Polish residents of different ethnicity. 
Thus, in retracing the period subsequent to the Piłsudski regime (1926–35), 
in the third chapter, “The Heirs of Piłsudski,” she immediately addresses 
the issue of inequality of power and political instability, then the question 
of official anti-Semitic ideology and economic policies against the Jews, 
and, finally, the role of the Church.
As Hartshorne and Hughes had highlighted in their works, the place 
where anti-Semitism grew and was fed was the university, a hotbed of anti-
Jewish ideology, while at the beginning its fountainhead was mainly the 
national intelligentsia. How the Jews reacted when faced with organized 
terror is mainly discussed in the fourth chapter. Between tradition and 
assimilation, Polonization and secularization, Heller analyzes the status of 
Orthodox Jews steadfast in the cultural tradition; the role of Agudat Israel, 
the umbrella party for almost all Haredi Jews in Israel; the meaning of 
Kehilla, the Jewish organizational structure, secular and religious, and 
elected by its members. Despite oppression and anti-Jewish measures, 
these communities and organizations develop and carve out a space 
within the Polish society, by creating a system of political institutions, at 
the local, regional, and national levels; communities and organizations, 
including socialist, Zionist, Orthodox positions in addition to those in 
favor of assimilation, that present no minor problems both in terms of 
cultural profile and in terms of national identity. For Heller, who admits 
that she does not fully explore the issue, Polonization (polonizacja) passes 
for a phase of acculturation through public schools, considered as the 
social agency able to guarantee Jews the acquisition of elements of Polish 
culture. 
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What distinguishes this work is also the secularization question 
addressed by Heller in the 1970s. Let me be precise, in studying secularization, 
she identifies the “generational conflict” and the “mother’s role” as analytical 
categories in the years between the two world wars. The latter, in fact, is 
more determinative than the father’s role to the values and the culture of 
the country. In this way in the family, the mother happens to play the role 
of mediator between the traditional authority of father over children, who 
must be educated in the new modern context. As the school has the task 
of transmitting Polish culture in society, similarly the mother transmits 
national culture at home. In the context of assimilation, the times and 
places resisting oppression emerge. 
As main forms of resistance, Heller indicates, there are the appeal to 
Poles’ leftist political parties and to the Zionist movement, the Bund’s 
initiatives, and, finally, the ability to migrate to Palestine, Eretz Yisrael. 
However, the disappointment of Jewish policies within the Polish parliament 
are not late in coming. In light of the cultural and historical context, the 
roots of the Holocaust in Poland are in the same Polish culture.92 The 
Kielce, Cracow, Chelm, and Rzeszów pogroms testify that, at the end of 
the war, the Jews who returned home were denounced as hostile and 
violent or were killed. Those who, “facing the extreme,” remained, either 
because they believed the promises of a socialist Poland, or because they 
wanted to contribute to a better society, did not consider themselves of 
Polish citizenship but of Polish nationality.93
Gershon C. Bacon stresses how important the categories of Heller, 
both historical and sociological, are in Holocaust scholarship. Above all is 
the distinction between the period in which Jews were welcomed by Poles 
and the one in which, at the time of Poland’s independence and democratic 
constitution (after the Great War peace treaties), they became the object 
of persecution.94 What is more important is that Heller destroys the idyllic 
92 See Norbert Elias, The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Oxford: Polity, 1996 [1989]); Dunning and Mennell, 
Elias on Germany, Nazism and the Holocaust. 
93 Cf. Cvetan Todorov, Face à l’extrême (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1991).
94 See Gershon C. Bacon, review of On the Edge of Destruction: Jews of Poland between the Two 
World Wars, by Celia S. Heller, Journal of International Affairs 31, no. 1 (1977): 143–45. 
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myth of the “happy life” that Jews would lead in Poland, showing how events 
related to assimilation generated conflicts between fellow compatriots.95 She 
does this in 1977. Heller remembers the times that Jews tried to enter 
public life and raise their concerns in parliament, with negative outcomes. 
Emblematic is the excerpt reported below and regarding four rabbis—
Kanal, Perelman, Langleben, and Fajner—who, on a visit to the cardinal of 
Warsaw, Kakowski, June 7, 1934, asked for immediate action against 
youthful outbursts of anti-Semitism, invoking the moral authority of the 
high Catholic prelate to save the Jews victims of violence:
Your Eminence! 
In the name of the rabbinate of the Polish Republic we turn to you 
in the following powerful matter. In Germany in the land of the 
Teutonic knights, from time immemorial Poland’s enemy, a horde 
of barbarous pagans has recently come to power warring against 
all the laws of God, trampling upon all the important principles of 
the Christian faith, persecuting all adversaries with cruelty 
unknown in human history, especially to the descendants of the 
land of Israel. The whole civilized world, and the princes of the 
Catholic Church, has condemned the monstrous actions of the 
Nazis in Germany. Unfortunately in Poland the land with the 
greatest number of God-fearing Catholic Christians, a certain 
faction, especially youth, is troubling us. Shamefully, calling them-
selves Polish nationalists, they modeled themselves after the 
example of the pagan Nazis. They attack defenseless people 
walking on the streets of Poland’s cities because they look Jewish. 
Without pity they bully, beat and injure them. Sometimes these 
ruffians encounter resistance from their innocent victims and they 
react with even more fury bringing shame to Poland’s old reputa-
tion for tolerance and God. We are convinced, Cardinal, that no 
true Polish Catholic can be utterly corrupt, that these youth have 
been momentarily deluded by the slogans of foreign enemies. At 
95 See Marta Petrusewicz, “Fine della Polonia innocente: Analisi di un dibattito,” Passato e 
Presente 20, no. 56 (2002): 153–66.
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an appeal by their senses and certainly cease the persecution of 
the Jewish people which defames Poland’s good name. In the name 
of the Rabbis and Jews of this illustrious Republic, we entreat you, 
Cardinal, to issue a pastoral appeal about this to all Poland 
Catholics. Then peace and order will reign again in the land 
beloved by us all. May grace flow upon it. Amen.96
It could be asked how modernization was linked with the destruction of 
the Jews. Between the two world conflicts, the Jews were a highly urban-
ized group in a predominantly rural country. Heller comments that they 
were easily visible and distinguished not only because of their religion, but 
above all for their modern manners and customs. At least in five of the 
largest Polish cities, Jews accounted for between a quarter and a third of 
the population, while in smaller towns they constituted the majority. They 
had philanthropic institutions, an active political life, and publishing 
houses—they engaged in the publication and dissemination of news in 
Yiddish, Polish, and Hebrew. 
What were the causes that led to the disappearance of the Jewish 
community in Poland? Heller’s book closes with a picture of a tomb-
stone, a memorial of what happened to the Jews between the two wars. 
The image of the plaque commemorating the destruction of the Jews is 
also observable in a historical book on anti-Semitism in Poland dedi-
cated to the destruction of the Jewish community in Jedwabne by 
fellow Christians. Here also the myth of the good and innocent Poland 
is debunked.97 Nevertheless, because of numerous inaccuracies, insuf-
ficient documentation, or absence of a bibliography, Heller’s work is 
96 Ronald Modras, The Catholic Church and Anti-Semitism in Poland, 1933–1939 (Chur, 
Switzerland: Harwood Academic Press, 1994), 348, quoted in Feigue Cieplinski, “Poles and 
Jews: The Quest for Self-Determination, 1919–1934,” Journal of History (2002), accessed 
November 24, 2010, http://www2.binghamton.edu/history/resources/journal-of-history/
poles-and-jews.html#_ftn1.
97 See Gross, Neighbors, 114. On the debate surrounding Gross’s book, see Joanna B. 
Michlic, Coming to Terms with the “Dark Past”: The Polish Debate about the Jedwabne 
Massacre (Jerusalem: SICSA, 2002); Petrusewicz, “Fine della Polonia innocente”; 
Antony Polonsky and Joanna B. Michlic, eds., The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy 
over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2004). 
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not considered of great importance.98 For most critics the research 
lacks a comparative perspective and reflects an inappropriate use of 
sociological concepts. Indeed, it cannot be inserted into any of the 
traditional strands of literature. It has to do with the inability of 
contemporary scholars to understand a work opening up completely 
new perspectives for Holocaust scholarship: Heller addresses issues 
that only after 1989 are going to have more room in Holocaust Studies, 
as with the analysis of the public nature of genocide and the involve-
ment of local collaborationist populations.99 
“Przepraszam, Jedwabne,” in this way the president of the Republic of 
Poland, Kwasniewski, began his speech of July 10, 2001, before the notable 
personalities at the ceremony of the sixtieth anniversary of the massacre in 
Jedwabne. Nobody knew of the Polish town until Jan T. Gross, a Jewish 
scholar of Polish origin, in Neighbors, recounted the story of 1,600 Jews (i.e., 
the entire resident Jewish community) who were herded into a barn to be 
burned alive on July 10, 1941. However, no Germans perpetrated the 
massacre but, rather, a group of Polish inhabitants of Jedwabne itself: they 
were neighbors. A new plaque, in place of the old Jewish cemetery, 
commemorates the Jews of Jedwabne, without mentioning the number of 
deaths or the names of the guilty. The themes of innocence and martyrdom, 
founding myths of the historical Polish identity, began to be questioned: it 
was the “end of innocent Poland,” thanks to Gross, who, in the spring of 
2000, delivered to the public, in the native language, his complaint book. 
Although he had resided in the United States since 1969 and despite having 
regularly published in the English language, he decided to tell the story of 
Poland in Polish, allowing his fellow citizens to face the inconvenient truth. 
Nevertheless, the issue, rather than stirring the Polish consciousness, a 
feeling of shared responsibility, and a joint assumption of guilt, created a 
 98 Cf. Bacon, review of On the Edge of Destruction, 143–45; Dank, review of On the Edge of 
Destruction, 129–30.
 99 See Omer Bartov, “L’Europa orientale come luogo del genocidio,” in Storia della Shoah, ed. 
Marina Cattaruzza et al. (Turin: Utet, 2005), 2:419–59; Andrea Graziosi, “Rivoluzione 
archivistica e storiografica sovietica,” Contemporanea 8, no. 1 (2005): 57–85; Antonella 
Salomoni, L’Unione Sovietica e la Shoah: Genocidio, resistenza, rimozione (Bologna: il 
Mulino, 2007); Salomoni, “L’Europa orientale: Transizioni, stabilizzazioni, nuove identità,” 
in Ridolfi, La storia contemporanea attraverso le riviste, 149–64. 
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long intellectual, and even media, debate, expressing the fatigue of Poland 
to take on a collective crime.
Rich in captioned photos, Heller’s book presents itself as a 
pioneering work in the field of post-Holocaust sociology. In fact, ques-
tioning the historical tradition of an innocent Poland, it anticipated 
courses of study, undertaken later in Eastern Europe when, since the 
early 1990s, the new historiographical practices put in doubt the posi-
tion of the modernity of the Holocaust resulting from the publication 
of Modernity and the Holocaust by Bauman. This was possible thanks 
to the opening of archives in Eastern Europe, which had remained 
inaccessible for a long time. As Bacon stresses, “a particularly poignant 
example is the quotation from the diary of a young girl who witnessed 
the execution of the rabbi of Plock on trumped-up charges of espio-
nage.”100 Not all critics are superficial. According to Barry Dank, it is a 
work firing up interest in the Jewish question.101 While reading Heller’s 
book, one gains access to a pronounced sociological study: she was 
among the first researchers to examine collections of autobiographies, 
diaries of young Jews gathered in Poland in Wilno (now Vilnius, 
Lithuania) in the 1930s, by the Jewish Scientific Institute (JIVO), estab-
lished in 1925, now in New York:
For other aspects which required primary research, I have exam-
ined some of the Jewish daily press (written in Yiddish and Polish). 
I have also analyzed census data. My greatest find was the autobiog-
raphies and diaries of young Jews; they had been collected in Poland 
during the 1930s by YIVO, the Jewish Scientific Institute in Vilno. 
Over 600 such documents were in the possession of YIVO before 
the war broke out. When the Nazis occupied Vilno, they removed 
them to Germany. After the war, 302 of these were found near 
Frankfurt. With the aid of the U.S. State Department and Military 
Government, they were brought to YIVO in New York, where its 
headquarters had been transferred in 1940. 
100 Bacon, review of On the Edge of Destruction, 144. See Heller, On the Edge of Destruction, 53.
101 Cf. Dank, review of On the Edge of Destruction.
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I consider myself fortunate to have had access to these and am 
grateful to YIVO for its generosity. Reading these documents was 
like hearing voices recalled to life. In analyzing these documents, 
however, I was careful to discern fact from fancy. These autobiogra-
phies supplied illustrations for findings derived from other data. 
I quote from these autobiographies and diaries (which I translated 
from the Yiddish and Polish in which they were written), as well as 
from the interviews I conducted, in order to bring some of the flesh-
less findings to life.102
2.3.1. Twenty-one Years after Celia Heller
Tadeusz Piotrowski, the Polish-born American sociologist, dedicated his 
book in 1998 to the 6 million “Polish citizens” who perished during World 
War II. His research begins with these words: “After 123 years of partitions 
by its imperialistic neighbors Russia, Germany (Prussia), and Austria, 
Poland finally regained its independence in 1918. In the years following 
World War I, two major problems confronted this young republic: the 
problem of its forever-straying borders, and the problem of its minorities.”103 
Thus, Piotrowski introduces at once two primary issues: on the one hand, 
the recurrent problem of a redefinition of territorial boundaries, on the 
other, the issue of ethnic minorities.104 For approximately 123 years, the 
empires of Russia, Austro-Hungary, and Germany took turns on Polish 
territory until, at the end of the Great War, with the collapse of the three 
great powers, Poland could formally declare its freedom from foreign 
102 Heller, On the Edge of Destruction, 9–10.
103 Tadeusz Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with Occupying Forces and 
Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918–1947 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1998), 3.
104 See the document Decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, March 15, 1923, on the Subject 
of the Frontiers of Poland, in Stanisław Skrzypek, The Problem of Galicia (London: Polish 
Association for the South-Eastern Provinces, 1948), 74–75, quoted in Piotrowski, Poland’s 
Holocaust, 263. According to the decision, a new Poland emerged from the maps of 
Europe: it included some of the territories that had belonged to the First Republic of 
Poland before the partitions, and other territories: the province of Wilno, a large part of 
Belarus, the western part of Volhynia, the whole of eastern Galicia, the Polish Corridor, a 
part of Upper Silesia, a slice of East Prussia, and some of the disputed territories along the 
Czechoslovak border.
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powers and, as a result of independence (November 11, 1918), a number of 
economic, political, and identity problems were reborn. As Feigue 
Cieplinski explains, “Poland became an independent nation against all 
odds in the interwar period and retained her sovereignty from 1919 to 
1939; hence the concept [of] “interwar Poland.” The vicissitudes of her 
existence earned her the name of “God’s Playground.”105 Mentioned by me 
here as a substudy of Heller, Piotrowski’s work can be read as an independent 
study on the Holocaust in Poland, which focuses on the problem of the 
multinational composition of the Polish state and considers Jews victims 
as “Polish citizens.” In the years of the Second Polish Republic (1918–47), 
for Piotrowski, the Holocaust includes ethnic strife between different 
ethnic groups living together in the same territory, local collaboration 
with occupying forces, and, finally, the total genocide. This is  accompanied 
by a description of the behavior of different ethnic groups or nations, in 
those years, against the Jews. Evident, following in the steps of Heller’s 
piece, is the echo of ethnographic theories of communities of Warner and 
Lynds. When she describes the different ethnic groups living on Polish 
soil at the end of the Great War, she stresses that they assumed radical 
nationalist and separatist attitudes and, claiming the primacy of their own 
nationality, prevented the formation of a Polish national unitary state: 
“Thus, the yearnings for an independent ‘greater Ukraine’ a reunited 
Belarus or a Jewish state within the Polish one smoldered relentlessly.”106 
They were ethnically diverse and mixed lands, which looked for some 
time to bring out their peculiarities and to carve out an autonomous 
 territorial space where they could transmit their culture. Piotrowski 
underlines the need for the Poles to be distinguished from other nations 
in the area and seems to borrow sociological categories of social and 
spatial distance and geographical mobility typical of the Chicago School.
From a sociological point of view, this means the institutionalization 
of social distance between the nation of Poland and other ethnic realities, 
105 Cieplinski, “Poles and Jews,” with reference to Norman Davies, God’s Playground, vol. 2 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
106 Judith Olsak-Glass, review of Poland’s Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with 
Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918–1947, by Tadeusz Piotrowski, 
Sarmatian Review 19, no. 1 (1999): 1, last accessed March 28, 2011, http://www.ruf.rice.
edu/~sarmatia/199/glass.html. 
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and finally the institutionalization of new political entities. This process 
providing for formation of defined geographical areas and delimitation of 
a geographically distinct limen, which coincides with the political formation 
of the nation-state, requires significant transformations and border 
changes beyond the local level. In fact, the phenomenon of geographical 
mobility (to, through, and outside a specific territory) is accompanied by 
a profound cultural change, often not accepted, especially by countries 
that, in the process, are damaged or lose large portions of territory, with 
negative implications in terms of demographic policy.
The peculiar aspect of this work is that Piotrowski illustrates the social 
problems that Polish society faced. For instance, he reports that, according to 
the 1921 census, more than 30 percent of all Polish citizens were ethnic 
minorities—more than 15 percent were Ukrainians/Ruthenians, 8 percent 
Jews, 4 percent Belarusians, 3 percent Germans, with a low percentages of 
Lithuanians, Russians, Czechs, Tatars, and even small groups of Gypsies, 
Kashubians, and Karaites. Two years earlier, on June 28, 1919, when the 
Minorities Treaty was signed, in accordance with chapter 1, article 7, an 
attempt was made to ensure equality for all inhabitants of Poland before the 
law without distinction of race, language, or religion. Instead, chapter 1, 
article 2 declaimed: “Poland undertakes to assure full and complete protec-
tion of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland without distinction of 
birth, nationality, race or religion.” The 1921 Polish Constitution arose to 
protect against all forms of discrimination and to ensure peaceful coexis-
tence between the various minorities. Article 109, paragraph 1 established 
that any citizen had the right to preserve his nationality, to speak his language, 
and keep his national qualities.107 Piotrowski accounts for all these preven-
tions and legal measures, especially because, despite them, Polish prejudice 
against ethnic minorities continued, and mainly in the eastern regions. 
Let me stress another point on which he reflects. When, in 1934, the 
Treaty for the Protection of Minorities was unilaterally abrogated by 
Poland, Polish nationalism was publicly legitimated and every effort to 
ensure rights and protection was extended only to residents of Polish 
107 Cf. “Excerpts from the Minorities Treaty of June 28, 1919,” in Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, 
263 and “Excerpts from the Polish Constitution of 1921,” in ibid., 264.
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nationality. This was at the origin of public recognition of a Polish state 
inhabited by Poles. In many regions of eastern Poland, these minorities, 
taken collectively, constituted the majority of Polish citizens in those 
regions. The constitution of 1921 was a more than valid document, but its 
application proved to be unsteady, accompanied by the impatience of 
minorities expecting a timely and immediate justice and rights from the 
new republic. To all this must be added the strong waves of nationalism 
that, thanks to the action of some leaders, always found more space, 
promoting the idea of national independence and reunification of ethnic 
territories. There were breakaway trends among the Ukrainians, for 
example, that moved in favor of an independent Western Ukraine. Then, 
there were aspirations of Lithuanian nationalists for a return of the 
Lithuanian Republic; of Jewish nationalists and Zionists who looked to 
Palestine, but in the meantime wanted to be treated as a national minority 
in Poland; of Belarusians, who were also in favor of reunification and inde-
pendence. This very precarious situation continued, albeit intermittently, 
but still was able to control ethnic tensions until the outbreak of war in 1939, 
when the newly established democratic institutions were no longer able to 
maintain such a temporary and uncertain balance. The aspirations of the 
radical nationalist groups and oppressed ethnic minorities took over the 
governing class. For Piotrowski, in the aftermath of World War I, ethnic 
conflict exploded in Poland, while pillars of democracy were more fragile. 
As Aleksander Smolar, an intellectual Polish Jew, recalls, with the beginning 
of the war Poles found themselves faced with two enemies at once: Germany 
and the Soviet Union.108 For ethnic minorities, the situation was good and 
was exploited to achieve their independence aims: so rather than helping 
Poland, these minorities, although they had obtained Polish citizenship, 
preferred to stand and cooperate with the Soviet Union, or with Germany, 
and to see their nationalist dream realized. 
2.3.1.1. Polish Nationalism during the Soviet Occupation
Irina and Jan Gross state, “The arrival of Russians in Poland was sad, and 
joyful. For some Jews, Byelorussians, and Ukrainians it was joyful. And 
108 Cf. Aleksander Smolar, “Jews as a Polish Problem,” Daedalus 116, no. 2 (1987): 38. 
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for the Poles it was sad and hard.”109 That is, few Poles welcomed the Soviet 
invasion. Piotrowski follows an accurate scheme: he presents the situation 
in Poland or, better, of all Polish citizens (and thus also of minorities) in 
the period between the two world wars, distinguishing the years of the 
Soviet occupation from those of the German. His goal is to show who 
collaborated with whom, according to the period and situation, showing 
the unceasing change of alliances: “It is precisely these incomprehensible, 
changing, complex collaborations among military and quasi-authoritarian 
regimes surrounding Poland, Piotrowski argues, that made these horrifying 
events on Polish soil possible.”110 
In the wake of the Polish historian Władisław Bartoszewski, 
Piotrowski tells how the Jews were constantly in danger. They lived with 
the continuous threat of being caught by not only German police or extor-
tionists deliberately recruited from the dregs of Christian Polish and 
Ukrainian police, but also by Jewish confidence men, who, seduced by 
false hopes and promises, often helped the Germans to hunt out fellow 
Jews who lived hidden in Aryan Warsaw:111
Of course there were Polish policemen who rounded up Jews and 
Poles, who blackmailed Jews whom they recognized as such . . . But 
who of the Jews survivors does not know . . . that there were also Jewish 
blackmailers, some of them even quite famous by name, outside the 
Ghetto, who were neither better nor worse than the Polish ones, and 
also Jewish policemen in the Ghetto whose duty in the first weeks of 
the extermination of summer 1942 was to deliver, each of them a spec-
ified number, Jewish victims to “be sent” to extermination.112
109 Irena Grudzińska-Gross and Jan T. Gross, War through Children’s Eyes: The Soviet 
Occupation of Poland and the Deportations, 1939–1941 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1985), 56, quoted in Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, 48. See Tadeusz Piotrowski, 
Vengeance of the Swallows: Memoir of a Polish Family’s Ordeal under Soviet Aggression, 
Ukrainian Ethnic Cleansing and Nazi Enslavement, and Their Emigration to America 
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1995).
110 Lisiunia A. Romanienko, review of Poland’s Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with 
Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918–1947, by Tadeusz Piotrowski, 
Humanity and Society 24, no. 1 (2000): 99, doi:10.1177/016059760002400110.
111 Cf. Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, 75; Władysław Bartoszewski, The Warsaw Ghetto: A 
Christian’s Testimony (Boston: Beacon, 1987), 89. See also Garliński, Fighting Auschwitz.
112 Israel Shahak, “‘The Life of Death’: An Exchange,” New York Review of Books, January 29, 
1987, quoted in Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, 75.
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And: “We have done very little to condemn Jewish collaboration with 
the Nazis. When, after the war, I demanded that those who had abused 
their office in ghettos or concentration camps be removed from Jewish 
committees, I was told that ‘this would diminish the guilt of the Nazis.’”113
Taking advantage of ethnic tensions, both Germany and the Soviet 
Union obtained their military and territorial objectives. Piotrowski accounts 
for how, for each region, interests and actors were different and therefore 
the attitudes towards fellow Poles differed. For example, during the Nazi 
occupation of Belarus, three different groups appeared on the scene: the 
Soviet partisans, who obeyed Moscow, with 143,000 members by June 1944; 
Belarusian pro-Nazis; and the anti-Nazi nationalists, who aspired to a 
unified and independent Belarus. For Lithuania, however, the emblematic 
case was represented by the change of the name of Vilnius: Wilno in Polish, 
Vilnius in Lithuanian, Vilna in Russian and Belarusian, Wilna in German. 
Moreover, for the Jews, Wilno was the Jerusalem of culture, the historical 
capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, where the YIVO archive was 
created. At the beginning of 1942, the Ukraine undertook a campaign of 
ethnic cleansing. The formal letter addressed to Hitler by the head of state, 
signing with the “Seal of the Ukrainian State,” on April 7, 1941, explains the 
nature of interest of relations unfolding during the conflict:
To the Führer and the Chancellor, Berlin
7/4/41, Lvov, Ukrainian Government, No 2/41
Your Excellence:
It is with an overwhelming feeling of gratitude and admiration 
for your heroic army which has covered itself with new glory in 
battles with Europe’s worst enemy—Moscow Bolsheviks—that we 
are hereby sending Your Excellence, on behalf of the Ukrainian 
people and its government which has been created in liberated 
Lvov, our heartfelt wishes for complete victory in your struggle.
The triumph of German arms will enable you to extend your 
planned construction of new Europe also to her Eastern part. You 
113 Simon Wiesenthal, Justice Not Vengeance (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), 231, 
quoted in Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, 75.
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have thus also given an opportunity to the Ukrainian people as one 
of the full and free members of the family of European nations to 
take an active part in the implementation of this great plan in its 
sovereign Ukrainian state. 
On behalf of the Ukrainian government,
Yaroslav Stetzko,
Head
(Seal of Ukrainian State).114
Nevertheless, Hitler later arrested the leaders and dissolved the Ukrainian 
government, attacking all over nationalist Ukraine. The Ukrainian context 
was very difficult to handle: if the relationships between Poles and Lithuanians 
created tensions just for the city of Vilnius, those between Poles and Ukrainians 
were strained in approximately four of the eastern provinces of Poland. The 
Ukrainian nationalists were armed and supported by the Germans against the 
Poles. It was a civil, fratricide war, started in 1919, and in addition an “ethnic 
cleansing.”115 The author explains how Poland was divided and occupied in 
accordance with war plans. To Piotrowski, the first nationalist Ukrainian 
document can be traced back to 1900, when Mykola Mikhnovskyi published 
the history of independent Ukraine. It was a real call to arms, which urged 
Ukrainians to take up arms against the foreigners in their own land and to 
defend the nation, following the motto “whoever is not with us is against us.” 
Thus a group identity was slowly formed. At the Congress of Vienna (January 
28–3 February 3, 1929), the first real meeting of the organization of Ukrainian 
Nationalists (OUN), the ideology was translated into a proclamation 
addressed to all Ukrainians with the aim of adopting a resolution on the issue:
Proclamation: Only the complete removal of all occupants from 
Ukrainian lands [povne usunennia vsikh okupantiv z ukrainskykh 
zemel—i.e., ethnic cleansing] will create the possibility for an 
expansive development of the Ukrainian people in the borders of 
114 “Captured Nazi War Document no. 145,” in B. F. Sabrin, Alliance for Murder: The Nazi 
Ukrainian Nationalist Partnership in Genocide (New York: Sarpedon, 1991), 51, quoted in 
Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, 211–12.
115 Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, 177.
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their own nation . . . In its internal political activity, the Ukrainian 
nation will strive to attain borders encompassing all Ukrainian 
ethnographic territories.
Resolution: The complete removal of all occupants from 
Ukrainian lands [povne usunennia vsikh zaimantsiv z ukrainskykh 
zemel—i.e., ethnic cleansing], which will follow in the course of a 
national revolution and create the possibility for an expansive 
development of the Ukrainian people in the borders of their own 
nation, will be guaranteed by a system of our own military forma-
tions and goal-oriented political diplomacy.116
The repetitions in the two texts clearly emphasize the strength of the 
nationalist spirit with its fanatical attitudes. In the totalitarian ideologies, 
if the iterations, the sentences repeated several times, on the one hand, 
reflect the poverty of language, then, on the other, they tend to inoculate 
some truth in an unconscious way. They can indoctrinate the population 
without it noticing it, bringing it to internalize expressions and concepts 
that, again unconsciously, lead to the adoption of attitudes corresponding 
to the principles of nationalist ideology.
At the second major conference of Ukrainian Nationalists (VZUN, 
Velykyi Zbir Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv) held in Rome on August 27, 
1939, the same concepts were repeated, but in an even more dramatic 
way, ending with the adopting, five days before the invasion of Poland, 
of the Nazi solution of “blood and iron.” As stressed here, “Ukraine for 
Ukrainians. We will not leave one inch of Ukrainian land in the hands 
of enemies and foreigners . . . only blood and iron will decide between us 
and our enemies.”117 When, on September 1, 1941, in Volhynia, Ulas 
Samchuk notified Ukrainians that the “element” (i.e., Jews and Poles, 
deliberately “made a thing” in the singular form to cancel personality) 
that occupied their cities should completely disappear, the Jewish 
problem was already in a resolution phase. It started a practice that 
would result in a general reorganization of the New Europe. At the end 
116 Ibid., 242–43, and fn. 473.
117 Ibid., 243, and fn. 474.
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of the war, the beneficiaries should be, for Samchuck, the true owners of 
the land, who the Ukrainian people:
This OUN editor knew full well that by September 1, 1941, “the element. . . 
brought here from outside the Ukraine” was already in the Gulag.
The Galician Ukrainian Nationalists said, “Smert lakham, 
zhydam i moskalam” (“Death to the Poles, Jews, and Russians”), and 
when their territories were Judenfrei, they said: “We have finished 
with the Jews, now it’s the Poles’ turn.” They then began on their 
long-talked-about and planned program of the “complete removal” 
(povne usunennia) of all occupants for the sake of their “free, 
 independent, united” (vilna, samostiina, soborna) “Ukraine for 
Ukrainians” on all “Ukrainian ethnographic territories” under the 
rule of the “initiative-minority,” the superior people of the OUN.118
In August 1943, when the organization of Ukrainian nationalists led by 
Stepan Bandera, the OUN-B, after the First World Conference of 
Ukrainian Nationalists (VZUN), began to make its own democratic 
 principles and to pursue a progressive social program, going against Nazi 
and fascist positions to promote a system of free peoples and independent 
states as the best solution to the problems of international order, the 
 killings of foreigners in most of western Ukraine continued unabated.
2.3.1.2. Polish Collaboration during the German Occupation
As reported by Faye Schulman, a “partisan” and a “woman of the Holocaust,” 
hundreds of Jews were killed by Soviet partisans:119 
In 1941 the partisan movement was struggling. Spies, traitors and 
Nazi collaborators among the populace abounded. Many partisans 
were ambushed and killed. In frustration, the commander of the 
Pinsk partisan units issued an order to kill every stranger in the 
woods who was not attached to a partisan group. 
118 Ibid., 243, and fns. 476, 477.
119 See next note.
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Unaffiliated strangers were immediately shot. Most were Jews 
who escaped from ghettos or camps and were hiding in the woods. 
They did not belong to any combat unit because the partisans did 
not want them. How cruel that those lucky enough to have escaped 
from the Nazis into the forest survived only to be shot as spies. 
Hundreds were killed before the commander realized his error; he 
was targeting innocent Jews and not Nazi spies. By the time he 
called off the order, it was too late for too many.120
According to the valiant fighter Oswald Rufeisen, the Soviet partisan units 
did not kill Jews for anti-Semitic reasons alone: there were the so-called 
laws of the jungle, those that let the strongest survive. At the beginning, 
the Russian partisans were not very organized, and among the Jewish 
fugitives there were many elderly people, children, and women, seen as 
obstacles to the underground army. The Russians also feared that, once 
captured by Germans, the Jews could reveal their location of hiding in 
exchange for safety. Faced with this danger, to save their skin it was necessary 
to deprive Jews of any help, security, and, especially, weapons, if not even 
to kill them. For Rufeisen, this was the law of the jungle.121 Moreover, the 
new regime and communist ideology regarded them as class enemies to 
be eliminated since they were enemies for Poland. Marek Edelman, the 
last survivor of the leaders of the Warsaw Uprising, helps us understand 
the situation: “We didn’t get adequate help from the Poles, but without 
their help we couldn’t have started the uprising. You have to remember 
that the Poles themselves were short of arms.”122 
What matters here is how Piotrowski seeks to document, thanks to 
witnesses’ voices, all aspects of Polish collaboration, but also “assistance to 
Jews.” Through Zofia Kossak-Szczucka’s speech or, better, through her 
120 Faye Schulman, A Partisan’s Memoir: Woman of the Holocaust (Toronto: Second Story 
Press, 1995), 104, quoted in Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, 105 –6.
121 Cf. Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, 106; Nechama Tec, In the Lion’s Den: The Life of Oswald 
Rufeisen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
122 Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, 107, fn. 172, with reference to Sheldon Kirshner, “Warsaw 
Ghetto Commander Forgives Tormentors” (an interview with Marek Edelman), Canadian 
Jewish News (Toronto), November 9, 1989. Cf. Marek Edelman, Getto walczy: udzial Bundu 
w obronie getta warszawskiego (Warsaw: Nakladem C. K. “Bundu,” 1945).
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eloquent protest, Piotrowski first documents then condemns social action 
reduced to silence in the face of the extermination: “He who remains silent in 
the face of murder becomes an accomplice of the murderer. He who does not 
condemn, condones.”123 Instead, through Emmanuel Ringelblum’s words, 
Polish assistance to the Jews is heard: “No one will accuse the Polish nation of 
committing these constant pogroms and excesses against the Jewish population. 
The significant majority of the nation, its enlightened working-class, and the 
working intelligentsia, undoubtedly condemned these excesses, seeing in 
them a German instrument for  weakening the unity of the Polish community 
and a lever to bring about collaboration with the Germans.”124 These are words 
that resound as criticism that the famed historian of the Warsaw ghetto says 
to the Poles for not having done enough to help the Jews. Among those who 
did not remain indifferent to the conditions of the Jews and hid their children 
in Christian monasteries, finding a safe refuge, there were even old anti-Semites 
whose ideas had been held for decades, who had favored the end of Polish 
Jewry: “The fault is entirely theirs that Poland has given asylum at the most to 
one per cent of the Jewish victims of Hitler’s persecutions.”125 In an economy 
destroyed by the Great War, many ethnic nationalisms led to the final solution 
for the Jews in Poland:126
Motivated perhaps, as a response to recent scholarly denunciation 
of the role of Polish people in the horrors that occurred upon Polish 
soil during World War II, Tadeusz Piotrowski attempts to set the 
historical and sociological record straight in Poland’s Holocaust. 
Using a strategy of combining ethnographic, demographic, policy, 
and archival data drawn from primary and secondary sources 
extracted through government documents, eye witness accounts, 
and interviews conducted in several languages and across several 
continents; Piotrowski’s book is one of the most comprehensive, 
123 Smolar, Jews as a Polish Problem, 36, quoted in Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, 112.
124 Emmanuel Ringelblum, Polish-Jewish Relations during the Second World War, ed. Joseph 
Kermish and Shmuel Krakowski (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1992), 53, 
quoted in Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, 112.
125 Ibid., 113.
126 Cf. Olsak-Glass, review of Poland’s Holocaust, 1.
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well documented, multimethodological contributions to scholarly 
work in the area.127
Solid and informative, for critics, says Romanienko, in “focusing the analysis 
to events that occurred within and around Poland’s borders,” Piotrowski’s 
work represents a bulwark in Holocaust Studies, above all because he calls 
Polish behavior and attitudes into question during the conflict years 
in “identifying the changing face of Poland’s perpetrators, as well as a 
 clarification of her victims.”128 It is relevant to notice when his work was 
issued: his reflection arrived at the end of Bosnian conflict (1992–95), that 
is, of an ethnic cleansing. His research inquiries into the roles ethnic 
minorities played in the end of the Republic of Poland and in the cruel 
acts that happened under the occupying troops. It carefully looks at the 
Polish government’s response to increasing ethnic tensions in the prewar 
years and its conduct of the war effort. This is not the first work in this 
regard: the historian Gross in previous years wrote on the role of Polish 
society during the German and Soviet occupations and on deportations of 
Jews. The researches of Piotrowski, Heller, and Gross may be read as a set of 
works forming the outline of a fairly exhaustive frame of what the Holocaust 
in Poland was.129 Additionally, one can recall the work on the anti-Semite 
Polish state by David Cymet (1999), who indicates anti-Semitism as a major 
cause of the Holocaust.130 In some respects, Piotrowski’s book seems to be a 
foretaste of what historically Gross would bring to bear in Neighbors about 
the massacre of the Jewish community in Jedwabne, perpetrated by 
Christian collaborators. Like Heller, he places the question of social evil, 
127 Romanienko, review of Poland’s Holocaust, 99.
128 Ibid. 
129 See Jan T. Gross, Polish Society under German Occupation: The Generalgouvernement, 
1939–1944 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Gross, Revolution from 
Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Tadeusz Piotrowski, Ukrainian Integral 
Nationalism: Chronological Assessment and Bibliography (Toronto: Alliance of the Polish 
Eastern Provinces, with the Polish Educational Foundation in North America, 1997).
130 Cf. Cymet, Polish State Anti-Semitism as a Major Factor Leading to the Holocaust. See also 
Pawel Korzec, “Antisemitism in Poland as an Intellectual Social and Political Movement,” 
in Studies on Polish Jewry, 1919–1939, ed. Joshua A. Fishman (New York: Yivo Institute for 
Social Research, 1974), 12–104. 
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which legitimized genocide policies, at the base of his work. As Aleksander 
Wat wrote in 1977: “In the end I had read a bit of history and I knew that evil 
takes one incarnation or another in every epoch. And I thought that in the 
twentieth century evil had incarnated itself in history and that Bolshevism 
was the devil in history.”131 And further concerning Piotrowski:
To that end, the book is organized not by chronological events, 
aggregations of villains, typologies of blame, or ethnographic tales 
of sole surviving heroes; but simply of cultural coordination or 
collaborations among ethnic groups. This approach demands that 
the reader keep focused on complex relations among and across 
nation-states, and avoids the reductivist tendency toward binary 
vilification (i.e. good guys/bad guys) as well as anti-Semitic agenda 
setting recently evident among media-savvy sociologists breaking 
into holocaust scholarship.132
This lets Piotrowski highlight the role Ukrainians, Russians, Germans, 
Poles, Lithuanians, and Belarusians played in the extermination of the 
Jews, when their social action did not correspond to common sense. He 
focuses on this social diversity and moral incapacity: for instance, when 
some Poles informed the Germans of other fellow Poles who had been 
interned in the concentration camp of Rembertow; or when some poor 
Jews provided the SS with other rich Jews’ identities to profit from them; 
or when Lithuanian police killed Polish people because they spoke in their 
national language; or, finally, when Russian volunteers picked up thousands 
of Jews in one day, at the request of the Orthodox Church, to assist the 
Germans in their reprisals of genocide (according to some estimates, 
approximately 40,000).133 As Lisiunia A. Romanienko underscores, “The 
author further suggests that historic animosity against the Polish people 
was used by some ethnic groups to substantiate aggressive acts and  policies 
131 Aleksander Wat, My Century: The Odyssey of a Polish Intellectual (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), 225.
132 Romanienko, review of Poland’s Holocaust, 99.
133 Cf. Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, 8, 16, 67, 104, 155.
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of excessive violence (i.e., infamous Ukrainian guards at Treblinka 
 concentration camp). In other documented instances, barbarity against 
Polish people was used to foster nationalism and purity among perpetrators 
(i.e., winter expulsion of Belorussian Poles to Siberia by the Russians).”134
Almost by way of bulletins, the text accounts for the ethnic tensions 
that exploded during World War II, under Soviet terror (in the first 
chapter) and under the Nazis (in the second chapter). What matters is the 
space Piotrowski gives to the voice of some witnesses to reactions of the 
people in the provinces of Białystok, Lwów, and Tarnopol under Soviet 
power.135 The peculiar character of the problem he sociologically reports is 
the question of responsibility for what happened during the war. Moreover, 
he points out very important matter, namely, “the children of these 
nations. . . have to come to terms with the ‘sins of their fathers.’”136 In explaining 
what collaborating with the occupiers means, Piotrowski deals with the docu-
ments on cooperation in the years between the two world wars, under the first 
Soviet occupation, then German, and in the immediate aftermath of the war, 
of Poles, Belarusians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Jews themselves. He 
devotes a chapter to each.137 
2.4. INJUSTICE IN THE EYES OF GERMAN WORKERS
In 1978, Barrington Moore published Injustice.138 The central question 
posed in his book is whether a society can be defined as healthy without 
social justice. This was not the first time that Moore, who had been 
publishing a number of works, called for an understanding of social justice. 
But at the end of 1970s his vision became compelling, after a series of polit-
ical events and while sociology as a discipline was undergoing several 
interdisciplinary influences and academic subdivisions. Between 1939 and 
134 Romanienko, review of Poland’s Holocaust, 99.
135 Cf. Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust, 17–18. 
136 Ibid., 6.
137 Four maps and twenty-five didactic tables offer a kind of summary of the work: table no. 
15 represents “National Minorities in Poland, 1995”; no. 16, the “Ethnic Structure of Poland, 
1931”; no. 17, the “Number of Poles Resettled or Evicted Between 1939 and 1944 in German-
Occupied Poland.”
138 Cf. Barrington Moore, Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (White Plains, 
NY: Sharpe, 1978).
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1945, Europe experienced unprecedented destruction. In asking how this 
was possible, Moore, an American sociologist and famed policy analyst for 
the government and on staff at the Department of Justice after a period in 
the OSS, tries to give an answer by taking the “German working class” as his 
analysis key. This choice may seem misleading, but the subject proposed by 
Moore and, more broadly, the social division of labor and the relationships 
among workers, helps to us to understand a human’s disposition to bear 
social relations of an oppressive nature. Other scholars, such as Edward P. 
Thompson and Carl E. Schorske, had pointed out the feelings and the 
history of the working masses in a different manner, highlighting their life 
conditions but especially their attitudes in the face of power.139 But now 
Moore tries to fathom, through the notion of the “German working class,” 
the reasons why some men rebel, when laws are violated or equality claims 
are avoided, while others accept oppression and degradation: “This is a 
book about why people so often put up with being the victims of their 
societies and why at other times they become very angry and try with 
passion and forcefulness to do something about their situation.”140 His 
approach is significant because it starts from an attitude or a political tool 
that recurs in 1970s, namely, politicians and the elite keep workers divided 
and undercut their attempts in organizing. In this way the author is able 
to discuss the roots of totalitarian power.
After his Soviet Politics (1950) and Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy (1966), the Harvard scholar Moore, focusing on the particular 
case of Nazi Germany, moved with increased interest toward those who 
were the “social bases of obedience and revolt.”141 His intent was to study 
“those who have obeyed” an unfair power and “those who,” instead, “have 
challenged authority,” trying, in the latter case, to trace the social causes 
that led to the rebellion. 
139 See Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy, 1905–1917: The Development of the Great 
Schism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955); Edward P. Thompson, The 
Making of the English Working Class (London: Gollancz, 1963).
140 Moore, Injustice, xiii.
141 Cf. Barrington Moore, Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power: The Role of Ideas in Social 
Change (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950); Moore, Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: 
Beacon, 1966).
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By “basis of society” Moore means individuals at the base (or at least near 
the base) of the social order, and “social order” refers to three institutions 
(authority, division of labor, and market or distribution of goods and 
services) that serve to keep society cohesive. As a result, the bases of 
society are all those people who have little power or authority, limited 
assets, insufficient incomes, scarce resources, or who are devoid of any 
material means or social advantage:
The moral order of a society consists, among other things, of a sense 
of corporateness. This sense is embodied in symbols (e.g., the flag), 
rituals (e.g., inaugurations), and representatives (e.g., officials) who 
speak and act as agents of the collectivity. In large measure, these 
symbols, rituals, and representatives themselves define and reaffirm 
the corporate character of a society.142
These individuals, by virtue of the fact that they have little power and 
scarce resources, should be the first in the society to feel a sense of 
injustice, to perceive, for instance, when authority becomes abuse of 
power, when goods and services are not distributed fairly. Under these 
circumstances, they should also be among the first to rebel and seek by 
every means to do something to change the situation. The question is, 
therefore, why the “social bases” of German society did not rebel against 
Nazi totalitarianism, an extreme case of social injustice, and, on the 
contrary, actually supported it:
Nevertheless it is worthwhile observing that for very many human 
beings, especially the mass of human beings at the bottom of the 
pyramid in stratified societies, social order is a good thing in its 
own right, one for which they will often sacrifice other values. They 
detest violent and capricious interference with their daily lives 
whether it comes from brigands, religious and political fanatics, or 
agents of the powers that be. People will generally support, even if 
142 Robert Wuthnow, “On Suffering, Rebellion, and the Moral Order,” Contemporary Sociology 
8, no. 2 (1979): 213.
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partly frightened into it, a political leader who promises peace and 
order, especially when he can do so under some color of legitimacy 
as defined in that time and place.143
In the light of what happened in Nazi Germany, Moore tries to comprehend 
if Hitler’s advent was inevitable or if in post–World War I Germany liberal 
conditions or democratic institutions, capable of preventing the fall of the 
Weimar Republic, existed. After examining the problems faced by the 
Social Democratic coalition government, he develops his own thesis: 
the explosion of a strong social resentment, silenced for many years, 
inflamed the downfall of Weimar; this “repressive aspect of moral outrage” 
was finally channeled into the Nazi ranks. 
To Moore, the origins of this sense of injustice or moral outrage 
date back to 1848 and persisted until 1920. They stemmed from the 
period when Germany evolved from a system of craft production to an 
advanced  capitalist industrial system. Through a sociological survey 
also based on autobiographies and questionnaires, he analyzes the way 
of thinking, acting, and the life conditions of the German workers. Both 
popular nationalism and class claims, for the author, were already 
present in 1848, when conflicts between principles based on birth and 
attribution and those based on merit and achievements, next to the first 
forms of nationalism among workers in urban centers, started to appear 
in the social hierarchy. At that period, the German claims on Schleswig-
Holstein, then under Danish sovereignty, had been made, but without 
success, by the Prussian armies; at the time of the Truce of Malmö, a 
violent popular uprising exploded, fueled by discontent of workers with 
low social status. 
For Moore, the suppression of this antibourgeois and antiliberal 
current, developed among the lower classes of urban centers and outside 
parliament, and the inability of the Assembly of Frankfurt to meet popular 
demands, let a popular nationalism grow, albeit slowly. This nationalism 
sought to define the ideal type of German, with negative consequences in 
the long term: “The most one can assert with confidence therefore is that 
143 Moore, Injustice, 22n13.
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the seeds for a working-class nationalism, as well as its contradictions and 
dilemmas, were already present. They would have plenty of time to grow.”144
2.4.1. AN OBEDIENT PROLETARIAT
The object of Moore’s study is the “social action” of the German working 
class in different historical phases: from 1848 to the period prior to the Great 
War, from the reformist revolution (1918–20) to the revolt of the Ruhr. In 
each of these periods, the working class was facing, although in different 
ways, a breach of the social contract. Despite their rights and expectations 
being damaged, the social protests were, however, limited or had no effect: 
few put together all the grievances and arranged them into a revolutionary 
program. In essence, the workers did not challenge the existing power 
because they did not have definite opinions on the obligations and duties of 
the authority, and they lacked a historical consciousness.145 
At the outbreak of the Great War, there was a large industrial proletariat, 
which posed a strong threat of revolution in Germany. Particularly, in the 
Ruhr, a symbol of industrial production where the precarious conditions 
of work were more evident and the wages lower than any in other European 
country, neither the coal miners nor steelworkers rebelled against the 
oppressive forms of power. The first because they were embedded in a 
system of corporate paternalism, the second because they were incapable 
of managing collective action:
Subject directly or indirectly to the disciplinary paternalism of the 
highly status-conscious mine officials (Bergbehörde), the miners 
were granted exemptions from certain taxes and feudal dues. Their 
working conditions were under state protection. According to 
prevailing legislation, “loyal and obedient mining people” (not 
“workers”: a term that when used later was regarded as an insult) 
were to have their names inscribed in the Knappschaftsregister and 
144 See ibid., 171–72. 
145 In this regard, Moore suggests a Chinese tale that shows how to lead a people to revolt: 
it is Fang-La, leader of the rebels, who mobilizes the population against the Sung 
dynasty; cf. ibid., 27.
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had the right to receive from a collective fund specified amounts in 
case of illness or accident.146
Those who worked in the coal mines found a common culture on which to 
draw: the miners had their Gedinge, their Knappschaften, and their Berggesetz, 
social institutions that distinguished them from other workers and that 
enhanced forms of collective protest. Nevertheless, the wage concessions 
they obtained delayed tensions without bringing any recognition of rights: 
they were mainly intended to build consensus among workers. Additionally, 
the patronizing attitude of the industrialists, benevolent and authoritarian 
at the same time, did not help social-democratic initiatives. For ironworkers, 
instead, the situation was different: because of technological innovations, 
they worked in displaced areas or in different areas of the factory that were not 
conducive at all to everyday personal relationships. As Moore underscores, 
“A smelter and a man who helped to operate the flying shears were not likely 
to have as much in common as the various grades of coal miners, making 
collective action more difficult.”147
Since the steel industries were more technologically advanced 
compared to the mining industry, they required, and created at the same 
time, a more diverse workforce and often imported labor from other regions 
of Central Europe: for example, many Poles were working with the Germans 
without sharing similar values. The absence of a shared past, social frag-
mentation in the workplace, and the lack of a tradition of informal collective 
bargaining, such as the Gedinge, did not promote the formation of a 
common sentiment, which must be the basis of  collective action. Although, 
in the Ruhr, the growth of big industry had created a substantial working 
class, the elite of this proletariat had  fractures within its ranks, while the 
mass of workers pursued minimum targets. Furthermore, the general 
trauma of the war, with especially its political and economic consequences, 
the end of the monarchy, and the discrediting of strata and dominant insti-
tutions in German society, contributed to the industrial workers lack of 
cohesion into one revolutionary force. What is noticeable is that issues 
146 Ibid., 234.
147 Ibid., 271.
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related to revolutionary forces were common and usual in political agendas 
of the 1970s, especially because episodes breaking the status quo or 
promoting political revolution, by involving a complete change, after 1968, 
were frequent. Moore stands out in post-Holocaust sociology for this atten-
tion to the political scene: he approaches the theme of Nazism and the 
consensus in favor of the NSDAP through contemporary sociological 
devices, mirroring what was happening around him in the 1970s:
In the chaos following Germany’s defeat, workers took to the 
streets, fought against the authorities, and formed representative 
councils. Unfortunately, the leaders of the labor movement were 
afraid to use these energies to effect a liberal revolution that might 
have destroyed the old order and formed the base for a democratic 
state, the leaders’ failure helped to evoke a “radical thrust” which 
culminated in the rising of the Red Army in the Ruhr during the 
spring of 1920, put down by reactionary forces fighting on behalf 
of the moderates.148
Moore accounts for the difficulties of German society, which was prostrated 
on the economic plan and deeply divided by the social plan, with high 
unemployment at the end of the Great War. In the cities, worker and 
soldier councils occupied companies and newspaper offices, requisitioned 
food to be distributed to the population, among demonstrations and riots. 
Seeking to leverage this situation was the extreme Left, gathered around 
the Communist Party, which, even after the failure of the Spartacist 
uprising and the Republic of Bavaria, continued to propose revolution as 
a solution to the country’s problems.
The situation was similar, in some respects, to that of Russia in 1917, 
but, in reality, there were many differences, and several obstacles to revo-
lution: a mobilization of the rural masses was lacking, and, more 
importantly, there were various power relationships within the labor 
movement. The German Social Democrats, willing to form an alliance 
148 James J. Sheehan, “Barrington Moore on Obedience and Revolt,” Theory & Society 9, no. 5 
(1980): 729–30.
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with moderate forces, and in no way intending to dismantle the military 
and civilian structures of the old order, were able to prevent a general 
revolution:
The first wave of the revolution that had begun in Kiel in November, 
1918, with the sailors’ revolt had been predominantly a “people’s” 
revolution, with limited liberal objectives. It was a general popular 
upheaval directed almost entirely against the military, the monarchy, 
and anything that smacked of the continuation of wartime discipline, 
suffering, and sacrifice. Though the workers played a major role, 
those who sought to turn the popular revolution into a radical or 
proletarian one were a small and scattered minority. Had not Ebert 
and his colleagues forestalled them by taking power in Berlin, they 
might have mounted a coup but hardly a revolution. The local 
workers’ and soldiers’ councils that sprang up spontaneously after 
the Kiel uprising might have become the organs of a popular 
democracy, or at least agents to break the institutional hold of the 
dominant classes—the Junkers, big business, the higher levels of the 
judiciary and the bureaucracy. But this did not happen. One obvious 
reason is that the reformist leadership of the SPD was afraid of 
letting it happen, lest the movement get out of hand and turn into a 
socialist revolution, which they believed would have disastrous 
consequences for all of Germany, including the industrial workers. 
Another reason why nothing resembling a democratic dictatorship 
emerged from the council movement is the fact that by and large the 
peasants would have nothing to do with the councils.149
The sailors’ rebellion of the German fleet gave impetus to a revolutionary 
process that ended with the fall of the empire of William II and the proc-
lamation of the Republic in November 1918:
The revolt in the Ruhr, in reaction to the Kapp Putsch, the abortive 
rightist coup of March 13–17, 1920, was the most significant uprising 
149 Moore, Injustice, 316–17. 
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by industrial workers that has so far taken place in any modern 
industrial country. Within a few days the Ruhr workers managed to 
improvise a Red Army. With this army they managed to capture 
Dortmund and Essen, major cities in Germany’s industrial heartland, 
and several smaller ones.150
In the Ruhr, the industrial process transformed the structure of employment, 
dramatically driving up the proportions of the proletariat. There, the lack 
of decent and humane treatment, withholding of pay, and the arbitrary 
pay scales creating conflicts between employees without encouraging the 
cooperation to form revolutionary groups, together with the lack of safety 
at work and the continuous possibility of dismissal without just cause, all 
increased discontent that could no longer be contained. Friedrich Ebert’s 
political choices, the implicit suppression of a socialist alternative implied 
by the Social Democrats’ compromises with the existing power structures 
to maintain social order, helped to channel discontent progressively 
towards National Socialism.151 In the context of a lost war, of growing 
inflation, of scattered territories or slices of German nationality, the moral 
outrage of workers, previously repressed, had to lead somewhere. The 
attention Moore devotes to the National Socialist German Workers Party, 
which, by promising an end to social injustice, harnessed this political 
disappointment. The NSDAP, with its propaganda based on the concept of 
national community and on the abolition of class alliances, recruited 
Germans from all sectors of the population. Of an anti-Marxist and 
 interclassist matrix, it elaborated a propaganda line tending to attribute 
the responsibility for the defeat of Germany in the Great War to the 
“anti-national elements,” a term by which Marxists and Jews were desig-
nated. Through this policy, the reason why the Nazi Party was born 
returned: workers and impoverished petty bourgeois, threatened by 
massive Czech immigration in areas inhabited mainly by Germans in the 
Sudetenland, sought to protect the rights of the German majority of that 
region. The sudden increase in unemployment and inflation produced 
150 Ibid., 328.
151 Cf. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
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anxiety, especially among the middle classes and the urban underclass. 
Taking advantage of the discontent of the petty bourgeoisie and the 
 unemployed, of the political instability of the Republic, and the errors of 
the moderate parties, already during the election campaign of 1930, the 
NSDAP was able to act as a force that could propose solutions for  salvation, 
winning about 6,500,000 votes and 107 deputies.
2.4.2. “Was du für Volk und Heimat tust, ist immer recht getan!” 
The National Socialist program of February 24, 1920, responded to the 
needs of frustrated workers and an exhausted Germany: among its 
points was primarily the concern of uniting all Germans and forming a 
greater Germany, as evident below from documents reported by Walther 
Hofer:
3.  We demand fields and lands (colonies) to feed our people and for 
the settlement of our surplus population.
4.  Citizen of the State (Staatsbürger) can only be one who belongs to 
the popular community (Volksgenosse). Volksgenosse can be only 
one who is of German blood, without any regard to religious affil-
iation. Therefore, no Jew can be Volksgenosse.
7.  If it is not possible procure the necessary foods for the entire 
population of the State, the members of foreign nations (who are 
not citizens of the State) must be expelled from the Reich.
8.  We demand that all non-Germans, who immigrated to Germany 
after 2 August 1914, be forced to leave the Country immediately.152
To evaluate the extent to which the Nazi Party was a workers’ party, and 
the number of those who instead belonged to the lower middle class, 
Moore resorts to Parteistatistik, a study conducted in secret by the leader-
ship of the Nazi Party (Reichsorganisationsleiter) in 1935, which became 
available only after the end of the war. The three volumes collecting data, 
152 Walther Hofer, Il nazionalsocialismo: Documenti 1933–1945 (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1964 
[1957]), 25–28 (my translation).
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actually, could not be disclosed outside of the internal personnel office of 
the Reichsleiter without written permission, and they had to be kept in a 
safe place. 
Abel, Gerth, Heberle, and Lipset had already largely dealt with the 
social composition of the Nazi Party.153 Moore adds another statistical 
source to previous research: the results of the general census of employment 
in 1933, carried out simultaneously with the general census of June 1933, five 
months after the rise of Hitler.154 Until that time, the Nazis had not exercised 
any control over the Central Statistical Service, as Hughes explains in “The 
Gleichshaltung.” Moore shows how it is possible to obtain useful informa-
tion from data. For instance, based on the census of employment and the 
Parteistatistik it is possible to determine the percentage of those enrolled in 
the NSDAP in many professional groups of German society. He notes that 
94.5 percent of the NSDAP members were male and that the total number 
of Party members equaled 2,493,890, representing 7.7 percent of the labor 
force, which had about 32,296,496 people; of these a little less than two-thirds 
were male, or 20,817,033. According to 1935 data of the Party and official 
census in thousands, Moore presents a table with professional groups who 
joined the NSDAP. By the intersection of the two data sources, it appears 
that from 1930 to 1935 the percentage of industrial workers and agricultural 
laborers increased by 4 percent, as opposed to that of employees, who 
suffered a decline of 4.6 percent. There are three groups of occupations 
appearing in the table: the first group includes a series of lower-middle-class 
professions; the second contains the manual workers of the city and the 
countryside, while the rich, retirees, and housewives constitute the third 
group. His sociological correlations are impressive—let me recall the 
consideration sociology as a discipline reserved for statistics in 1970s—in 
examining the role of NSDAP. For example, Group 1 contains small holders 
with difficulties in placing their goods on the market or retailers grappling 
with competition; the old middle class (as rural owners but with mortgage 
debt and craftworkers out of the market) and new middle class (now made 
153 Cf. Richard F. Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1982).
154 For census data Moore consults Statistik des Deutschen Reichs (SDR), Band 453, Heft 2 
(Berlin, 1936), 6.
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up of civil servants, salaried workers, and teachers, who constituted the 
profession with the highest percentage of subscribers to the NSDAP). 
Moore emphasizes the correlation between a limited level of education and 
the influence of the charisma exercised by the NSDAP. So, the lower-middle 
class forms all of Group 1. There were some resentments feeding the Nazi 
movement. They were those of the “‘little man’ angry at the injustices of a 
social order that threatened or failed to reward the virtues of hard work and 
self-denial as these personal efforts became crystallized in the merchant’s 
store, the peasant’s plot, the craftsman’s manual skill, the white-collar job, 
and the technician’s and journalist’s gifts. Here was one possible outcome of 
the labor theory of value.”155 
Manual workers, especially industrial workers, form Group 2. 
Although the data highlight that, in 1935, there was not a massive shift 
into the Nazi ranks by these workers, the Nazis managed to infiltrate and 
gain more than half of their number. Moreover, as Moore underlines, in 
1918, specialized metalworkers were the major source of combative and 
even revolutionary impetus. 
Group 3 is made up of the wealthy, retirees, and housewives, on the 
edge of the productive system, according to Moore, who nourished a 
“rather desperate resentment” for their conditions, considering the fact 
that they represented one-twelfth of Party members. 
This is why Moore stands out—his sociological analysis of these three 
groups, socially frustrated and resentful because of the work that was not 
paid a just wage or, as in the case of the unemployed, because they could 
not find a job. It was a frustration going back to a strong work ethic, the 
historical precursor of a popular reactionary movement. In doing so, 
Moore illustrates how the NSDAP, to the majority, was the “center and 
promoter of the resentment type and moral fury.” Then who were the 
Nazis?
Moore elaborates in a more specific second table the social composi-
tion of the NSDAP in 1935. The first distinction he explains is concerned 
with “manual” and “non-manual” labor, and then with that between the 
“lower-middle” and “middle-upper” class. This analysis shows that the 
155 Moore, Injustice, 406.
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principal organized expression of resentment came from the lower-middle 
class, with industrial workers accounting for slightly more than a quarter 
but no more than half of its members. The Party was made up of ordinary 
people: over three-quarters of members belong to this fluid category. It 
seems to be a national community, which, in some ways, recalled life 
conditions in the trenches, where the common good must come before 
individual utility. According to Moore’s surveys, the strength of the Party 
was, therefore, represented by the lower-middle class (i.e., by self-em-
ployed craftsmen, clerks, small businessmen, civil servants, teachers, but 
also by many industrial workers). 
2.4.3. The Early Nazists for Abel, Merkl, and Moore
The autobiographical accounts of Nazi militants, collected by Abel in 1934 and 
examined by Merkl and Moore in the 1970s, testify that the first in Germany 
to feel the tension among conservatism, liberalism, and revolutionary radi-
calism were the workers, especially young workers, who were raised on values 
of honesty, obedience to authority, and fatigue. What is interesting is that 
Moore, looking back at or starting from Nazi Movement by Abel, underscores 
their values and when they begin to feel threatened. Here are two examples:
Troops were once again returning to the Fatherland, yet a disgusting 
sight met their eyes. Beardless boys, dissolute deserters and whores 
tore off the shoulder bands of our front-line fighters and spat upon 
their field gray uniforms. At the same time they muttered some-
thing about liberty, equality, and fraternity. Poor, deluded people! 
Was this liberty and fraternity? People who never saw a battle field, 
who had never heard the whine of a bullet, openly insulted men 
who through four and a half years had defied the world in arms, 
who had risked their lives in innumerable battles, with the sole 
desire to guard the country against this horror. 
For the first time I began to feel a burning hatred for this human 
scum that trod everything pure and clean underfoot.156 
156 Abel, The Nazi Movement: Why Hitler Came into Power, quoted in Moore, Injustice, 413n14.
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And:
My most urgent task in 1919 was to make my business a going 
concern once more. This was the more difficult since throughout 
the long years of the war no one had had the time to concern himself 
with it.
After much effort I finally succeeded in getting some orders. 
All my hopes, however, were dashed. The inflation put an end to my 
endeavours . . . Hunger and privation once more held sway in my 
home. I cursed the government that sanctioned such misery. For I 
was convinced at the time that the inflation was not necessary on 
the scale on which it had been carried out. But it had served its 
purpose: the middle class, which still had some funds, and which 
had steadily opposed Marxism without actually combating it, was 
completely wiped out. The only way out of our misery was to find a 
man who might succeed in uniting all Germans who still had some 
regard for honor.157
The NSDAP members viewed the serious economic situation in moral 
terms. Moore cites among the main reasons for Hitler’s followers’  enrollment 
the disappointment in the solutions that other parties, such as the 
Deutschnationale Volkspartei, a reactionary monarchist party supported by 
Junker and big industry, had suggested in such a difficult situation:
How different from this was the daring proposition that sprang 
from Hitler’s warm sympathetic heart! His idea was not to use the 
resources of the state to help industrialists and land owners, but to 
take advantage of them immediately to relieve the misery of millions 
of unemployed Germans!158
Nazi ideology offered real and salutary solutions, without cost in 
terms of conflict and suffering, to the social workers, who felt them-
selves morally outraged by the existing social order and victims of the 
157 Ibid., 414n16.
158 Ibid., 416n22. 
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liberal capitalism of the Weimar Republic. Merkl, another sociologist, 
in Political Violence under the Swastika, analyzes the 581 case studies 
collected by Abel in 1934 and elaborates some social profiles for 
different subgroups.159 His study shows a generalized hostility toward 
any authority. Merkl’s research, richer in statistical data than Moore’s, 
demonstrates that for the majority of Abel’s interviewees the experi-
ence of camaraderie in the trenches, the defeat, the revolution, the 
exposure to foreign occupation, and the situation in border areas were 
the decisive factors in joining the Nazis in the name of Volksgemeinschaft. 
Abel reports how, many of them, in 1930–32, were stoned or stabbed 
in the street by blends of organized groups of the Left: factors that sharp-
ened the sense of persecution and reinforced the feeling of loyalty to 
Hitler. The greatest curiosity emerging from Merkl’s study regards the 
violence of the young Nazis, which was inversely proportional to anti-Se-
mitic prejudice, a factor that leads him to outline a typology of 
anti-Semitic prejudice. Nevertheless, Abel reports that 60 percent of 
interviewees were not anti-Semitic, unlike Merkl, who found that only 
25 percent were not anti-Semitic. According to Moore, those who 
adopted violent attitudes showed a lower verbal violence, but such an 
interpretation, in reality, only reveals the discordance between data. 
What is noticeable is then the statistical influence in Merkl’s piece, in 
which statistical methods and econometrics are evident. It is an influ-
ence involving the sociology of any country, in general, for reasons 
related to national economic needs, resulting from the international 
economic crisis of 1973. Both works represent a reinterpretation (that of 
Merkl in a statistical key, that of Moore in a historical key) of Abel’s 
sociological survey. That Merkl updates the personal stories of the earlier 
Nazis by emphasizing a theme, that of the social composition of the 
NSDAP, which had often been sidelined but deserves the greatest 
emphasis. Nevertheless, both authors point out that the lower-middle 
class that supported and represented the NSDAP was not a homoge-
neous mass. Although criticized by his disciples, such as Charles Tilly, 
159 Cf. Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika.
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Moore’s work stands out in post-Holocaust sociology for another 
element. Namely, it focuses on the theme of human suffering, or on the 
social causes of human suffering, a highly recurring question between 
the 1970s and 1980s in sociology (Bauman would also deal extensively 
with this question) in rereading the nature of political power.160 
2.4.4. Surrender to Authority in Concentration Camps
That Moore’s work is also a historical piece is evident in studying the 
power of concentration camps. It seems he is influenced by the pioneering 
works of Kogon, Adler, and Bettelheim.161 This emerges by examining 
those social and psychological mechanisms that led some prisoners to 
accept the moral authority of their oppressors. There seem to be two main 
causes of these attitudes. First, a number of prisoners, like German 
patriots, shared Nazi values and ideology since the beginning. At this 
point, Moore remembers, “When Bettelheim in 1938 asked more than a 
hundred old political prisoners if they thought the story of the camp 
should be reported in foreign newspapers, many hesitated to agree that 
this was desirable. Nearly all the non-Jewish prisoners, he asserts, believed 
in the superiority of the German race and took pride in the so-called 
achievements of the National Socialist state, especially its policy of expan-
sion through annexation.”162
Second, within the camp, social pressures fall on the individual who 
wants or tends to resist the moral authority of the oppressor: heroic deeds, 
in fact, threaten not only the lives of those who resist but also those of the 
group to which he belongs. Assuming that cruelty and suffering are 
imposed on prisoners through violence and coercion, Moore tries to 
160 Cf. John P. Fox, review of Political Violence under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis, by Peter H. 
Merkl, International Affairs 53, no. 2 (1977): 304–5; Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution; 
Albert Schweitzer, review of Political Violence under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis, by Peter 
H. Merkl, Contemporary Sociology 7, no. 4 (1978): 460–61.
161 Cf. Eugen Kogon, Der SS-Staat: Das System der deutschen Konzentrationslager (Munich: 
Alber, 1946); Hans G. Adler, Theresienstadt 1941–1945: Das Antlitz einer Zwangsgemeinschaft 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1955); Bruno Bettelheim, The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age 
(Glencoe, IL: The Free Press), 1960.
162 Moore, Injustice, 74n64.
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explain how capitulation to moral authority of the oppressors, especially 
by members of the middle class, is attained. 
In the first case, the victims feel that the suffering is not divorced 
from moral authority and, therefore, what seems inevitable is somehow 
right. This attitudinal acceptance of oppression sometimes leads some of 
them to identify with the SS, imitating, as far as possible, the uniform. In 
analyzing this, one should ask which practices the Nazis carry out in order 
to exercise totalitarian power in the camps. All social constraints and any 
kind of relationship among the camp inmates are broken. By reducing the 
possibilities for communication and collaboration among them, it is 
possible to guarantee total disintegration, denying any type of social 
agreement aimed at overturning the power within the field. Citing the 
elements contributing to isolating the individual, Moore gives special 
importance to the welcoming ceremonies, really traumatic rites, which 
degrade the subject, destroying self-esteem and respect. The degrading 
equalization of the inmates, marked by an equal uniform or by a tattooed 
number, is the initial step of destruction, namely, the beginning of a 
regime that deprives prisoners of everything. In this total institution, SS 
control pervades every moment of prisoners’ lives, to the point of granting 
them minimum time to defecate, urinate, or sleep. Moore glimpses into 
this a kind of social relation that is atypical and one-way.163 
These social factors cause an increase of the instinctual drives of hunger 
and other bodily needs, accelerating adaptation processes and encouraging 
the habituation to oppression and fear, while the desensitization feeling 
generates uncertainty and discomfort in the prisoner. According to the 
“definition of the situation” (at the basis of social action) by Merton, it is 
clear that the uncertainty of the situation in the camps caused both the 
inability to act and the submission to SS moral authority.164 Clearly, at 
the basis of obedience to moral authority of injustice there was social 
163 Cf. Howard S. Becker, “The Art of Comparison: Lessons from the Master, Everett C. 
Hughes,” Sociologica 2 (2010): 1–12, accessed March 25, 2012, doi:10.2383/32713; Hughes, 
“Memorandum on Total Institutions”; Vienne, “Introduction to Everett C. Hughes’ 
‘Memorandum on Total Institutions’”; Vienne, “The Enigma of the Total Institution.”
164 Cf. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure: Toward the Codification of Theory 
and Research (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1949).
The Destruction of the Jews in a Sociological Perspective during the 1970s | 199
disintegration, resulting from some elements that contributed to the 
atomization process among prisoners. First, mutual suspicion, created 
specifically by the SS (thanks to the presence in the camp of outlaws or 
criminals) undermines any form of collaboration between prisoners by 
making the exercise of power more invisible. Second, the theft or the fear 
of being robbed removes the element of trust at the base of solidarity action 
for revolts against authority. Finally, the different historical and social expe-
riences of the prisoners prevent forms of collaboration and common 
strategies of survival. Moore many times stresses how the heterogeneity of 
the prison community makes solidarity and resistance impossible: 
There was also prisoners from different ethnic backgrounds between 
whom there was often violent hostility, even among Jews from 
different nationalities. In Theresienstadt Czech Jews frequently 
hated German Jews. At one point the Czech Jews said, “Now the 
Germans will see what ‘transport’ means!” (Transport was the 
euphemism for shipping prisoners out to an extermination camp.) 
Czech Jews also fought with the Zionists.165
Nevertheless, the political atomization of inmates leaves to prisoners some 
spaces of minimal freedom: since the authority needs prisoners’ coopera-
tion to carry out the daily routine, it sometimes does not come into the 
dorms or other spaces, allowing the formation of informal networks of 
cooperation among the prisoners. Several of them react by creating space 
for survival and response to authority. Reparaphrasing Bettelheim, Moore 
explains that those who survive in the camps are mostly political commu-
nists, who, faced with unfair moral authority, do not falter. Rather, they 
use to their advantage the power of the SS, with whom they must coop-
erate. The minimum cooperation with the SS, however, leads to defilement, 
in the sense that they end up exercising power over other prisoners in the 
camp, especially over direct enemies, namely, the criminals.166 Obviously, 
within the camp the politicians on the Left constitute an elite (Prominten), 
165 Moore, Injustice, 67n44.
166 See ibid., 70.
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the ruling class (the one that Gaetano Mosca called “of managers,” as they 
are used to exercising power in society).167 Now, for the fact in itself that 
these prisoners, compared to the others, had a greater chance of survival, 
they were privileged in the sense that, when they decided whom to let live or 
let die, they exercised an arbitrary power, like the SS, in the camp. Belonging 
to this elite are especially the elderly prisoners, who hinder the chances of 
survival of the newcomers as they, being alien to the culture or the rules of 
the camp, could upset the precarious balance between the prisoners.168 
Apolitical, rich, or wealthy classes instead fail to define or understand their 
situation: they accept it as a mistake. The inability to process this generates 
self-pity, not allowing thinking or reaction to injustice. Muslims represent 
the extreme form of capitulation: they abandon any form of class action, 
renounce their feelings, and after ceasing to act at all, they die.169 As 
concerns the middle class, a factor weakening the ability to resist is the 
attachment to the familiar routines before camp life, as Moore reports in 
referring to Bettelheim’s experience:
In Buchenwald Bettelheim asked many German Jewish prisoners 
why they had not left Germany beforehand because of the utterly 
degrading conditions to which they had already been subjected in 
1938. Their answer was to the effect that they could not leave because 
it meant giving up their homes and places of business.170
2.5. HOW MANY VICTIMS OF THE HOLOCAUST? 
In the shadow of international revolutionary facts, such as the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 or the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution with its consequences for real life, public opinion, and the 
societal change set in motion, for sociologists there started a phase 
focusing on their attention on micro-questions. The previous “theory 
building” continued to develop within specialty fields under the influence 
167 See Gaetano Mosca, Elementi di scienza politica (Turin: Bocca, 1923).
168 Zofia Posmysz-Piasecka returns to this aspect during interview cited above.
169 Cf. Primo Levi, Se questo è un uomo (Turin: Einaudi, 1958).
170 Moore, Injustice, 68.
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of other social sciences, particularly political science and economics. By 
1970, the attention to case studies, status variables, economic analysis, 
and statistical data became increasingly more profoundly relevant in 
sociological research. 
While there was an ever more evident period of segmentation in 
sociology (accompanied sometimes by a reduction or decadence for theory 
building), a sociological touchstone in Holocaust scholarship was issued in 
the form of Accounting for Genocide (1979) by Helen Fein. In reading 
the book, one seems to find the mathematical and statistical influences 
characterizing the state of sociological studies of the period. Indeed, if one 
decides to start to identify and number the victims of the Holocaust (when 
looking at post-Holocaust sociology), the mind immediately runs to 
Accounting for Genocide. Nevertheless, the major reviews written about 
this book presented it as a kind of macabre bulletin for its attention to how 
many victims and where deaths have been.171 
When analyzing her work, one can notice how Fein creates a much 
more complex research, far from a simple statistical analysis on the number 
of victims for any country of Europe. For instance, the sociometrical theory 
by Jacob L. Moreno resounds in the piece as does the methodological pref-
erences of sociology of the 1970s: what is original is that she deals with all 
this by addressing the destruction of the Jews. As stressed by Benjamin M. 
Ben-Baruch, “her application of statistical controls to factors influencing 
historical processes affects the agenda for future research.”172 Meanwhile, the 
influence of the intentionalist Dawidowicz is glimpsed in her research.
A set of historical events coincided with her work, which received less 
attention than they should have. As Fred Crawford says, “this analysis of 
itself guarantees Fein’s work a place as a timeless scholarly classic dealing 
with a human problem of such magnitude that few social scientists have 
171 Cf. Fein, Accounting for Genocide; Irving L. Horowitz, “Bodies and Souls”, review of 
Accounting for Genocide: National Response and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust, 
by Helen Fein, Contemporary Sociology 9, no. 4 (1980): 489; Helen Fein, “Reduction by 
Review,” Contemporary Sociology 10, no. 2 (1981): 168; Irving L. Horowitz, “Reply to Fein,” 
Contemporary Sociology 10, no. 2 (1981): 170.
172 Benjamin M. Ben-Baruch, review of Accounting for Genocide: National Response and 
Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust, by Helen Fein, Theory & Society 10, no. 3 (1981): 
461, http://www.jstor.org/stable/657477.
 | American Sociology and Holocaust Studies202
ever considered it—the Holocaust.”173 In essence, her work (arranged into 
12 chapters and with 468 pages that recount in a new way what happened 
to the Jews of Europe) followed the lead, on May 26, 1972, of SALT I, the 
international treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on 
nuclear weapons. The event, in the midst of the Cold War, together with 
the conclusion of the Vietnam War in 1973–75 and the Camp David 
Accords, on September 17, 1978, between Israel and Egypt, opening a new 
phase in the Middle East, opened the way to account for, in a novel manner, 
the destruction of the Jews of Europe. To this context, one can add the 
social movements and antiwar protests in 1970s along with the role of the 
women’s rights and civil rights movements. All these events started to 
address a new democratization process and to pierce again, and above all 
publicly, the politics of the Iron Curtain. 
Thirty-four years after Hitler’s death, Fein emphasizes the concept of 
nation-state by specifically questioning how nation-states behave when 
faced with the destruction of the Jews. What matters more is that she 
breaks the categories of historical and traditional analysis, especially 
because her comparative and statistical examination reevaluates and 
reconsiders those factors leading a nation-state to practice genocide and 
how a particular group becomes vulnerable and subject to the genocidal 
process. When she compares the Turkish massacre of the Armenians and 
the extermination of the Jews in the chapter opening the book, she 
explains in what way groups occupying peripheral positions in the world 
system are easily vulnerable in respect to other young rising groups.174 
Among the most exposed to discrimination, persecution, massacres, and 
extermination are communities that do not hold strong ties with the 
dominant political group and are therefore excluded from the nexus of 
power and other strong bonds. In addition, by abandoning the traditional 
analytical categories of victims and bystanders, she focuses on political 
communities under the Nazi domain. For instance, when speaking of 
173 Fred R. Crawford, review of Accounting for Genocide: National Response and Jewish 
Victimization during the Holocaust, by Helen Fein, Social Science Quarterly 61, no. 1 (1980): 179.
174 Cf. René Lemarchand, Disconnecting the Threads: Rwanda and the Holocaust 
Reconsidered,” Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 4 (2002): 499–518; Paul Bartrop, “The 
Relationship between War and Genocide in the Twentieth Century: A Consideration,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 4 (2002): 519–32. 
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“strong bonds” or “value consensus,” she refers to the juridical situations 
dealing with the acquisition of civil and political rights (and those that 
recall citizenship concepts) and relations of goods exchange,  remembering 
the relevance of moral solidarity by Durkheim or idem sentire of Tönnies. 
What she underlines is that both relationships, referring to political 
competition between groups (for polity and resources address), produce 
asymmetry among subjects opposed to each other. 
If the sociological notions underpinning the work are those of nation-
state and national solidarity, the concepts with which Fein elects to explain 
the genocide of the Jews are the “intensity of German control” over occupied 
European states, in satellite or allied states, and the “level of anti- Semitism” 
present in the same territories in the period before World War II. Fein, in a 
vast geopolitical space that draws on and shows the speed of the destruction 
of the Jews of Europe as it occurred, addresses these two last variables. 
For Ben-Baruch, one of Fein’s biggest critics, the possibility of 
genocide arises when, in a country isolated from international context, 
a vulnerable group does not create, for various reasons, alliances or 
relationships of any kind with the group able to bypass or circumvent 
the danger. This detachment caused by a lack of “moral solidarity” 
among fellow countrymen degenerates into relational anomie, so that 
the minority group is left to itself or, worse, led to the final solution. 
When Fein states that political national behavior, in front of the 
National Socialist totalitarian ideology, changed from nation-state to 
nation-state, she alludes to the fact that those countries depended on 
the type of political competition that is the struggle of power present 
in each state. This means that different countries of Europe reacted 
differently to Nazism. Specifically, they took different positions and 
adopted distinct public policies that made the difference between the 
genocide of Jews perpetrated in Poland and that in Romania, in 
Holland, and so on: the public policies that varied from state to state 
enlighten the reasons for the different numbers of Jewish victims from 
a particular country. 
What distinguishes Fein’s sociological work is that she does not consider 
Europe as a single large and indistinct territorial block where the extermi-
nation was perpetrated: rather, she illustrates that Europe is made up of 
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several states and acknowledges the cultural specificities of each country. At 
a time when she analyzes the number of deaths for each part of the geno-
cide, she gives them a nationality, a specificity, rebuilding their history and 
their emancipation stages. In this sense, thanks to her work, sociology made 
room, in an early way, for studies giving importance to identification of any 
victim of the Shoah (a process that in historical works would be evident only 
when the archives of the former Soviet Union were finally opened). Reliable 
data on the former Soviet Union through new research began to appear 
only after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and afterwards, when the 
archives, which had been kept secret or hidden for years could be opened 
and the darkness of Europe could be pierced.175 Let me underline a point. If 
in the East the archives were opened after 1989, in the West, after 1989, it was 
possible to unearth unnoticed sociological writings and disseminate them. 
I refer to Gerhardt’s edition of Parsons’s works on National Socialism in 
1993, to Neurath’s study edited by Fleck and Stehr in 2005, and, finally, to 
Hartshorne’s researches, uncovered by Gerhardt and Karlauf in 2009. All 
this was possible only after the end of communism. 
Another central aspect of her examination concerns the power 
 relations between groups arising during the formation of nation-states 
within the international context. Following Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein 
(the founder of the world-system theory) and Theda Skocpol (the 
American sociologist who used the historical approach for her thinking 
on state autonomy), Fein explains the ways in which the international 
system intervenes, or rather interferes, with the small structures of 
national power.176 As Ben-Baruch notices, Fein highlights the close link 
between political relationships that unfold between different groups 
within a state and the rapport that the same state has with other countries, 
175 See Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s 20th Century (New York: Knopf, 1998); 
Barbara Curli, “Il dopoguerra lungo: L’Europa indivisa di Tony Judt,” Contemporanea, 12, 
no. 3 (2009): 581–97, accessed March 10, 2016, doi:10.1409/29975.
176 See Andre G. Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1966); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic 
Press, 1974), 347–57; Amin Samir, Imperialism and Unequal Development (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1977); Giovanni Arrighi, La geometria dell’imperialismo (Milan: 
Feltrinelli, 1978); Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of 
France, Russia, and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
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which is often influenced by geographical location. By analyzing social 
groups and their networks, behaviors, attitudes, and bonds of solidarity, 
she enlightens the disintegration of those ties and the establishment of a 
context favorable to genocidal practices: the “weak ties” among groups 
inner to a society enlarge the angle (the gonos, from ancient Greek γόνος) 
of social and political discrimination, favoring a power competition.177 
The groups most vulnerable to genocide are those intermediaries who, by 
birth, do not enjoy political rights and duties (they lack a native political 
base). Especially, Jews are numbered as an “interstitial nation,” that is, a 
sovereign nation but without a state territory, which is why, from the outset, 
they are excluded from the national universe of juridical obligations. By 
performing these obligations, the subjects are obliged to fulfill positive 
performance, that is, enjoy and exercise rights or discharge negative 
services or practice corresponding legal situations of duty. Fein stresses 
how genocide plays a significant role in the constitution of the order- 
national state. For Fein, who considers several genocide examples by 
making a comparison among distinct cases, the final solution was possible 
because the rapport of organic solidarity was weakened and failed within 
each state of Europe. This was due to weak bonds, not so indissoluble 
between Polish Jews and Polish Catholics, for example.178 Fein wonders why 
the Germans did not become alarmed by the progressive disappearance of 
the Jews, while the killing of Poles forced Hitler to revise the initial plans. 
She sees foreshadowed the beginnings of the Holocaust in the loss of 
democratic power, in the midst of an economic and liberal crisis following 
the Great War, when the formation of totalitarian states became possible.
2.5.1. Within a Statistical Framework
Accounting for Genocide shows how important the statistical approach 
and data collection were in sociology by the 1970s, when statistics and 
177 See Giuseppina Pellegrino, “Introduction: Studying (Im)mobility through a Politics of 
Proximity,” in The Politics of Proximity: Mobility and Immobility in Practice, ed., Giuseppina 
Pellegrino (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011), 1–14. Let me cite also the international workshop 
conducted by PIC-AIS, “Cultures of Mobility: Proximity, Displacement, New Media,” 
University of Calabria, March 12–13, 2010.
178 Cf. Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 4n7, 84–88.
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econometrics were appearing more and more in sociological researches. 
The relevant point is that this novelty is evident with Fein explaining the 
destruction of the Jews.
Born in 1934 and with a background in history studies, Fein investi-
gates the aspects and properties of political communities within which 
genocide has been perpetrated: the percentage of a particular country of 
Jewish victims directly or indirectly killed or interned in concentration 
camps presents a broad reference range—from 95 percent in Poland to 1 
percent in Finland. Through an analytical model of statistical regression, 
the sociologist describes the variability of these rates. For example, she 
compares two or more groups of data, or compares the variability within 
groups with the variability between groups: everything she needs to deter-
mine under which conditions genocide had a strong success. Fein explains 
the destruction of the Jews with the measurement of variability. This socio-
logical approach allows for data values (i.e., y-dependent variables and 
x-independent variables) that are statistically significant in the sense that 
to each numerical data a given social phenomenon corresponds and can 
therefore be explained. 
Her study plays a pivotal role in the development of post-Holocaust 
scholarship. It includes all the countries of Europe during the Nazi era—
twenty-two states and political units (except the Soviet Union, due to the 
unavailability of data at the time of the research, and countries, such as 
Luxembourg, with a low density of Jews), in the period before the World 
War II. She juxtaposes to it the time variable, specifically, the period that 
extends from the rise of the Nazis to the end of the war. The main causes, for 
Fein, accounting for the destruction of the Jews were Nazi control exercised in 
occupied territorial areas and anti-Semitism present in the same countries 
before the war. These two reasons alone account for about 86 percent of the 
difference in the rates of Jewish victims in Europe: prewar anti-Semitism 
determined the number of victims, in any country, and in the countries 
where Nazi control was greatest, mortality rates were higher. 
Into her analytical model, however, Fein enters other variables depending 
on the type of political competition in every state and the influence in the 
genocidal process. (Among these variables are the reception mode of National 
Socialist directives for each state, Jewish responsiveness before anti-Jewish 
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policies, national collaboration, and so on.) Fein’s model on the genocidal 
process can therefore be considered as a good framework within which to 
place and rethink previous works about the Holocaust. The exclusion of the 
Jews from the national universe of juridical and political bonds, indicated by 
the success of the prewar anti-Semitic movements and the absence of a strong 
government capable of protecting the civil rights and political liberties of the 
Jews, elucidates why states cooperated with the Nazis, allowing anti-Jewish 
policies to flourish. In fact, in areas that were already fully subjected, the Nazis 
leveraged the help of local governments: where the bonds of national  solidarity 
were weak, the state encouraged collaboration with the occupying forces and 
allowed the social segregation of the Jews, including their isolation in the 
ghettos.179 Fein’s presentation, which, for experts in statistics, might resemble 
a diagram in ascending values, allows a revisiting of all the stages of the exter-
mination.180 As Ben-Baruch remembers, under Nazi power the anti-Semitic 
countries launched actions against the Jews that were more violent than those 
started before the conflict.
What distinguishes Fein work is that, on the one hand, she considers 
genocide committed in any state of Europe, but, on the other, she also 
presents the factors decelerating cooperation with the Nazis in each state 
and that somehow hindered the stages of discrimination, increasing the 
chances of survival for the Jews. The protests of the churches and the 
initiatives of half of the Jews, such as resistance movements or actions of 
the leaders in exile, lowered percentage indices of the victims, at least in 
areas where Nazi control was not very high. The effects of these factors 
can be found in the outstanding examples of the Netherlands and 
Romania, carefully studied by Fein. Despite the low level of anti-Semitism 
in the Netherlands, the rate of victimization was almost 80 percent: 
promoting the success of genocidal practices was, in fact, the high level of 
cooperation on the part of the Dutch bureaucracy, which mechanically 
carried out orders given from above. The Dutch social institutions at the 
179 Cf. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 43–174, 257–308, 555–619.
180 About state “willingness” to segregate and isolate the Jews, see figure B-1, “Chain 
Illustrating How Cooperation of Jewish Agents and Rank of Jewish Victims Are Linked to 
Isolation of Jews during the Holocaust,” in Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 354; Hilberg, The 
Destruction of the European Jews, 31–39.
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beginning even promoted the Nazi occupiers, while the Dutch Reformed 
Church or the government in exile did not use their leadership to put 
a stop to collaboration. On the other side, the one of the victims, the 
 situation was no better: the movements for Jewish social defense required 
and found the cooperation of networks (of social defense) poorly organized 
or not made up of Jews; this situation persisted even after half of the Dutch 
Jews were deported.181 In the other case, that of Romania, anti-Semitism 
allowed the extermination of the Jews: the liquidation of the Jews had begun 
even before the Nazi order was explicitly given, and only when Germany 
started to lose did Romania change cooperation policies, trying to extricate 
itself from the Axis. This belated resistance was supported by both the state 
and the churches and had as its objective that of minimizing the revenge of 
the winners after the war. The number of victims in Romania was below 60 
percent.182 
Accounting for Genocide is a meaningful sociological work, especially 
because Fein sheds light on the actions of single citizens interacting within 
the public sphere. These findings link, and at the same time cross, the 
private and public dimensions: Fein’s ability lies in tying and braiding the 
behavior of the individual with the future of the national subject. For these 
reasons, she never separates her Heimat, both intimate and personal, from 
the universal and public. The extent of the action of the individual has to be 
considered in the context of the status of the nation and in no case is separate 
from the national political context. This action is inseparable from the 
experience of what Simmel calls Wechselwirkung; and this reciprocity 
between public and private actions remembers the “being in the world” of 
Arendt: alien to herself many times, but bound and attached to the world 
of and from which she could not be felt as a foreign. For her the social 
action was “an acting together with the other,” transferring private 
moments and situations in the public sphere:
181 In accordance with Hilberg’s subdivision, the Netherlands falls in the west of Europe. Cf. 
Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 363–381; Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 
262–89, 458–59.
182 Hilberg makes a distinction, in the Balkans, among “Military Area Southeast,” “Satellites 
par Excellence,” and the “Opportunistic Satellites,” such as Romania, by analyzing their 
collaborationist political behavior; see Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 
432–554.
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When finally the “before” of childhood became a memory that stood 
behind the great wall of the Second World War, Hannah Arendt 
began to talk about . . .in 1964 . . .until the end of her life, her Heimat, 
her home and her homeland, so to speak, was a political fact . . .was 
also a way of not remembering, or remembering only indirectly, that 
her childhood had been cut in two. To cut it in two was the death of 
her father, even if the trauma was not sudden . . .what is most striking 
in this work is a kind of nostalgia, a vision of that sense of community 
that St. Augustine called “the love of the next” . . .in 1933 with the rise 
to power of Hitler . . .“the love of neighbor” was something that was to 
become concrete and practical.183
In the 1970s, which were characterized by political revolutions in favor of 
democratization processes, Fein came to combine two human dimensions, 
one private and one public, transforming a highly emotional field 
(concerning the destruction of the human life of 5.1 million Jews) into field 
operations. Undoubtedly, this is an accurate measurement from a statistical 
analysis of the Holocaust, with the numbers of victims expressed as a 
percentage for each country in Europe:184 “The essential focus is on the 
differences, in the response to genocide against Jews, of European states and 
regions occupied by or allied to Germany in World War II.”185
2.5.2. Space and Time as Coordinates
Divided into two parts, Fein’s text describes and analyzes the behavior of 
the Jews faced with extermination, showing how the victims, in the places 
183 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt, 1906–1975: Per amore del mondo (Turin: Bollati 
Boringhieri, 1990), 29–31 (my translation).
184 Here the term “operation” or “process of operationalization” alludes to the observation and 
the subsequent measurement of a social phenomenon through the use of statistical and 
sociological variables, both dependent and not. The study in question is therefore regarded 
as a system. Concerning the number of victims, see Brunello Mantelli, “Campi di ster-
minio,” in Storia della Shoah: La crisi dell’Europa, lo sterminio degli ebrei e la memoria del 
XX secolo, ed. Marina Cattaruzza et al. (Turin: Utet, 2005–2006), 2:536–59; Horowitz, 
“Bodies and Souls,” 489. 
185 Leo Kuper, review of Accounting for Genocide, by Helen Fein, Ethnic & Racial Studies, 3, 
no. 2 (1980): 238–39.
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most exposed to destruction, recognized the danger and reacted to it.186 
The first part, with a quantitative approach, traces the structure of social 
forces (explaining the circumstances that influenced, controlled, or simply 
facilitated the genocide), while the second reconstructs some case studies 
(in particular, where the territorial contexts of Warsaw, the Netherlands, 
and Hungary are analyzed). Acute issues such as international indifference 
towards the extermination, the behavior of the churches, and the role 
played by the Jewish Councils are also highlighted. 
In the first part, for four long chapters, Fein explores a huge volume 
of dates: she inspects, nation by nation, the numbers of Jewish victims, 
examining the differences in the numbers of victims. Deep inequalities 
emerge from the intersection of space and time variables: they are translated 
into numbers, percentages, and statistical data and concern the independent 
causes that led to the different numbers of deaths for each country in 
Europe. To understand the reasons for these numerical differences, Fein 
sets certain statistical correlations: in the first part, she specifies which 
factors, forces, or sociopolitical conditions contributed to these results, as 
far as to draw and read significantly, in a statistical way, the percentage of 
the variance of the numbers in question. Fein, who, in many ways adopts 
the methods of social mathematics, tries to understand the statistical 
correlations existing between the independent and dependent variables.187 
As Ben-Baruch shows, her reflection on the percentage difference of the 
victims, “variance” as she calls it, depends not only on geographical space 
but also on the temporal dimension, that is, the time when the Nazis 
ascended to power and their dictatorial control expanded from Germany 
to Europe. In his words, “Fein’s sociological model of a process occurring 
over time explains both the general pattern and the exceptions because she 
accounts for variation in the crucial intervening processes.”188
With a 360-degree eye carefully looking at the international political 
system, Fein does not fail to consider the behavior of the Jewish 
186 For Hilberg, Hungary falls in the area called “the opportunistic satellites”; cf. Hilberg, The 
Destruction of the European Jews, 473, 509–54.
187 Fein’s sociology could be defined a “between sociology,” midway between the mathemat-
ical sciences and historical knowledge.
188 Cf. Ben-Baruch, review of Accounting for Genocide, 459.
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communities in Europe and the United States. Also, she does not forget to 
examine the attitude of Christians; the role of Pope Pius XII during World 
War II; Allied policies; the reasons for not bombing the concentration 
camps; and, finally, the functions of the Jewish Councils. It is relevant to 
stress that Fein adds other statistical indexes to the crucial variables 
preparing, regulating the extermination.
Maps, charts, themed figures, and dates both explain and illustrate the 
social relations that gradually disintegrated in Europe, allowing the collapse 
of national social solidarity and the decimation of the Jews. In a perfect way, 
Fein illustrates how genocidal policies were favored and anticipated from 
the training and development of anti-Semitic movements in the period 
preceding World War II. Thanks to a mass of documents and considering 
the density of the Jews for each specific region of Europe, Fein is able to 
theorize her correlation and, explicitly, show that prewar anti-Semitism and 
control of the SS, in 1941, explain approximately 86 percent of the number 
of Jewish victims in Europe.189 By gradually considering the factors analyzed 
by Fein, it becomes clear that anti-Semitism is a sensitive measure to gauge 
because one is unable to predict or anticipate the results of the war period. 
Thanks to the presence of strong bonds of national solidarity in countries 
such as Denmark, located in what Hilberg calls the “semicircular arc,” where 
there was a low percentage of anti-Semitic movements, the number of 
deaths reported was not high. Before 1936 in Denmark, the success of the 
anti-Semitic movements occupies, in the table prepared by Fein, a “low” 
level: in fact, the Danish Nazi Party (DSNAP), but also that of the Netherlands 
(NSB), were the only ones to spread anti-Semitic propaganda.190 From the 
analysis of tables 2.3, 3.5 and figure 3.4, it is evident how, between the two 
variables (prewar anti-Semitism and Nazi control) the prewar anti- Semitism 
is assessed more precisely. When the level of prewar anti-Semitism is high 
while Nazi control is low, the number of deaths recorded is disproportion-
ately higher than when prewar anti-Semitism is lower and Nazi control is 
instead higher. Certainly, anti-Semitic practices or attitudes play a signifi-
cant role in extermination, but it is clear that these factors alone cannot 
explain the destruction of the Jews of Europe: 
189 Cf. Horowitz, “Bodies and Souls,” 490.
190 See tables 2.3, 3.5, and figure 3.4 in Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 45, 80–81.
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Fein has little to say about how anti-Semitism among non-dominant 
political actors (including both ethnic groups and churches) affected 
the fate of Jews. France, for example, is classified a “low” anti-Semitic 
state (similar to Denmark, Belgium, and Finland) because prewar 
governments acted against anti-Semitic movements. Nevertheless, the 
advent of the Vichy government certainly provided new opportunities 
to traditionally anti-Semitic political actors.191
Far from being simple, the research presents many complicated aspects. For 
instance, the variable of national anti-Semitism (measured for each country) 
cannot alone account for the Holocaust if not crossed with other indepen-
dent variables, such as that of the control or dominion exercised by Nazi 
forces. Certainly, there is no mechanical connection between the number 
density of the Jews in a country and the high number of victims. Fein does 
not observe a high percentage of victims in areas where the concentration of 
Jews was low: in her presentation, which exceeds the elementary factors of 
pure demographics, the victims, produced by each nation-state, do not 
depend on the number (quantum) of Jews surveyed: “Fein also rejects 
historical interpretations claiming that Jewish demographic characteristics, 
such as their percentage of the population, absolute size, or extent of concen-
tration in urban areas, are causally related to the victimization rate.”192
Demographic characteristics do not offer an extensive explanation of 
the variable rate of victims. Fein focuses more attention on the social posi-
tion of the Jews and the organizational nature of their communities, 
especially, the relationships between the Jewish and non-Jewish organiza-
tions and institutions of their communities represent a set of variables to 
be studied. How a state practiced discriminatory measures against Jews 
depended on the type of competition that existed between ethnic groups 
residing in a given territory and the position that Jews occupied among 
these within the same social structure. For example, in the Balkan coun-
tries, isolated by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Jews constituted 
only one of the numerous ethnic groups (Armenians, Greeks, and Syrian 
191 Ben-Baruch, review of Accounting for Genocide, 462.
192 Ibid., 461.
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Christians), and as a group, Ben-Baruch explains, they were also less 
suited to becoming the first social target to be hit. The Jews lent money 
with interest: to governments for their armies, or in the exercise of their 
functions, to the upper classes, but also to craftsmen and peasants; they 
were intermediary actors in society, responsible for a public service. 
Returning to political competition between groups, the nature of discrim-
ination against the most vulnerable is highly dependent on international 
relations that a state is able to establish with others. Fein does not renounce 
considering the impact of the international economic crisis and the influ-
ence of financial capital system on the states, which were at the base of 
violent anti-Semitic waves that occurred during the two world wars.193 
According to her, the structure of the Jewish community and specific rela-
tionships between groups (although they are variables of a dependent 
nature) deserve consideration rather than demographic factors. In fact, 
the low percentage of victims was related to the ability of the leaders of the 
Jewish Councils, who were able to mobilize resources and networks of 
social defense and cooperation with allies.
2.5.3. Moral Solidarity
To comprehend the relevance of Fein’s work in relation to the develop-
ment of Holocaust scholarship, it is crucial to illustrate the central issues 
of her thesis. My choice for analyzing chapter by chapter is related to the 
following aim: by addressing the sociological concepts she adopts in 
explaining the genocide, it is possible to clarify that Fein’s interpretation 
and her sociological devices pave the way for a resolution to the question 
of the delay of sociology. The reason is linked to the 1970s, years in which 
sociology woke up as discipline. 
The first chapters, “The Calculus of Genocide” and “The Bonds that 
Hold, The Bonds that Break,” represent a unicum in Holocaust sociology. 
These chapters, in which the social reality is explicated in a clinical manner 
and with microscopic details, develop an original model and method in 
comprehending the “Jewish victimization,” considering the nationality of 
193 See Richard J. Overy, The Inter-War Crisis, 1919–1939 (London: Longman, 1994).
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the victims without creating a unique discourse, that is, without univer-
salizing the extermination. 
In “The Calculus of Genocide,” Fein sums up genocide. She tries to 
explain the manner according to which the Jewish communities were 
systematically disintegrated by those social systems by which they should 
have been protected, and she does it by adopting three theories: namely, that 
of solidarity, of Nazi control, and of value-consensus. The first theory, the 
one that puts the category of solidarity at the center of the reflection, is that 
of verifying the exercise or practice of resistance opposed to the violence 
perpetrated against the Jews. Since Jews belong to a universe of common 
bonds, Fein asks what had or had not allowed their nationals to act on their 
behalf, ensuring the cohesion of society.194 “How is society possible?” was 
the question that Simmel, author of several excursus, had posed to himself.195 
Societal cohesion depends on a number of devices. For example, to main-
tain cohesiveness between individuals there is a system of obligations, such 
as the law. For Fein, under the National Socialist power, organic solidarity 
was interrupted—encouraging the elimination of those shared norms that 
allowed the compatriots of the Jews not to intervene in their defense against 
extermination. She explains how “before the war, Jews were members of the 
nation-state, accepted within the universe of obligation by other natives.”196 
Before the war, there were anti-Semitic environments in which it was easy 
for the Nazis to take power and ensure the end of solidarity ties of a political 
nature, such as citizenship and civil rights, and of economic order, such as 
the relation of economic exchange:
Their acceptance as members of the nation-state with equal rights was 
inversely related to the achieved success of anti-Semitic movements. 
194 In the light of Values and Violence in Auschwitz by Pawełczyńska, Fein often returns to the 
notion of solidarity and thus the importance of holding strong bonds to contrast and limit any 
extermination initiative: “The author’s principal stress is on how prisoners maintained soli-
darity, at the small group level principally, to show how bonds and values are related to 
survival”; see Helen Fein, “The Holocaust and Auschwitz: Revising Stereotypes of Their 
Victims,” Contemporary Sociology 9, no. 4 (1980): 496. For a sociological theory of morals, see 
the categories of “social proximity,” “moral responsibility,” and “social production of distance” 
in Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity, 1989), 169–200.
195 Cf. Georg Simmel, Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung 
(Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1908).
196 Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 35.
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The extent of states’ resistance to or cooperation with German-
instigated or -imposed anti-Jewish policies during World War II was 
a function of the extent of value consensus between Germany and 
occupied states, satellites, and colonies. State authorities’ policies 
reflected the maximal earlier success of anti-Semitic movements.197
What led to the end of national solidarity and ensured that states 
cooperated or collaborated with Germany depended on what Fein 
defines as “anti- Semitic humus.” It was powered during the formation 
of modern nation-states, when a series of historical and political 
circumstances, by intervening on the bonds of solidarity between 
fellow countrymen, represented anti-Semitism with a quite unusual 
role, which was, in fact, modern:
The emancipation of the Jews in Europe generally accompanied 
the consolidation of the modern nation-state because, [as] Salo 
Baron asserts, the grant of citizenship to all and annulment of 
special statuses was a logical need of those states. If Jews also 
became  integrated following their inclusion—assuming the 
presence of other conditions mediating integration—the degree of 
integration should be positively related to the stage’s age. . . . The 
state’s accession to demands for disemancipation of the Jews 
would signify the destruction of the nation-state’s constituent 
assumptions. An attack upon the Jews was an attack upon the 
integrity of the nation: it was best realized and defined as that in 
Denmark, the oldest of the most solidary states. To protect the 
nation, one must also protect the Jews.198
Fein puts into play an important argument concerning when Jews were 
granted rights of a political nature or other guarantees. This coincides 
with one of the phases of the modern nation-state and deals with one of 
197 Ibid., 35–36.
198 Ibid., 86–87n41. The reference is to Salo W. Baron, “The Modern Age,” in Great Ages and 
Ideas of the Jewish People, ed. Leo W. Schwartz (New York: Modern Library, 1956), 317. Fein 
subsequently will reconsider the strong solidarity ties of the state. Cf. Fein, Accounting for 
Genocide, 114–15, 144–46.
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the greatest achievements of modernity. It recalls iure soli, a principle of 
national sovereignty, namely, the conditions in which the struggle and the 
competition between established groups and minorities for the management 
and allocation of political and economic resources easily took root. This is 
one of the contradictions of modernity:
If we take the encapsulation of minorities within the nation-state as 
a given condition, the implication of the Holocaust is that the life 
and liberties of minorities depend primarily upon whether the 
dominant group includes them within its universe of obligation; 
these are the bonds that hold or the bonds that break.199
At the end of the Great War, when the old empires crumbled and nation-
alist claims emerged with greater force, the level of solidarity cohesion 
between residents of a territorial state was lowered, allowing social disin-
tegration to reach high levels. Without overgeneralizing the discourse, 
Fein, by seeking to identify the differences of extermination rates of the 
Jews in European countries, brings into play a number of variables, such 
as the density or visibility of Jews in the population of a state and the 
“warning time,” that is, the period in which the threats of the Nazi danger 
begin; the attitude of the national and local governments and their char-
acteristics before the conflict; the response of the Jewish community; the 
actions of the righteous, the rescuers who work to save Jews; and the 
opportunities for local residents to practice genocide:200
Thus the territories ranking highest in the annihilation of Jews fall 
in the areas the author lists as the zone of domination (Austria, 
Germany, the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia) and the zone of 
extermination (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Serbia).201
199 Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 92.
200 See the codebook, notes, and the methodological tables in ibid., 327–57. 
201 Kuper, review of Accounting for Genocide, 239. In Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland 
extermination was to ensure living space (Lebensraum) for the German nation. All of these 
countries before World War II had strong anti-Semitic movements and perpetrated the 
massacre without the German control. “Auxiliaries from the Baltic States served in the 
The Destruction of the Jews in a Sociological Perspective during the 1970s | 217
Fein uses the time variable to relate the place where genocide was  practiced 
with the phases of deportation and then extermination. In this way, she 
obtains a regional analysis of the Holocaust: the so-called warning time 
for a region, that is, the time the deportations and the destruction phase 
commenced, depended on the extent of control exercised by the SS in that 
region and on the level of anti-Semitism. Deportation and extermination 
were accelerated by the presence, in any region, of prewar anti-Semitism, 
while the number of victims, in any region, grew proportionally with the 
increase of the control of the SS: under Nazi control did extermination 
became possible. 
Faced with the domination practiced by National Socialist forces, 
three kinds of attitudes arose: some states, while adapting to new 
conditions, used the time at their disposal to prevent Jews from being 
deported; others did not make use of the time available; and some 
countries facilitated or accelerated the stages of the final solution. 
Commenting on the construction of a superior race, Fein shows 
that anti-Semitism was not the socialism of fools, but the policy of a 
totalitarian system, in the sense that the aversion for the Jews had 
become a cathartic moment to redeem the conflicts of race even before 
those of class.202 This “-ism,” considered as a “discursive practice” or “set 
of relationships” (Simon Levis Sullam remembers that it became the 
“ideology of Party and State, transforming itself into a political program, 
and finally into action”), aimed at hitting the Jews in place of another 
larger community:203
The German nationalist ideologies united romantic nationalism with 
anti-Semitism and modern racism. They assumed an underlying 
mythic identity or homogeneity among the German people, or Volk, 
based on “blood.” The Jews were not Volk, but aliens to whom the 
killing-centre operations, and we know from other sources that in the euphoria of liberation, 
the Poles instituted pogroms against the few, small, surviving remnants of Jewry” (ibid.).
202 Cf. Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, 31–38. See Charles H. Stember et al., Jews in the Mind 
of America (New York: Basic Books, 1966); Paul W. Massing, Rehearsal for Destruction: A 
Study of Political Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany (New York: Fertig, 1967).
203 Cf. Horowitz, “Bodies and Souls,” 491; Simon Levis-Sullam, L’archivio antiebraico: Il linguaggio 
dell’antisemitismo moderno (Rome-Bari: Laterza 2008).
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Germans owed no obligation. This was explicit in the Nazi party 
program of 1920. While the Germans belonged to the Aryan race, 
whose supremacy over the Slav and nonwhite races they unhesitatingly 
asserted, the Jews, according to the Nazis, were nonhuman; blood-
suckers, lice, parasites, fleas, bacilli.204
As Dawidowicz and Salomoni evidence in their works, the date June 22, 
1941, was crucial and groundbreaking. Starting from that date, when 
Germany invaded the Soviet Union, anti-Semitism and Nazi control were 
echoed by the absence of an authority or a popular answer, or something 
else in opposition to Nazi power.205 Because in a political system  practicing 
a genocidal policy passive acquiescence facilitates the final solution of the 
races considered as inferior, Fein glimpses the lack of organic solidarity 
between fellow citizens in the majority who did not intervene. Thus, her 
question is about the deterioration of national solidarity and the factors 
that contributed to the process. It can sound like a strange method, but it 
is far from it if we consider, in Fein’s work, the fourth to seventh chapters, 
constituting the central part of the text where problems and specific issues 
are addressed in a linear and extensive manner. 
For example, in her chapter 4, “The Keepers of the Keys,” the role of the 
churches and their attitudes (which differed from country to country) in the 
promotion, or not, of genocidal practices are analyzed: the arguments in 
question appear complicated from the outset. A distinct difference exists 
between the indulgence of Pius XII and the militant opposition of the 
metropolitan of the Orthodox Church of Bulgaria. Fein interrogates herself 
on the diversity of behaviors assumed, and tries to comprehend if this sort 
of discrepancy has to do with political issues or rather is dependent on the 
control exercised by the Nazis in a particular area. The Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church belonged to the regional context of the East. Following map 2.1 
showing the intensity of Nazi control (during the phases of deportation or 
direct physical extermination) reported by Fein in the second chapter, we 
can observe that while Bulgaria, from March 1943, was located in the 
204 Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 20.
205 See Dawidowicz, The War against the Jews; Salomoni, L’Unione Sovietica e la Shoah. 
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 “colonial zone—least control,” the Roman Catholic Church instead lay in 
the “command zone—more control” and had done so since October 1943. 
From the analytic regression developed by Fein, it is clear that the behavior 
of the churches varied considerably according to the extent of the Nazi 
control, the role of national churches (especially that dominant in a state), 
the  vicissitudes of state policies, and the spread of anti-Semitism.206 For 
instance, the Roman Catholic Church compared to the Orthodox and 
Protestant churches was less willing to fight against Nazi practices when 
faced with a domination of their local institutions. 
Fein discovers a high correlation between anti-Semitism and profes-
sion of Catholicism. First, protests of the churches were totally absent in 
countries with a Catholic predominance and with high anti-Semitism. 
Second, the non-Catholic churches were able to let their voice be heard, 
especially in states where the anti-Semitic movements, prior to World War 
II, had little success. Croatia and Slovakia represent a special case because 
they were Catholics states created by the Nazis during the conflict. The 
forms of clerical protest, analyzed by Fein, are important because they 
reduced the extent of state cooperation with the Nazis and facilitated the 
spread of “social defense networks for Jews,” to the point of influencing 
mortality rates.207 Beyond the specific analyses, Fein opens a crucial issue in 
Holocaust research and is concerned with the political aspects of neo- 
Catholic states. 
In her chapter 5, “The Judenräte and Other Jewish Control Agents,” 
Fein explores the role of the Jewish Councils and other Jewish institutions 
established to foster the isolation of Jews and accelerate the stages of 
 destruction.208 In this manner, she contributes to the international academic 
debate on the effects of cooperation of the Jewish Councils in relation to the 
fate of the Jews. If Arendt had emphasized the cooperation of the Jewish 
Councils with the Nazis because they “rounded up” as many Jews as possible 
for the extermination camps, Fein focuses instead on the reasons for the 
206 See Ben-Baruch, review of Accounting for Genocide, 459.
207 Cf. Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 341–42.
208 On the stages of destruction, see the classification prepared in 1996 by Gregory H. Stanton, 
“The 8 Stages of Genocide,” on the occasion of the Yale Program in Genocide Studies, 
accessed March 24, 2010, http://genocidewatch.net/2013/03/14/the-8-stages-of-genocide.
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cooperation of the Judenräte, in some ways, considered as appendages of the 
modern rational process of destruction. Specifically, in analyzing the causes 
and consequences of this cooperation, during deportation phases, she 
describes the ways in which the Jews became victims in any state. For 
example, in Italy, if there were conspiracy networks, the likelihood that a 
Jewish Council was established or collaborated with the Nazis was lower 
than in regions where the bonds of organic solidarity between Jews and 
Italians were frayed:
The principal intervening factor accounting for the extensiveness of 
Jewish victimization during the Holocaust was the isolation of the 
Jews, which was not attributable to German control alone but is best 
accounted for by state cooperation to segregate Jews that was not 
checked by native resistance. State cooperation is principally accounted 
for by the degree of legitimation of anti-Semitic movements by 1936. 
German control, the choice of tactics, and the time the state was 
occupied account for the establishment of Judenräte, social control 
organizations designed to further isolate the Jews and facilitate their 
annihilation.209
According to Fein, who verifies with data in hand how the cooperation 
of the Jewish Councils, in the final stages of the solution, actually 
increased the number of victims, Arendt excessively emphasized the 
role of Jewish  institutions in the process. By distinguishing the actions 
of Judenräte between a “before the deportations” and an “after,” Fein 
underlines that, after ghettoization, they did not have a significant 
impact on the increase of the number of victims. Rather, the coopera-
tion of the Jewish Councils, before the deportations began, prevented 
single Jews or those in the group from creating organizations or networks 
of resistance at an international level. 
It seems that Accounting for Genocide challenges Arendt’s thesis and at 
the same time the majority of other studies focusing attention on the 
Judenräte in Eastern Europe, which are certainly valuable in understanding 
209 Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 141.
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the life of the ghetto, but they do not help to determine the causes of the 
so-called variability of victims’ rates. 
Chapter 6, “Forging the Bonds That Hold,” is located in the middle of 
the book and appears to be a studied and thoughtful response to the third 
chapter, the one on the ties of national solidarity that remained or were 
interrupted during the genocidal process.210 At the same time, this chapter 
anticipates and prepares for the second part of the book, which presents 
the “victims’ view” and case studies of the Netherlands, Hungary, and the 
Warsaw ghetto. 
Fein’s chapter 7 is instead centered on the behavior of forces external 
to the German orbit. Specifically, “The Role of the Allied Governments” 
investigates the passivity of the U.S. and British governments in putting 
an end to the genocide and the inadequate responses of the American 
and English Jewish communities, addressing what responsibility a state 
has towards its own citizens. This is a topic reconsidered in 1980s in the 
journal Genocide Studies, as we will see with Horowitz and Kuper in the 
next chapter.
2.5.4. Jewish Victims
Several distinctions are useful. In this manner of thinking, the peculiar 
feature about a book is not in the structure that it constructs, but in the 
theory that supports it. Thus, Fein’s work is a determining moment in 
post-Holocaust scholarship for her attention, in 1979, to Jewish victims: 
with her chapter 8 (with which the second part of the work begins), she 
shifts the focus from the macrosociological lens to the everyday world of the 
victims.211 Accounting for Genocide interprets the destruction of the Jews as 
a result of European history, on the basis of statistical correlations for which 
she provides a “codebook” at the end of the work, a sort of instruction 
booklet to understand the meanings of the statistical measures taken. The 
210 Cf. Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 262–89; Suzanne Vromen, “Collective Memory and 
Cultural Politics: Narrating and Commemorating the Rescue of Jewish Children by 
Belgian Convents during the Holocaust,” in Sociology Confronts the Holocaust, 134–53.
211 The “victims’ view” allows for the punctual retracing of the particular type of “resistors: the 
partisans, ghetto fighters, organizers of death camp revolts, and soldiers in the Red Army” 
(Porter, “The Holocaust as a Sociological Construct,” 186).
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set of data collected by Fein also contains the tabular material in the 
appendix in order to verify the assumptions, procedures, and outcomes of 
the same research: it is material operationalized by correlation coefficients, 
and that assumes the cooperation of the state, organizations of the Jews, 
phase segregation, and the number of victims as variables.212 In addition to 
the masterpiece of the book, there are more than forty-eight pages of notes 
explaining in detail the key points of the twelve chapters, and also forty-
eight pages of bibliography, an index of names, and one of themes. Behind 
Fein’s work we can see a new alternative hypothesis in the comprehension of 
the Shoah. She anticipates the discourse of several historians, evident espe-
cially after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when the archives were opened and 
the end of communism and the Iron Curtain gave names to forgotten 
victims. Fein avoids homogenizing the different regions of Europe: she 
captures the specific conditions that led the Jews to become victims in any 
particular country. “Communists erect monuments to victims-of-fascism-
in-general-depriving the dead of Auschwitz of their Jewish identity even in 
death,”213 Fackenheim has declaimed.
2.5.5. International Debate after Publication
In 1980, one year after the publication of Accounting for Genocide 
(described by the director of the National Jewish Resource Center, Irving 
Greenberg, on the back cover of the book, as “a pathbreaking work in 
Holocaust Studies”), the first criticisms regarding Fein’s work appeared. 
They were not all positive. Among many comments, ranging from its 
textual elegance to banality, its innovation to sociological imagination and 
methodological pedantry, there was that of “ambiguity of its ubiquity.”214 
In essence, two of her most critical commentators, Horowitz and Kuper, 
help us understand the meaning of this expression. After admitting to 
having reviewed the book with great difficulty, they comment that it is, for 
them, both excruciating and “agonising.”215 
212 Horowitz, “Bodies and Souls,” 492.
213 Fackenheim, Quest for Past and Future, 17.
214 Cf. Horowitz, “Bodies and Souls,” 489.
215 Cf. Kuper, review of Accounting for Genocide, 238.
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The debate, which I researched using online reviews, is reported here 
to show how scholars, like Kuper and Horowitz, were affected by her 
piece, especially by her interpretation of genocide. A little further on, I 
will address their subsequent Holocaust researches, very important not 
only for post-Holocaust sociology but also for Holocaust Studies in 
general. It can be said that this lively debate paved the way to Holocaust 
sociology of the 1980s. In addition, Horowitz’s criticism regarding the 
statistical approach of Fein helps to show that sociology, in its segmenta-
tion in 1970s, was increasingly influenced by economics and statistics. If 
some scholars had looked at Fein’s book with more attention, maybe the 
assumption Bauman made about how sociology woke up in 1989 would 
not have had so much influence in the discipline. 
The first criticism concerned the very title and subtitle, or the choice 
of the words, Accounting for Genocide and National Response and Jewish 
Victimization. These terms were completely cut and sifted in a very 
 meticulous manner by the critics. It is Kuper who started the criticism in 
April 1980, according to whom the expression “accounting for genocide” 
implies that the general theory of genocide is improper. This because Fein 
had not considered the defining work on the genocidal process, begun in 
1943 with the definition by Lemkin, and then reused by the UN to approve 
the text of the Convention on Genocide on December 9, 1948.216
Apart from some positive comments, for Kuper, who published his 
Genocide a few years later, Fein’s book shows some genocide examples 
without elaborating the massacres perpetrated in the course of the twentieth 
century in the theoretical part: brief references are only reported by Fein 
about the genocide committed by the Turks against the Armenians and 
about the destruction of the Gypsies:
The sociological study of genocide has been almost a taboo subject, 
and Helen Fein’s book is an important contribution in the attempt 
to gain more adequate knowledge of the process. It is all the more 
significant, since genocide is so prevalent in our own era, and the 
216 Cf. Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin, 
1981): 210–14. About Lemkin’s definition see the next chapter in this book, section 3.2, “The 
Significance of Genocide.” 
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United Nations, charged with its prevention and punishment, 
hardly attains the level of the almost silent diplomacy of the Vatican 
during the period of Nazi ascendancy.217
After a few months, in July 1980, Horowitz published his doubts 
surrounding the choice of the verb “accounting for” in Contemporary 
Sociology—it is mainly a cause of ambiguity because it reduces reflection 
upon the  extermination to a simple reporting, based on the rational 
principle of “costs/benefits,” even though this was not Fein’s intention. 
Additionally, Horowitz criticizes the analytical research method used 
by Fein, and he accuses her of having examined and studied a dense topic, 
full of suffering and worthy of compassion, with cold estimation: she had 
counted “bodies and souls.” For these critics, the Holocaust topic cannot 
be reduced to a mere computation that measures statistical relationships 
between the various causes that led to the destruction of the Jews of 
Europe. However, in my reading, Fein’s “analytical framework” the bodies 
are not just counted: people are not forgotten nor are the tragic or moral 
issues transformed into pure technology or into problems of social engi-
neering, since ample space is given to the notion of “subject”:
There is intellectual risk in reducing the Holocaust to strictly 
sociological proportions. The Holocaust is an issue that has gripped 
historians, theologians, and every human soul concerned with 
questions of human survival in an atmosphere of official homicide. 
If the attempt to render the Holocaust in statistical terms is 
warranted, its results must perforce be limited.218
Concerning the unsuitable choice of the title, Horowitz continued by 
pronouncing against the use of the term “victimization” and transforming 
the criticism into a real academic diatribe. The initial question 
concerns to whom and to what the term “Jewish victimization” refers. 
Horowitz explains that the English noun “victimization,” utilized by 
217 Kuper, review of Accounting for Genocide, 240.
218 Horowitz, “Bodies and Souls,” 489.
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Fein, does not simply translate the noun “victim” but also alludes to 
the action of “victimizing.” Actually, it brings into play the rendering 
of someone as a victim and being a victim, thus placing the one who 
victimizes (victimizer) and the victimized on the same level. However, 
for Horowitz, the term “victimization” cannot distinguish the victims 
from victimizers: a subtitle, such as “Victims and Survivors of the 
Holocaust,” would have clarified the matter. 
The critics then dealt with the approaches of the second part of Fein’s 
treatment, “which are interesting but irrelevant to the genocidal outcome. 
This latter section, analyzing the victims’ views, is largely derivative and not 
particularly innovative.”219 According to Horowitz, there is a consequential 
logic disordered between the two parts of the book. Briefly, for Horowitz, 
at the end of the reading of Accounting for Genocide, the reader who 
intends to comprehend the history of the Holocaust remains confused: if 
the first part claims that the Jews who resisted were unable to reach a 
change of Nazi genocidal policies, the second part instead detects actions 
and behaviors inconsistent with the first. Namely, considering Fein’s work, 
one fails to understand if the reactions of the Jews really had a significant 
effect or not during the genocidal process. Therefore, Horowitz questions 
why one would tell a second story that contradicts the first. 
Finally, according to Horowitz, Fein seems not to refer to the specific 
issues of the history of the Jews, for example, to the Zionist tradition. In 
reality, the second part of the book, which puts emphasis on the victims’ 
point of view and the theme of resistance, recalls the concepts of socialism 
and Zionism:
Between Zionism and socialism, neither of which dominated Jewish 
thinking, was the bourgeois vision of an integrated enlightenment 
that created the foundations for the survival of Jews in liberal states. 
But the elimination of basic forms of political democracy invited 
the elimination of Jewish communities. One feels the weakness of a 
functional analysis divorced from political analysis. The daily strug-
gles of the Jewish communities of Europe were not simply in terms 
219 Ibid.
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of participation in civil service bureaucracies or in terms of Jewish 
community life as a relatively vague secular act, but rather they were 
struggles of Jews with each other.220
The idea of a self-emancipation of the Jews as a nation, outside of the 
European continent, reveals just how precarious the process of national 
integration of the Jews of Europe was. Under Nazism, this integration 
completely failed. “In the eyes of the anti-Semite,” Hilberg writes, “the 
Jews therefore became a ‘race,’” an Unterasse in society.221 “This took place 
at a time when Jewish communities did not have the capacity for national 
self-defense.”222
When Hugo Bettauer, in the early 1920s, eleven years before Hitler’s 
rise, published Die Stadt ohne Juden, he stressed that Vienna could not do 
without the Jews. Certainly, in front of a “State without Jews” the inert 
attitude of the Allies makes even more evident the absence of a same 
national feeling:223
A uniform solution and integrated annihilation would be made 
possible by pressuring those areas where resistance was strongest or 
those areas in which anti-Semitism was weak in an early warning 
period. I realize that this is grotesque rendering of Fein’s data, but it 
is a conceivable end.224
Horowitz’s criticism does not only concern the numerical or graphical 
representations developed by Fein.225 Horowitz thinks it is not highly 
220 Ibid., 491–92. On Zionism see Vincenzo Pinto, I sionisti (Milan: M&B Publishing, 2001). 
221 Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 13n31. The reference is to Konrad 
Dürre, “Werden und Bedeutung der Rassen,” in Die Neue Propyläen Weltgeschicte 
(Berlin 1940), 89–118.
222 Horowitz, “Bodies and Souls,” 492.
223 Hugo Bettauer, Die Stadt ohne Juden, quoted in Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the 
European Jews, 17.
224 Horowitz, “Bodies and Souls,” 492.
225 “The captions are proper, but the maps are not” (ibid., 492). In particular, Horowitz noticed 
some errors in map 2.1 (“Intensity of German Control over European States at Time 
Deportation of Jews or Direct Physical Extermination Began”); in map 2.2 (“Development 
of Political Anti-Semitism up to 1936 in European States Occupied by and/or Allied with 
Germany during the Holocaust”); in chart 3.2 (“Relative Size and Visibility of Prewar 
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appropriate that Fein uses statistical tools in interpreting the Holocaust: 
even if she is brilliant in using categories of statistics, he questions the 
statistical method in itself. To Horowitz the statistical approach is not the 
best way to comprehend the genocide of the Jews. 
The collection of material “nation by nation,” optimal places for 
research on Jewish resistance, is misleading because of the lack of a link 
between description and explanation or between correlation and causation. 
It is undoubtedly a publication “apart” that represents a sociological bastion, 
truly, the only report of mass murder perpetrated against the Jews of 
Europe in the twentieth century.
2.5.6. An Intellectual Diatribe: Horowitz and Fein
Unconsciously, this debate came to set the discipline of sociology in a 
respectable place in Holocaust scholarship, greatly refuting the notion of 
its so-called delay in approaching the Holocaust. Fein responded in March 
1981 to five criticisms advanced in July 1980 by Horowitz in Contemporary 
Sociology.226 Particularly, “While I stand accused of reductionism, it is the 
reviewer who is disinterested in understanding the meaning of the victims’ 
behavior for its own sake who dismisses Part II—“The Victims’ View” 
(not views)—which essentially complements Part I and restores the unity 
of their experience.”227
“The Victims’ View,” singular, rather than “views,” plural, is an essential 
and basic aspect of her research. In fact, it serves to define the situation of 
victims and to appreciate their humanity. Fein highlights that certainly 
several Holocaust researches had been conducted before Accounting for 
Genocide but that these works mostly focused on blaming the Nazis or 
defending the victims without periodically defining the historical situation. 
In regard to the second part of the research, which is for Horowitz “derivative 
and not particularly innovative,” Fein writes that this is the result of an 
Jewish Population in European States Occupied by and/or Allied with Germany during 
the Holocaust”); and in map 3.3 (“SS Grip over European States in September 1941”). Cf. 
Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 39, 46, 59, 79).
226 Fein, “Reduction by Review,” 168.
227 Ibid., 169.
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intensive work based on the memoirs and diaries of Jews living in the 
Netherlands, Hungary, and in the Polish city of Warsaw, where a high 
number of victims were recorded. This part is then used to reconstruct the 
perceptions, attitudes, and the “responsiveness” of the victims. Far from 
summarizing Sepolti a Varsavia by Emmanuel Ringelblum or building 
new theoretical structures, Fein aims at bringing to light what had been 
hidden or forgotten.228 
In support of her discourse, she speaks of the last pages of the chapter 
“Implications,” specifically, those in which she has analyzed collective 
behavior of the mass of the Jews, answering those accusations according to 
which she would fail to interpret Jewish strategies as part of the genocidal 
process.
To Horowitz, who criticizes her neglect of Jewish ideologies, she 
instead replies that those details are discussed in both the fifth and seventh 
chapters.229 With regard to the allegations about the contradiction between 
the two parts of the book, Fein defends herself by saying clearly that her 
critics, after all, disregard the conclusions of the book.230 The cases of 
Western countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, with low 
anti-Semitism and low control by the SS, compared with those of the East, 
Romania and Hungary, with high anti-Semitism and Nazi high control, 
prove an irrefutable reality: even if “the Jewish responses” did not produce 
clear effects against Nazi policies, the active role of Jewish leadership 
would have increased the possibility for Jews to survive.231 Thus in the last 
pages of Accounting for Genocide we read: 
However, the effectiveness of defensive strategies undertaken by 
Jewish leaders depended on the magnitude and timing of the threat 
to the Jews and the extent of sympathetic response by native leader-
ship. Where SS control was at its most intense earliest and 
anti-Semitism was high, scarcely any strategic response of Jews 
affected the outcome. But in states where these conditions did not 
228 Cf. Horowitz, “Bodies and Souls,” 489; Emmanuel Ringelblum, Sepolti a Varsavia: Appunti dal 
Ghetto (Milan: il Saggiatore, 1965). 
229 Cf. Horowitz, “Bodies and Souls,” 491–92.
230 Cf. Fein, “Reduction by Review,” 169.
231 Cf. Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 45–53, table 2.3.
The Destruction of the Jews in a Sociological Perspective during the 1970s | 229
prevail simultaneously, the ability of Jewish leaders to anticipate and 
mobilize against threats could make a difference.232
Concerning the critique about prewar anti-Semitism, according to which 
it is represented as a constant of Western societies, a mechanism of state 
power, Fein specifies that Horowitz advances only fatuous generalizations, 
ignoring what is shown by her in the first part. She then emphasizes that 
anti-Semitism is indexed by the political success of anti-Semitic movements 
from 1936 and must be interwoven with the anti-Jewish policies from 1939 
to 1945.
As evident from figure 3.3, anti-Semitic movement is a crucial variable 
that accelerates the process of extermination.233 The probability of the Jews 
becoming victims just depends on the level of anti-Semitism, a factor on 
which the choice of the individual state to segregate and isolate the Jews is 
based, making their defense or escape less easy. In any particular country, 
when the individuals perceived the Jewish problem as the natural result of 
their actions over the centuries, it was obvious that a feeling of aversion 
towards them had taken deep root. This fact undermined the moral bonds 
of solidarity among fellow citizens and reduced the possibility of resistance 
to Nazism. In the opposite case, the possibility of collaborating with the 
Nazis increased. Fein in her chapter “Direct Causes of Jews’ Vulnerability 
to Victimization” defines all these elements. 
Certainly, when Fein writes that “nowhere did I say anti-Semitism 
necessarily accounted for each outcome,” she does not yield to any 
generalization; rather, in illustrating the exceptional cases of the 
Netherlands and Romania she sheds light on a number of factors 
involved in the genocidal process.234 For instance, in the Netherlands, in 
spite of the long history of civic inclusion of the Jews, the cooperation of 
the state facilitated their segregation and their extermination, even 
though prewar levels of anti-Semitism were low.235 In Romania, the 
government was pressed to prevent segregation and the concentration 
232 Ibid., 325.
233 Cf. ibid., 65, fig. 3.3.
234 Cf. Fein, “Reduction by Review,” 170.
235 Cf. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 365–81.
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of Jews despite the triumph of prewar anti-Semitism and the collabora-
tionist government. This element is correlated with the impact of the 
Jewish leadership, but it does not assume a statistical significance. 
Interesting is that this intellectual diatribe clarifies how difficult and 
harsh research on the Holocaust can be. Fein does not try to reexplain her 
theoretical positions already asserted; rather, she asks Horowitz, “How long, 
O Irving, how long must I wait to integrate?”236 since he had previously 
written that “the author [Fein] unfortunately is not yet at an intellectual 
stage at which an integrated result can issue from study of this subject in 
cross-cultural or cross-national terms.”237 
Their heated debate, which did not end with these two pieces, invited 
a resumption of research. Horowitz’s reply always starts off on the same 
note: “Let me begin my reply to Helen Fein with the same point with which 
I opened my review of Accounting for Genocide. This is a very difficult book 
to review.”238 The critic in appreciating Fein’s study wishes to replicate the 
points that, according to him, have aroused his wrath.
Contrary to Fein’s assertions, Horowitz claims to have read the book 
“from cover to cover” on three different occasions for a period of four 
months. Additionally, he states that his charge of reductionism starts 
from thesis of Fein, who presents the “size of Nazi special task forces in 
place” as the sole cause of the extermination at the outbreak of hostili-
ties. Moreover, for Horowitz, Fein has not established any statistical tie 
or any correlation between this variable and prewar anti-Semitism and 
the number of victims. Horowitz continues to speak of reductionism in 
relation to Fein’s discourse on Jewish leadership. His reasoning is more 
or less as follows: although this leadership had the chance to secure the 
Jews, Fein, in demonstrating this, has not shown any significant correla-
tion between their autonomy and capacity for survival of the Jewish 
communities.239 Briefly, for Horowitz, Accounting for Genocide is a 
mechanical juxtaposition of numbers that do not tell of, but rather cloud, 
236 Fein, “Reduction by Review,” 170.
237 Ibid.
238 Horowitz, “Reply to Fein,” 170.
239 Cf. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy 
of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 1988).
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some factors that would have been interesting to analyze, but yet they are 
ignored in the book.
This diatribe is more important for another point: in the article 
Horowitz comes to speak of racism of whites in the United States. For him, 
the presence of a constitution (albeit unequal) and a civil society that does 
not become the speculum of a totalitarian state would have prevented the 
genocide of blacks. In other words, in the United States, borrowing Fein’s 
words, “the bonds that hold” occur. Instead, in Germany during the crisis of 
liberal democracy there developed the mythical worship of a community of 
people, Volk-Gemeinschaft, although (as Horowitz says) the explanations 
about the difference between Staat and Gesellschaft are not read. Finally, 
he criticizes Fein’s inability to integrate her work with other researches 
conducted at the international level on the fault or defense of the victims. 
In closing the article, he therefore calls for continuing the research on the 
Holocaust, using Fackenheim’s midrashic words:
The deed is done, but it has not yet come to men’s ears. If a few feel 
differently, it is because their ears have heard, if indeed they are not 
survivors who have seen with their own eyes. These few will not enter 
the madhouse of their own accord. Never! They must not enter the 
madhouse. The post-Holocaust universe is in need of them. It needs 
them if man is to become, not a superman replacing God, or a “last 
man” replacing man, but rather, after what has happened, once again 
human. Yes, it is necessary for we who are not survivors to become 
heirs of their witness in this world and beyond.240
2.5.7. Ben-Baruch’s Position
Ben-Baruch raised one different criticism on the concept of nation-state. 
According to him, in Accounting for Genocide much space is devoted to the 
attitudes of/between groups, although the explanation about competition 
for power and resources is omitted. Indeed, power and resources are 
notions at the basis of the juridical concept of the modern nation-state, 
240 Horowitz, “Reply to Fein,” 171, with reference to Emil Fackenheim. 
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namely, when a nation exercises its sovereignty on the basis of established 
legitimate powers and of certain resources on a given territory. Although 
Fein focuses on the universe of the obligations of a state, she does not 
consider nation-states as arenas in which groups compete for resources. 
Through her approach, it is possible to see how anti-Semitism has led some 
states or groups with strategic locations within a country to cooperate with 
the Nazis, outlining dynamics of cooperation and conspiracy networks. 
However, for Ben-Baruch this model superficially describes the causes of 
the cooperation of states or the conduct of the churches.
2.5.8. Accounting for Genocide and the Sociological Tradition
Horowitz says he notices a discrepancy between the first and the second 
part of Accounting for Genocide, and, indeed, his view opened a new path 
of research on the Jewish question in 1980s. Unknowingly, his criticisms 
highlight an aspect neglected by previous sociological works, namely, “the 
victims’ view,” which was original in the literature of Holocaust Studies. In 
the early 1960s, some historians especially analyzed the way in which the 
National Socialist state had prepared and finalized the annihilation of the 
Jews of Europe. These reflections gave rise to works on the perpetrators of 
the crime, all based on German documents and with a methodological 
perspective of a global type. Prior to Fein, nobody had studied the victims’ 
point of view in sociology. Moreover, in her discourse she does not speak 
of their viewpoint in general: the choice of the plural “victims’ view” 
should serve to unify the voice of all the victims in a unique idem feeling 
as if they were a single organic body that is the community, which, during 
the crisis of liberal democracies, had frayed. Through the history of the 
Jewish victims, Fein recovers the solidarity that was broken versus the 
necessity of preventing the destruction of 5.1 million Jews. Nevertheless, 
the novel contribution of the research is her focusing on the category of 
nation-state. By moving the center of attention from the role of victims 
and perpetrators to community policies and their attitudes faced with 
National Socialism, Fein examines variables such as prewar anti-Semitism 
and Nazi control, which, in correlation with geopolitical space, allow for 
the analyzing of local collaboration, a new element compared to the 
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previous sociological literature. Her processing is original, combining the 
social, political, and structural aspects of the state with those of the genocide. 
The relationship she outlines between the state and genocide in some ways 
anticipates the sociological studies on the genocidal state inaugurated by 
sociologists like Kuper and Horowitz in the 1980s: “Holocaust scholars 
will have to treat seriously her findings and inferences and thus begin to 
incorporate the sociological perspective into their work.”241
Fein is executive director of the Institute for the Study of Genocide 
at the City University of New York and always puts the issue of genocide 
at the center of academic debates. In this way, in 1994, together with 
Israel W. Charny, Robert Melson, and Roger Smith she established the 
International Association of Genocide Scholars, of which she became 
the first president. She was convinced that it was possible to prevent 
genocide only through a network of scholars, intellectuals, Holocaust 
survivors, and journalists, who were able to teach nonhatred and nonvi-
olence. For her, the inclusion of educational proposals that emphasized 
the weak boundary between the violation of human rights and the geno-
cidal act itself into political programs and of teaching was almost 
obligatory. The creation of solidarity networks and the involvement of as 
many people as possible in research programs or comparative studies on 
new genocidal cases would help to build a picture as exhaustive as 
possible and to fight the violence on multiple fronts. 
At this point, one can question, as Ben-Baruch does, why such a serious 
and significant work had not been applauded, as it should have been. 
Particularly, in reference to the thoughts of Horowitz, according to whom 
sociology profanes or desacralizes a tragic experience with its quantitative 
and qualitative analyses:242
Is it because the primary sources are hidden in the mysterious 
corners of archives where historians have staked their territorial claims? 
Is it because those historians uniquely qualified because of their mastery 
241 Ben-Baruch, review of Accounting for Genocide, 462.
242 When Horowitz’s article was published, several studies on the Holocaust had yet to be 
fulfilled, for example, the so-called Historikerstreit and the wide and lively debate among 
historians in Germany in 1986–89.
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of several European language are not trained in sociological methods? 
Only partly.243
For Ben-Baruch, Fein is able to hear, penetrate into, and open a trauma 
hiding in time. It is a metasociological book showing the ways to enter 
into tragic historical events and human suffering by using statistical 
elements that bring order out of chaos with “a historical methodology . . . 
essentially a discussion on the proper way to interpret the surviving 
sources.”244 
2.6. SUMMARY
We have seen how, especially, women sociologists, such as Pawełczyńska, 
Heller, and Fein, stood out in the post-Holocaust sociology of the 1970s. 
I described the structural conditions making the extermination of weaker 
groups possible and the factors allowing its practice within a nation-state. 
Starting from the category of solidarity, a new sociological concept of 
resistance was theorized. Thanks to Fein’s book, the sociological discipline, 
in the 1970s, distinguished itself for the attention reserved to an individual 
victim, and not just for victims in general. Sociology, as a discipline, saw a 
time of entry into a number of sociological subfields, resulting from the 
influence of other social sciences, and post-Holocaust sociology saw a 
fertile period. The influence of econometrics or mathematical analysis 
was visible in the works of Fein, Merkl, and Moore. I analyzed the Yom 
Kippur War (the 1973 crisis), neoliberalism phases, and other political 
facts that led to this influence. For authors of these years, anti-Semitism 
was the hotbed of the Jewish genocide. For a better view of the sociological 
lesson of the 1970s, one should read several excerpts, especially related to 
Polish nationalism. How history and sociology can dialogue emerged 
from studies by Pietrowsky and Heller.
243 Ben-Baruch, review of Accounting for Genocide, 462–63.
244 See Arnaldo Momigliano, Sesto contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico 
(Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1980), 1:14 (my translation).
CHAPTER 3
Toward a Sociology of 
Genocide, 1980–1989
Genocide is pre-eminently a government crime and governments can hardly be 
expected to plead guilty. 
—Leo Kuper
3.1.  GENOCIDE AS A GOVERNMENT SOLUTION  
DURING THE 1980S
It is not a mistake to assert that a new interpretation of the Holocaust was 
outlined in sociology scholarship of 1980s. In 1979, Israel W. Charny, Shamai 
Davidson, and Elie Wiesel—Leo Kuper also deserves mention—established 
the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem. Just three years 
after its foundation, in 1982, for the first time, a multidisciplinary  conference 
on the Holocaust and genocide—perpetrated over the centuries— was 
 organized at an international level. The forum was a success despite the 
obstacles created by some national governments attempting to hinder its 
satisfactory outcome, as the New York Times and other newspapers reported.1
Post-Holocaust sociology, in the 1980s, constituted a sort of moral 
reaction in the face of massacres and atrocities of a nationalistic nature 
committed in many countries and noted by mass media. This led to a 
continuous raising of consciousness to what was and is genocide, an 
awareness that, in various ways, paved the way toward the cosmopolitan 
memory of the Holocaust in the early twenty-first century. In the 1990s, 
ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and the return of nationalism and 
 fundamentalism in Europe and the United States revealed the negative 
aspects of civil progress in modern states: there was a new kind of 
 1 Israel W. Charny, Fascism and Democracy in the Human Mind: A Bridge between Mind and 
Society (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006).
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challenge, a kind of regeneration after communism and sectarian wars, 
after the 1992–96 civil war in Bosnia, for example.
In 1994, Mike F. Keen, with some quotations in American Journal of 
Sociology, recalled the intuition of Parsons, who, before 1947, had spoken 
of “the challenges of modernity” in referring to conflicts with difficult 
resolutions.2 For many sociologists of the 1980s, such as Kuper, Baum, 
and Horowitz, historical texts, the experience of the witnesses of the 
Holocaust, and, above all, the Maya Indians genocide (1981–83), the Sikh 
genocide of 1984, and Burundian genocide that started in 1972 and 
ended only in 1993, all raised provocative questions scholars of society 
could not ignore. It can be said that in the 1980s there started a new 
consciousness in sociology—the twentieth century was the century of 
genocides. What all these sociologists, having studied records of the 
Nuremberg trials, the Convention on Genocide adopted in 1948 by the 
UN, and the role of the International Criminal Court, seemed to agree 
on was the concept of “genocide committed by the state.” In the light of 
this new interpretation, their path of thought, which they inaugurated, 
rendered them, in many ways, the sociologists of the “genocidal state” 
because of their ability to reconstruct the history, processes, and development, 
together with the causes and circumstances of the destruction of the 
Jews. Meanwhile, their studies constituted a welcome start for a typical 
approach of criminology that, in theorizing the genocide and addressing 
the issue of the Holocaust, leveraged the question of civil and criminal 
liability.3 It is relevant to stress how these approaches explain unusual 
devices within post- Holocaust sociology in general. Although several 
scholars do not agree with this, it was a new current seeking to enlighten 
people on the responsibility of states that exterminate their own citizens. 
What mattered to these scholars was that of eliminating genocide from 
the political agenda, often used as a political tool and adopted by national 
governments to solve problems of public order. Behind their efforts was 
the desire to end further human destruction.
 2 See Keen, review of Talcott Parsons on National Socialism, 1359–61.
 3 Cf. Woolford, Making Genocide Unthinkable. 
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What happened to the Jews has no historical precedent. Its exceptionality 
derives—as Wolfgang Sofsky (one of the researchers in this current of 
studies) stresses in The Order of Terror—not from the manner or methods 
of extermination, but from the fact that genocide was perpetrated “with 
the aid of an experienced bureaucratic administration, a civil service for 
extermination. The setting up of death factories, to which an entire people, 
from infants to the aged, were transported over thousands of kilometers to 
be obliterated without trace and ‘exploited as raw material’ was not just a new 
mode of murder; it represented a climactic high point in the negative history 
of social power and modern organization.”4 As Antonio Cassese says, these 
atrocities “have been made possible, in their immense proportions, by the 
modern state, with its enormous bureaucratic apparatus, the centralization 
of power and the monopoly of economic and military resources. And, 
indeed, in both cases, the policy of genocide, devised and planned by the 
central authorities of the State, was performed through the use of modern 
mass of communication (for example, by trains for deportations).”5 In the 
wake of these studies, the political scientist Rudolph J. Rummel, after a long 
collection of data on collective violence and war, coined the expression 
“democide,” which was meant to describe actual murder committed by a 
government of its people that was not covered by a juridical definition of 
genocide.6
 4 Wolfgang Sofsky, The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp (Chichester, West Sussex: 
Princeton University Press, 1997 [1993]), 12.
 5 Antonio Cassese, I diritti umani oggi (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2010), 146 (my translation).
 6 Cf. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1944); Horowitz, Taking Lives; Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology 
of Genocide: Analysis and Case Studies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990); Helen 
Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993); Steven T. Katz, 
The Holocaust in Historical Context, vol. 1, The Holocaust and Mass Death Before the Modern 
Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Rudolph J. Rummel, Death by Government 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994); Stanton, “The 8 Stages of Genocide”; Samuel 
Totten, William S. Parsons and Israel W. Charny, eds., Century of Genocide: Eyewitness 
Accounts and Critical Views (New York: Garland, 1997); Leighton C. Whitaker, 
Understanding and Preventing Violence: The Psychology of Human Destructiveness (Boca 
Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2000); Stephen T. Davis, ed., Encountering Evil: Live Options in 
Theodicy (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001); John G. Heidenrich, How to 
Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen (Westport, 
Literally, “killing of δημος (démos), i.e. of people,” actually, the locution 
“democide,” for Rudolph Rummel, is the “assassination of any person or a 
community committed by a government”: among cases examined, 
Rummel distinguishes between genocide, political murder, and mass 
murder: for him genocide is a specification of wider democide.7 After 
noting that a precise term is lacking with the meaning of the destruction 
or the intention of destroying entirely (or in part) specific individuals 
belonging to a given group, he invents the notion of democide. The new 
term would help to solve this conceptual problem. Indeed, the deaths 
caused by a government for political reasons do not constitute instances 
of genocide. The author does not include in his statement those who die 
during armed reprisals against civilians, in protests or riots, and those 
sentenced to the death penalty. According to his research, during the 
twentieth century, the number of people killed because of democide was 
six times higher than for victims of all the wars of the century. 
Starting from the assumption that democracy is the form of government 
that is less likely to kill its own citizens, Rummel marks as democide 
examples, along the course of history, Stalin’s purges in the Soviet Union, 
the deaths caused by the colonial policies in the Congo, and those caused 
by the famine that followed Mao Tse-tung’s Great Leap Forward. In all 
these examples, the victims were not selected on the basis of their race, but 
were victims of government policies. As demonstrated by his research, as 
the basis of recent Holocaust studies, we find the idea that there is a close 
correlation between the degree of a people’s freedom and the possibility 
that a government can practice democide.
Kuper, Baum, and Horowitz, in different ways, account for the fact that 
genocide may increase in the case of conflict, when a state is faced with inner 
disorders or needs to avert threats to its own government policies. Obviously, 
there is a series of steps, one of which is genocide, allowing national 
 governments to eliminate not only the members of a hated or envied group, 
but also to reap security benefits, both economic and material, by massacres, 
CT: Praeger, 2001); Konrad Kwiet and Jürgen Matthäus, eds., Contemporary Responses to 
the Holocaust (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004).
 7 See Rudolph J. Rummel, Democide: Nazi Genocide and Mass Murder (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction, 1992).
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by the appropriation of victims’ goods, or by replacing them in commercial 
activities. Then it is relevant to consider the basic ideology behind the 
 genocide, that is, the belief, in common opinion, that the national, ethnical, 
racial, or religious group “chosen for the extermination” is contemptible 
because it does not participate in the “community of values” of the dominant 
group. It is necessary to highlight above all that the actions are all aimed at 
the destruction of the “protected group.” This means that the groups who have 
been “voted for extermination” are intentionally destined for destruction, 
which is never, therefore, the indirect consequence of an action intended to 
accomplish a different goal. Moreover, the choice of the verb “to destroy,” as 
stressed by all these authors in their works, is not arbitrary: on the contrary, 
it points out a gap between a general massacre and that committed instead 
with the intention of eliminating even only one person. In the 1980s, the 
researches of these sociologists were joined by studies by Nechama Tec and 
Bauman. Tec, especially, introduced a new concept of Jewish resistance, 
starting from her Defiance.8
3.2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GENOCIDE
On December 9, 1948, the United Nations adopted the Convention on 
Genocide (in force since January 12, 1951) according to which (art. 2) geno-
cide is defined as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”9 The 
Jewish Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin, a scholar of international law, coined 
the term “genocide” in 1944. A refugee in Sweden in 1939 after the German 
occupation of Poland, between the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943, 
Lemkin fled to the United States, where he persevered, first, at the School of 
Military Government at the University of Virginia and, then, at the War 
Department in adopting an international convention on genocide, even 
though he had already formulated the concept during a conference held in 
Madrid in 1933. On that occasion, he presented a paper in which he recalls 
attention to the destruction of racial or religious groups over the centuries, 
 8 See Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust; Nechama Tec, Defiance: The Bielski Partisans 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
 9 Accessed May 8, 2010, http://www.preventgenocide.org/genocide/officialtext.htm.
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wishing for an agreement that, similar to the one against slavery and piracy, 
condemns all acts aiming at the destruction of specific groups as “interna-
tional crimes.” With reference to these crimes, Lemkin had initially adopted 
the expression “acts of barbarism.” However, dissatisfied due to its too 
general definition, and because it had not been adopted in subsequent inter-
national law, some years later he created the neologism “genocide.”
Professor of law at Duke and Yale towards the end of the war, Lemkin 
published Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944), where for the first time he 
advances the notion of genocide as a “practice of extermination of nations 
and ethnic groups.” Additionally, he proposed its regulation at the interna-
tional level. Nominated four times for the Nobel Peace Prize, Lemkin played 
an important role in the trials against Nazi war criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Equally important was his 
contribution in the debates on genocide in the United Nations, culminating 
in General Assembly Resolution, 1946 96 (I), according to which “genocide is 
a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns, and for 
the commission of which principals and accomplices—whether private indi-
viduals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on 
religious, racial, political or any other grounds—are punishable.”10
Beyond the contradictions that emerged from the terminology, which 
important scholars have extensively debated, what matters is the irrefutable 
element that is at the center of the discourse (genocidal) and that makes 
genocide a specific type of murder, distinguishing it from all other forms of 
murder. Its essential feature is “the destruction of the foundations of the life 
of certain national groups, in order to eliminate the groups themselves.”11 
The same etymon of the word helps to understand the specifics of the crime. 
It includes two relevant meanings. On the one hand, there are the Greek 
words γένος (ghénos) and γίγνοµαι (ghìgnomai) that translate the sense 
of “to be born,” “to originate,” “to be,” and, above all, the meaning of 
10 Accessed May 8, 2010, http://archive.adl.org/education/curriculum_connections/spring_2005/
spring_2005_lesson2_resolution.html; see Rudolph J. Rummel, “Genocide,” Enciclopedia del 
Novecento, III Supplement, 2004, accessed May 8, 2010, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/
genocidio_(Enciclopedia-del-Novecento)/.
11 See Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, 9, see 276n13; Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 
79–81; Michele Sarfatti, La Shoah in Italia: La persecuzione degli ebrei sotto il fascismo 
(Turin: Einaudi, 2005), 8.
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“generating” (in its noun form, “generation”); on the other hand, the final 
suffix -cidio refers to the Greek word κτείνω (ktéino), which means “to kill.” 
In other words, the term “genocide” literally renders the phrase “killing life.” 
This is the last sense lying in Lemkin’s statement “destruction of the founda-
tions of the life” of a race, that is, the killing of all the aspects or elements 
that contain life and serve to pass on the ghénos of a nation, including its 
culture. Faced with such an essential definition, the annihilation of the 
foundations of the life of a nation embraces the destruction of economic 
and religious institutions, the decay or degradation of the moral fiber, the 
demolition of the educational system, and the mass murder of selective 
sectors of the population.12 According to article 2 of the Convention, geno-
cide refers to (1) killing members of the group; (2) causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group; (3) deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part; (4) imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group; (5) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.13
From the reading of these points, the specific procedural aspect of 
genocide emerges. The process of genocide includes a series of events and 
issues that are interrelated and in conjunction with one another, with the 
aim of destroying step-by-step any form of life: not only physical (within a 
genocidal project, for example, the aim is the annihilation of structures and 
institutions responsible for the allocation of economic resources, functional 
to reproduction), but also spiritual and moral. For this reason, here, it is 
proper to speak of the “genocidal process” rather than “genocide,” stressing 
the procedural aspect, in a series, total, of the destruction of life.
3.3. WHEN STATES SPONSOR GENOCIDE
Leo Kuper fully understood what discrimination, segregation, and collective 
mass massacres meant only when the Nationalist government of South 
12 Bauer briefly presents two formulations on genocide developed by Lemkin: the first is “a 
radical and murderous denationalization accompanied by mass murder, which destroys the 
group as an entity but leaves many or most of the individuals composing it alive”; the 
second is, instead, the “murder of every single individual of the targeted group” (Bauer, 
Rethinking the Holocaust, 9).
13 Accessed May 8, 2010, http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html.
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Africa banned some of his works concerned with the cruelest aspects of 
his country’s policies. Nevertheless, he preferred a passive resistance to 
revolutionary violence, guided by liberal principles and cooperation. 
Born in Johannesburg on November 24, 1908, Kuper was one of the few 
who, along with Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, laid the foundations for 
a concrete peaceful transition to democracy in South Africa after Apartheid.14 
In the midst of a politics of violence in his country, Kuper obtained a degree 
in law and conducted a legal practice until the outbreak of World War II, and 
thus he was able to obtain a certain mastery in law and a penchant for juridical 
texts, allowing him to approach the notion by Lemkin.
Motivated by the desire to denounce crimes committed in his own 
South Africa and willing to promote an education rejecting nationalist or 
genocidal violence, Kuper began to think the about category of genocide 
and elaborate a broader consideration of the Holocaust. In this sense Kuper 
was the sociologist who, starting from the UN Convention on Genocide, 
inaugurated a new interpretation of the Holocaust, according to which the 
extermination was primarily designed as a “genocide committed by the 
State.” Obviously, this had previously been an unexplored concept in 
sociology, but one to which many scholars remain devoted today.
Kuper began his training in sociology in 1948, first at the University 
of North Carolina and then with Charles Madge at the University of 
Birmingham, where he prepared a sociological masterpiece in urban 
planning entitled Living in Towns and based on research conducted in the 
city of Coventry, England. His attention to genocidal studies resulted also 
from his marriage to the anthropologist Hilda Kuper, who brought him 
closer to genocidal reality from a theoretical point of view. Their home in 
Westwood Village became a kind of cultural paradise, a leisure center 
where many scholars and intellectuals, but also friends of their children, 
14 Cf. Desmond M. Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999). During 
1980s, Desmond Mpilo Tutu, the South African Anglican archbishop, was committed to 
making his country a democracy. At the end of Apartheid, he led the Commission for Truth 
and Reconciliation, an important institution and a new event at the international level for 
transparency and methods of appeasement adopted against injustice and massacres of the 
dictatorial regime’s past. Tutu’s philosophy of action, attentive to others, was based on the 
idea of ubuntu, an African concept according to which society is without divisions. Tutu 
received the Sidney Peace Prize in 1999.
Toward a Sociology of Genocide, 1980–1989 | 243
could take refuge to think. As a staunch supporter and activist for the 
assertion of rights in South Africa, Kuper transformed himself into a 
theorist of peace against any genocide in 1953, when he returned to South 
Africa as a professor of sociology at the University of Natal in Durban. 
During this period, he published two classic studies on South African 
society, Passive Resistance in South Africa and An African Bourgeoisie, 
both banned by the government, and in 1958 he prepared a study of racial 
ecology with two colleagues of Durban.15 
When the Nationalist Party required entry tests to matriculate at 
universities, having as one selection criterion that of race, Kuper wrote a 
scathing satire on new “tribal” colleges, but, despite calls by his friend 
Alan Paton to leave the country, he decided not to emigrate. In 1961 he 
agreed to move to the University of California, where he remained until 
his retirement, while also performing the functions of manager at the 
Center for African Studies for four years. His commitment to a peaceful 
transition, a kind of obligation for the future, was mandatory and adamant, 
especially after 1963, when his brother, a judge in South Africa, was killed. 
It was then that Kuper underwent a profound change: he started with a 
long series of studies on theories of race and ethnic relations in societies, 
then moved on to the question of genocide.
3.3.1.  Between Nation-State and International Law: The Role of 
International Organizations
In Genocide (1981), Kuper outlined the history of genocidal violence. On 
the cover of the book are the years in which the genocides of Armenians, 
Jews, Bangladeshis, and Hutu occurred, with the corresponding number 
of victims. Together with The Pity of It All and The Prevention of Genocide, 
Genocide constitutes an extensive analysis of the genocides during the 
twentieth century, describes the factors leading a society toward violence 
15 Cf. Leo Kuper, P. Sargant Florence, and C. Madge, eds., Living in Towns: Selected Research 
Papers in Urban Sociology (London: Cresset, 1953); Kuper, Passive Resistance in South Africa 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957); Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class, 
and Politics in South Africa (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965).
 | American Sociology and Holocaust Studies244
and extermination, and identifies the social forces, such as international 
organizations, committed to preventing it.16 
In the mid-1980s, with help of Michael Young, Baron Young of 
Dartington, Kuper established International Alert, a nongovernmental 
organization aimed at defending human rights. This agency, together with 
the International Center for Transitional Justice instituted in 2001, was 
engaged in adopting political strategies to recompose or recast, within 
states, those social cleavages causing ethnic conflicts. Both institutions 
were committed to the peace process between states. The International 
Center especially aspired to identify people involved in crimes against 
humanity.17 For more than twenty years, Kuper personally followed the 
cases of genocide in a ceaseless work of complaint, as objectively as 
possible, with the conviction that only accurate information about events 
can face up to the evil in society. His inexorable inquiry had a wide inter-
national resonance, particularly with regard to Central Africa. For 
example, by studying massacres of Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda and 
Burundi in the 1960s, he came to the bitter conclusion that the interven-
tion of international agencies and foreign governments had caused a 
higher number of deaths than they had managed to prevent. When, in the 
preface to Genocide, Kuper states that the United Nations responds with 
indifference to genocidal violence and that even their attitude legitimizes 
violence when they defend the rights or sovereignty of the individual 
state, his position of open condemnation towards the current interna-
tional system of protection of human rights is clear. In this way he calls the 
role played by different countries during the Holocaust into question. 
Kuper repeatedly explains how, in the course of the twentieth century, 
genocide had been used by national governments as a screen to maintain 
internal order or national sovereignty over a specific territory. When he 
affirms that “the word [genocide] is new,” but “the crime ancient,” he 
means exactly this: genocide has always unfolded in the presence of social 
16 Cf. Kuper, The Pity of It All: Polarisation of Racial and Ethnic Relations (London: Duckworth; 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977); Kuper, The Prevention of Genocide 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985).
17 Cf. Sara Dezalay, “Des droits de l’homme au marché du développement,” Actes de la 
recherche en sciences sociales 174, no. 4 (2008): 68–79.
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and ethnic divisions. For this reason, he defines multiethnic societies as 
“plural” and “divided.”18 Genocide is an “anodious scourge” that returns 
and is encouraged when the international community intervenes to 
protect state sovereignty:19 the United Nations condones genocidal 
violence when it defends or restores the rights of the individual state, 
while civil societies foment the return of genocidal holocausts.
During the debate on the Convention on Genocide at the UN General 
Assembly, the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Hartley 
Shawcross, denounced these limits. For him, it was disappointing that the 
security of a state depends on a UN convention—behind which there is 
always the rule of law and thus the sovereignty of a nation—and on the 
decrease of dangers and threats of racial and religious persecution.
Kuper’s researches are important because they explain how the 
extermination of the Jews rendered possible the recognition of genocide 
as a crime in international law. Thanks to Lemkin’s studies, it is possible 
to comprehend that genocide is not only the immediate killing of a 
community but also a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
annihilation of the essential foundations of the life of national groups, with 
the goal to destroy them and to avoid, in the long term, the regeneration of 
the protected nation. 
It should be noted that Kuper’s and other sociologists’ contributions 
first developed the category of genocide, first, as the outcome of the 
conflict between racial, national, ethnic, or religious groups, and, second, 
as an event intimately related to the wars of a political nature and to the 
division of the territory between nations. In other words, characteristics 
specific to the modern nation-state. After examining various genocide 
theories, Kuper identifies which social structures determine it. Genocidal 
massacres take root in “plural societies,” those in which there are some 
fractures between ethnic groups and religions present in the same area, 
resulting from colonial domination, on the one hand, and the phases of 
decolonization and succession to power, on the other. In these multiethnic 
18 Kuper, Genocide, 11; Kuper, Race, Class and Power: Ideology and Revolutionary Change in 
Plural Societies (London: Duckworth, 1974). See Arend Lijphart, The Trauma of Decolo-
nization: The Dutch & West New Guinea (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).
19 Kuper, Genocide, 11.
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societies, the difference has not been processed or, if it has, the process of 
social reconstruction has not reelaborated the diversities. As Kuper 
stresses, this notion is found “in a tradition deriving from J. S. Furnivall, 
to describe societies with persistent and pervasive cleavages between 
these sections.”20 
Other factors leading to genocide are the old religious differences 
concentrated in a region, the lack of political participation, economic 
inequality, and migration. Nevertheless, what is most relevant in Kuper’s 
analysis is what he says about social evil by alluding to the process of 
dehumanization and exclusion of “protected groups” from the human 
community—genocide is the political instrument that breaks moral obli-
gations among fellow countrymen, classifies people into heterogeneous 
categories, requires from them a designation, or demonizes them. 
The categories of this process were the concepts returning in the 
post-Holocaust literature in 1980s: (1) reduction of man to an object; (2) 
the destruction of a group or collectivity as such; and (3) the denial of it 
later. Since the specificity of genocide is the killing of a ghénos, in order 
for that to happen, the act must be legitimate in everybody’s eyes. If, in 
the common mind prevails the idea that the group in question is a 
bacillus (it represents a cancer to society, such as the Jews to the Nazis), 
genocidal ideology succeeds in its intent. In genocide the concept of 
carcinogen evil is thus in nuce. This is the reason for which the genocide 
is designed and adopted as a policy solution, with biological connota-
tions, to solve the social evil. High ideals of social order, within a national 
system, often serve to put a genocidal act into practice. However, Kuper 
shows his disagreement with the definition of the UN Convention on 
Genocide since it does not consider as cases of genocide either the 
destruction of a political group or the cancellation of the culture of a 
human group.21 In Kuper’s consideration of the genocide of the 
Armenians, and that of the Jews, evident is the functionalism of Hilberg’s 
and Reitlinger’s thought, especially when Kuper contemplates genocide 
as “a gradual process”  characterized by typical stages, such as the legal 
20 Ibid., 57.
21 Cf. ibid., 39.
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definition, expropriation, and concentration of the victims.22 The most 
complex part of Kuper’s thesis is that in order for the state to maintain 
territorial sovereignty (the national law within its borders) it invokes the 
right to genocide. In this way, a burning issue is posed and a theoretical 
reflection of no small value is required, since in the UN convention’s 
intentions there is the need to protect from genocidal massacres, but, in 
its effort to ensure the principle of national sovereignty principle, the 
UN consents to genocide. So Kuper asks what we have to do when the 
state rather than defending its own citizens turns against them; and 
when the system of international law, which should protect citizens 
from a country with genocidal goals, instead does not intervene, and lets 
the massacres happen. Later Donald Bloxham noted, “Modern States 
are, in normatively neutral terms, particularly well-suited to large tasks, 
including mass murder, because of their control over sophisticated and 
powerful organs of administration and coercion.”23
The problem is also to understand what really happened to the Jews 
who were European citizens. The state is constituted by three elements: 
those of people/nation, its territory, and sovereignty. When the state practices 
genocide (it kills the nation), it provides only two factors: namely, the 
sovereignty and territory. This means that the state itself, from a formal 
point of view, fails. 
For Kuper, the extermination of European Jews, like all genocides, was 
not the outcome of a conflict. Rather, it resulted from flawed integration 
policies, typical of societies in which ethnic, racial, or religious minorities, 
not long before recognized as subjects of civil and political rights, are 
dismissed. Kuper’s theory of genocide appeared in 1985 with The Prevention 
of Genocide, where he distinguishes between domestic genocides, that is, 
those caused by inner divisions within society, and genocides that instead 
explode as an outcome of an international state of war.24
22 Ibid., 137.
23 Donald Bloxham, “Organized Mass Murder: Structure, Participation, and Motivation in 
Comparative Perspective,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 22, no. 2 (2008): 203, doi:10.1093/
hgs/dcn026. See Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (London: Polity, 1985).
24 Cf. Paul R. Bartrop and Steven L. Jacobs, Fifty Key Thinkers on the Holocaust and Genocide 
(New York: Routledge, 2011), 164–68.
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3.4.  A GENERAL THEORY ON STATE-SPONSORED GENOCIDE: 
BAUM AND HOROWITZ
“Zeolites”—“stones that boil,” from ancient Greek ζέω (zéo), “boil,” and 
λίθος (lìthos), “stone”—are minerals characterized by an enormous 
amount of empty volume. If heated, they expand by releasing steam from 
water trapped in inner cavities. More or less Kuper’s plural and divided 
societies function in the same way: because of their own internal cleavages, 
if inflamed by some event, they can ignite conflicts degenerating into 
genocides.
During the 1980s, sociologists trying to understand the destruction of 
the Jews through the category of genocide were faced with a great challenge: 
the concept, not purely sociological, was born in a juridical context and 
was used in anthropological sciences. In some ways, Kuper revolutionized 
the model of the UN Convention on Genocide when he defined genocide 
sociologically: especially because he evidenced the failures of this 
Convention, inasmuch as genocides continue in the world.25 When the 
German sociologist Baum published The Holocaust and the German Elite, 
in 1981, he put the end of moral values among elites, after Wilhelmine 
unification, at the center of the discussion, meaning that the ruling political 
class and elite thinking (both economic and military) cannot create a critical 
and public opinion. In studying the Holocaust, Baum adds or introduces a 
new concept to Kuper’s thought: that of “national suicide.” The upholders 
of the killing of the German nation were in fact the Germans themselves.26
Baum presents an echo of the functionalism of Hilberg: the German 
sociologist rejects both the idea according to which the Nazis had 
committed murder to steal the wealth and property of the Jews (a theme 
addressed, later on, by Horowitz and still later on by Götz H. Aly, according 
to whom the Nazis came to favor persecution for economic reasons). Here 
we can see similar thought in both sociology and history—it all boiled 
down to Hitler’s charismatic charm.27 For Baum, the Holocaust was, first, 
the product of a bureaucratic plan, developed to relieve Germany of excess 
25 Cf. Cassese, I diritti umani oggi, 150–55.
26 See Baum, The Holocaust and the German Elite.
27 Ibid., 150.
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population; second, it was made possible thanks to moral the indifference 
of elites, by which, following Simmel’s tradition, he means the loss of 
moral sense; but beyond the elites, he refers to all those who held goods, 
power, or knowledge in the Holocaust years.
When Baum argues that the Junkers had lost their positions within 
the body of the army after the Treaty of Versailles, or that teachers, priests, 
artists, civil servants, and military officers had been underpaid since the 
establishment of the Second Reich and that their situation had become 
more and more aggravated until the outbreak of the Great War, he alludes 
to the fact that these elites had been gradually downgraded. Additionally, 
he explains that the elites, from Wilhelm II to Hitler, had a one- dimensional 
nature and were antithetical to each other, because among them there was 
no open channel able to facilitate communication. In other words, the 
elites, though holding great resources, did not hold the power nor did they 
occupy prestigious positions in universities, while those who exercised 
power were not rich nor did they possess strategic positions in academia, 
and so on. However, mostly they were not blended together because they 
did not share the same values or the same common opinions: they were 
morally divided. For Baum, this social cleavage dated back to the same 
time that the elites were formed. It is important to remember that Germany 
became a modern nation-state rather late, only in 1871, and it was indus-
trialized, albeit unevenly across regions, during the same period in which 
it became a nation-state. This double process of modernization led to a 
destratification of traditional society and a reversal of traditional values: 
when the new German nation was established, an industrial revolution 
was in progress and led to the replacement of traditional values with the 
new ones of the city and modern industry. Since modern development 
produced different circumstance, the process of national unification was 
very complicated and was not based on a single national value. Among the 
many fundamental values, finally, those of the Prussian ruling class gained 
the upper hand. The moral division mentioned by Baum can be better under-
stood in the light of the fact that the values (in accordance with Durkheim’s 
morality) of the Prussian dynasty were different from those of the emerging 
industrial class. The new German nation, in asserting its own territorial sover-
eignty, was then looking for a living space: here Nazi ideology found a fertile 
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ground in the new state, where the idea that sovereignty belongs only to the 
German nation took root, and that those who are part of another ghénos 
(aliens or foreigners) have to be sent away, especially the Jews.28
The problem, for Baum, was therefore in the process of naturalization 
of the Jews recently undertaken. Paradoxically, the nation-state, which 
provides for a population that exercises sovereignty over a territory, 
contemplates genocide: it finds its raison d’être exactly in the nation-state 
since a nation must make room over a territory to exercise sovereignty, 
removing all other ethnic groups. More precisely, genocide is the destruction 
of “protected” nations.
Both in Genocide (1976) and in Taking Lives (1982), Horowitz underlines 
that genocide is a fundamental mechanism of the modern state. According 
to the author, the state that “robs” human lives, taking them away from 
their own territorial boundaries, commits an abuse of power. In some 
aspects, Horowitz recalls the short but intense history of blasphemy with 
which Norman Cohn, in Warrant for Genocide (1967), explains how a 
myth, and that is the strength of ideology or conspiracy theory, can lead 
to the rise of nonliberal powers and the construction of genocidal states. 
Pre-Hitler Germany and Europe were not free of responsibility for what 
happened. May a state—Cohn will wonder some years later on, as part of 
a research on the preconditions of persecutions and genocides—commis-
sion death?29
Centered on the exercise of power by the modern nation-state, Taking 
Lives is an essential work in the history of sociological literature that has 
as its object of study the genocide and the Holocaust, since it rebuilds, 
starting from 1945, the social and political context of genocidal states. As 
Horowitz clarifies in his research, genocide is not a sporadic event, rare or 
unusual, nor it is necessarily linked to economic development and social 
28 Cf. Daniel Tollet, review of The Holocaust and the German Elite: Genocide and National 
Suicide in Germany, 1871–1945, by Ranier C. Baum Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 
39, no. 4 (1984): 734–36. Tollet writes that an alien (allogène) is one who belongs to another 
ghénos.
29 See Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy and the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion (New York: Harper & Row, 1967); Irving L. Horowitz, 
Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1976); Horowitz, 
Taking Lives.
Toward a Sociology of Genocide, 1980–1989 | 251
progress, rather, it is a mass destruction carried out with the consent of 
the state apparatus. 
Here a new course of study opened up that was to find fortune in later 
years, especially in the field of Holocaust and Genocide Studies. At the 
center of this thought, there is the concept of bureaucracy, namely, of men 
in charge of accomplishing the genocidal massacre. They are men paid to 
execute certain orders: they, like white-collar workers, are employees or 
have managerial positions, and, the same as blue-collar workers, they do 
jobs that are of second order or manual. For this, they escape from their 
ambivalent feature—they are beyond the specific essence of blue collars 
and white collars: the work they do is a dirty job, gray, which involves the 
administration of death. It precedes an ordinary, banal evil. These people 
are the new workers with a “gray collar”—the “grey-collar workers,” as 
Allen calls them. 
In this period, as a result of German historical studies, begun in the 
late 1980s and producing important contributions to the end of the 1990s, 
Brustein returned to the structure of the National Socialist Party, analyzing 
the documents of 40,000 members of the NSDAP. The material constitutes 
a representative sample of German society. In 1998, data on how economic 
interests led individuals to militate in the NSDAP emerged.30
3.4.1. The Holocaust as Crime of State in Sofsky
One reason to keep reconsidering The Order of Terror (Die Ordnung des 
Terrors) by Sofsky is that he so vigorously demonstrates that post-Holocaust 
sociology addressed the problem of the Holocaust in unexpected ways. 
When Sofsky writes that “a new species of absolute power was unleashed 
30 See Charles W. Mills, White Collar: The American Middle Classes (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1951); Norbert Elias, Humana conditio (Bologna: il Mulino, 1987 [1985]); Michael T. 
Allen, “The Banality of Evil Reconsidered: SS Mid-Level Managers of Extermination 
Through Work,” Central European History 30 (1997): 253–94; Allen, “Grey-Collar Worker: 
Organization Theory in Holocaust Studies,” Holocaust Studies: A Journal of Culture and 
History 11, no. 1 (2005): 27–54; William I. Brustein, The Logic of Evil: The Social Origins of 
the Nazi Party, 1925–1933 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Brustein, “The 
Nazi Party and the German New Middle Class, 1925–1933,” American Behavioral Scientist 
41, no. 9 (1998): 1237–61. On Allen, see the end of subsection 1.7.7 of this book.
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that shattered all previous conceptions of despotism or dictatorial 
brutality,” he refers to the metamorphosis of the concentration camp 
“from a locus of terror into a universe of horror.”31 And this is crucial. 
Göttingen scholar Sofsky (born in Kaiserslautern in 1952) brings to 
light “the business-like annihilation of human beings.” It is a rational 
explanation without losing sight of human suffering, as Ralf Dahrendorf 
comments. The Order of Terror continues the discourses of Baum, Kuper, 
and Horowitz as concerns the courts’ acquiescence in applying expected 
legal rules against genocide. Not quite knowing how to underline the 
novelty of this sociological piece, we accentuate primarily that the study is 
focused on the removal strategies and improper language of defining the 
Holocaust simply as a “crime against humanity,” as if the only Nazi fault 
was that of not having had humanity. “The ideology of disburdenment, of 
“safe disposal” (Entsorgung), has penetrated public discourse, leeching the 
lexicon,” explains Sofsky. “It diminishes the significance of facts and takes 
flight into sanctimonious moralizing, although no form of traditional  religious 
or political morality can adequately grapple with the enormity of the  atrocity.”32 
When Sofsky states that “any attempt to engage in a theoretically guided 
investigation runs up against two reservations: the topos of the basic 
 incomprehensibility of the camps and the notion of singularity, the 
 incomparability of that welter of crimes subsumed under the name of 
Auschwitz,”33 he deals with the comprehension of the camps through 
cognitive categories. Can the concentration camp system be conceived of 
as an extreme form of power and modern organization? 
Sofsky is a scholar who revisits the testimonies of those who passed 
through the camp, while his work, concerned with Adler’s texts, does not 
belong to an analysis typical of the functionalist approach. Namely, Sofsky 
does not explain “the external history of the system.”34 The originality of 
this research is the questioning of the role of the sociological discipline 
pursuant to the institutionalization of the concentration camp system. 
Sociology has always been careful to interpret society in the light of the 
31 Sofsky, The Order of Terror, 5.
32 Ibid., 7.
33 Cf. ibid., 8–9.
34 Ibid., 10.
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concepts of social action, reciprocity, labor and power, and common 
opinion—the fundamental elements of society. For Sofsky, the reality of 
the concentration camps led to the disappearance of all of these categories 
(absent in the institution-Lager), determining the end of the same society 
and then of sociology, a discipline that is based on its study. Strange to say, 
since, for him, the camp is “at the margins of sociality”:35 however, at the 
base of his theory there is the concept of society, even before that of 
 absolute power and organized terror. 
Like Simmel, Sofsky posits social relationships (taking shape in 
the recurring behaviors of men) as the foundation of society. Moreover, 
of these relationships he studies the particular form of power that, in 
his view, in the Lager becomes absolute, one “that has broken free, 
fundamentally and totally, from the familiar forms of social power.”36 
Sofsky identifies some analytical categories of absolute power, 
explaining how the concentration camp (a place in which terror and 
destruction are pursued through  organizational instruments) is an 
invention of the twentieth century. The absolute power of which Sofsky 
speaks, developed in Nazi concentration camps, had nothing to do 
with the common types of domination and was not be confused with 
the usual forms of government, namely, asymmetrical relationships of 
exchange or unequal abilities to distribute sanctions. It could not even be 
compared with modern disciplinary power or with  relations of hegemony 
based on obedience. Typical processes of this power went far beyond the 
exploitation, the monopoly of penal force: they contemplated the ability 
to manipulate space, time, and sociability among men. The universe of 
the Lager was much more than a rational system, equipped with clear 
and specific purposes. Between administrators and guards, collaborators 
and victims, beneficiaries and camp-work employees, it unfolded as a 
system of relations made of dependence and antagonism. The  concentration 
camp was an entity isolated from the rest of society, where a watchdog 
group dominated prisoners. It was—in accordance with “social systems 
closed theory” that experienced a particular development in 1980s—a 
35 Ibid., 9.
36 Ibid., 10.
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kind of terror zone situated on the edge of human society.37 Finally, 
this power, using terror, broke the structures of common sense (namely, 
those of time and place mentioned by Alfred Schütz) to disorient 
isolated individuals, as Pawełczyńska highlighted in Values and 
Violence. 
In what way the concentration camp had its own routine, that is, 
its own normality, transferring absolute power into a particular configuration 
of power, emerges from Sofsky’s work, based on extensive historical research, 
but mainly on inmates’ memories, on administrative documentation of Lager 
commands, and on the acts of the Nuremberg trials. As he underscores, “The 
concentration camp cannot be integrated into the history of despotism, 
slavery, or modern discipline. Organized terror cannot be mapped onto a 
continuum of domination. The differences are not gradual, staggered along 
a line of coercion, but fundamental.”38 For example, it did not renounce any 
kind of violence, which, thanks to the different ways of organization, it 
started to implement where the terror of tyranny ended. Under such 
conditions, blind obedience or loyalty to discipline did not protect anyone 
from the most terrible consequences, because of the absolute uncertainty. 
In this situation, victims became a mass of unequal individuals to whom 
systems of control and maltreatment were applied. This type of terror was 
not the result of the infringement of rules: it was unleashed anywhere and 
at any time. It did not restrict freedom: rather it annihilated it; did not 
guide action, but destroyed it.
Kuper’s sense of genocide as “the destruction of every aspect of human 
life” returns in Sofsky, or it finds in The Order of Terror an interesting devel-
opment. It is crucial to stress that this power is organized (in its structures the 
typical characteristics of the organization can be found, such as the hierarchy 
of command, the division of labor, and discipline for subordinates) and abso-
lute, that is, free from every constraint. “Absolute,” from the Latin ab-solutus 
and the Greek λύω (lùo=to dissolve), refers to a type of independent power 
and is, as such, irresponsible. In fact, the bureaucracy of the SS did not require 
an automatic or mechanical reaction, but, rather, the kind of personal 
37 Cf. Franco Crespi, Evento e struttura: Per una teoria del mutamento sociale (Bologna: il 
Mulino, 1993).
38 Sofsky, The Order of Terror, 16.
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initiative that does not obey orders blindly. This action is flexible and varies 
depending on the mechanisms of corruption, of personal rivalry and cama-
raderie. In the Lager, it was dominated by the principle according to which 
responsibility belongs to the doer. Under these conditions, to predict SS 
behavior was quite impossible: it was the initiative of the authorities, which 
increased the sense of uncertainty in action, disorientation, free will, all of 
which factors, naturally, generate terror. What Sofsky means is that in the 
camp there were rules, but to each of them the inability of the individual 
prisoner to follow them corresponded. This allowed the watchdog group to 
act in a discretionary manner: paradoxically, the rules were created especially 
to be disregarded and to enhance the terror. Behind his expression “the order 
of terror,” we must understand that the rules did not serve to limit the exer-
cise of power, but they were the institution that provided the “terrorist will.”
3.4.2. The Organization of Work
As noted by Baum, Kuper, and Horowitz, this absolute power subverts the 
principles of social classification and destroys society. Free from space and 
time conditions, it is omnipresent and unlimited. It is more evident when 
through the mechanism of delegation of power some victims are converted 
into complicit agents of the Nazis. Additionally, since this power is absolute, 
it does not need ideological consensus to be established and maintained. 
Sofsky emphasizes that the personal guard of the camp was made up of 
careerists, criminals, and corrupt men who did not share the elitist pride 
professed by leaders of the SS. The work was a tool of oppression and terror, 
and absolute power had no other basis than itself. In the Lager, there was 
not the rationality of capitalism of which Weber spoke, namely, a rational 
action of purpose. Only in the final stages of the war, when workers fit for 
production were becoming fewer and fewer, did the objective of economic 
rationality become a priority. It was a work of attrition and harassment, of a 
complete power that also abolishes the symmetry inherent in the most 
basic violence, one that provides for the possibility of a man to kill another, 
or the possibility of suicide, and then to exercise power over oneself. For 
Sofsky, the concentration camp system instead disabled all these opportu-
nities. It was a laboratory of violence functioning with the brute violence 
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that unchains among its enclosures, within the “triple barbed-wire fence,” a 
ruthless struggle for survival. Inside the  prisoners did not die from wounds 
directly suffered, but as an outcome of a slow sinking into degradation, 
starvation, exhaustion, and disease. When Sofsky explains how absolute 
power did not kill immediately but created a sort of no-man’s-land between 
life and death, he refers to the production of “living skeletons” as “genuine 
inventions” of concentration camps: in this sense, the extermination was 
organized in different phases.39 Sofsky is well known for his powers of 
reasoning, and it is noteworthy to stress the main theme of this work: abso-
lute power in its deployments and the structures from which it draws 
strength. The space controlled by impassable boundaries, characterized by 
a strong physical densification and standardized times, changeable in an 
arbitrary manner, created social areas where time was warped and the 
victims were no longer capable of perceiving its flow. Sofsky’s analysis, as 
that of Pawełczyńska, does not seem to be of the institutional type. Rather, 
he enumerates the autonomous dynamics of terror processes. In this sense, 
there is a continuum, of a sociological kind, between the work of both 
authors. Resulting from Sofsky’s sociological research (and, for that reason, 
very significant), The Order of Terror is a book offering a complete recon-
struction of the concentration camps, from the first camp established in 
1933, Dachau, to the end of the war. What has to be stressed is the sociolog-
ical representation of the  concentration camp system, providing one with 
the devices to comprehend what a “total institution” is.40
3.5. THE SOCIOLOGICAL FRAME OF KATZ
New was a post-Holocaust sociology dealing with the modernity and 
un-modernity of the Holocaust, and Katz addressed that in 1982. 
39 Ibid., 25.
40 Cf. Cornelis J. Lammers, review of The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp, by Wolfgang 
Sofsky, Organization Studies 16, no. 1 (1995): 139–56, doi:10.1177/017084069501600107; John 
Torpey, review of The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp, by Wolfgang Sofsky, 
Contemporary Sociology 26, no. 6 (1997): 719–20; Paul Rock, review of The Order of Terror: The 
Concentration Camp, by Wolfgang Sofsky, British Journal of Sociology 49, no. 1 (1998): 159–60 
(see note 255, above, chapter 1), about “total institution”); Renzo Gubert and Luigi Tomasi, 
eds., Teoria Sociologica ed investigazione empirica: La tradizione della Scuola sociologica di 
Chicago e le prospettive della sociologia contemporanea (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1995).
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Katz takes note of details about the causes leading to the extermination, 
such as anti-Semitism and nationalisms, the consequences of the Great 
War, and the destruction practices perpetrated against the Jews. With his 
“Sociological Perspective to the Holocaust,” published in the journal 
Modern Judaism, Katz was among the first sociologists sustaining concepts 
such as routinization and bureaucratization during the extermination 
phases. He revisits several times the categories of the routinized banality 
of evil and incremental process of extermination in his research. Especially, 
he was the very first scholar to be faced with the role of the Einsatzgruppen 
in the Nazi policies of destruction, or in the immediate phase, which 
involved the immediate killing of Jews in the occupied territories of the 
Soviet Union—a theme that would emerge strongly in historical scholarship 
after the fall of Berlin Wall. Some years later, in 1993, he reproposed the 
question by dealing the banality of evil.41 
When it is argued that his sociology is of a synoptic type, this alludes 
to the fact that Katz addresses a number of relevant topics, such as the 
sociological debate on the alleged silence regarding the Holocaust. 
He explicitly criticizes, at the opening of his essay, those who deny the 
contribution of sociology in the study of the Holocaust: “To a sociologist 
Dawidowicz’ book strikes a timely note. Sociologists, too, have been reluctant 
to study the Holocaust. Not long ago it was noted in a sociology journal 
that ‘there is no sociology of the Holocaust.’”42 Katz opposes the contributions 
of Fein and Horowitz, who, in his view, mark positively the post- Holocaust 
sociological literature.
Despite his concise contribution, Katz identifies a combination of 
factors leading to the destruction of European Jewry. What made him an 
innovator in post-Holocaust sociology were his sociological concepts and 
the manner in which he used them to rethink the Holocaust. In part, they 
were already known (such as the concept of banality of evil by Hughes and 
Arendt) and in part were entirely new. When he says, “In this paper I want 
to take a step in this sociological direction by discussing the Holocaust as 
a way of routinizing monstrous behavior. . . . The vast scale on which the 
41 Fred E. Katz, Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil: A Report on the Beguilings of Evil 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1993).
42 Katz, “A Sociological Perspective to the Holocaust,” 273n2.
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Holocaust operated means that, to a considerable extent, the killings and 
torture were routinized,”43 he anticipates concepts used later by other 
scholars, for instance, the notions of bureaucratization and routinization 
in the definition of modern extermination proposed by Sofsky in 1993. 
Nevertheless, it is right to say that his theoretical combination of routini-
zation and the banality of evil was a novelty in Holocaust sociology. When 
one can read, “One feature of the routinization process that is especially 
important is that relatively ‘ordinary’ people participated in the murderous 
Nazi bureaucracy, and did so with enthusiasm and innovativeness,”44 it 
appears that Katz presents the Holocaust as a product of modern bureau-
cracy, highlighting sociological concepts that express something else 
about the modernity of extermination:
Much of the Holocaust was carried out as part of the “ordinary” 
day-to-day routines of government machinery. Much of it became 
part-and-parcel of “ordinary” career patterns of civil servants, of 
military personnel, and of many persons in the civilian, private 
sector of European nations. Much of it relied on a specially trained 
staff of concentration camp administrators, persons who were 
human extermination specialists.45
What we can appreciate here is that, first, he introduces the concept of 
“appendage of the machine,” which Bauman will use later, and second, 
that in the wake of Hughes, he explains how the work of the specialists of 
death is very similar to the work of the employees in the assembly line, 
where it is not the production of a commercial product at stake but, rather, 
human death.
3.5.1. Individuals and the Factory System
At this point, we can ask what it is that makes us think about piece of 
Sofsky’s piece in a new way. Surely, his crucial problem is that of 
43 Ibid., 273–74. 
44 Ibid., 275.
45 Ibid., 274.
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comprehending how the destruction of Jews became a routine. For him, 
the ways in which the death camps functioned as factories for the produc-
tion of death are vital. According to the sociological concept of 
routinization, the fulfillment of complex social goals, such as education or 
learning, involves the  development of phases and organizational forms. 
The fundamental role in the process is played by bureaucracies present in 
a state and that follow the rules. What matters is the achievement of the 
goal, which requires  obedience to rational and legal rules imposed by an 
authority that must be obeyed. Specifically, bureaucracy obeys and accom-
plishes the orders given by the state without reflecting on the performance 
in progress—the necessary actions do not require a responsible reflection. 
The most important element in modern bureaucracy is the achievement 
of objectives regardless of moral sense of the action. Here the transition 
from routinization of actions to their mechanical execution becomes 
crucial. 
For Sofsky, the workers in charge of destruction were an appendix of 
the bureaucratic machinery of the annihilation: they were employed on an 
assembly line that performed standardized actions prescribed for certain 
purposes. For Katz, these men, specialists of death, were officials performing 
the command to kill in a systematic and planned process of elimination. 
Thanks to the category of “no responsibility for their actions” (used later on 
by Bauman), Katz explains the ways in which it passed from a modern 
administrative system to a bureaucratic system of death, or an  extermination 
system. Death was administered through a corps of bureaucrats in charge of 
the chain of murder and obedient to authority. At the base of the process were 
the notions of the repetition of actions, modern specialization of functions, 
and obedience to legal-rational authority:
The possibility that one’s actions may be evil is often beyond the 
day-to-day level of awareness. So it comes about that when the 
bureaucrat organizes the transportation of Jews (and Gypsies and 
others deemed undesirable) to extermination camps, or arranges for 
the “efficient” use of slave labor in the Ruhr’s munitions factories, the 
immorality of killing people is not taken into account. Morality or 
immorality may simply be outside the bureaucrat’s range of concern. 
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Technological issues—the availability of trains, for example—are apt 
to prevail.46
According to Katz, there were no government leaders or charismatic 
leaders within the bureaucratic chain or within the average levels of the 
Nazi hierarchy. It seems Katz opposes the absurd positions of some 
sociologists, who, in saying “we are all Nazis, so what to do?” elude or 
block the responsibility question.47 Differently from Bauman, Katz does 
not consider the Holocaust as only the product of industrial modern 
rationality and administrative technique. When he speaks of a process 
of destruction (in the wake of Hilberg), defining it as “incremental,” he 
takes the “personal participation”—not contemplated in notions of 
modern bureaucracy—of German officials into account. According to 
Weber, in fact, bureaucracy and offices should not be of a personal 
nature, nor should the properties of the individual. What is more 
important is that Katz, in his understanding of the Holocaust, deals with 
sociological concepts typical of the modern age, putting in evidence 
their limits. When he defines the destruction process as a set of developed 
and packaged actions, he evidences an aspect that has nothing to do with 
the ideal type of modern bureaucracy posited by Weber, according to whom 
the orders and the functions to be carried out must be clear and precise.
Therefore, Katz addresses the question of the ordinariness of evil 
linked to personal autonomy. Nevertheless, this factor collides with the 
canonical concept of modernity of the Holocaust, as expressed some years 
later by Bauman, according to whom there are not decisions of personal 
nature, but only orders to be executed in a mechanical way and precisely. 
Looking back to the element of autonomy, the discretionary behavior of 
bureaucrats, especially of the Nazi officials, makes an incredible comeback. 
Even if these are hints by Katz, it emerges at the moment he refers to the 
work of the Einsatzgruppen in the occupied Soviet areas, when he addresses 
the different ways of killing on the Eastern Front: an extermination of a 
nonsystematic kind, but personal and of a public and dramatic nature. 
46 Ibid., 274.
47 Ibid., 275n11, quoting Hans Ashkenazy, Are We All Nazis? (Secaucus, NJ: L. Stuart, 1978). 
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Katz’s first part is of a theoretical nature, but the second part of the 
essay deals with the specific case of Rudolf Höss, the commandant of 
Auschwitz. Katz centers on an important point, and he does this handling 
Höss’s case: when he addresses Höss’s horror faced with brutality 
committed in Auschwitz, Katz readdresses the question of the banality of 
evil and how ordinary evil is “transformed into the extraordinary.”48
3.6. TEC AND SOCIOLOGICAL CATEGORIES OF GENOCIDE
“Behind me was Lublin, the city in which I was born—a city now Judenrein.”49 
In this way, Nechama Tec starts to account for her “lost childhood.” Tec, in 
her first steps addressing the destruction of the Jews, analyzes the death 
process in telling her own personal history in Dry Tears (1984). Her story 
is an example of a wider theme: resistance acts conducted in the midst of 
evil, which she terms “light.” In her eyes, resistance was essentially a flame 
that “pierced” the darkness.50 Although Tec’s works explain different 
stories, they are quite similar. Their common interpretive notion, a turning 
point in post-Holocaust sociology, is the unexplored concept of resistance. 
It is a repeatedly addressed theme: in When Light Pierced the Darkness 
(1986), Tec considers Christians who rescued Polish Jews; in The Lion’s 
Den she tells the story of a Polish Jew, who, under a false Christian identity, 
used the knowledge and power in his hands to save other victims of 
Nazism. Nevertheless, Defiance (1993)—where she describes how some 
Jewish partisans, the Bielski brothers, fought the Nazis and survived, 
rescuing other Jews—represents a revolutionary sociological piece in 
Holocaust scholarship:
Like most charismatic leaders, Tuvia [Bielski] was spontaneous. He 
felt free to pursue an agenda that required him to save as many of 
the doomed Jews as possible. . . .
48 Katz, “A Sociological Perspective to the Holocaust,” 282.
49 Nechama Tec, Dry Tears: The Story of a Lost Childhood (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1984), 43.
50 Cf. Tec, When Light Pierced the Darkness: Christian Rescue of Jews in Nazi-Occupied Poland 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Tec, In the Lion’s Den.
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No matter how a woman arrived, no matter who she was, when 
she reached the Bielski otriad she could automatically become a 
member.51
When Tec refers to “Tuvia’s policy of unconditional acceptance of every 
Jew, man, woman, and child, no doubt accounts for the high proportion of 
women, a proportion that fluctuated between thirty and forty percent,”52 
she puts victims’ behavior at the center of her studies, demolishing the 
image of “Jewish passivity.” For Tec, passivity and, additionally, the 
complicity of the Jews in their own destruction, seems to absolve the perpe-
trators from their accountability for crimes committed, and she gives 
visibility to the history of the righteous, to persons who worked to save 
Jews from mass extermination. In the introduction to When Light Pierced 
the Darkness, she underlines how everybody knows the story of Anne 
Frank, but they ignore the history of those who had saved themselves or 
the reasons that led these people to risk their lives to save their family. Her 
aim is to reflect on the ordinariness of good—“small goodness”—through 
an original research dealing with “case histories.”53 
Based on published personal stories, statistical data, archival collections, 
and extensive interviews with survivors (rescued, rescuers, and 
bystanders), When Light Pierced the Darkness—whose final ten pages are 
a sort of postscript on Tec’s methodology—emphasizes how sociology 
needs to work together with history, especially when she stresses issues 
such as the extermination and Nazi propaganda, sadism and indifference 
of the Poles, and the silence of other nations: “The world looks upon this 
murder, more horrible than anything that history has ever seen, and 
stays silent.”54 
Interesting is that, first, in her works, Tec always takes time to answer 
frequently asked questions, such as “Why did the Jews go like sheep to 
their slaughter? Why did they not stand up to the Germans? Why did they 
51 Tec, Defiance, 109, 158.
52 Ibid.
53 See Tec, When Light Pierced the Darkness, 3–4; Enrico Deaglio, La banalità del bene: Storia 
di Giorgio Perlasca (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1991); Salomoni, L’Unione Sovietica e la Shoah, 182–91.
54 Tec, When Light Pierced the Darkness, 111.
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refuse to fight?”55 Second, thanks to unpublished written works, personal 
stories, and interviews, she gives voice to the witnesses. Her research 
speaks of both the saved and the rescuers (several times, the author asks 
herself questions: Who were the saviors? Alternatively, what did they feel 
in saving other Jews?), and she speaks of persons who were indifferent to 
the destruction. She clearly evokes the question of guilt. What is new is 
her articulate manner in dealing with these topics.56 To understand her 
sociological approach, we can stress that at the basis of When Light Pierced 
the Darkness we find her personal story of Jews rescued by fellow citizens 
of the Christian religion, the description of the environment of Gentiles in 
which she grew up, and the analysis of the world insensitive to the 
 extermination.57 Tec examines how minorities are persecuted anywhere at 
any time. Among the multitude of persecutors, there were also people 
willing to help the persecuted:58 even in Nazi-occupied Poland, where the 
chances of rescuing Jews were reduced to the extreme, there was moral 
solidarity. For Tec, the Poles who risked their lives to save those of their 
fellow citizens were “altruistic helpers,” while most of those who could 
intervene and did not—the author also includes heads of state in this 
 category—are defined as “uninvolved” persons. Among the saviors, there 
were also those who saved lives on payment, “paid rescuers,” but the focus 
is mainly on the righteous among the nations. 
What matters is the newness with which she addresses the issue of 
anti-Semitism and the role that ideology played in the extermination 
process. When she speaks of the “Polish antisemitic rescuer,” she refers to 
residents in Poland who, before the outbreak of the war, nourished 
 sentiments of anti-Semitism, but who, during the Nazi occupation, aided 
55 Nechama Tec, Jewish Resistance: Facts, Omissions, and Distortions (Washington, DC: 
Research Institute of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2001), 1. See Michel, 
The Shadow War; Israel Gutman and Shmuel Krakowski, Unequal Victims: Poles & Jews 
during World War II (New York: The Holocaust Library, 1986).
56 Cf. Karl Jaspers, La questione della colpa: Sulla responsabilità politica della Germania (Milan: 
Cortina Raffaello, 1996 [1946]).
57 Cf. Carol Rittner, Stephen D. Smith, and Irena Steinfeldt, eds., The Holocaust and the Christian 
World: Reflections on the Past, Challenges for the Future (New York: Continuum, 2000).
58 Cf. Celia S. Heller, review of When Light Pierced the Darkness: Christian Rescue of Jews in 
Nazi-Occupied Poland, by Nechama Tec, American Journal of Sociology 93, no. 1 (1987): 
221–22, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2779692.
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the Jews. For example, in the “Protest!” of 1942—a manifesto of the 
Catholic Front for the Rebirth of Poland (Front Odrodzenia Polski, FOP), 
a document of protest, an official proclamation, created in Warsaw to 
establish an illegal unit in saving the Jews and whose greatest exponent 
was Zofia Kossak-Szczucka—stated that one who would not help the Jews 
was not a true Catholic or even an authentic Polish citizen. 59 In the docu-
ment, the nationalist creed and the image of Jews as defenseless victims 
are evident. The anti-Semitic saviors were devout Catholics and ardent 
nationalists who were elites on the social scale. Many of those interviewed 
by Tec were committed actors who could not remain silent when faced 
with Nazi atrocities, and for that reason they opposed the totalitarian 
regime, as evidenced by the activity of the Council for Aid to Jews, starting 
from the end of 1942. 
3.6.1. The Meaning of Resistance
In Defiance, written while traveling between the United States, Israel, and 
Poland, Jews are treated as a special category of victims, those who rebelled 
against oppression and took part in the resistance, by which term Tec 
means (referring to Roger S. Gottlieb’s formulation) a series of activities 
motivated by the desire to limit and stop the exercise of oppression against 
the oppressed.60 Her assumption is simple: the resistance is conceived as a 
reaction to oppression; hence, the different forms of resistance, including 
armed resistance, spiritual, urban, rural, and so on. Fascinating is the 
motivation. There is a certain link between resistance and oppression: 
the stronger the oppression, the greater the need to oppose it; however, 
the more intense the oppression, the lower the possibility of reacting to it 
effectively. Tec considers that revolutions are always carried out by those 
who are less dominated by power and that, therefore, they become the 
organizers of resistance groups.
59 For more details, see “Protest!” in Collection: Jan Karski, Polish History Museum, accessed 
July 19, 2016, https://www.google.com/culturalinstitute/beta/u/0/asset/WgEHPjyKIluslA.
60 Cf. Tec, Jewish Resistance, 2, 4, 25–26; Roger S. Gottlieb, “The Concept of Resistance: Jewish 
Resistance during the Holocaust,” Social Theory and Social Practice 9, no. 1 (1983): 31–49.
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Tec’s studies cross through different conceptions of resistance, from 
those of Bettelheim to Hilberg, passing through Arendt, questioning or at 
least inviting us to reframe the surrender of the Jews faced with the 
oppressor and the role of the Jewish Councils. Tec focuses on the moral 
effects and positive results that the acts of resistance produced as much as 
on those who performed them and, more generally, on victims. That is 
what she intends to show. When Yitzhak Zuckerman, deputy commander 
of the Warsaw Uprising, on the commemoration of the twenty-fifth 
 anniversary, claimed not to know “if there is a yardstick to measure all 
this,” she refers to the strength shown by the young Jews who, after years 
of submission, challenged their executioners, knowing very well that they 
would face death. 
Tec’s sociological mission is to rethink the history of the destruction 
of the Jews through sociological questions in the spirit of the sociological 
tradition. She seems to be worried about rehabilitating the real image of 
European Jewry during the war.61 In doing this, affected by Ringelblum’s 
and Friedman’s historical studies, she focuses more on the victims than on 
the perpetrators of Nazi crimes. Her researches become institutional 
places to reconsider, without omissions of any kind, the most heroic and 
the most obscure actions. Only in this way is it possible to refute the 
alleged passivity of the Jews or their alleged complicity in their  destruction. 
For instance, when she defines the Bielski otriad as a community in the 
forest, she highlights the moral strength of the partisan unit, which 
 challenged the Nazi policies of destruction. 
To break down some prejudices, Tec reports some selfless efforts of 
the otriad members, aimed at protecting their fellow Jews and asserting 
traditional moral values. They are examples of resistance without weapons. 
When a partisan unit assisted the persecuted and individuals groups, 
women and sick people (offering them a refuge or ensuring their survival), 
a series of compassionate activities, more often illegal and not violent, 
were put into practice.
61 Cf. Philip Friedman, Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust (Philadelphia: Jewish 
Publication Society of America, 1980); Norman Davies, Rising ’44: The Battle for Warsaw 
(New York: Viking, 2003). 
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The heart of Tec’s analysis takes into account different actions of the 
partisans, within humanitarian action, in favor of their compatriots: acts 
of resistance. Her methodology, going beyond the specific resistance 
movements, emphasizes the relevance of a comparative approach. For 
instance, she focuses on the activities of the Jewish resistance movements 
in the occupied areas of Europe, where wooded and mountain areas 
became inaccessible shelters, theaters of struggle and combat. Additionally, 
Tec elaborates on the linkage between organization and resistance in the 
face of danger. In 1942, after the Nazis gave greater impetus to their 
 annihilation policies, large masses of people were deported from Western 
to Eastern Europe. In 1943, almost all the ghettos were emptied. In this 
period, Jewish resistance movements developed their own strategic base 
of operations, studying the spaces within which to move, favoring mobility 
and movement, and creating a balance between the reduced number of 
rebels and the scarcity of weapons. What arouses one’s curiosity is that Tec 
poses some relevant issues, such as the active leadership that made the 
difference, as in the case of the Bielski brothers:
The existing leadership gap was filled in part by the young heads of 
the local branches of the various youth organizations. Most of these 
underground commanders were idealistic, and eager to protect and 
fight for the Jewish people. Also, as in most periods of social 
upheaval, during the German occupation there appeared a few 
 charismatic leaders such as Tuvia Bielski. All of these new leaders, 
though anxious to relieve the Jewish plight, were inexperienced. As 
we have already seen, at times their idealism coupled with inexperi-
ence curtailed their effectiveness.62
At this point, we recall what Israel Gutman writes apropos of the leaders 
during the Warsaw Uprising, that they were “idealists with no battle expe-
rience, no military training. With but a few weapons and limited 
ammunition, they knew that they had no chance to succeed. Their choice 
was ultimate: not whether to live or to die, but what choice to make as to 
62 Tec, Jewish Resistance, 17.
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their death.”63 In reading Tec’s treatment, what is without precedent in 
post-Holocaust sociology is that the Bielski otriad is introduced as a 
typical Jewish resistance movement, different from national resistance 
movements in which Jews were active fighters or from movements, also 
national, in which Jews fought while hiding their identity. The Bielski 
otriad was a unit of partisans taking refuge in the forests of Belarus, with 
a common goal: to save as many human lives as possible. When, in 1942, 
rumors began to circulate about the presence of partisans in the forests, 
the possibility arose for many Jews in the ghettos to join partisan fighters: 
“One might attempt to reach and join the partisans.”64 The Jewish partisan 
network continually sent guides (in ghettos still active) with lists of people 
to whom to propose escape (usually friends or relatives of people already 
in the forest) and aimed at saving the lives of as many Jews as possible and 
resisting when faced with evil. Tec stresses how “Tuvia, for example, sent 
an invitation to his friend Chaim Dworecki, his wife, and his two teenage 
daughters. The Dworeckis were forced into the Lida ghetto during the 
liquidation of the Iwje ghetto. In his letter Tuvia wrote, ‘It does not interest 
me if you have a gun or not, you are coming with your wife and children. 
Nothing is important. Just come.’”65
Bielski otriad, a community with rules mediated and directed by its 
leader, Tuvia, always tried to elude the enemy.66 However, primarily—as 
the sociologist Einwohner put in evidence in the 1990s—it was possible to 
combat and resist thanks to information or correct information about 
what was happening. The partisan unit was kept informed of what was 
happening outside the woods. Good information allowed the otriad to 
react and to plan resistance actions. In 1943, towards the end of July, the 
otriad learned of a German document, dated July 7, 1943, which spoke of 
the operation Unternehmen Hermann aimed at attacking the Nalibocka 
forest to defeat the partisan movement. The Bielski partisan unit, like 
other detachments, refused to remain passive and organized a coordinated 
63 Israel Gutman, Resistance: The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1994), xii.
64 Tec, Jewish Resistance, 8.
65 Tec, Defiance, 97.
66 Ibid., 42, 174, 233. 
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and extensive collective action along entry points into the forest. 
Thereafter, the Bielski otriad was officially included in the Soviet army’s 
Kirov brigade.
What Tec aims at in telling the story of the Bielski brothers is the 
complex organizational structure of this partisan unit, especially during 
the last phase (1943–44) spent in the Nalibocka forest. The otriad included 
a general district under the command of Tuvia Bielski, with a leader of the 
combatants, a deputy commander, a staff officer, a commissioner, platoon 
and section leaders, a chief doctor, and more. It also had different workshops, 
ranging from a bakery to a public bath, from transport management to an 
Orthodox butcher: the entire life of members was organized and designed 
to ensure survival hopes outside of the ghetto. In the Bielski otriad, 
community life of the ghetto could continue:
I was amazed at what Tuvia did. I saw the workshops, the children 
[cries] . . . I saw an orthodox Jew pray. People worked, they fixed 
watches, made shoes, they made leather from cowhide. People from 
all the surrounding areas came there to have things fixed.67
3.7. “THE HOLOCAUST AS THE TEST OF MODERNITY”
When Bauman says that “having read Janina’s book” he starts to think 
about what he did not know “properly,” he realizes that he did not compre-
hend what had occurred—in his words, “in that ‘world which was not 
mine.’”68 Analyzing, in this place, his approach to the Holocaust, it is not 
only important for the reasons already introduced (because his Modernity 
and the Holocaust is considered by most as the work that woke up post- 
Holocaust sociology), but this also helps to ask what happened to 
Holocaust sociology, in general. First and foremost, we must know his 
past: this means understanding the story of the scholar who made his 
exile from Poland a fascinating choice and point of strength in accounting 
for what was happening in 1960s, even in sociology. Additionally, my look 
67 Ibid., 138, referring to an interview with Zorach Arluk.
68 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, vii.
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at Bauman provides a much needed look at his work, even though this 
excursus does not seem to be coherent with the rest of my treatment in 
this book. Instead it is useful to clarify how Bauman developed his 
thinking, or how he began to speak of the Holocaust in starting from the 
notion of human suffering.
Primary, the Holocaust, for the Polish Bauman, who began to study the 
extermination of the Jews only after his forced emigration to England in 
1968, was not an aberration or a cancerous growth within civilized society 
and was not a deviation in the midst of civilization, nor did it constitute a 
millennial anti-Semitism episode. What he underlines is that Holocaust 
literature, seeing the destruction of the Jews as a hiccup, had not considered 
the internal logic of modernity as it developed in the West and had not 
called into question the “normal condition of society.”69 This is one of the 
central points for Bauman. As he says, “The Holocaust was a unique 
encounter between the old tensions which modernity ignored, slighted or 
failed to resolve—and the powerful instruments of rational and effective 
action that modern development itself brought into being.”70 In other words, 
the phenomenon cannot to be inscribed within the framework of national 
states where the legal definition of citizenship is relevant; rather, it should be 
placed between the social mesh and fluctuation resulting from a series of 
processes, such as modern rationalization and bureaucratization.
3.7.1. Between England and Poland
Both Fein and Bauman have recourse to the concept of the nation-state in 
trying to understand the Holocaust, even if in different ways. Each has his 
own way of showing new insights into the relationship between the rationality 
of the modern world and the political life characterizing the heart of 
Europe in the first half of the twentieth century.
Zygmunt Bauman was born in Poznań in 1925. When Poland was 
invaded by German troops in 1939, he was forced to flee with his family to 
the Soviet Union, where, instead of joining the ranks of physicists, he 
69 See ibid., viii–xiv.
70 Ibid., xiv.
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enlisted in a Soviet military unit. At the end of the war, he returned to 
Poland to study sociology at the University of Warsaw with Julian Hochfeld 
and Stanisław Ossowski. After studies at the London School of Economics, 
during which he prepared his dissertation on British socialism, he published, 
in 1959, the work that opened the doors of academia to him (even though 
since 1954 he had been a professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences in 
Warsaw). On March 25, 1968—while social rights movements filled up the 
American academies and streets, Bauman was removed from the chair of 
sociology at the University of Warsaw as consequence of a new wave of 
anti-Semitism detonated by Polish authorities.71 His expulsion from the 
ranks of academics was not a random event: on the contrary, it was prepared 
and planned. Already in 1953, the author experienced some anti-Semitic 
purges: as a Jewish officer, he was expelled from the Polish army due to the 
“nationalization of the executives,” which required the removal of all Jews 
from leading positions. In 1968, this dejudaization policy was intensified 
and touched all the intellectuals who headed or organized the 1968 student 
protests: among these organizers, there was also Bauman:72 
After leaving Poland I was inundated with offers to join all sorts of 
“sovietologist” establishments, and with invitations to write for 
their journals. I was one of the “Warsaw six”—the “dissident” 
professors of Warsaw University who were demoted and expelled 
on 25 March 1968 on the accusation of fomenting student riots—
and the case was widely publicized in the Western press. I refused 
the offers. I had no intention of living the second half of my life off 
the first (as things looked then, I could live quietly and happily ever 
after out of my “dissident past”).73 
71 See Peter Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism: Zygmunt Bauman and the Other 
Totalitarianism,” Thesis Eleven 70 (2002): 98.
72 Cf. Keith Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman (Gardolo: Erickson, 2005 [2004]), 14–15.
73 Keith Tester and Michael H. Jacobsen, “Bauman before Exile—A Conversation with Zygmunt 
Bauman,” Polish Sociological Review 3, no. 155 (2006): 273. Actually, this conversation 
appeared for the first time in Keith Tester and Michael H. Jacobsen, Bauman before 
Postmodernity: Invitation, Conversations and Annotated Bibliography, 1953–1989 (Aalborg: 
Aalborg University Press, 2005).
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After several attempts to move to Israel and Australia, in 1971 Bauman 
obtained a new academic position at the University of Leeds, where he 
taught until 1990.74 This period—of English exile begun on March 25, 
1968, and far from Poland—paved the way to Modernity and the Holocaust. 
The two European countries, England and Poland, mark his life, even 
if Bauman always takes care to qualify the “similarities” in order to avoid 
any kind of generalization in not considering the specifics of each nation.75 
When he arrived in England in 1971, it was a time of political, social, and 
cultural change in the history of England and Poland, and the days of 
student radicalism: there was a collective fermentation and mobilization 
abroad at international level and on others fronts. The new British Left, 
the revolution of the socialist proletariat in Britain, and the completely 
political reality of Polish ‘68 affected his life: after these events, and 
primarily resulting from the English exile, he wholly changed his own 
social theories. Starting from 1971, he no longer wrote in Polish, but almost 
always in English, and he himself translated his previous works into 
English. It was a new route between England and Poland, similar and 
parallel, but absolutely not identical.76
3.7.2. From Memories of Class to Modernity and the Holocaust
At the end of the war, Bauman continued his military career in communist 
Poland—he reached the rank of captain—having as his project building a 
Poland free from any totalitarian horrors and any kind of misery and 
discrimination, in other words, towards a respectable life.77 World War II 
had not yet finished when Bauman glimpsed, in the actual Polish socialism, 
those elements able to eliminate all inequality and all forms of anti- Semitism, 
74 Cf. Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 15.
75 Cf. Tester and Jacobsen, Bauman before Exile, 274. See also Karel Kosík, La nostra crisi 
attuale (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1969).
76 See Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 94–95. Regarding the difficulty of translation 
from Polish to English—in some respect it reflects national Polish problems—and the 
choice of writing directly in English, see Tester and Jacobsen, Bauman before Exile, 268.
77 Cf. Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 14; Zygmunt Bauman and Keith Tester, 
Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman (Cambridge: Polity, 2001); Beilharz, “Modernity and 
Communism,” 88.
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underdevelopment, backwardness, poverty, social differences, and power 
conflicts among classes. Designed as a universal dream, socialism, espe-
cially for its economic and political features, seemed to be the impeccable 
solution against discrimination and therefore suffering in general in capi-
talist and industrial society. As Peter Beilharz writes, by focusing on the 
relationship between modernity and all types of  totalitarianism, “commu-
nism survives, as a ghost, as it ghosts us all, those on the left or who came 
from it.”78 Prior to his English exile, Bauman never referred to the Jews in his 
studies: only in 1989, when the communist ideology symbolically collapsed 
on a universal level, did he publish Modernity and the Holocaust, when a set 
of historical circumstances (political and economic) intervened. Among 
these was, for instance, the Demjanjuk trial that ended in April 1988 in 
Jerusalem. One may ask what led him to move his sociological thinking 
towards the Judënfrage and, above all, why he dealt with the social suffering 
of the Jews only at the end of the 1980s.
His turning point of thought came from his wife, Janina Bauman, 
who had experienced the Holocaust firsthand, and she recounted what 
the Holocaust was for her in Winter in the Morning in 1986.79 She was a 
Jewish girl and experienced the Nazi occupation of Poland. Her state-
ment on those days and the years during which (together with her 
mother and sister) she succeeded in avoiding deportation to Auschwitz 
or Treblinka with the help of some fellow countrymen, expresses the 
plight of remaining human in inhuman conditions more than the 
dramatic experience being of and in the ghetto. Even in her story, situa-
tions of courage and moral integrity are opposed to cruelty and the 
depravity of some men. She clearly puts human suffering and the experience 
78 Ibid. Cf. Ferenc Fehér, Agnes Heller, and Gyorgy Márkus, Dictatorship over Needs 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1983). A symposium was organized on this work. It dealt 
with a power vigilant of bodies, souls, and needs. Cf. Zygmunt Bauman, Memories of Class: 
The Pre-History and After-Life of Class (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982); Beilharz, 
“Modernity and Communism,” 91.
79 Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 142. See Michael H. Jacobsen and Sophia Marshman, 
“The Four Faces of Human Suffering in the Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman—Continuity 
and Change,” Polish Sociological Review 161, no. 1 (2008): 9–10. Cf. Janina Bauman, Winter 
in the Morning: A Young Girl’s Life in the Warsaw Ghetto and Beyond, 1939–1945 (New York: 
Free Press, 1986).
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of pain at the center of the discourse: “I belong to the Jews. Not because 
I was born one or because I share their faith—I never have done. I belong 
to the Jews because I have suffered as one of them. It’s suffering that has 
made me Jewish.”80 Janina’s words in retelling the story of the ghetto 
experience and that of a Jewish youth lived in uncertainty gradually 
made Zygmunt feel she really was Jewish and understand the meaning 
of human suffering, which was central notion in his thought. 
The choice of being Jewish did not happen causally but came at a time 
when he felt the unfinished tragedy of Jewish persecution, as when the 
anti-Semitic campaigns restarted in Poland in 1967–68, while the reality 
of Polish socialism vanished into the ideal of utopia.81 Before 1967, his 
Jewish identity did not count for much in his life:
It was I who was mistaken, grossly and totally. In the quasi- 
totalitarian quasi-Soviet regime, sociology as I saw it could only 
be an alien body and treated as the enemy’s fifth column. And 
the rulers understood it before I did. It took me a few more years 
to catch up with their wisdom.82
It was this identity change resulting from the Polish anti-Semitism of 
1960s, a rather late change of attitude for Bauman, that brought him closer 
to Hebrew reality. The personal pain he felt caused by his expulsion from 
the University of Warsaw, for the fact of being one of the most active 
 intellectual “Jewish dissidents,” woke up him and showed him the suffering 
80 Bauman, Winter in the Morning, 181. Cf. Jacobsen and Marshman, “The Four Faces of 
Human Suffering in the Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman,” 9.
81 Cf. Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 141. The first time that the sociologist realized he was 
a Jew happened at the explosion of anti-Semitism in Poland in 1967. See Zygmunt Bauman, 
Intimations of Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 1992); Harald Welzer, “On the Rationality of 
Evil: An Interview with Zygmunt Bauman,” Thesis Eleven 70 (2002): 100–12. “The Soviet system 
is an acid test for the enlightenment utopia, for it sets the idea of a social rationality against that 
of individual rationalities by substituting state order for individual autonomy. Its failure indi-
cates the hiatus of all socialist utopia” (Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 91–92). Cf. 
Jacobsen and Marshman, “The Four Faces of Human Suffering in the Sociology of Zygmunt 
Bauman,” 9; Carmen Giaccardi, and Mauro Magatti, La globalizzazione non è un destino: 
Mutamenti strutturali ed esperienze soggettive nell’età contemporanea (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 
2001), 150.
82 Tester and Jacobsen, “Bauman before Exile,” 270.
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endured by the Jews under the Nazis, and moved him towards an 
 understanding of human suffering in general. It is useful to remember 
that in postwar Poland, the communist regime often used the theme of 
anti- Semitism in an instrumental way in order to face and easily overcome 
periods of instability and crisis.83 
However, the topic of human suffering began to become a recurring 
and cyclical argument in his sociological writings and it became even 
deeper because of his experience of exile. The personal choice of feeling 
Jewish turned into a kind of challenge that Bauman chose to attack by 
creating a whole new critical sociology, a type of “human creative practice”: 
in light of this, human suffering developed into a social category by which 
he explained, starting from his own evil, the pain in society. Following his 
Polish teachers, Hochfeld and Ossowski, he built a critical sociology, 
modeled on humans and making reference to humans.84 As he retold it in 
1992, “The Jewish experience had a special significance for understanding 
the logic of modern culture.”85 Again, it was mainly the Polish anti-Semitic 
campaigns of 1967–68 that led him to think critically and in a completely 
new way about society and humans in and of society. When he connected 
his own individual discomfort with that of the others, he translated his 
experience and the phenomena of society into sociological thought and 
literature.86 Like him, Arendt, Hochfeld, and Mills had correlated their 
private world with the public, being able to transfer and place the particular 
experience of their private affairs within the public sphere. To reelaborate 
unpleasant experiences, a narrative community arises where language 
mediates: with and through the language it is possible to review the past 
(monstrum) through the mirror of distance. This reflects some 
 sociological strands of the 1970 and 80s when a reflexive sociology was 
83 Cf. Michael Checinski, Poland: Communism, Nationalism and Anti-Semitism (New York: 
KarzCohl, 1982); Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 14; Jacobsen and Marshman, “The 
Four Faces of Human Suffering in the Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman,” 11.
84 Cf. Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 143.
85 Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, 228.
86 See Peter Beilharz, The Bauman Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). The text reports an 
interview prepared for Bauman, published in Critical Theory in 2001, even if the article, in 
which Todorov’s thinking resounds, was written ten years before; see Cvetan Todorov, Les 
abus de la mémoire (Paris: Arléa, 1995).
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affirmed because of postmodernity (and this discursive sociology of 
the  postmodern period was evident when Bauman approached the 
Holocaust). He was a citizen-writer who found his homeland, in exile, 
through narration.87 If the Polish anti-Semitism in 1968 and the experience 
of exile changed his sociological perspective, modifying his thinking 
on social suffering, then it is pertinent to comprehend what Bauman 
meant by suffering. What pushed him to Modernity and the Holocaust 
was indeed the ideal category of suffering even before the concept of 
nation-state. So, what was suffering for Bauman?
3.7.3. Suffering in Society
The concept of social suffering, inherited from Hochfeld and Mills (like 
Mills, Hochfeld is aware that the persons can suffer),88 is a moral evil born 
in and caused by social relationships and therefore not attributable to 
natural phenomena, against which men are powerless. On the contrary, in 
the case of social suffering, men can intervene, indeed they must do so to 
limit the effects of suffering caused by their own interactions and 
 relationships in communication.89 Bauman, in a period in which sociology 
as academic discipline focused mostly on economic inequality and social 
suffering (after the fall of Berlin Wall, i.e., with the collapse of the 
 communism), was in step with the sociology introducing the reflection on 
a bygone industrial period, namely, dealing with postindustrial doctrines. 
Bauman particularly questioned what type of social relationship generates 
social suffering, and he dealt with this when tracing a historical parable of 
human suffering that goes from solid to liquid modernity—reflecting the 
87 Cf. Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 97; Paolo Jedlowski, Il racconto come memoria: 
Heimat e le memorie d’Europa (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2009).
88 Cf. Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 55.
89 Cf. ibid. “Morality is not a product of society, but is rooted in the human condition of ‘being 
with others’ and is manipulated by society;” see Moishe Postone, review of Modernity and 
the Holocaust, by Zygmunt Bauman, American Journal of Sociology 97, no. 5 (1992): 1522, 
the reference is to Levinas. “That is, according to Elias, what we have come to call “morality’ 
is not ‘innate’ but socially produced and variable through time and space” (Dunning and 
Mennell, “Elias on Germany, Nazism and the Holocaust,” 340).
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postindustrial principles of postmodern sociology following a period of 
an intense sociological growth. 
For Bauman, human suffering changed over time in society and 
assumed different faces (from The Flawed Producers in Crisis-Ridden 
Capitalistic Society to The Jews and Modern Adiaphorized Genocide, from 
The Others and the Strangers to The Human Waste of Liquid Modernity).90 
He distinguishes four stages, or he speaks of four faces of human suffering, 
which I will introduce one by one. 
The transformation of social relations of an economic and political 
kind, in modern society, generates social change that disrupts the orders 
of the new era, causing deep divisions and transformations. In accordance 
with the topological scheme of Stein Rokkan, these cleavages (center–
periphery, church–state, industry/city–countryside, and work–capital) 
result from the two major changes that occurred during the nineteenth 
century—the political and the industrial revolutions—and reflect the 
 relational asymmetries of forms of power present in a society. These new 
imbalances create social suffering. In his retracing the human relationships 
that determine it—in the wake of Vilfredo Pareto—he raises the concept 
of the “power social forces.” The first human relationships of suffering that 
Bauman investigates are, in fact, work relationships and the bonds forming 
between the working class and the capitalist class. These  relationships 
become the object of his interest since they produce alienation, which in 
turn generates suffering episodes of stigmatization and marginalization.91 
In his own approach, or for the coalescence of Marx’s and Weber’s theories 
that Bauman uses, it seems Bauman reflects the neo-Marxism phase of 
sociology from the 1960s to 1990s. Thus, every face essentially coincides 
with a historical period. Michael H. Jacobsen and Sophia Marshman 
give a name to each of these faces—Marxian, Modernist, Moral, and 
Mosaic. And following their schema, let me here repropose the question.
90 Cf. Jacobsen and Marshman, “The Four Faces of Human Suffering in the Sociology of 
Zygmunt Bauman,” 3–4. 
91 See Richard Kilminster and Ian Varcoe, “Appendix: Sociology, Postmodernity and Exile: 
An Interview with Zygmunt Bauman,” in Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, 
quoted in Jacobsen and Marshman, “The Four Faces of Human Suffering in the Sociology 
of Zygmunt Bauman,” 5.
Toward a Sociology of Genocide, 1980–1989 | 277
The first phase is the one in which the Marxian echo spreads. Already 
from Bauman’s early writings, from 1956 to 1968, emerge issues concerning 
the alienation, social injustice, and the struggle of the working class in the 
light of Marx’s thought. These works, mentioned in the first years of his 
study, criticize the situation of the post-Stalinist society. Thanks to 
Bauman, a Polish sociology, free and open, results: “And it had to stand up 
against the new injustices and inequalities that the new powers spawned 
in profusion in the course of extirpating the old ones.”92 
To report how the imbalance of the socioeconomic relationship 
between the capitalist class and the labor force is reflected in forms of 
power within the society, he studies with great thoroughness the miserable 
condition prevailing in the working class, the proletariat of the rags of the 
late-capitalist society mentioned by Marx. The working class, not owning 
what it produces, finds itself understructured compared to the owning elite 
or those with managerial functions in society. Briefly, Bauman highlights 
that it is “ejected” from the sphere of political decisions. Since real socialism 
proposed itself in its plan to eradicate all forms of social injustice and 
inequality, it becomes, in Bauman’s eyes and not only, one of the historical 
alternatives to capitalism: indeed, after the Great War it was the only 
 alternative to capitalism.93 Nevertheless, over time, he no longer considers 
the suffering of the working class as the universal symbol of all suffering 
and finds quite a different symbolic equivalent, another category of 
suffering universally accepted and legitimized by historical events. 
There were a succession of historical political and economic situations 
that let Bauman no longer look at the suffering of the working class but at 
that of the Jews. Over the passage of years, concrete facts revealed fresh 
forms of inequality and modern practices of authoritarianism, but, above 
all, he saw the lack of freedom triggered by real socialism and then the 
fallacy of the cause for which Bauman initially stood up. The anti-Semitism 
episode that broke out in Poland at the end of the 1960s, and which led to his 
expulsion from academic positions, highlighted all the so-called αλλαί 
92 Tester and Jacobsen, “Bauman before Exile,” 271.
93 Cf. Marcello Flores, “Autoritarismo, totalitarismo, comunismi,” I Viaggi di Erodoto 22 
(1994): 237; Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 91.
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(“others”), other forms of social inequality and imbalance no longer linked 
to the relations of capitalist production. The issue of anti-Semitism at this 
point became central in the life of Bauman, who, in his writings, reviewed 
the Polish real socialism dear to him previously. Bauman is the one who 
transforms the criticism of real socialism into a discursive practice and 
represents the academic person who, at a theoretical and cultural level, 
subdues many buttresses of the communist ideology.
He refused to equate the working class with universal suffering, and 
stated it at the center of his discourses, because of a sequence of political 
events. There was the failure of actual socialism and the collapse of Stalinism 
(in 1956 there was the condemnation of war crimes during the Twentieth 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (PCUS),94 and a 
 revisionism of a cultural kind that criticized the failure of socialism and the 
Polish political system for failing to put an end to social injustice. 
If the renunciation of the centrality of the working class had already been 
announced at the beginning of the 1970s with the crisis of the system of Fordist 
production and the loss of the central role of the working class in the system 
of the world economy, it was now Bauman who revealed the true face of real 
socialism. In the early 1970s, the crisis of Fordism, a key element of modernity, 
was accompanied by the change of the positions of cultural systems of values 
or, rather, the crisis of social regulation and hence the crisis of the welfare 
state, the bureaucratic hierarchical model, and the analytical approach of 
pluralism. It is obvious that if the working class loses its importance, the 
universal social suffering (resulting from the rapport between the capitalist 
class and the working class) can no longer coincide with the particular 
suffering of the working class: it must be replaced by something else. 
Bauman reflected on the fact that actual socialism had offered 
 solutions to the problem of human suffering represented symbolically by 
the working class, and he asked by whom or by what human suffering 
could be represented, when real socialism fails in its objectives, creating 
94 “The Polish regime only emulated Soviet Stalinism into the 1950s, losing its impetus by 1953 
and ending with Beria’s death in 1956. The ‘Polish Road to Socialism’ emphasized differ-
ences, rather than similarities with the USSR. As a result, there was little synchronization of 
the political histories of the two countries. The Polish regime prided itself as Polish, western, 
over the Russian eastern ways” (Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 95–6), (author’s 
in-text citations omitted).
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even more alienation. To sum up, thanks to, and after, the failure of 
socialism in Poland, whereby the political limits of a totalitarian system 
were unmasked (this system was intended to conceal them through 
anti-Semitic practices), it was clear that social suffering, personified by the 
working class, could not be the only one. Namely, there was other suffering 
in addition to that of the “the proletariat of rags.” 
In the 1980s, his thought could no longer reflect the suffering 
 elaborated in the so-called Marxist phase, since real socialism created the 
same alienation caused by the capitalist system, both economic systems 
used the same modern utilitarianism typical of managerialism.95 When, as 
a result of exile, Bauman abandoned the cause of real socialism, he found 
himself examining a humanity dominated by the strong utilitarianism 
typical of the capitalist Fordist system and of the communist economic 
model, based on state planning of investments and on heavy industry. For 
him, it was necessary overcome the liability of the two modes of production: 
the problems attributed by Marxism to the market economy reappeared 
in real socialist regimes. Real socialism and capitalism missed the mark in 
solving the agitations between the market and state.96
The traditional concept of sociological imagination relative to the 
working class went into crisis in the 1980s, and this “modernist phase” 
coincided with the age of neoliberalism: the years of UK prime minister 
Margaret Thatcher and U.S. president Ronald Reagan, at the end of 
the so-called golden age or welfare state.97 In his continuous attempt to 
universalize suffering, Bauman had to consider new economic policies 
and postindustrial culture, the structural increase of unemployment, 
inflation, turbulence of consolidation of the welfare state and the exhaustion 
of labor movements, and, finally, the two systemic crises that capitalism 
suffers.98 A first time when there is a change and transformation from the 
 95 Cf. Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 109–63.
 96 See Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 93–94.
 97 Cf. Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 53–79; Giaccardi and Magatti, La globaliz-
zazione non è un destino, v.
 98 See the “Winter of Discontent” at Brixton, Toxteh, in 1978–79. For a general overview, see 
https://libcom.org/history/1978-1979-winter-of-discontent (accessed July 20, 2016). Cf. 
Jacobsen and Marshman, “The Four Faces of Human Suffering in the Sociology of 
Zygmunt Bauman,” 7.
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rural, feudal, and premodern world to the organized world of modern 
factories (this is the so-called period of solid modernity), and a second 
time when, in the last part of the twentieth century, society was gradually 
transformed from a producer society to a consumer society. It was the 
latest crisis to affect Bauman: in this society, new deprivation, social injustice, 
and alienation were born, which ills were no longer attributable to the 
capitalist system of production in which the workforce is underdeployed. 
This shift resulted from “solid modernity”—in Bauman’s words—that 
generates a social progress fast enough to create new spaces for new poor: 
the latest poor are marginalized and are not part of the working class. 
For Bauman, there was a historical parable of suffering beginning with 
the working class and ending with the consumers of the modern age. Already 
in 1982 in Memories of Class, he had understood that the social suffering of the 
working class was not enough to represent the universal suffering of the whole 
society: it lacked a “between” or a link, and at there was a void to be filled. 
The events of socialist Poland during the Cold War, the anti-Semitic inci-
dents that happened to him personally, the issue of Winter in the Morning, 
and, the failure of real socialism led him to change to the subject of alienation. 
It is passed from the working class of modernity to the marginalized unem-
ployed and those unable to find a job in the era of late capitalism.99 Thus, 
Memories of Class has to be read as a revision of Marx’s orthodox theory: all 
those who are deprived of power in society and who are not protected are the 
victims of this new suffering.100 When Bauman universalized the particular 
suffering endured by the Jews, he had precisely this in mind, namely, that of 
talking about the history of the new social suffering and the new ghettos 
formed unintentionally and in which those who are left out of the economic 
production live (flawed producers).101 Characterized by an uninterrupted 
deprivation, which accumulates over time all those who do not participate in 
the game of production and consumption are the new losers of the society, 
labeled as the sponges of the welfare state and late capitalism. In the so-called 
moral phase (or that of values, in accordance with Durkheim’s meaning) 
 99 Ibid.
100 Ibid. Cf. Bauman, Memories of Class, 170.
101 Cf. Jacobsen and Marshman, “The Four Faces of Human Suffering in the Sociology of 
Zygmunt Bauman,” 8.
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during the 1990s, the protagonists of suffering were the “otherness,” while in 
the new millennium there were the “wasted lives”: namely, the underclass of 
consumers spoiled by liquid modernity.102 These unwelcome people (immi-
grants or asylum seekers) constitute the “just arrived” faces of social suffering, 
determined this time by social causes not modern. Then the question concerns 
which modern solidarity was lacking in time:
What happens to these superfluous and useless people? First of all, 
they are physically isolated in involuntary ghettos—out of sight and 
out of mind of the rest of society. Second, they are made responsible 
for their own misfortune and thus barred from complaining, asking 
for help or even demanding solidarity or moral concern from those 
lucky enough to escape such misfortune. Finally, they are informed 
that they are alone in their suffering when being told that their 
suffering is their suffering, their problem, their fault.103
In the so-called liquid society of the last millennium, in which the 
producing class disappears, that of consumers emerges, and in which the 
conditions alienating individuals increase, it is necessary to find new 
symbolic equivalents that reflect suffering. In this society, there is no more 
space for the weeds but only for the waste.
3.7.4. The Holocaust as a Product of Modernity 
It matters that Bauman, while approaching solid modernity, used the category 
of the Holocaust, choosing the metaphor of “perfect garden.” He points to 
the suffering endured by the Jews during World War II as a universal 
symbol of human suffering, able to assume any kind of misery. His is a 
new sociological imagination of his post-exile life. While analyzing the 
route of the European Jews, he opens up an original critical perspective on 
human reality.104 
102 See Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).
103 Jacobsen and Marshman, “The Four Faces of Human Suffering in the Sociology of 
Zygmunt Bauman,” 14.
104 Cf. Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 140.
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The very first book of his critical sociology of post exile was Memories 
of Class, which anticipated, in some respects, Modernity and the Holocaust. 
The trait d’union between the two works is human suffering. “I assumed 
that the Holocaust,” the author writes “was, at best, something to be 
 illuminated by us social scientists, but certainly not something that can 
illuminate the objects of our current concerns.”105 Inspired at the end of 
the 1980s by reading Winter in the Morning, Bauman shifted the object of 
social suffering from the tension between the working class and spoiled 
producers to that of Jews who experienced the Holocaust and to a critique 
of the modern and “adiaphorized” genocide of the Jews. While Modernity 
and the Holocaust marked the transition from the Marxian phase to the 
modern phase in sociology, in post-Holocaust sociology it was focused on 
the role that modernity had played in the destruction of the Jews of 
Europe. In the 1980s, in the years in which he criticized all the modern 
trends of totalitarianism and the ways in which modernity had not only 
generated the civil progress but also the suffering of millions of Jews 
(persecuted and killed during World War II and beyond), Bauman 
 rediscovered his Jewish roots, his identity never recognized before. He 
especially binds modernity to the process of adiaphorization, referring, 
first, to the emptying (in actions) of moral content and, second, to the 
establishment of a chain of command and execution of mediated orders in 
which no actor is responsible for his own actions. 
For Bauman, this system remembers what happened in a Western 
space during World War II. This mechanism of adiaphorization was 
started and maintained by modernity itself and, in its unfolding, remains 
trapped in its same modern devices, by finishing in engulfing itself and 
destroying the freedom for which it was set in motion.106 The concept is 
central for understanding in which way the two ideologies, capitalism and 
socialism, are explained by the category of modernity. Bauman does that. 
Both capitalism and real socialism, aspiring to achieve a rational 
purpose, work towards a goal that is realized only in the indefinite future, 
105 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, viii.
106 Cf. Ulrich Beck, I rischi della libertà: L’individuo nell’epoca della globalizzazione (Bologna: 
il Mulino, 2000); by selected essays, Riskante Freiheiten (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1994), chap. 
1; Kinder der Freiheit (1997), chaps. 2–5; Modernität und Barbarei (1996), chap. 6.
Toward a Sociology of Genocide, 1980–1989 | 283
and both end up turning the world into a tool.107 Both deliver the idea of a 
perfect society: in the case of capitalism, manageable through the market, 
and, in the case of real socialism, through the state. At the base of the two 
ideologies, there is the modern totalitarian project of the perfection of 
society. The real socialism pursuing rationality in respect to value tends to 
ensure a perfect future in the same manner as modern capitalism. For 
example, the Gulag ensured death in the name of values and this happened 
due to real socialism; while the Lager (in Bauman’s version it is the result 
of capitalist modernity) promised death in the name of instrumentality. 
In other words, the Holocaust was instrumental in ensuring an order able 
to eliminate any kind of disorder: clearly, both ideologies moved from the 
desire to create order in future times.108 In Legislators and Interpreters, 
Bauman examines the modern order in which the state is compared to 
and behaves as a gardener careful to weed out all the weeds that can infest 
his garden. In this sense, the one who orders exercises and practices 
power.109 Next there are also other officials in charge behaving like this 
gardener. This happens because they take care to treat their state as if it 
were a garden, where only a few plants are to be grown and within certain 
limits, in a precise area, and in a manner appropriate to the gardener and 
his helpers.110 The state is this gardener ordering and not allowing any 
spontaneous growth unauthorized by him: namely, in such state-garden 
no disorder or disproportion is possible. The will and management of 
perfect order coincide with a totalitarian context of ideas: in this way, 
Bauman explains sociologically the Holocaust as a product of modernity.
Modernity as a project subsumes the metaphor of the “state-gar-
dener”: and genocide can be conceived as a work of gardening, while the 
state, considering its own society as a garden, destroys all forms of weeds, 
eliminating any element that haunts its garden. In this perspective, the 
action of eradicating (i.e., the genocide) becomes a creative and 
107 Cf. Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 140.
108 See Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 92–93 and see also Zygmunt Bauman, 
“Dictatorship over Needs,” Telos 60 (1984), 263, quoted in Beilharz, “Modernity and 
Communism,” 91.
109 Cf. Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-modernity, and 
Intellectuals (Cambridge: Polity, 1987).
110 Cf. Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 147; Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 91–93.
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 nondestructive work. However, in modernity, to order also signifies to be 
able to determine what is harmful and what is harmless: the power to 
sort by name, according to instrumental and precise purposes, answers 
to the rationality of the existence of the modern state. The taxonomizing, 
classifying, differentiating, segregating, and collecting in classes, by 
limiting possibilities for grouped items to escape from that class, in some 
respects evokes the supervising action exercised by a state on the society.111 
Nothing should be missed by the gardener-state that cares to structure 
and allocate the subjects of its own society in a particular class.112
Another important point on which Bauman focuses is this: the groups 
not classifiable as ambivalent belong to more classes and consequently they 
seem to be not controllable like Jews, homosexuals, and Gypsies, who 
make imperfect and uncontrolled, according to totalitarian ideologies, the 
social garden of modernity. In accordance with totalitarian ideology, they 
must be eliminated. Now, the ambivalent class par excellence is the one 
made of foreign persons physically close, but spiritually and culturally 
distant. Their physical proximity frightens and threatens the established 
order. The Jews appear as the “foreigners par excellence,” who, one day, in 
the modern period, arrive and do not leave.113 Their presence serves as a 
reminder of the fallacy of any nationalism or, rather, its incompleteness 
and thus the limits of any national project. The questions are where these 
groups should be inclosed and how they should be classified for the public 
good. Namely, in what garden may they be? The problem lies in that they 
cannot be confined anywhere, because they are extraneous to any classifiable 
national identity. It is therefore a trial for the Jews by the modern 
nation-state, which lets their unit (faced with their interstitiality)  disappear 
or be lost. The modern project of classifying national identities leads to 
Auschwitz. For Bauman, who in his analysis deals with the category of 
rationality, the modern nation-state or the ambivalence of the modern 
state leads to genocide. One of the reasons he chooses the category of 
111 See Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), 1966; Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir: Naissance 
de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975); Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 151.
112 Cf. Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 122–25. 
113 Cf. ibid., 152.
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modernity to account for the Holocaust coincides with the crisis of solid 
modernity, with its social consequences and the effects of capitalism. In 
essence, Bauman connects the Holocaust to the phase of the maximum 
deployment of modernity, which, according to him, coincides with its crisis. 
As Silverman notes, “the rediscovery of the Holocaust is symptomatic of the 
crisis of modern France and Western modernity as a whole.”114 Faced with 
this social crumbling, in finding an answer, Bauman reconsiders the 
suffering endured by the Jews.
At this point, it is important to remember the different theories of 
modernity: only by taking in mind what modernity means, in the main 
scholars’ eyes and over the time, can one understand Bauman’s interpretation 
of the Holocaust. One of the many ways is to define—as in a glossary—the 
species of modernity, ordered according to the peculiar characteristics of 
modernity and the reference categories of space and time. For this purpose, 
let me introduce here thirteen definitions of modernity in referring to 
Bauman’s approach to the Holocaust. Specifically, let me attribute to the 
category of modernity an adjective referring to its specific historical 
context and then match an exponent or a scholar representative of each of 
these qualified categories. For instance, one can consider the aesthetic 
modernity of Charles Baudelaire, the capitalist modernity of Marx, and 
the rational modernity of Weber. Moreover, one can speak of the economic 
modern analysis of Simmel’s or Durkheim’s sociological analysis, or the 
lesson of the Frankfurt School, or a definition of modernity in Parsonian 
expressions. 
Behind this discourse, there are the ideas of progress, the limits of 
modern liberties, and the exercise of accountability. Nevertheless, what is 
modernity? Modus and modernus are Late Latin terms that, translating 
the expressions “now,” “last,” and “more recent,” allude to incessant change, 
which creates instability and uncertainty, typical aspects of modernity. 
The element of “always new” features the polysemic category that appears in 
the discourses of several scholars and that unifies the temporal dimension 
of the “present-time” with that of the space-qualitative of “last-recent.” 
114 Max Silverman, Facing Postmodernity: Contemporary French Thought on Culture and 
Society (London: Routledge, 1999), 13.
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A present is always new, based on the maximum autonomy of the individual. 
Augustine had marked the caesura between the pagan and Christian 
world through the term modernus.115 Like a key, modernity opens the 
closure of a flexible society: the elements of “here” and “now” distinguish 
modernity from the traditional elements of an unmodern society. 
According to this sociological interpretation, modernity coincides with the 
physical and political space of the West, and, as in a mirror, the geopolitical 
space is Eastern and amodern. To define modernity, it is suitable to modify 
the noun with several qualifiers, such as historic, political, socioeconomic, 
and philosophical. The result is an elementary dictionary with many voices 
individuating one or more representative scholars for any definition.
The study of structural and procedural characteristics of modern society 
problematizes the tradition of the new: from a sociological examination, a 
status of crises emerges. The Greek verb κρίνω (krino), “to choose,” underlines 
the moment of the transition from traditional societies, economically and 
socially static, to those that are dynamic and in continuous progress. 
Studying Modernity and the Holocaust one may see what makes a society 
modern. Namely, behind the work is a wonderful sociological piece 
related to modernity and the categories that identify it. A digression about 
modern society in considering classical and contemporary theories of 
sociological literature can help to understand the reasons why several 
scholars, including Bauman, chose to explain the destruction of the Jews 
through the category of modernity. Here, I will not focus on modernity 
characterized by the capitalist system of production that transforms the 
economic and social relationships in a modern way. Rather, I will consider 
the category of instrumental rationality as a feature of modernity. In the 
steps of Weber, the origins are in the practical implementation of the 
Protestant ethic. In 2000, Peter Beilharz highlighted what Weber had 
bequeathed to Bauman, especially, the dominance of a formal and a-reflexive 
rationality. What matters is that it can legitimize any social action and 
degenerate into genocidal practice.116 It can be added that the notions of 
modern Western capitalism, bureaucracy, and legal-rational authority 
115 William Outhwaite et al., eds., “Modernità,” in Dizionario delle scienze sociali (Milan: il 
Saggiatore, 1997), 440. 
116 Cf. Kuper, The Pity of It All.
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that characterize modernity certainly constitute a good analytical basis for 
Modernity and the Holocaust. It recalls in turn the economic, social, and 
political sphere. 
Specifically, modernity coincides with the modern national state: 
capitalist, bourgeois, and that which develops in the West. In essence, for 
Weber, the social action of an economic capitalistic kind, that is, oriented 
to constant increase of capital, results in a continuous growth of new 
elements. Thus, he considers modern society as a capitalistic society 
whose conditions are rational organization, development of open markets, 
so-called rational-legal authority, formally ruled, and the separation of 
family from trade. The end of gubernaculum emphasizes that within the 
state, the obedience to a command or a monopoly of legitimate violence 
over a given territory is necessary: “When nation states begin to assert 
themselves against medieval universalism, . . .the nominalist conception 
of the individual is prepared, which will become a second nature in all 
further development.”117 In other words, in Weber modernity is essentially 
the formation of nation-states. To protect markets and prevent conditions 
of abuse or oppression on the part of companies, the modern national 
state assumes the responsibility of protecting its citizens. In this modern 
state also the exercise of power is rationalized. Its implementation requires 
an administrative apparatus, that is, a rational organization of the work 
according to five principles: (1) the presence of services and expertise 
 regulated by legislation; (2) a functional hierarchy; (3) impersonal 
 appropriation of the charge; (4) recruitment on merit; and, ultimately, (5) 
wages for state officials. From these five points, the sense of office—the 
instrumental rationality and the end of personal individuality in the 
performance of the role—emerges. What Bauman takes from it, for his 
discourse, is that the rational organization in political, legal, and economic 
settings reduces, however, so-called discernment, in the sense that the 
individual is no longer required to evaluate his own actions. The sphere of 
options and values gives way to pure instrumental rationality: when the 
117 Horkheimer and Adorno, Lezioni di sociologia, 52 (my translation). The sense of indi-
viduum is always present in the modern context. Furthermore, the locution individuum is 
the Latin translation of Greek άτοµον (“atom”), from Democritus: in the humus of modern 
individualism the doctrine of free competition flourishes.
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moral practice of action stops working, it performs the end of reason 
mentioned. This withdraws in front of the hypertrophic development of 
the intellect.118 But, above all, all this can degenerate into irresponsible 
actions. 
The calculation of means and ends becomes the goal of modern social 
action aimed at perfection. What is happening to society is quite similar 
to what happens to a body in which antibodies are higher than normal, a 
sort of hyperattentiveness. As in an immune system where the excessive 
number of antibodies ends up engulfing parts of the body itself, in a modern 
society those rational elements, the symbol of the liberation from superstition 
and fear, a legacy from the medieval age, degenerate into  irrationality and 
loss of meaning (of actions) and freedom of individuals.119 It is the process 
Weber defines as Entzauberung, “progressive disenchantment,” faced with 
which the only solution seems to be refuge in the irrationality of myth and 
a  charismatic leader, which become secure anchors against the iron cage 
of formal rationalization incumbent on every relational system. In its 
deployment upward, the logos rationale staggers into sur-ratio, regressing 
at irrational times. Thus, Horkheimer notes in Eclipse of Reason: “Society 
would be deprived of any intellectual means of resistance to a bond that 
social critiques have always denounced.”120
3.7.5. His Sociological Lesson 
Can we write a history of Modernity and the Holocaust? Until Bauman, the 
Holocaust was basically conceived as an event that happened to the Jews, 
an episode of the long history of anti-Semitism or some sort of aberration 
or deviation in and from the progress of civilization.121 In the wake of the 
118 Cf. Simmel, Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben.
119 Cf. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination; and see Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason.
120 See ibid., 50 and Horkheimer and Adorno, Lezioni di sociologia, 108.
121 Cf. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, viii–ix; Halpert, “Early American Sociology 
and the Holocaust,” 7. See also Postone, review of Modernity and Holocaust, 1521; Robert 
van Krieken, “The Barbarism of Civilization: Cultural Genocide and the ‘Stolen 
Generations,’” British Journal of Sociology 50, no. 2 (1999): 297–315; Tester, Il pensiero di 
Zygmunt Bauman, 154–55.
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master Ossowski, Bauman recuperates typical concepts of the sociological 
discipline and thinks about a new sociology of the Holocaust, since, 
according to him, traditional sociology had failed in its task. Postone 
wrote, “Bauman claims that sociology has not adequately confronted the 
challenges raised by the Holocaust, in part because sociology participates in 
the same scientific culture of modernity, shares its emphasis on technique, 
its propensity for social engineering, and its understanding of rational 
action. . . . Bauman contravenes this view and calls for a reconsideration of 
modernity and of the nature of sociological thought.”122 
After an excursus of private and personal research, Bauman does not 
choose the usual image of “victim, perpetrator (inhuman) and viewer.” He 
does not even opt for the conception of a cancerous formation occurring 
in the course of modern civilization. Rather, he explains the Holocaust 
through modern societal dimensions. Modernity and the Holocaust are quite 
exceptional terms, which the scholar connects in an original way, forming a 
multifaceted union. In fact, the concept of modernity is polysemous and 
extends beyond historical trends. For this reason, the bond with the 
Holocaust, a phenomenon more specifically historical, is perfect. This 
unusual verbal couple arouses the interest in Holocaust scholars, who 
return, after his publication, to rethink it. 
Bauman’s sociological lesson attracts scholars because, on one 
side, he considers modernity the primary historical cause of the 
destruction of the Jews, and on the other, he makes the Holocaust 
modern. Now, for a detailed analysis of Bauman’s construct, it is neces-
sary to identify the traces of the Holocaust in modernity and also 
understand the modernity of the Holocaust. According to Bauman, 
the question concerns which historical and sociological conjunction 
links modernity with the Holocaust. Certainly, it is the rationality 
principle, even if the deeper lesson is in the combination of two inven-
tions of modernity, namely, the bureaucratic apparatus is used to 
implement the ideological project of a perfect social order, which 
122 Postone, review of Modernity and Holocaust, 1521; see also Bauman, “Sociology after the 
Holocaust,” 469–97; Tester and Jacobsen, Bauman Before Exile, 267–74.
 | American Sociology and Holocaust Studies290
demands and legitimates contemporarily the instrumental purpose for 
the destruction of the Jews. The Holocaust is modern because it is 
given by a combination of modern factors:123
No doubt the Holocaust . . . bore features that it did not share with 
any of the past cases of genocide. . . . Like everything else done in the 
modern—rational, planned, scientifically informed, expert, effi-
ciently managed, co-ordinated—way, the Holocaust left behind and 
put to shame all its alleged pre-modern equivalents, exposing them 
as primitive, wasteful and ineffective by comparison. . . . It towers 
high above the past genocidal episodes in the same way as the 
modern industrial plant towers above the craftsman’s cottage work-
shop, or the modern industrial farm, with its tractors, combines and 
pesticides, towers above the peasant farmstead with its horse, hoe 
and hand- weeding.124
3.7.6. A Samizdat Phenomenon 
When Bauman elaborates his critique on Western modernity, he carries 
with him the experience in Poland, that which happened in the heart of 
Europe in the years of late socialism. As in the Frankfurt School, his 
thinking criticizes totalitarian power, even though his design is quite 
different:125
The question of Soviet modernity and the status of the Polish expe-
rience of which Bauman was part need to be placed alongside the 
more famous critique of the Holocaust, which can be more readily 
aligned with Horkheimer and Adorno’s views in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment.126
123 The concepts of “house in order” and “perfect garden” respond to the public policy of 
social hygiene of the Third Reich, according to thesis of Habermas on the project of 
modernity.
124 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 88–9.
125 Cf. Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 89.
126 Ibid., 88.
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The hope for a real change after the death of Stalin in 1953, and the 
following condemnation of his crimes at the Twentieth Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union with Khrushchev’s secret speech on 
February 25, 1956—for several intellectuals a kind of window of free 
expression of thought—was short-lived. The trials against intellectuals 
returned by giving a new start to a long season of dissent. 
Bauman, no longer willing to waive the rights enshrined in an offi-
cial way at the Helsinki Conference in 1975—which would characterize 
the subsequent history of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and 
Poland—opened his own conflict, ideal and real, between the political 
regime and civil society. He wants primarily to express his deep disap-
proval towards the politics of real socialism and the fallacy of the 
communist system in Modernity and the Holocaust.127 As several intel-
lectuals did between the end of 1950s and the beginning of 1960s in 
order to circulate their texts or ideas that did not conform to official 
canons, he adopted a samizdat strategy: a clandestine publishing 
industry, which requires, especially in the early stages, only the copying 
and distribution of banned texts. The reference to this Russian term 
samizdat, which literally means “self- publishing,” in this case reminds us 
of the author’s attempt to disseminate his thoughts about communist 
ideology in an indirect way. His text was published in 1989, when total-
itarianism of the Left symbolically fell with the fall of the Berlin Wall.128 
Bauman disagrees with a state, the real socialist Poland, which in poli-
tics contradicts its own ideological pre/promises. He undoubtedly 
alludes to difficulties or the impracticality of a free and critical literature 
in Eastern Europe, where cultural dissent is being denied: the anti-Se-
mitic purges of senior or academic positions confirm this. Thus, in 
Modernity and the Holocaust totalitarianism assumes a symbolic dimen-
sion that is new for academic sociology, namely, that the totalitarian 
experience is not just the prerogative of the National Socialists: in the 
127 Cf. Peter Beilharz, Zygmunt Bauman: Dialectic of Modernity (London: Sage, 2000).
128 Valentina Parisi, “Samizdat: Problemi di definizione,” eSamizdat 8 (2010–2011): 19–29, 
accessed March 28, 2012, http://www.esamizdat.it/rivista/2010-2011/index.htm.
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history of totalitarianism it is necessary to also include the Bolsheviks 
and consider communism as modern:129
Bauman reintroduces the frame of modernity and after. Communism 
was socialism in overdrive, socialism in a hurry, the younger, 
hot-headed and impatient brother. Lenin’s political impatience led 
to a sociological rupture. Lenin redefined socialism (or commu-
nism) as a substitute for, rather than a continuation of, the bourgeois 
revolution. Communism would be modernity without the bour-
geois revolution, without bourgeois democracy or a public sphere 
of any kind. Communism was an image of modernity one-sidedly 
adapted to the task of mobilizing social and natural resources in the 
name of modernization.130
Furthermore One-Dimensional Man by Marcuse and Dialectic of Enligh-
tenment by Adorno and Horkheimer indicate how the Bolshevik and Nazi 
experiences, despite their distinctions, must be compared in order to 
obtain a picture as complete as possible about the age of  totalitarianism.131 
However, for Bauman, any modernity is totalitarian, including real social-
ism.132 According to Beilharz, both the Frankfurt School and Bauman 
(apropos of totalitarianism) agree on the limits of the Enlightenment 
when rationality is bridled and self-phagocytes its raison d’être:
The relation of National Socialism to the rebellion of nature was 
complex. Since such rebellion, though “genuine,” always involves a 
129 Cf. Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 89; see also Beilharz, Zygmunt Bauman.
130 Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 96.
131 The sociologist subsumes Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism under a single analytical category. 
Cf. Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 92. “Forty years ago, writing in One-Dimensional 
Man, Herbert Marcuse suggested that ‘domination [now] . . . extends to all spheres of private 
and public existence, integrates all authentic opposition, absorbs all alternatives.’ Today, his 
thesis seems justified, as the historic decline of critical social movements, the absorption of 
countercultural elements into consumer capitalism, and the continued erosion of the public 
sphere make it ever more difficult for society to acknowledge even the possibility of an alter-
native to the status quo”; John Sanbonmatsu, “The Holocaust Sublime: Singularity, 
Representation, and the Violence of Everyday Life,” American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology 68, no. 1 (2009): 122 (author’s in-text citations omitted). 
132 Cf. Beilharz, Zygmunt Bauman; Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 89.
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regressive element . . .In modern fascism, rationality has reached a 
point at which it is no longer satisfied with simply repressing nature; 
rationality now exploits nature by incorporating into its own system 
the rebellious potentialities of nature. The Nazis manipulated the 
suppressed desires of the German people.133
And, “Anti-Semitic behavior is unleashed in situations in which blinded 
people, deprived of subjectivity, are let loose as subjects.”134
In any case, the Enlightenment is revealed as a utopia, a “no place” 
both in the Soviet system, organized according to a rational state, and in 
the modern National Socialist state, which replaces the state order with 
individual rationality.135 Both systems can be defined as “modern”:
For the Bolsheviks did violence to their people in their own name. 
The murders were done in the name of noble ends. Where the Final 
Solution was rational in its own terms, a murderous solution to a 
Nazi-imposed Jewish problem, the ethics of communism were 
worse than those of fascism, for the Bolsheviks were prepared to 
commit murder for noble rather than ignoble ends. Thus the irony 
of the fellow-travelling insistence that Stalinism was superior to 
Nazism because it sought to improve Humanity. Unlike the Nazis, 
the Bolsheviks meant well; this is supposed to be some kind of 
compensation for their victims.136
At a time when control over society fails, human behavior is exploited and 
objectives are pursued with determination and efficiency without moral 
approval from those who pursue them. The result is the destruction of the 
133 Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, 82.
134 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 140.
135 Cf. Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 92.
136 Ibid., 90. See Julian Hochfeld, “Poland and Britain: Two Concepts of Socialism,” 
International Affairs 1 (1957): 2–11; Leszek Kolakowski, “A Pleading for Revolution: A 
Rejoinder to Z. Bauman,” Archives Europeenes de Sociologie 12, no. 1 (1971): 52–60; Zygmunt 
Bauman, Stalin and the Peasant Revolution: A Case Study in the Dialectics of Master and 
Slave (Leeds: University of Leeds Department of Sociology, 1985).
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Jews: the Holocaust and real socialism are, for Bauman, ideal-typical 
experiences of the modern project:137
A condition in which the actor sees himself as executor of the wishes 
of another person.138
3.7.7. Some Literary Critics
To see with what happened after Modernity and the Holocaust came out, 
I’ll summarize the principal content of the main criticisms in order to 
understand why Bauman’s thesis works well among scholars. 
Essentially, most public reviews were favorable towards the work, 
celebrating it as unique in the sense that, for the mainstream of scholars, 
it was going to break the professed silence in post-Holocaust sociology 
and because it seemed to surpass the gap between functionalist theories 
and those of intentionalists in the historical field. Before analyzing the 
leading critiques, we must underline one point139—that the book appears 
“thought-provoking,” as Postone notes, for having put the category of 
modernity in progress. Meantime, it seems like a “puzzling” work140 and 
“fails to say enough about Germans and Jews.”141 It is relevant to notice 
that reviewers such as Banton, Beilharz, Dunning, and Mennell are 
scholars who, in their works, reevaluate the notion of modernity, starting 
from the categories of civilization and genocide. This is evident from 
review of academic journals online. As we saw in the first paragraphs of 
this chapter, the civilizing process involves genocidal practices. According 
to anthropological studies, genocide is a system of relationships between 
people having nothing to do with the so-called primitive societies. For 
postcolonial historians, genocides are perpetrated with instruments of 
137 Cf. Tester, Il pensiero di Zygmunt Bauman, 170.
138 See ibid., 157. Cf. Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 96.
139 To criticisms by Natan Sznaider and Arne Johan Vetlesen, I will devote a separate study. 
Now, for additional features, see Natan Sznaider, Jewish Memory and the Cosmopolitan 
Order (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).
140 Postone, review of Modernity and the Holocaust, 1523.
141 Beilharz, “Modernity and Communism,” 97.
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violence of a higher evolution of military technology. Thus, they have to 
be considered as outcomes of Western modernity. 
In essence, immediately after the publication of Modernity and the 
Holocaust, Michael Banton, of the University of Bristol, was among the 
first to review the book. Banton, who published his review in March 1991 
in British Journal of Sociology, recalling both Lemkin’s discourse and the 
text of the UN Convention on Genocide, appreciates Bauman’s work in a 
positive manner.142 
Michael Freeman, instead, philosopher of social sciences at the 
Government Department of University of Essex, has quite a different critical 
look: because of his works on the genocide, he considers that Bauman’s 
arguments upset the orthodox theories of sociology, ethics, and politics. 
Briefly, Bauman seems not to reflect on the history of genocide and not 
focus on the specifics of the national history of Germany, unlike Elias, 
who considers instead the civilization as a pacification process of borders: 
Lemkin did not develop the concept in order to comprehend the 
event we now know as “the Holocaust.” His purpose was to document 
German war crimes. He came to the view that these crimes were so 
barbarous that they went beyond the acts that had been rendered 
criminal by the framers of the relevant international law. This body of 
law assumed that war was fought between states. However, the 
German state, under the influence of Nazi ideology, was waging war 
against nations. It was for this project that Lemkin coined the term 
“genocide.” The original conception of “genocide,” therefore, was that 
of the waging of war by a state in order to destroy nations.143
Now, to come back to Freeman’s critique, for this scholar Bauman “misses” 
an important aspect, namely, “what was not modern in that genocide.” He 
fails for not having collocated “the Holocaust in the more general theoretical 
consideration of genocide.”144 In this sense Freeman is close to a relevant 
142 Michael Banton, review of Modernity and the Holocaust, by Zygmunt Bauman, The British 
Journal of Sociology 42, no. 1 (1991): 164.
143 Freeman, “Genocide, Civilization and Modernity,” 209.
144 Ibid.
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matter, that Bauman, in choosing modernity as unique explaining key of 
the Holocaust, fails to offer a complete lesson of the event; that, in his 
effort to understand the Holocaust through the category of modernity, 
Bauman cannot recognize the specificity of the Holocaust; by locating the 
destruction of the Jews in a Western space, he does not take into account 
(and this is the main failure) the public massacres perpetrated in the East 
by means of unmodern practices.145 It is linked to the fact that slaughters 
executed in the Soviet territories are unknown to scholars: first, because 
the Soviet archives were closed until the fall of Berlin Wall; second, 
because they are voluntarily dismissed under the Cold War ideologies. 
His failure is more evident when Freeman highlights the difference 
between Lemkin’s assumptions and Bauman’s, which are totally opposed 
to Lemkin’s. For example, according to Lemkin, the Nazi case constitutes 
a return to barbarism despite the practice of high-tech and modern 
methods. But for Bauman, the Holocaust is the full manifestation of the 
modern age and civilization and not at all a moment of return to barba-
rism. This point distances and moves from genocidal practices committed 
in the Soviet territories and that fit in the Holocaust. This element opens 
on to new reflections in comprehending the Holocaust in the East related 
to the recent theories on the genocide.146 As Freeman says, “The values of 
145 Cf. Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide; Gross, Neighbors; Bartov, 
“L’Europa orientale come luogo del genocidio”. See John Mueller, “Changing Attitudes 
towards War: The Impact of the First World War,” British Journal of Political Science 21 
(1991): 1–28.
146 See Steven L. Jacobs, “The Papers of Raphael Lemkin: A First Look,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 1, no. 1 (1999): 105–14; Dan Stone, “Modernity and Violence: Theoretical 
Reflections on the Einsatzgruppen,” Journal of Genocide Research 1, no. 3 (1999): 367–78; 
Øystein G. Holter, “A Theory of Gendercide,” Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 1 (2002): 
11–38; Matthew Lippman, “A Road Map to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 2 (2002): 177–95; 
Bartrop, “The Relationship between War and Genocide in the Twentieth Century”; Jeffrey 
S. Morton and Neil V. Singh, “The International Legal Regime on Genocide,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 5, no. 1 (2003): 47–69; Jacques Sémelin, “Toward a Vocabulary of 
Massacre and Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 5, no. 2 (2003): 193–210; Akio 
Kimura, “Genocide and the Modern Mind: Intention and Structure,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 5, no. 3 (2003): 405–20; Linda M. Woolf and Michael R. Hulsizer, “Psychosocial 
Roots of Genocide: Risk, Prevention, and Intervention,” Journal of Genocide Research 7, 
no. 1 (2005): 101–28; Stuart D. Stein, “Conceptions and Terms: Templates for the Analysis 
of Holocausts and Genocides,” Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 2 (2005): 171–203. 
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our society require that we develop such a sociology.”147 It requires a 
retracing of the genesis of the genocide. Moreover, this is a new field of 
research for sociology and history in the post-Holocaust years that has to 
do with the state establishment. For Freeman, genocide is both a manifes-
tation of modern civilization and a return to barbarism. 
Let us look at, even if briefly, another critique, by Dunning and 
Mennell, published in 1998, which puts at the center of its response “how 
the German historical experience” explains “its occurrence or peculiar 
features.”148 They do this while reconsidering The Germans by Elias, and 
their piece confronts Bauman’s and Elias’s statements.
Published in the same year as Bauman’s Modernity and the Holocaust, 
Elias’s The Germans agrees partly with Bauman, specifically, when it 
points out that the planned extermination of the masses does not fall 
outside of the mass society. Instead, Elias opposes Bauman as regards the 
theory of the civilizing process at the basis of the rise of totalitarian 
power.149 According to Elias’s interpretation, the civilizing process is espe-
cially the pacification of the borders for national and individual security 
from all forms of predatory incursion or incivility. Unlike Elias, who puts 
the specificity of the German national history at the basis of his work, 
Bauman neglects the social forces that unfold during the process of 
democratization in Germany.150 
The specificity of the Germany history is instead rather crucial: the 
process of German civilization, translated with the term Kultur, explains 
better the sense of the struggle for power or control and falls in the last 
stage of imperialism. From 1871 to 1918, the Kaiserreich was a society 
guided by a code of honor (satisfaktionsfähige Gesellschaft). Nevertheless, 
the unification of Germany included a process of brutalization, in the 
sense that the aristocracy and the middle class found themselves in the 
new unified Reich, but without sharing the same cultural background and 
national levels—the middle and working class ignored the rules of the 
code of honor of the aristocracy, that is, when Germany was founded, at 
147 Freeman, “Genocide, Civilization and Modernity,” 222.
148 Cf. Dunning and Mennell, “Elias on Germany, Nazism and the Holocaust,” 342.
149 Elias, The Germans.
150 Cf. Dunning and Mennell, “Elias on Germany, Nazism and the Holocaust,” 344–45.
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the end of the nineteenth century, it had unnationalized masses: there was 
no any merger of values and national ideals common to the majority of 
the middle and working classes.151 There was no nation. What is also 
crucial, for Dunning and Mennell, is that the international context of the 
Great War deserves more attention. Freikorps were educated in a climate 
of violence and barbaric national mythology full of prejudices, which 
slowly led to Hitler’s rise:
Germans in general did not develop a habitus and conscience 
attuned to the give-and-take of parliamentary rule. On the contrary, 
they developed a pattern dependent on external, authoritarian 
control expressed through such concepts as Kadavergehorsam—
“corpse-like obedience.” Hans Frank, the Reichsminister and 
Governor-General of occupied Poland, for example, recast Kant 
when he wrote that: “The categorical imperative of action in the 
Third Reich is this: act in such a way that the Führer, if he knew of 
your action, would approve of it.” Consistent with this was the 
metaphor of the Radfahrermechanismus—the “cyclist mecha-
nism”—which referred to a lust for submission to those in power 
and the displacement of the resultant hostilities onto those below.152
In the bourgeois aristocracy ethos, the military component and the ethos 
of the honor code (satisfaktionsfähige) were very important. Discipline, 
honor, and sense of duty were essential, while hierarchy, discretion, social 
distance, and formality characterized social relations:153
The brutalization of leading sections of the German middle classes 
and their absorption of a militaristic code thus formed, according to 
Elias, one of the preconditions for the process of barbarization in 
Germany which helped pave the way for Nazism. In short, Elias 
stresses how a peculiar conjuncture of circumstances arose in 
151 Cf. ibid., 350, 352–53.
152 Ibid., 351–52; the reference is to Elias, The Germans.
153 Cf. ibid., 349; the reference is to Stephen Kalberg, “The German Sonderweg De-Mystified: 
A Sociological Biography of a Nation,” Theory, Culture and Society 9, no. 3 (1992): 111–24.
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German history and social development, combining to produce a 
resurgence of warrior values when a more unilinear theory—of the 
kind which Bauman and Burkitt wrongly interpret Elias as having 
proposed—might have led to an expectation of their decline.154
The Kaiserreich society aimed at maintaining the characters of the German 
aristocracy and the character of the German Aryans. It is relevant to 
remember what Jeffrey Herf says, “The reactionary modernists insisted 
that the Kulturnation could be both powerful and true to its soul. As 
Joseph Goebbels repeatedly insisted, this was to be the century of 
stählernde Romantik, steellike romanticism.”155 
As pointed out by Dunning and Mennell, for Elias, National Socialism 
inherited the characteristics of the dynastic Prussian state: those of a 
strong German Aryanism. (The Kaiserreich, in its formation, combined 
rapid industrialization with the structures of the Prussian dynasty, leaving 
little room for political and economic liberalism.) These conditions did not 
result in a state embodying a nation with which the mass of the population 
identified. Rather, in the modern Kaiserreich the transcendental myth of 
Aryan beauty and the belief that from the best fathers are born the best 
children unfolded. In this context, Elias sees all those conditions that 
allow the engraftment of Nazi ideology leveraging on the Aryan race, and 
that creates the premises of biological anti-Semitism: Blut und Boden.156 
What Dunning and Mennell’s piece unearths, in confronting Elias’s 
and Bauman’s works, is that in Nazi society were those characteristics 
specific to the society of honor code, where the masses do not enter into 
the state and where the state does not include their social claims. In 
essence, they stress that at the basis of Elias’s discourse there is a mass “not 
nationalized” and that the “non-nationalization,” during the process of 
modernization in Germany, in some ways, stopped civilization: when, for 
instance, this mass did not come into politics. The preserving of the 
 aristocratic German tradition, rather than modern progress, interpreted 
154 Ibid., 349–50.
155 Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 3.
156 See Dunning and Mennell, “Elias on Germany, Nazism and the Holocaust,” 349, 352–53.
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as a degeneration of values, was a return to barbarism. It was a process 
opposite to that of civilization, called “de-civilization” by Elias. 
What Dunning and Mennell underscore is, first, the role of National 
Socialism, which offered a vision of a society reassuring to the conservative 
classes: a society that would allow economic development without putting 
at risk social boundaries and national traditions. Second, that at the 
origins of nonnationalization of the mass were political instability and 
tensions between the house of Hohenzollern and Habsburg in the more 
general context of the Weimar Republic years.157 Namely, following the 
second industrial revolution, several changes occurred, especially for the 
emergence of the working class: its role became crucial in the rise of 
National Socialism and the Holocaust. It is well outlined by Elias:158
One thing, though, has to be said in favour of Bauman compared with 
Elias: he does develop a stimulating explanation of why the Holocaust 
was directed mainly against Jews. Despite his own Jewish origins, that 
is an issue on which Elias was relatively silent. . . . Ultimately, however, 
his attempt to transcend Elias fails because he does not realize how 
crucial the concept of “functional democratization” is to Elias’s theory. 
Nor does he appreciate the fundamental role attributed by Elias to 
middle-class groups.159
Looking at the other reviews, we should highlight that in the 1990s the 
resonance of Modernity and the Holocaust was felt in Australia, where, 
after the 1968 Polish anti-Semitic purges Bauman had spent a period of 
study. Robert van Krieken of the Department of Sociology of Work, Social 
Policy and Sociology at the University of Sydney, on the basis of the 
concept of social suffering, dear to Bauman, started to approach the 
Holocaust to explain additional exterminations. He tells of new massacres, 
genocides, starting from the accounting for the Holocaust. For instance, 
157 Cf. ibid., 346–50; George L. Mosse, Die Nationalisierung der Massen: Politische Symbolik 
und Massenbewegungen von den Befreiungskriegen bis zum Dritten Reich (Frankfurt: 
Campus, 1993).
158 Cf. Dunning and Mennell, “Elias on Germany, Nazism and the Holocaust,” 350–54.
159 Ibid., 354 (authors’ in-text citations omitted). 
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he explains the social suffering of indigenous children in Australia, looking 
at the systematic removal of indigenous children from their families, mostly 
for reasons of social engineering, with the aim of systematically annihilating 
the cultural identity of the Aborigines.160 This is central for seeing how the 
Holocaust as a phenomenon can become a social/sociological category—
this element will be more evident in my next chapter—to explain disorders 
in society in the form of deviation, annihilation, and crime. 
For Krieken, Modernity and the Holocaust becomes a kind of theoretical 
basis to compare contemporary historical situations, in which similar events 
to those that happened to the Jews occur. In this way, in Bauman’s aim, the 
suffering endured by the Jews is emblematic of all suffering. This is possible 
thanks to the end of the Cold War, when there started, systematically, a 
more open vision towards what happens in the world. Although Krieken 
has recourse to the category of modernity, he deviates from Bauman’s 
general theory. Foremost because he focuses on questioning what kind of 
modernity is one that leads to the genocidal practice, stealing entire 
generations. Nevertheless, what does it mean to be a modern citizen? 
Starting from these elements, Krieken evidences that modern culture 
has ambivalent aspects and that behind the genocidal policies or practices 
there is the process of civilization:161 modernity includes a barbaric 
 civilization that refers to the perpetration of genocide as a means of 
solving political problems. What is remarkable in reading Krieken’s 
critique is that, by criticizing Modernity and the Holocaust, genocide 
appears in its essential nature, namely, as a system of relationships between 
populations not at all primitive. Modern societies become barbaric in 
their unfolding, in their civilizing process. In the modern world, barbarity 
is accomplished—this is the ambivalence of modernity. Moreover, the 
discourse would become more evident with the explosion of the civilian 
wars in the Balkans during the 1990s.
Right in this period, in 1992, an important critique of Modernity 
and the Holocaust was published. Postone, of the University of Chicago, 
puts in the center of discussion why Bauman cannot simply explain 
160 Krieken, “The Barbarism of Civilization,” 297.
161 Cf. ibid., 309. See Dunning and Mennell, “Elias on Germany, Nazism and the Holocaust,” 
339–57.
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the story of the Holocaust with the concept of anti-Semitism. After a 
synthetic presentation of the work, Postone reflects on the failure of 
sociology in the study of the Holocaust. A few years earlier, in 1986, in 
Anti-Semitism and National Socialism, he had explained the reasons 
why the Jews are considered both the source of financial capitalism 
and of international communism.162 For him, the main reason lies in 
the status of the same subject, in the sense that sociology, in assimi-
lating the positive sciences, forgets the content and the proper tools of 
sociological analysis, underestimating important categories, such as 
that of Durkheim’s moral solidarity.163 Postone, who reconsiders the 
entire conceptual notions and sociologists referring to Bauman, 
devotes much space to his methodology. He reflects on the issue of 
cooperation of the victims with National Socialism. Nevertheless, the 
more important factor is that, for Postone, the kind of relationship that 
Bauman traces between anti-Semitism and modernity is unsatisfac-
tory. According to this explanation, modern anti-Semitism would be 
the expression of phobias versus modernity. Finally, “Although 
Bauman’s position parallels central aspects of that of the Frankfurt 
school, they differ fundamentally as regards the issue of society and 
morality. Bauman does not appropriate their sophisticated attempts to 
consistently regard humans as culturally, socially, and historically 
constituted by socially grounding both conformist and oppositional 
worldviews.”164
When Modernity and the Holocaust was disseminated in France, the 
country came to terms with one of the many contradictions resulting 
from modernity: the destruction of the Jews of Europe was interpreted as 
a unique event in the Western culture. Michael Bernstein to this end talks 
about obsession for “issues raised by the Nazi genocide”:165
162 See Moishe Postone, “Anti-Semitism and National Socialism,” in Germans and Jews since 
the Holocaust, ed. Anson Rabinbach and Jack D. Zipes (New York: Holmes and Meier, 
1986), 302–14.
163 Cf. Halpert, “Early American Sociology and the Holocaust”; see also Hoover, “The Failure 
of the Social Science,” 89–96.
164 Postone, review of Modernity and the Holocaust, 1523.
165 Cf. Silverman, Facing Postmodernity, 13
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In France this obsession epitomizes a country ill at ease not only 
with its own involvement in genocide but also with the very ideals 
of modernity which France upheld.166
The reception of Modernity and the Holocaust in France coincided with a 
kind of awareness at the national level that allowed reflection on its historical 
specificity, especially, on the responsibilities that the Vichy regime had in 
the destruction of the Jews. However, the reflections on the Jewish question 
were only possible after the death of Charles de Gaulle:
At the beginning of the 1970s, the death of Charles De Gaulle (1969) 
and the challenge to the great resistance myth that he personified—
epitomized by Marcel Ophuls’s documentary Le Chagrin et la pitié 
(1971) and Robert Paxton’s book (1972) on Vichy France—opened 
the way to a reappraisal of the question of anti-Semitism and the 
relationship between Vichy and the “final solution.”167
In the France of the 1970s, the Holocaust entered into public discourse 
and began to be regarded as the genocide of the Jews. All this happened in 
a period that followed the Eichmann trial, as the era of witnesses who 
survived the Holocaust that had just begun.168 However, in France, 
Holocaust Studies were postmodern and closer to the positions of the 
Frankfurt School than the theory of Bauman, since they regarded the 
Holocaust as a decline and not a product of modernity.169 In essence, the 
reflection of French scholars on the Jewish question went hand in hand 
with the crisis of modernity, when it started an animated cultural debate 
resulting from a series of circumstances—from the Yom Kippur War to 
the oil crisis, from the end of Fordism to the decline of the welfare state, 
passing through the collapse of public management and, theoretically, 
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid., 12.
168 Cf. Annette Wieviorka, L’era del testimone (Milan: Cortina, 1999); Silverman, Facing 
Postmodernity, 12.
169 Cf. ibid., 20, 24, 31–32; Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness 
(London: Verso, 1993).
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through its deconstruction by Derrida, who criticizes the modern Western 
tradition.170
3.7.8. An Open Problem on the Modernity Thesis
The thesis of the modernity of the Holocaust argued by Bauman seemed 
to fail or, certainly, was put into discussion after the publication of 
Neighbors by Gross. Here arises a reevaluation of Bauman’s book for the 
role that anti-Semitism and Polish nationalism ideologies played in 
the destruction of the Jews. This analysis seems to be crucial to confront 
the thesis of both authors. It is important to ask (and the question remains 
open) why Bauman, who escaped from Poland and became a refugee in 
England, after Australia, and Israel, due to Polish anti-Semitism, in his 
book explaining the Holocaust, sets apart anti-Semitism. He outlines 
instead modernity as the primary cause of the Holocaust. By asserting that 
it is a question in progress, the mind runs to the inevitability for Holocaust 
scholars to confront with it. One reason why his thesis fascinates and 
attracts numerous scholars (from historians to theologians, from politologists 
to anthropologists, and not only sociologists) even so far to define his 
book as the work wakes up the Holocaust sociology, might have to do with 
the political obligation European governments have had to face after the 
opening of Eastern archives, after 1989. In other words, that opening changed 
the entire situation by compelling an assumption of responsibilities for what 
happened. In addition, we can highlight that it deals with the anti-Semitic 
experiences of Bauman. Specifically, other scholars who experienced 
anti-Semitism dwell on it, but Bauman does not put it at the center of his 
thinking. Rather, he is for thought sine ira ac studio, avoiding explanations 
filled with too much personal meaning. Moreover, following the thinking 
of social sciences of 1960s onwards, he avoids monocausal explanations of 
phenomena. Hence, his modern devices that embrace and call for many 
other causes.171 Bauman is aware of this scholarly opinion and is brilliant 
170 Silverman, Facing Postmodernity, 17. Cf. Gillian Rose, Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical 
Essays (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1993).
171 Let me thank Giuseppe Veltri for having discussed the matter with me.
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in arguing the modernity thesis in a better way: he does this speaking of 
the human suffering in society.
That the modernity thesis, as neutral, is purposeful in academic 
realms is evident in stressing further how it is an outcome of sociological 
thinking of 1980s. It reflects the political and economic changes of the 
period: the end of the welfare state and the beginning of globalization 
period, when an intensification of demands for rights is developed.
In saying that Bauman puts in progress the category of modernity, 
I refer also to the fact that modernity is a powerful tool: it calls politicians 
and politologists to a new politics, economists to a new economy, and so 
on. However, this notion fails to find the real roots of the Holocaust and to 
find those responsible for it. It misses in defining the perimeters of who 
perpetrated the Holocaust, failing, as a consequence, the coming to terms 
with penalties assessed against the perpetrators of the Holocaust. 
Paradoxically, but the line of reasoning is thin, it returns what happened 
during the Cold War, or its effects—that of the deresponsabilization, of 
not paying for crimes committed (government by government, country 
by country).
At the same time, the modernity thesis is neutral because it is not 
going to disturb anyone and it does not open extra halls of shame for the 
governments of the Cold War period, but, above all, it does not put anyone 
on trial, in the sense that modernity has no personal face, an individuality. 
By assuming the theory of modernity as source and cause of the Holocaust, 
circuitously, it happens that scholars attribute any accountability to 
modernity, in general. Strange to say, but people stop finding the guilty 
party, and it means, according to the law, that there is no unequivocal and 
definite condemnation of the individual guilty. And thus a destruction of 
people can always happen. As Neumann remembers, the Holocaust was 
not born with Nazism. Rather, it belongs to worldwide anti-Semitism.172 
Generally, the category of ideology, literally “science of ideas,” thanks 
to Destutt de Tracy, helps us better comprehend the power of destruction 
that the anti-Semitic ideology brings. The social construction of situations 
not corresponding to the truth, but assumed as real, hardly leans towards a 
172 Cf. Neumann, Behemoth.
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justice of the facts. In addition, it finds its legitimacy in scientific rhetoric 
and social engineering. 
Reconsidering the thesis of modernity of the Holocaust, in some 
ways, means to compare the sociological approach with the historical one. 
It also can be argued that modernity as notion is meaningful, for Bauman, 
because in Poland, and in other communist countries, the passage to 
modernity had been much slower.
Bauman, in presenting modernity as the real cause for what happened 
to the Jews, does not contemplate the registration of acts committed. 
Namely, the so-called criminal responsibility for the mass murder cannot 
deal with the modernity of the Holocaust. For their specificity, the legal 
inquisition or the celebrations of the proceedings cannot admit the ratio-
nality of evil or pure evil as the main indicator of Nazi crimes. The criminal 
responsibility with the attribution of committed crimes, the clarification of 
the offense, and the definition of the offender have the practical utility of 
recognizing the offense, avoiding a possible prescription or its nonexistence. 
This is because it brings legal justice with it. At the head of a bureaucratic 
office, there is a juridical person, one who centralizes power relations, medi-
ates directives received, or performs the final operations, and who is 
juridically responsible. Thus, to ensure the accountability for the action, it is 
feasible that any public courtroom can see and accuse the rationality of evil 
or the ideological-totalitarian regime. The modernity of the Holocaust 
removes instead the personal assumption of blame, in the sense that, if one 
imputes the Holocaust to modernity, “the empty dock” finishes in disre-
garding the evil done and even denying the Holocaust. Bauman unexpectedly 
risks obtaining this effect. Furthermore, the responsibility question defines 
the civil liability within a state when it recalls the element of territoriality, 
that is, the place where a crime is committed.173 The accusing of single indi-
viduals, at fault in Nazi fascist crimes, is the duty imperative, necessary to 
break the rational, bureaucratic, and industrial chain set in motion by the 
Nazis; then, the execution of service orders, which reproduce the leadership 
command and imply the hierarchy of skills.
173 Cf. Silverman, Facing Postmodernity, 34.
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In essence, Modernity and the Holocaust is a work that opened up a signif-
icant debate, among sociologists and historians, and that inevitably 
intersected with the reality of modern society, social devices, and national 
structures that facilitated or controlled extermination by fellow citizens. Both 
history and sociology, as academic disciplines, have to reconsider the prac-
tices and theoretical categories of modern anti-Semitism on the genocide in 
Eastern Europe: the matter lies in the appropriating of the specific (cultural, 
historical, and political) notions and tradition of those territories.174 
Rereading the event through the category of modernity is certainly a 
fruitful exercise, but considered alone it resizes and flattens the reality. 
Modernity and the Holocaust is presented in a postmodern world: 
it results from the post-1968 era and comes up between German 
philosophy, French sociology, and English beliefs. Bauman knows this. 
After his publication, or after 1989, a number of factors have to be 
considered instead: into the Holocaust fit not only the victims of death 
and concentration camps, but also the Jews who died in the forests or were 
killed in the Soviet territories with the help of local people, supporters, 
ordinary people (anashim tovim). One cannot forget the akcjas, or pogroms, 
against the Jews that followed, in rapid succession, until after the end of 
the war, as evidenced by the massacres of whole communities perpetrated 
in Eastern Europe due to the anti-Semitic feelings. As Bauer notices, the 
same Bauman recognizes the scope of the anti-Semitism in Endlösung,175 
although in the work he then disassociates its determinant role.
At one point, Bauman writes that historian Martin Broszat has 
synthesized compelling results from a historical point of view:
“In those cities and towns where Jews formed a large segment of the 
population, the relations between the Germans and the Jews were, 
even in the first years of the Nazi era, for the most part relatively good 
and hardly hostile.” Nazi attempts to stir up antisemitic feelings and 
to re-forge static resentment into a dynamic one (a distinction 
174 See Bauman, “On the Maturation of Socialism,” Telos 47 (1981): 48–54; Augusta Dimou, 
Entangled Paths towards Modernity: Contextualizing Socialism and Nationalism in the 
Balkans (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009).
175 See Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, 68–83.
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aptly coined by Müller-Claudius)—i.e. to inflame the non-Party, 
ideologically uncommitted population into acts of violence against 
the Jews or at least into an active support of SA displays of force—
foundered on the popular repugnance of physical coercion, on 
deep-seated inhibitions against inflicting pain and physical 
suffering, and on stubborn human loyalty to their neighbours, to 
people whom one knows and has charted into one’s map of the 
world as persons, rather than anonymous specimens of type.176
However, this historian had been a member of the Nazi Party. 
What matters is that Bauman overlooks the concept of citizenship: 
although Jews are citizens, they are perceived by their compatriots as a 
foreign body to be eliminated or as enemies to be fought as a threat to the 
health of the nation.177 If stateless and without rights, like the Jews, as 
mentioned by Arendt in 1951, instead for Bauman the new pariahs are all 
those who live on the margins of a society that has dismissed the bonds of 
solidarity.178 What was lacking, in the construction process of the modern 
state, the so-called nationalization, was a process of policies of integration 
for foreigners or policies for citizenship. When the achievement of certain 
rights had occurred or a change of balance in power relations had taken 
place, some social groups and existing hierarchies felt undermined: what 
Gérard Noiriel calls “déclassement” happens and that degenerates into 
forms of rejection against certain persons.179 The protection of rights is 
largely dependent on the level of democracy present in the institutions, 
while their violation (the Nuremberg Laws or the waves of anti-Semitism) 
is linked to specific times of political and social crisis.180 The Jews were 
foreigners and nationals at the same time. 
176 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 186, see 223n10.
177 Cf. Enzo Traverso, “Immigrazione, antisemitismo e razzismo: Una sola storia?” 
Contemporanea 12, no. 1 (2009): 204; the author refers to Michael Foucault, Bisogna difen-
dere la società: Corso al Collège de France (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1998 [1977]).
178 Cf. Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence.
179 Cf. Traverso, Immigrazione, antisemitismo e razzismo, 205–6; see also Gérard Noiriel, 
Immigration, antisémitisme et racisme en France (XIX–XX siècle): Discours publics, humili-
ations privées (Paris: Fayard, 2007). 
180 Cf. Luciano Morlino, Democrazie e democratizzazioni (Bologna: il Mulino, 2003).
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It can be said that a series of very complex factors made the Holocaust 
possible: it is proper to consider all of them to avoid rendering the phenom-
enon incomprehensible or mysterious. Let me stress, here, that the failure 
of the modernity thesis or arguing for the amodernity of the Holocaust 
can be fertile. Bauman’s thesis provides, for example, scholars with the 
analytical tools for starting new research in the areas of the former Soviet 
Union. In addition, it, indirectly, leads the same scholars to readdress the 
responsibility question: the accountability that any individual has (and for 
which he must pay the penalty) for having committed genocide.
3.8. SUMMARY
In this chapter, we have seen that post-Holocaust sociology engaged with 
issues of genocide traditionally located outside the realm of conventional 
sociology. My focal point was the sociological reworking of the concept of 
genocide, at a time when the bonds of national solidarity were continu-
ously destroyed by a continuous proliferation of genocides. This new 
sociological shift at work was particularly visible in the 1980s. I delineated 
the ways in which the discipline arrived at the term “sociology of geno-
cide” and came to speak of “genocidal states.” By offering new studies that 
investigated what is meant by the order of terror as total institution or by 
dealing with the contradictions of modernity placed sociology of the 
1980s in a noteworthy light. Sociology combined well with history in 
handling questions such as resistance and the banality of good. Much 
space was dedicated to the concept of social suffering: thanks to Bauman, 
who had repersonified human suffering in making the Jews the emblem of 
all the oppressed, in line with the social sciences of the 1980s. Also seen 
was the significance of the opening of the Eastern archives after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Whether Bauman’s book did indeed wake up 
post-Holocaust sociology was also put into question.
CHAPTER 4
The Problem of the 
Holocaust after 1989
Why women? Why should a book on the Holocaust—which targeted all Jews for 
annihilation irrespective of their sex or age or any other social characteristics—
focus on women?
—Dalia Ofer and Lenore J. Weitzman (1998)
Another political factor that contributed to the bracketing of the Holocaust was the 
rhetoric of the Cold War (during which the old enemy Germany had become an ally, 
and the Soviet Union, the old ally, had become the new enemy) and its conceptual 
foundation, the theory of totalitarianism. In this context there was no space for a 
particularistic version of the Holocaust. Instead the victims of concentration camps 
were primarily depicted as political prisoners.
—Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider (2002)
Birnbaum attributes the rise of modern anti-Semitism to popular reaction against 
the strong state. Where a strong state is perceived as having imposed on society the 
emancipation of the Jews, anti-Semitism tends to be strong (for example, Germany 
and France). On the other hand, where the state is relatively weak and Jews 
obtained equal rights through society rather than the state, anti-Semitism tends to 
be muted (for example, the USA and Great Britain).
—William I. Brustein and Ryan D. King (2004)
4.1. AFTER THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL
Holocaust sociology after 1989 is important, especially because, for this 
discipline, the 1990s were characterized by an experimental unceasing 
period of subdivision into original interminable substrands. Therefore, it 
is important to try to understand how these different substrands approach 
the topic with their typical devices. This chapter is concerned with the sort 
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of scientific contagion of sociology with other social sciences: mostly, 
politology, statics, and demography. It seems that sociology went in 
different directions, and post-Holocaust sociology followed this trend. 
This new approach was possible after 1989, the year in which the collapse 
of the Berlin Wall marked the end of bipolarism and signaled the start of 
a long series of political transformations, and everyone understood that 
the Iron Curtain dividing the world was no more. From that event it 
becomes possible to account for, step-by-step, any nation’s story and any 
national Holocaust history in a manner that was either not admissible or 
unthinkable under communism.
The resonance of these political events and, especially, the power to 
reproduce and disseminate durable representations of these important 
changes are prominent in post-Holocaust sociological studies. Scholars 
were now able to elaborate the past without the shadow of Cold War ideas. 
As well stressed by Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, “The end of the Cold 
War has led to a fundamental change in the parameters of collective 
memories in Europe and made possible attempts to produce shared 
cosmopolitan memories.”1 
In this period, Modernity and the Holocaust attained universal 
approval: in essence, everyone welcomed it, and it was an enchanting 
book. Bauman’s sociological interpretation marks Holocaust Studies in 
general: historical, politological, and philosophical researches seemed like 
they could not do without it. This is because of his key reading of the 
“rationality of the Holocaust,” which has fascinated scholars ever since.2
As we saw in the previous chapter, the category of modernity is not 
going to disturb any conscience or any government. It is neutral, perfectly 
scientific, as the postindustrial era requires. Nevertheless, the efficiency of 
this category is questioned by recent historiography (possible after the 
end of bipolarism), as demonstrated by the debate resulting from the 
publication, in 2000, of Gross’s volume on the massacre of the Polish 
Jewish community in Jedwabne on July 10, 1941.3 
 1 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 100. 
 2 Cf. Postone, review of Modernity and the Holocaust, 1521–23. 
 3 See notes 97, 99, above (chapter 2). Consider Simcha Epstein, “From Anti-Semitism of 19th 
Century to Nazi Anti-Semitism,” paper presented at Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, August 22, 2011.
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“The Cold War,” Levy and Sznaider write, “was an alliance of values as 
much as of interests.”4 The opening of archives allowed a review of the history 
of former Soviet satellites and, consequently, an accounting for the number 
of dead Jews in the Soviet territories and the extermination methods adopted. 
The huge difference compared to other parts of occupied Europe was in the 
public nature of the genocide and the collaboration of local people in the 
slaughters. By the beginning of the 1990s, there was a profound conversion 
in historiographical practices, after decades during which the Holocaust and 
its memory was off limits in the Eastern communist territories. The archives 
in Eastern Europe were opened to historians, and a new phase of historiog-
raphy commenced, revising and openly placing previous results into 
question, but the historical overview of sociological studies of this period 
instead presents several difficulties. As Antonella Salomoni writes, “At the 
stage in which historians prevail, however, the pressure of sociologists arises 
because of their ambition to offer a kind of overall story of the Holocaust, 
shaping it as a specific line.”5 Nevertheless, the end of bipolarism constituted 
a watershed that overturned the established systems of thought:
When the uniting interests and values of anti-communism vanished, 
international cooperation had to be reorganized on a new basis. The 
attempt to articulate and organize around new values has been a 
conscious one over the last ten years. And it is no accident that the 
Holocaust has come to play a major role in that reorganization. 
It has emerged precisely because of its status as an unquestioned 
moral value on which all people can supposedly agree.6
The theme of the Holocaust, because of the influences upon sociology, 
started to be analyzed and mixed with supplementary issues, such as 
migration to Israel, the birth of the State of Israel, and the experience of 
second-generation survivors. Furthermore, it is relevant to stress that 
while the globalization process reached its peak, some sociologists (like 
Levy and Sznaider, in the wake of Beck and Alexander) began to show 
 4 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 96. 
 5 Salomoni, I libri sulla Shoah, 4 (my translation).
 6 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 96–97. 
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some sensitivity towards aspects of the global society, so much so that the 
concepts derived by observing this phenomenon were placed at the center 
of their analysis on the Holocaust. In other words, their works constituted 
a new current of sociological strand and a new path for Holocaust 
sociology because of the original analytical categories they introduced. 
Thus, in the last twenty years, Holocaust sociology has differed from 
the earlier tradition, both in perspective and in research methods. The 
works of this period, elaborated in the most intense moment of the 
 globalization process, have been affected by the global dimension, which 
has been ever-present. This means that they present a multidimensional 
view not referring to a physical space and having no ties with a specific 
territory. Because, after 1989, the Holocaust has sometimes been studied in 
a confusing manner, let me here try to put some order to it by examining 
some major conceptual themes and recalling what Gerson and Wolf have 
already synthetized in Sociology Confronts the Holocaust.7 Those themes 
are collective memory, gender, and collective action, which  can be found in 
the general discourse of sociology of the period, given that they constitute 
the principal notions introduced and recurring in sociological debates.
4.2.  FROM COLLECTIVE NATIONAL MEMORY TO 
COSMOPOLITAN MEMORY
It is crucial to retrace what “collective memory” means. First, it is assumed 
that no human life can be rebuilt outside of its territory, alluding to the 
deep connection between the “reinterpretation of experienced sense” and 
the physical location where the event or object of the narrative reelaboration 
occurs:8 “Halbwachs never provides a clear definition of collective memory. 
Synthesizing several of his formulations, I would say that the collective 
memory of a group is, for Halbwachs, a set of representations of the past that 
are stored and transmitted among its members through their interactions. 
 7 See Gerson and Wolf, Sociology Confronts the Holocaust, 3–37.
 8 Carlo Socco, “Landscape, Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” paper presented at the 
forum Italian Landscapes for the Government of Transformations, organized by Benetton 
Foundation, Castelfranco Veneto, May 26–29, 1999; see also Eugenio Turri, Il paesaggio 
come teatro: Dal territorio vissuto al territorio rappresentato (Venice: Marsilio, 1998).
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Sets of events and concepts mentioned, it is also a common way to inter-
pret them.”9 Thus, the collective memory as a set of traces of the past that 
one social group transmits from one generation to the next, in connection 
with own traditions and history, constitutes the expression of the identity 
of a group. 
According to Nora, starting from the 1990s, a new era commenced 
for Holocaust sociology, marked deeply by the weight of collective 
memory.10 As Traverso stresses, the extermination of the Jews became a 
central event in the contemporary world, but only when Nazism started to 
belong to a distant past. In the 1940s, “it was unimaginable to begin a 
university career preparing a thesis on the extermination of the Jews—
Raul Hilberg’s memories are eloquent in this regard—but now this issue 
has turned into a real scientific discipline.” In addition, for the edition of 
his book, he writes that it is “inevitably indebted to a Zeitgeist, that of 
the current turn of the century. Thirty years ago it would have been incon-
ceivable.”11 What has led to this shift, up until the contemporary and 
ever-increasing attention, is a matter of considerable interest, as Traverso 
points out. There have been several factors, such as the persistence of 
anti-Semitism in different realms and in postwar international politics, in 
the removal or omission of the memory of what happened to the Jews:
The immediate aftermath of the Second World War was marked by 
a silence concerning the destruction of European Jewry, which at 
that time did not even have a name yet. It was broadly subsumed 
under the atrocities of the war. The idea of the Holocaust did not 
spring full-grown from the facts. And yet, surprisingly perhaps, all 
 9 Paolo Jedlowski, Memoria, esperienza e modernità: Memorie e società nel XX secolo (Milan: 
Angeli, 2002), 50–51 (my translation).
10 Cf. Pierre Nora, “Mémoire collective,” in La nouvelle histoire, ed. Jacques Le Goff, Roger 
Chartier, and Jacques Revel (Paris: Retz, 1978), 398–401.
11 Cf. Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 227–28, 237–38, see note 4 (my translation). On 
the difficulties concerning the publication of studies dealing with the Jewish question, 
reconsider Neurath’s case or Hughes’s story. Apropos of the powerlessness of pursuing a 
university career by studying the subject of the Holocaust, see Halpert, Early American 
Sociology and the Holocaust, 6–7, and again the case of Hughes, who held a course on the 
Holocaust at McGill University but with a different name; see note 205, above (chapter 1).
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the “facts” were there in the beginning. The Nuremberg trials were 
held in November 1945, where the highest Nazi officials still alive 
and under guard were accused of killing 5.7 million Jews as part of 
a conscious plan. Calling up the original document on the Internet 
reveals a 226-screen-long document. But only three are taken up 
with the extermination the Jews. And that is a fairly graphic 
 representation of how the Holocaust was originally conceived: as 
one in an almost endless list of Nazi crimes. It was perceived as part 
of a larger  practice of war crimes. To be sure, Auschwitz was 
certainly addressed by intellectuals and others, but the Holocaust 
did not permeate public discourse nor was its commemoration 
institutionalized.12
The Cold War diverted many things from their proper course. It modified, 
in Central and Eastern Europe, and worldwide, the methods and means 
for telling about the past. Here, let me borrow Traverso’s thinking: that, at 
the end of the conflict, the Western bloc overlooked that Germany was the 
successor country of Nazism. The Federal Republic was part of the Atlantic 
Pact; it was going to constitute a free trade asset for the Western world in 
contrast to Soviet totalitarianism:13
Germany, Israel and the USA had different motivations for being 
silent about this past, but there were also nation-transcending 
commonalities that informed the postwar references to the 
Holocaust.
. . . An acknowledgment of political responsibility for the 
“crimes committed by a small murderous gang of Nazis in the name 
of Germany” was not only marked by this kind of linguistic 
distancing but also confined to a few voices. References to the 
Holocaust were frequently articulated in the broader context of war 
atrocities and as a measure of German suffering.14
12 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 93–94 (authors’ in-text citations omitted).
13 Cf. Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 231–32.
14 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 94.
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The competitive coexistence and, especially, the equivalence between 
Nazism and communism “puts in brackets” the story of the Holocaust, 
making it a Nazi regime product.15 When I began work on this book, 
I had only some notions about the Iron Curtain and post-Holocaust 
memory. My goal was to awaken sleeping consciences by returning to the 
discourse about denazification, which had decelerated the practice of 
collective memory and the process of accountability for what happened. 
It was necessary to create a context for the Holocaust victims and for the lives 
around them. The denazification program betrayed proposed expectations, 
such as those of permanently and totally removing Nazism from Germany. 
As Traverso explains, Adorno’s formula, according to which the real danger 
was the survival of fascism, was concrete in post-Holocaust governments:16
Talk about a “European Civil War”—a term that later would become 
a code word for historical revisionism in Germany—was a pervasive 
rhetorical strategy among leading politicians and other public figures. 
. . . The Cold War, together with a focus on the Wirtschaftswunder 
(economic miracle) provided Germany with a universal frame of 
reference. Modernization, both in economic and cultural terms and 
as a paradigm for sociological analysis, dominated the public 
imagination.17
Because of a series of political events that promoted increasingly broader 
reflections, starting from the 1960s (contemporary to the initial processing 
of collective memory) what happened to the Jews of Europe in the twen-
tieth century became progressively visible. Here, what is relevant is 
remembering that “Europe” and “twentieth century” constitute two 
central categories: of space and time. They have been used to identify a 
given phenomenon within precise boundaries. Why is this important? 
Because such spatial-temporal demarcation uses the same elements (time 
and space) utilized to define conceptually the modern nation-state. 
15 Cf. Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali, 227–37.
16 Ibid., 231–32.
17 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 94. The success of the category of modernity arises 
in this context.
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Additionally, the same categories have led the scholars Levy and Sznaider 
to speak, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, of national collective 
memory. The specificity of this analytical tool (which involves the concepts 
of memory, society, and nation) is that of focusing on something (in our 
case it is the trauma of the Holocaust) that occurs in a given time and 
within well-established national boundaries. 
What makes new and original Levy and Sznaider’s Holocaust 
discourse is that “the conventional concept of ‘collective memory’ is firmly 
embedded within the ‘Container of the Nation-State.’”18 This means that 
the notion of national collective memory goes hand in hand with (or 
derives from) the concept of the modern state, to which drafting the 
element of territorial borders contributes. Based on the fact that the 
modern national state exists if there are elements of territory, people 
(residing on the same territorial space), and sovereignty, the national 
collective memory arises when the same community that dwells in the 
same territory, which has the same culture and speaks the same language 
and so on (i.e., it belongs to the same country), shares and then repro-
cesses the same event. 
In Levy and Sznaider’s words, “the nation is the basis for authentic feel-
ings and collective memory.”19 This requires that the fact itself has as its 
subject and addressee of the memory only those who belong to the same 
national reality: it is not legitimate to go beyond that. And thus in this 
sphere of memory, the boundaries of the nation are not exceeded: they 
constitute the inner element of the modern state. What sociologist Maurice 
Halbwachs says about social memory and collective memory helps to better 
understand Levy and Sznaider’s discourse. Briefly, in the first case, 
Halbwachs means the memory of things, to which one, or the group to 
which one belongs, has a personal and direct experience. It is the story itself 
that is, before it becomes history, celebrated and relived through the memo-
rials from the group that has had the experience: in our case, for instance, 
the social memory of the Holocaust belongs to and is limited to the genera-
tion that lived during the war period. In the second case, namely, in historical 
18 Ibid., 88.
19 Ibid., 90–91.
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memory, Halbwachs includes the memory mediated by books, movies, and 
so on.20 In this discussion, the persons concerned are, on the one hand, the 
Germans, as the perpetrators of mass murder, and on the other, the Jews, as 
victims. In the modern nation-state, Jewish people are considered intersti-
tial, that is, a nation in between spaces.21 Other individuals seem (and are) 
cut off, since they do not appear to fall within the national sphere of Jews or 
German Nazis. According to that, the persons involved are the Jews, as 
victims, and the Germans, as guilty of genocide. It means that only those 
who are linked to the event, due to the national factor, and belong to this 
collective memory, which, in turn, identifies them, are required to commem-
orate and to reprocess their trauma or their faults.22 This means that the 
memory remains within national boundaries in which the event has 
occurred. To summarize, we may speak of national memory when the event 
(which has to be remembered) recalls the same schema that defines the 
nation-state: if modernity is concerned with the border issue, territorial 
limen, and it results historically in the construction of the nation-state, then 
in the same way the collective national memory coincides with the elements 
of modernity, with national borders. However, what is innovative is that this 
issue—the modern collective memory—constitutes another way to define 
modernity itself: 
The Holocaust, or rather the representations that produce shared 
memories, is a paradigmatic case for the relation of memory and 
modernity. Modernity, until recently one of the primary analytic 
and normative frameworks for intellectual self-understanding, is 
itself questioned through memories of the Holocaust. On this view, 
the mass murder of European Jews by the Nazis is not considered as 
20 See Maurice Halbwachs, La Mémoire collective (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 
1950); Olimpia Affuso, Il Magazine della memoria: I media e il ricordo degli avvenimenti 
pubblici (Rome: Carocci, 2010).
21 See Irena Steinfeldt et al., How Was It Humanly Possible? A Study of Perpetrators and 
Bystanders during the Holocaust (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2002). On the political construc-
tion of foreigners, see Beck, I rischi della libertà, 167–95.
22 Cf. Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 88; see also Anthony D. Smith, Nations and 
Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995).
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a German-Jewish tragedy but as a tragedy of reason or of modernity 
itself.23
When Levy and Sznaider say that the Holocaust “was not perceived as a 
timeless and de-territorialized measuring stick for good and evil, but 
instead as a terrible aspect of a particular era,”24 they explain how the 
theory of modernity of the Holocaust justified the silence about the 
Holocaust in the context of the Cold War. However, this remains a good 
open question.
During the 1990s, after the collapse of frontiers of the bipolarism era, 
it became common among scholars to speak of nation and national 
memory. In addition, exactly when national limits fell, as a product of 
globalization process (i.e., when the nation as nation-physically and 
conceptually), several Holocaust scholars started to deal with nation and 
memory issues in their reflections. Here, let me mention a few cases to 
introduce the context. For instance, The War After by Karpf, a writer of the 
second generation who tells the experience of personal pain of parents in 
the light of the collective experience of the entire Jewish people, and Genre 
Memories and Memory Genres by Olick. Both works, though in a different 
way (Karpf ’s piece puts the role of victims into the foreground—she traces 
the lives of her family, their marginalization in the Nazi era, and their 
obsession with death after the Holocaust—while Olick’s research focuses 
on the perpetrators), confine the extermination of European Jews to the 
specific context of the twentieth century. In this manner, they make the 
memory exclusive to people who directly or indirectly lived through that 
experience.25 It can be said that their works became part of the thinking of 
national collective memory. Among scholars, the idea of conceiving the 
Holocaust as trauma came to the fore.26 This means that it did not coincide 
23 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 88.
24 Cf. ibid., 95.
25 Cf. Anne Karpf, The War After: Living with the Holocaust (London: Heinemann, 1996); 
Jeffrey K. Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres: A Dialogical Analysis of May 8, 
1945 Commemorations in the Federal Republic of Germany,” American Sociological Review 
64 (1999): 381–402.
26 Cf. Alexa R. Kolbi-Molinas, The Secret of Redemption. Memory and Resistance: A Lesson for 
the 21st Century (New York: The Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity, 2000); Alexander et 
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exclusively with the extermination perpetrated by the Nazis against the 
Jews: it was something more. A trauma crosses consciences universally, 
taken as a reference model for further traumatic events. Unknowingly, 
this original conceptualization paves the way to the cosmopolitan memory, 
which recalls the concepts of accountability and responsibility:
As the same Cassin had said in a report to the French government 
at the beginning of the works, in February 1947: “If men want to be 
protagonists of the whole of human society against arbitrariness, 
they must assume in exchange, as citizens of the world, their duties 
and their responsibilities.”27
For the same reasons, in more recent years, the concept of anti-Semitism 
has been primarily due to Brustein, who delineates the anti-Semitic 
phenomenon in Roots of Hate, as we will see at the end of this chapter. 
Episodes of contemporary anti-Semitism acquaint scholars with the 
Holocaust matter.28
4.2.1. Levy and Sznaider in the Wake of Ulrich Beck
The postcommunism years have been experiencing a collective memory 
boom. Two scholars, Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, especially, are 
distinguished in collective memory studies of the Holocaust,29 because 
the past, remembering Halbwachs’s words, “is not preserved, but it is 
al., Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity; Olimpia Affuso, “Jeffrey C. Alexander—il 
processo del trauma culturale,” in M come Memoria: La memoria nella teoria sociale, ed. 
Teresa Grande and Olimpia Affuso (Naples: Liguori Editore, 2012), 215–43.
27 Zappalà, La tutela internazionale dei diritti umani, 29 (my translation).
28 With King, Brustein wrote an essay on anti-Semitism. Helen Fein measured anti-Semitic 
phenomena in different European countries (Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and 
Romania) from 1899 to 1939. Cf. William I. Brustein and Ryan D. King, “Anti-Semitism in 
Europe before the Holocaust,” International Political Science Review 25, no. 1 (2004): 35–53, 
doi:10.1177/0192512104038166.
29 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound”; Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, “The 
Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan Morality: The Holocaust and Human Rights,” Journal 
of Human Rights 3, no. 2 (2004): 143–57, doi:10.1080/1475483042000210685.
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reconstructed starting from the interests of the present.”30 For both 
authors, in the global age, or at a time that nation-states are no longer 
considered as the primary actors in political, social, and economic life, 
it is crucial to build a collective memory crossing state boundaries to 
reach a full moral responsibility and political accountability about the 
extermination of the Jews.
International criminal law, born from the Nuremberg trials and 
Tokyo tribunals, has suffered almost immediately “the paralyzing effects of 
ideological opposition.”31 And, “global media representations, among 
others, create new cosmopolitan memories, providing new epistemological 
vantage points and emerging moral-political interdependencies.”32 The 
transformations that have occurred in the last twenty years, linked to the 
transition from modernity to globalization, give rise, in a broad sense, to 
the need for a new form of universalism, in the political and cultural 
sphere, focusing on the multidimensional nature of the events.33
Levy and Sznaider, trained in the school of Ulrich Beck (professor of 
sociology at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, in the heart of Munich, at 
the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme (FMSH) in Paris, and at the 
London School of Economics), think of modernity as a project in accor-
dance with the essential current of German social philosophy from Habermas 
onwards. The originality the two disciples of Beck (famous for his studies on 
modernity and for the concepts of “second modernity” and “theory of risk”) 
deals with the process of modernization. It is a reflexive thought that opens 
towards fresh political and social scenarios. In essence, from Beck’s theory 
revolving around the concepts of risk, individualization, and subpolitics, Levy 
and Sznaider take into consideration, in contemporary Holocaust sociology, 
primarily the third aspect, that of subpolitics. On this, which Beck calls “risk 
society” (where the places, times, and media of politics continuously change), 
or “second modernity,” especially by the mid-1980s, Levy and Sznaider focus 
their attention in comprehending the Holocaust memory. In fact, in the new 
30 Affuso, Il Magazine della memoria, 21.
31 Zappalà, La tutela internazionale dei diritti umani, 120.
32 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 87.
33 See Bertarnd Badie, La Fin des territoires: Essai sur le désordre international et l'utilité sociale 
du respect (Paris: Fayard, 1995).
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contemporary space, democratic rights and obligations, along with private 
interests related to work, ask for a reconsideration. For instance, if the rules 
of profit, on the one hand, lead to an expansion of national markets on a 
global scale, then, on the other, they lead to new forms of political participa-
tion that break the boundaries of traditional politics, putting into play 
additional institutions outside of parliaments, governments, and national 
political parties. The result is a completely changed political and moral 
dimension. What matters is that, according to Levy and Sznaider, the studies 
on the collective memory of the Holocaust have to be rethought in the light 
of globalization phenomenon, since globalization restructures social life in a 
plurality of spaces and times. Subsequent to 1989, what the two authors 
investigate is very innovative. While new historiographical practices—
resulting from the opening of archives in Eastern Europe—call into question 
Bauman’s thesis, Levy and Sznaider wonder if the thesis of the modernity of 
the Holocaust (linked to the concept of the modern state) is still valid in a 
historical-political context in which the modern national state is in crisis and 
loses its centrality. Additionally, they ask if it is more appropriate to find new 
sociological categories for the study of the Holocaust:34
Can this event be memorialized by people who do not have a direct 
connection to it? At the beginning of the third millennium, memories 
of the Holocaust facilitate the formation of transnational memory 
cultures, which in turn, have the potential to become the cultural 
foundation for global human rights politics. This nation- transcending 
dynamic stands at the center of our sociological analysis.35
Levy and Sznaider identify original means and procedures to investigate the 
phenomenon within works on collective memory in the age of globalization. 
In addition, once identified, their main objective becomes that of analyzing 
these different forms of memory.36 In a globalized society, even memory 
34 See David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural 
Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).
35 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 88.
36 See ibid., 87–88.
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changes and transcends national boundaries. What is important now is to see 
in which way Levy and Sznaider analyze how the transition happens from the 
national to the cosmopolitan memory.37 At the time that the states begin to be 
traversed by the flow of goods, capital, ideas, information, and, not least, 
human beings, even cultural dimensions fluctuate and, in our case, the 
memory of the events related to a nation mutate.38
When Levy and Sznaider speak of cosmopolitan memory, they reelab-
orate Beck’s principle of cosmopolitanism, which overcomes the dualisms 
of global/local and national/international. Based on this thought, they 
conceive the end of a memory relegated to national borders, that is, defined 
according to the categories of physical modern space, geometric and unidi-
mensional, and the practice of a memory always exercisable and present, 
even in regions with boundaries, which are definable in a  conven tional 
way.39 Clearly, this thought, when it puts aside the  assumptions of nation-
alism, according to which the individual regional differences are 
incorporated and lost in a wider territorial-national context, which histor-
ically takes the form of the nation-state, nullifies the specificities of a 
nation. In the past, the process of modern national  unification has canceled 
those ethnic and national singularities on the territory forming the nation-
state. However, it is crucial to remember that the modern state, while 
achieving the nationalist project, establishes some limits with other nation-
states through so-called state boundaries. 
Levy and Sznaider aim at moving towards a memory unbound, that 
is, not bound by national borders. Especially, their category of 
 cosmopolitanism, in the sense of beautifying—from the Greek κοσµέω 
(“to order”)—the inhabited world, “combines appreciation of difference 
and alterity with attempts to conceive of new democratic forms of 
37 Cf. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
38 About the despatialization and respatialization of geographic borders, see Arjun Appadurai, 
Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996); Appadurai, ed., Globalization (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2001).
39 Cf. Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Köhler, eds., Re-imagining Political 
Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge: Polity 1998).
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political rule beyond the nation-State.”40 It refers to a process of global-
ization or extension of the confines that transfers categories or social 
phenomena from a global to a local community. The same process creates 
interdependencies among morality (inner forum), politics, and the 
public life of persons, building a bridge between the spheres, which 
exceeds delimited margins. The authors investigate “what happens when 
an increasing number of people in Western mass-consumer societies no 
longer define themselves (exclusively) through the nation or their ethnic 
belonging?” They ask, “Can we imagine collective memories that tran-
scend national and ethnic boundaries?” What leads to a “transnational 
memory” is the  recognition of otherness, which is the basis of Beck’s 
principle of  cosmopolitanism. In addition, there is a concept of oppo-
sites: good and evil. In this manner, they do not conceive the Holocaust 
as something specific typically of the Jews of Europe, but as an event that 
must belong to every inhabitant of the world, “a formative event” that 
offers “the  foundations for a new cosmopolitan memory, a memory tran-
scending ethnic and national boundaries,”41 as a part of the national 
identity of every man:
The so-called responsibility to protect is the last frontier of national 
sovereignty. The fundamental idea is to impose on States the obliga-
tion to defend its citizens and to ensure their safety and respect for 
the most basic rights, preventing the State from massacring its 
civilian population; the shield of sovereignty falls. National sover-
eignty becomes responsible sovereignty, as the final document of the 
Summit of the UN General Assembly in 2005 stated, when the state 
protects its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. This responsible sovereignty leads to 
prevent such crimes, incitement to commit them by means of strate-
gies, appropriate means to do that.42
40 Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe (Cambridge: Polity, 2007 [2004]), 12.
41 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 88. Cf. Levy and Sznaider, “The Institutionalization 
of Cosmopolitan Morality,” 152; Elihu Katz and Ruth Katz, “Life and Death among the 
Binaries: Notes on Jeffrey Alexander’s Constructionism,” in Alexander, Remembering the 
Holocaust, 156–70.
42 Zappalà, La tutela internazionale dei diritti umani, 132. 
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This is possible when the Holocaust is taken as a paradigm of all 
tragic events. In 2011, Raphael Vago, during a seminar, spoke, as Bauer 
did, of the uniqueness of the Shoah. According to the Vago, of Tel Aviv 
University, the globalization of the Holocaust translates a very important 
idea: that every person can be a potential victim, perpetrator, or bystander. 
In this way, the interpretation of the Holocaust does not belong only to the 
first generation of survivors, but it transcends national borders of Europe: 
hence the concept of globalization of the Holocaust. This reinforces 
Bauer’s thesis, who speaks of the unprecedented nature of the Holocaust. 
This new interpretation returns, once again, a specific identity, a name 
(yad vashem) to the victims.43 
The goal of Levy and Sznaider is that of universalizing knowledge by 
creating a public discourse that does not take the boundaries of the nation-
state into account. Along these lines, the categories of space and time, at 
the basis of modernity, cease to be linear: from their relation the physical 
quantity (speed) that accelerates the bonds and the possibility of meeting 
among many societies spreads. The relations generated are of two kinds: 
they can have a reticular form or continuous streams that, in any case, do 
not consider limits or established conventions. The speed transforming 
space into temporalized dimensions and making time spatialized comes 
out from the rapport of space above time. Namely, it allows individuals 
belonging to different places to associate themselves with events occur-
ring in the same time.44 
The collective memory of the Holocaust no longer involves only the 
direct actors (the Jews, affected by the genocide, and the Nazis, perpetrators 
of the crime): Jews become universal victims, and, as such, they belong to 
all the territories in which genocide is perpetrated, while the Nazis become 
43 Cf. Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, 14–67. The talk in question was “Shoah and Genocide,” 
paper presented at the International School for Holocaust Studies for the ICHEIC Program 
for Holocaust Education in Europe, Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, August 28, 2011. See 
Fackenheim, “Jewish Faith and the Holocaust”; Fackenheim, Quest for Past and Future, 
17–20; Fackenheim, God’s Presence in History, 87–88.
44 For the time–space compression, see Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–
1918: With a New Preface (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Gabriella 
Paolucci, ed., Cronofagia: La contrazione del tempo e dello spazio nell’era della globaliz-
zazione (Milan: Guerini, 2003). 
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the perpetrators par excellence of the crime. In thinking this way, the 
social evil assumes a cosmopolitan dimension that allows not taking into 
account the specificity of the victims or perpetrators at a given time and in 
a given spatial context:45
Even though the Holocaust and the fate of the Jews remained a 
neglected aspect of the Nuremberg trial, it formed the backdrop for 
its universalistic message. The struggle at Nuremberg was conceived 
as one between civilization and barbarism. Civilization was the 
victim, Nazi barbarism the perpetrator. And this is how we initially 
got from the Holocaust to the concepts of “humanity” and of 
“crimes” against them. The Jews were there, but they were standing 
in for “humanity as a whole.” This version then guided the legal 
argumentation, as indicated in the following statement by the chief 
American prosecutor at Nuremberg, Supreme Court Justice Robert 
H. Jackson: “The crime against the Jews, insofar as it is a crime 
against humanity and not a war crime as well, is one which we indict 
because of its close association with the crime against peace.”46
As Levy and Sznaider underline, this interpretation brings substantial bene-
fits to sociological theory, since it rethinks the phenomenon of the Holocaust 
with categories taken from contemporary social reality, and the universal-
ization of the genocide of the Jews allows for recognition, in a global society, 
of the same conditions that permitted the Holocaust. Levy and Sznaider pave 
the way to recognizing these dangers that may reoriginate the genocide. 
The universalization process of the Holocaust does not lead to a loss of 
recognition of the specific event: on the contrary, the Jews are assumed to be 
universal victims, and the Nazis (and those who support them) to be 
universal criminals. This procedure of reprocessing memory has the  positive 
claim to identifying all the victims of all genocides and the perpetrators of 
the corresponding crimes, because, as both authors stress, “One of the 
central questions relates to the ‘right’ or ‘appropriate’ form to commemorate 
45 Cf. Levy and Sznaider, “The Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan Morality,” 152–53.
46 Ibid., 149 (author’s in-text citations omitted). 
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the event. Who does the Holocaust ‘belong’ to in the global age? Can it only 
belong to the Jewish victims of the German perpetrators?”47 
By reflecting on this, the solidarity of which Durkheim spoke (at 
least this is the intention of Levy and Sznaider’s lesson) is no longer 
national. It transcends territorial boundaries, moving towards a universal 
 consciousness in the sense that the event or the location of a genocide 
belongs to everyone, even to those who do not reside in that place, or, 
rather, who do not belong to that place at that time. That is, the authors 
address a cosmopolitan collective responsibility that makes each victim 
or  perpetrator of crimes a citizen of the world and no longer only of the 
state where genocide happens—all citizens of the world, in the name of 
universal citizenship, are called to act against the violation of universal 
rights. The price of required responsibility is very high, since it strains and 
speeds up, in the same way as the globalization process, the timing of 
intervention.48
4.3.  BETWEEN MEMORY AND POLITICAL ACTING: THE 
HOLOCAUST IN GLOBAL SOCIETY
The term Holocaust has passed from an abstract universal, to a set 
of very particularistic and/or national meanings, back to what we 
have elsewhere referred to as cosmopolitan memories. The 
Holocaust is now a concept that has been dislocated from space and 
time precisely because it can be used to dramatize any act of injus-
tice, racism, or crime perpetrated anywhere on the planet.49
Beck repeatedly stresses that we cannot undisputedly accept the distinction 
between national and international after the end of bipolarism, by the 
breaking of the East–West conflict. In this way, entirely original dimensions 
are introduced in the historical space of Europe. This means that the Nazi 
47 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 92–93.
48 See Immanuel Wallerstein, “Citizens All? Citizens Some! The Making of the Citizen,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 45, no. 4 (2003): 650–79; cf. Zappalà, La tutela 
internazionale dei diritti umani.
49 Levy and Sznaider, “The Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan Morality,” 156.
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horror, extermination of the Jews, and ethnic persecution can no longer 
be investigated according to traditional categories of a national perspective, 
but only in accordance with “methodological nationalism.”50
Levy and Sznaider use the analytical category of globalization (which 
is, we can say, procedural-methodological) to speak of cosmopolitan 
memory issues. By virtue of the unfinished broaching of boundaries that 
widen the spaces of memory, albeit for a short while, both scholars try to 
outline a history of representations of the Holocaust, in the last fifty years, 
and take the area of three countries as an explanatory model—the United 
States, Germany, and Israel. In addition, the authors divide the globalization 
process of memory into three chronological stages on the basis that every 
historical process, and therefore the social construction of memory, is 
prepared by a number of events. They are the postwar phase, the period of the 
Cold War, and the years following the Cold War. Here, let me briefly report 
what Levy and Sznaider investigate to stress better their lesson in post- 
Holocaust sociology or in the Holocaust sociology of the globalization age. 
They consider the first postwar years as the founding stage of the 
process of memory based on three key events: the Nuremberg trials, 
which established the “legal notion of crimes against humanity,”51 the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and, the UN Convention 
on Genocide, which set up “the foundation of human rights regimes.”52 
Our authors reflect on this UDHR in a period after the end of the Cold 
War. As Beck highlights, the Nuremberg trials, their internationality, led 
to the formation of juridical categories and of a court that go beyond state 
sovereignty to ensure justice for citizens whose rights have been violated by 
their own state. In accordance with article 6 (c) of the constitutive act of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, “any civilian population”53 
refers to the end of the principle of nationality according to which the 
imputation is made within certain boundaries. Another new juridical 
50 Cf. Beck and Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe, 132.
51 Levy and Sznaider, “The Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan Morality,” 149.
52 Ibid., 143.
53 United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal—Annex to the Agreement 
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis 
(“London Agreement”), August 8, 1945, accessed March 17, 2010, http://www.refworld.org/
cgibin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3ae6b39614.
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principle was established, one of cosmopolitan responsibility. This was 
designed to safeguard the civilian population from violence perpetrated 
by states or enemies, but also, primarily, it protected individuals from acts 
of violence committed arbitrarily by sovereign states against their own 
 citizens. This underscores Beck’s lesson: he defines a “criminal state” and 
stresses how crimes against humanity are not simply war crimes that can 
be judged and whose perpetrators can be sentenced within the boundaries 
of a nation-state. In this way, Beck creates a different order of juridical 
moral priorities among nations. He explains how juridical cosmopolitan 
morals supersede those of national laws: based on what happened 
 historically, the crimes against humanity erase the principles of national 
legislation and the statal jurisprudence in the sense that they question the 
essence of a state as a defender of human rights. Beck’s reflection goes 
further: if the traditions are European from which the Holocaust, 
 nationalism, and genocide arise, it is clear that the legal and moral 
measures used to judge them are also European. The initial requests of the 
victors, Churchill and Stalin, of condemning the perpetrators of Nazi 
terror in accordance with martial law, were set aside, and they allowed the 
trials of these men in national courts, as happened in the Eichmann trial 
in Jerusalem or in the Auschwitz trials in Germany. In the face of the 
degeneration of national law, the European tradition of recognition of the 
other was called in.54 In the name of global memory, by placing the 
Holocaust as a paradigm of universal suffering, the Polish Jew Raphael 
Lemkin defined genocide:
The term “genocide” was coined in 1946 by Raphael Lemkin, a 
Polish Jew. No doubt the example of the Holocaust was the trigger 
for Lemkin’s efforts to warn the world about systematic attempts to 
annihilate specific groups. In his mind, however, genocide was by 
no means synonymous with the extermination of the Jews. Instead, 
Lemkin justified his project with references to genocidal activities 
that took place before and after the Holocaust. He was eager, as were 
so many others, not to present the Holocaust as an exclusive threat 
54 See Levy and Sznaider, “The Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan Morality,” 150.
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for European Jewry, as is made clear in the following passage: “The 
Nazi leaders had stated very bluntly their intent to wipe out 
the Poles, the Russians; to destroy demographically and culturally 
the French element in Alsace-Lorraine, the Slavonians in Carniola 
and Carinthia. They almost achieved their goal in exterminating the 
Jews and Gypsies in Europe.”55
In the years of bipolarism, the globalization of memory was built starting 
from the Eichmann trial, which became the very first stage of the 
 construction of collective memory, because, during the process, as 
Arendt argues, for the first time, witnesses reached a public visibility. 
This court case led to an open representation of the Holocaust, not as an 
 “unprecedented crime of genocide” but, on the contrary, as the oldest 
known crime: it “constitutes an important moment in the nexus of 
memory and legal narratives . . . it paid to the voices of the victims.” But, 
especially, what emerged from the Eichmann trial was that its “elements 
are recovered and reinterpreted three decades later in the context of the 
Balkan wars and the ongoing war crimes tribunals beginning in the 
1990s.”56 This is important because the third phase of which Levy and 
Sznaider speak is characterized by conflicts that erupted in the Balkans 
in the 1990s. As they explain, “It was the historical backdrop of the 
Balkan crisis and unsuccessful demands for NATO intervention in 
Bosnia that helped establish the link and thus the centrality of the 
Holocaust as a measuring stick for international human rights politics.” 
The Holocaust became “a global icon . . . through a number of mass-me-
diated events,”57 which contributes to spread Beck’s lesson. To develop 
collective memory, at a cosmopolitan level, the mass media are available 
to present at a local level what happens at a distance:58 the local/global 
dimension and “televised images” set the so-called Holocaust iconog-
55 Ibid., 150–51.
56 Ibid., 152. See David Bankier and Dan Michman, eds., Holocaust Historiography in Context: 
Emergence, Challenges, Polemics and Achievements (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem; New York: 
Berghahn, 2008).
57 Levy and Sznaider, “The Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan Morality,” 152.
58 Levy and Sznaider explain how the film Schindler’s List, directed by Steven Spielberg, and 
the establishment of the Holocaust Museum (1993) in Washington, DC, contribute to this 
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raphy that can produce an identification with others.59 This identification 
process is possible by virtue of the connection between the global and 
the local element, which, ultimately, provides an analysis transcending 
the nation-state. When it is said that the memory of the Holocaust 
crosses borders, it means that the victims (Jews) and executioners 
(Nazis) do not belong only to the borders of Germany or Europe. Rather, 
the victims and perpetrators are repeated in time and space. This aspect 
establishes the element of decontextualization of the Holocaust (always 
falling in the globalization process of the  phenomenon), in other words, 
the memory of the Holocaust in the globalization age outlines and struc-
tures a “new rights culture.”60 Highlighting this awareness or, better, this 
shift in the theoretical paradigm were the genocide in Kosovo, to such 
an extent that Levy and Sznaider coined the term “Kosovocaust,” and 
the Stockholm Conference in January 2000. The two events are seen as 
benchmarks.61 When Levy and Sznaider stated that “slowly over the 
course of the Bosnian conflict the U.S. public came to identify the Serbs 
with the Nazis,”62 they helped to deterritorialize and detemporalize any 
suffering, recognizing all the victims of any ethnic nationalism. “As a 
Jew I say that we have to do something to stop the bloodshed in this 
country (Bosnia). People fight and children die. Why? Something, no 
matter what, must be done.”63
What deserves attention is that the Balkan crisis and NATO’s 
 intervention built a bridge between the past of the victims par excellence, 
the Jews, and the new victims of the Balkans—once again, in the heart of 
Europe. This link provides the basis for international policies different 
from those previous and for a transnational system of values that is based 
social construction. Cf. Levy and Sznaider, “The Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan 
Morality,” 152.
59 Cf. Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 92, 99; Levy and Sznaider, “The 
Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan Morality,” 153.
60 See ibid., 155–56; cf. Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the 
Electronic Frontier (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1993).
61 Cf. Iain Chambers, Migrancy, Culture, Identity (London: Routledge, 1994); Levy and 
Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 97–102.
62 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 97–98.
63 Ibid., 99, quoting Elie Wiesel, who in his speech “on the day of the museum’s inauguration 
directly turned to President Clinton.”
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on human rights and condemns all forms of genocide.64 It has moved the 
perspective from a Kantian universalism to a more contextualized 
 cosmopolitanism, where the watchword has become “Nuremberg now.” 
In February 1993, the UN Security Council requested the establishment of 
an International Tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for violations 
of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia (based on the model of 
Nuremberg) and thus institutionalized the globalization of memory. 
It could be said that the reception of the Kosovo conflict constituted the 
end of supremacy of “nation-centered memories.” Human rights became 
the new yardstick for measuring global politics while there arose new trans-
national solidarities that corresponded to new levels of power, superseding 
or putting in second order state authority. This reinforced the institution-
alization of cosmopolitan memory.65 At this point, let me reflect on what 
Beck and Grande say reproposing Arendt’s thought:
Not only God must grant forgiveness; human beings must forgive 
each other, and publicly, because only in this way can they recu-
perate the ability to act. Although this is true in general, it is 
particularly true in view of the monstrous crime of the destruction 
of the Jews. What is important for Hannah Arendt is that human 
beings can begin anew and not remain prisoners of the past. That is 
what forgiveness means. Only through the ability to forgive, which 
nobody can demand as a right, can action, which is more urgent 
than ever, regain its political efficacy.66
In January 2000, while Levy and Sznaider discussed the importance of 
a Europe unified by common values, but above all the need, in the 
wake of Adorno’s categorical imperative, to prevent another Holocaust 
and other genocides in Europe, historical conditions arose to decon-
textualize the Holocaust and institutionalize universal memory. This 
culture of prevention became a kind of universal memorandum for 
European civilization: “A closer look at the final declaration of the 
64 Cf. ibid., 98–99.
65 Cf. ibid., 100.
66 Beck and Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe, 133.
The Problem of the Holocaust after 1989 | 333
Stockholm Forum illustrates the institutionalization of an emerging 
European cosmopolitan memory.”67
In view of this responsible type of political sovereignty, which 
provides a response to any genocide with the aim of preventing it, we can 
see the universalization of the Holocaust: “It can happen to anyone, at any 
time, and everyone is responsible.”68
However, institutionalized cosmopolitanism appears to be the most 
viable answer to the horrors of the 20th century, which apparently 
will continue in the future. The Holocaust, or rather the collective 
memories that have sprung from it during the last six decades, is 
a paradigmatic case for the political and cultural salience of 
 cosmopolitan sentiments.69
In some ways, the cosmopolitanism of the Holocaust represents the reali-
zation of the Enlightenment project, which if, on the one hand, it has given 
the universal values of freedom, unity, and equality to society, then, on the 
other, it has triggered the process of the construction of nation-states, 
legitimizing national peculiarities. In the current globalization phase, the 
Enlightenment represents itself as a “civilizing project,” which places 
human rights at its core.70 It is relevant to note that during this age of 
globalization post-Holocaust sociology has increased its presence.
Globalization cancels territorial distances by a spatialization of time 
that allows long distances to be connected in the shortest possible time. By 
virtue of highly refined technological devices, we reach what is called a 
“cancellation of space” and the annulment of national borders, and, in a 
broader sense, of national, ethnic, and other differences.71 The geograph-
ical contemporary landscape outlined by Appadurai marks the end of 
67 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 101. See Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les 
nations (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1962); Ulrich Beck, What Is Globalization? (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2000); Zygmunt Bauman, In Search of Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 1999). 
68 Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 101. 
69 Levy and Sznaider, “The Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan Morality,” 155.
70 Ibid., 145. See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking, 1963). 
71 Cf. Mike Featherstone, Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity (London: 
Sage, 1990); Luciano Gallino, Globalizzazione e disuguaglianze (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2000).
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organic society based on Durkheim’s moral norms: gradually, we are 
witnessing the end of stability and the beginning of moral uncertainty. In 
this context of perpetual movement and fluidity, there is a need to have 
some certainty, a “moral touchstone” to cling to.72 This stone is precisely 
the phenomenon of the Holocaust that becomes an irreplaceable moral 
security, but also indissoluble and with dual characteristics: it is a solid 
phenomenon, it cannot fail, and it is mobile, in the sense that it is able to 
cross national borders, according to the logic and timing of globalization. 
It exceeds territorial limina and goes beyond state boundaries, and it 
creates links between the states themselves becoming a certainty in a world 
of uncertainty. 
As Beck states, a universal historical perspective has to seek the global 
in the local and at the same time cross borders, even conceptually and 
methodologically. The aspect of localization is the other side of the coin 
of the globalization process. It is important because, when a state prepares 
and elaborates its own discourse on the Holocaust according to 
the  historical events that occurred in its own national context, the 
 representation of the Holocaust (the pro of the state) returns its national 
specificity to the event. Paradoxically, the process of the globalization of 
memory, in global society, constitutes national specificities (the quid of 
the modern state). The two phenomena of globalization and localization 
represent what Bauman calls “glocalization” and that now, in the  representation 
of the Holocaust, is to be rethought.73 
I have provided a kind of review of the sociological literature on 
cosmopolitan memory because it deals with an important aspect: as a 
public discourse, the Holocaust serves as a narrative memory in post-Ho-
locaust sociology. In other words, it creates community narratives in a 
globalized society. In essence, for Beck and for Levy and Sznaider, the 
process of globalization of memory leads to the assertion of universal 
rights and the constitution of identity no longer based on the concept of 
state, nation, or the founding myths of a race, but on the unique sharing 
of human suffering. The cosmopolitan memory of the Holocaust becomes 
72 Levy and Sznaider, “The Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan Morality,” 155.
73 Zygmunt Bauman, “On Glocalization: or Globalization for Some, Localization for Some 
Others,” Thesis Eleven 54 (1998): 37–49; Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 93.
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a warning against the eternal modernization of violence, which in the 
years 1914 to 1945 had seen the state and the nation, quoting Traverso, in 
“fire and blood.”74 This could suggest that it urges a rethinking of Levy and 
Sznaider’s concept of cosmopolitan memory. The entire conceptualization 
leads to a debate in social theory, namely, whether or not it has to take 
leave from postmodernity. Nevertheless, this question still remains open.75
4.4.  ALEXANDER AND DURKHEIM: “WHAT HOLDS  
SOCIETY TOGETHER?”
At this point, one can ask how integration occurs in a global society. 
If, in 1895, Durkheim wondered in Les règles de la méthode sociologique what 
guaranteed the unity of a society, today Jeffrey Alexander wonders if there is 
something that holds the global society together. A society where there are a 
few absolute truths and those that seem like confirmed convictions (such as 
the distinction between the sexes, the rejection of violence, and so on) are 
continually put into question, with the result that everything is confused 
and nothing is stable. When Alexander writes, “If progress is to be made, 
morality must be universalized beyond any particular time and place,”76 he 
aims at providing an intellectual and practical therapy for society. As a 
remedy for the evils of contemporary society and progress, which have 
produced the wars in the Balkans, the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi, 
and the destruction of humanity in the broadest sense, Alexander offers the 
social construction of universal values that lead individuals to the common 
good. For this reason, it is crucial to understand how morality is socially 
constructed. In this sense, Alexander proposes the eternal conflict between 
74 Cf. Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkampf, 2001); Ulrich Beck, Daniel Levy, and Natan Sznaider, “Erinnerung 
und Vergebung in der Zweiten Moderne,” in Entgrenzung und Entscheidung: Wast its neu an 
der Theorie reflexiver Modernisierung? ed. Ulrich Beck and Christoph Lau (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkampf, 2004); Enzo Traverso, Fire and Blood: The European Civil War (1914–1945) 
(London: Verso, 2016). 
75 Beck and Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe, 134. Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound,” 
103–4; Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, “The Cosmopolitanization of Holocaust Memory: 
From Jewish to Human Experience,” in Gerson and Wolf, Sociology Confronts the Holocaust, 
313–30.
76 Alexander, Remembering the Holocaust, 35.
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good and evil as indisputable truth, valid everywhere.77 For him, as for 
Durkheim, a moral sentiment binding each of the members of society to the 
society itself (a pattern of values in which the individual can be identified) 
guarantees societal unity and therefore its cohesion and reproduction over 
the time. Identity and memory, morality and solidarity are the notions to 
which he refers in his theoretical model, whose center is the cultural 
construction of trauma. In other words, at the basis of society Alexander 
puts a collective identity that arises when “members of a collectivity feel they 
have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon 
their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing 
their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways.”78 Alexander 
looks for a trauma, a historical injustice, which, in a global society, can 
become a “transnational paradigm of collective identity,” the universal 
symbol of human suffering. World War II, an unprecedented historical 
event, hit all of humanity and the entire world by showing the Holocaust as 
a “global icon of evil.” In a world of uncertainty, in what Beck calls the “risk 
society,” the destruction of the Jews represents a traumatic reality that cannot 
be denied and whose elaboration can serve to establish bonds of solidarity 
among individuals.79 Alexander reports the attention to the historical past of 
the Holocaust, tracing its roots, and he posits the event as a paradigmatic 
moral reality, which must be understood in order to live in society, so that 
humans will no longer be destroyed and human rights will no longer be 
violated under the name of progress, violence, and modern technology.
As a sociologist of culture, Alexander is aware that the meanings of 
the social world are constructed from relationships between human 
beings and groups. After having analyzed society and identified a number 
of problems to solve, he identifies historical categories and social 
phenomena that can turn into sociological concepts able to solve those 
same social problems. Alexander deals with the function the Holocaust 
has in society: it is first and foremost a historical phenomenon, called 
upon to form a culture, norm, morals to transmit (as in Durkheim’s 
77 Cf. James Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
78 Alexander et al., Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity, 1.
79 Cf. Alexander, Remembering the Holocaust, 174–75, 185.
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thought) and, therefore, is seen as a useful sociological category to read 
contemporary reality, particularly, to avoid further human rights 
violations:
How did a specific and situated historical event, an event marked by 
ethnic and racial hatred, violence, and war, become transformed 
into a generalized symbol of human suffering and moral evil, a 
universalized symbol whose very existence has created historically 
unprecedented opportunities for ethnic, racial, and religious justice, 
for mutual recognition, and for global conflicts becoming regulated 
in a more civil way? This cultural transformation has been achieved 
because the originating historical event, traumatic in the extreme 
for a delimited particular group, has come over the last fifty years to 
be redefined as a traumatic event for all humankind. Now free-
floating rather than situated—universal rather than particular—this 
traumatic event vividly “lives” in the memories of contemporaries 
whose parents and grandparents never felt themselves even remotely 
related to it.80
Alexander’s sociology, political and cultural, contributes conceptually to 
the explanation of which effects cultural facts produce on the moral life of 
persons and society; how a universal morality is constructed when a 
suffering that unites individuals provides for the basis of the collective 
identity. Especially, Alexander conceives the Holocaust as a trauma 
(τραυµα) in accordance with the meaning of the ancient Greek, which is 
both a personal injury and a defeat or destruction of a community. In 
order to become a cultural fact or norm, it has to be represented: it must 
become a social representation, a drama or, more precisely, a tragedy.
4.4.1. Τραγ¥δία as Interpretation of the Human Condition
The idea of the tragic is a kind of consciousness that man has of himself, 
his realm, of the world. When Thespis, in 534 B.C., staged the first tragic 
80 Ibid., 3.
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performance in Athens, something special happened: it dealt with the 
witness. In the invention of tragedy, there was a basic step, namely, that of 
exiting from one’s own personal identity to play a role. In this novel condi-
tion, which is indeed that of the actor, in a time dimension that equates 
the past with the present, he presented himself as protagonist of a reality 
whose imitative power attracts those who view it, making them part of the 
action totally and immediately. In Alexander’s words, “this transcendental 
status, this separation from the specifics of any particular time or space, 
provided the basis for psychological identification on an unprecedented 
scale.”81 Thanks to this transformation from the individual to the collective, 
the fundamental transition from representation to action occurs—from 
the “song of the goat,” τραγῳδία (tragoidia), to the drama (δραµα), which, 
according to Greek verb δράω (drao), “to act” and “to do” (in some 
versions also “to run”), is no longer narrated but lived. In line with the 
Dorians’ tradition, the sense of action is visible in the word “tragoidia” 
from the root άγω, “act.” Briefly, both drama and tragedy translate the 
sense of an action represented mimetically. The terms “tragedy” and 
“drama” in Greek share the same root stem, δρ-, dental plus liquid, conso-
nants that onomatopoeically render the idea of action. 
Faced with the irreconcilable conflict between good and evil, faced 
with the horror of the evil that undermines the basis of human life, the 
action (in the sense of “what should we do?”) the drama, becomes the 
natural vehicle of expression, the conceptual discourse through which 
persons can reflect and the value framework to which one can refer—not 
as a system of abstract formalisms, but as a mentality, a norm of practice, 
a dynamic acceptance of a common tradition, which returns and evolves 
into a single creative act.
Tragedy, when it was born, was a literary genre that addressed a 
community of men and women in a visual-auditory way, and this fact 
demanded a specific reference system to facilitate receipt of the staged 
message. This discourse is clearly present in the thought of Alexander, 
who wants to make the trauma a drama, visible and audible since it is both 
alive and real. The observation of social real problems leads, in an Aristotelian 
81 Ibid., 32.
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sense, first, to a recognition of the error, αµαρτία (amartia), and then to 
action. The purpose of trauma-drama is that the single social individual, 
who hears and sees, assumes, as a tragic hero, the accountability for his own 
fate and the moral responsibility to fight against evil in society. Alexander 
perceives urgently the need to address the problems dealing with the fate 
of man and his existence in the world. The tragedy, for its character of 
collective experience in which there are moral and political instances, 
constitutes an ideal venue to meditate on reality, involving the society as a 
whole. As for Aeschylus, in the sixth century B.C., so for Alexander 
tragedy is a device able to investigate and express a world of values. The 
Holocaust was a tragic event, and tragedy, as it is conceived, is a literary 
genre that allows reality to be criticized. Considering the ethical and 
didactic usefulness of tragedy, he resorts to the tragic event because an 
existential interpretation is subtended by it. Just as in Sophocles’s tragedy, 
the absolute protagonist of the tragedy is the individual man, who suffers 
on the stage the fate of all humanity and who has to seek the meaning of 
his experience and accept his responsibilities, in the same way the dramatic 
action brings the individual of the global society to bear the weight of 
human condition. More than being Sophoclean, Alexander moves closer to 
Euripides’s tragedy, as an expression of human relationships and choices. 
The Greek tragedian entrusts the fate of man to human reason. For Euripides, 
the rules and structures of society are valuable. In this sense, tragedy has a 
pragmatic value, that is, it becomes a symbol of something and a frame of 
values within which to move. Zofia Posmysz-Piasecka recalls:
When I heard by chance some German voices next to me, I was in 
Paris, the voice of one of them took me back immediately to 
Auschwitz; that voice seemed the same of a SS. It was a trauma. Then 
I wrote a radio drama in 1959, which was broadcast in the same year. 
It was called Pasażerka z kabiny 45 (Passenger from Cabin Number 
45). It became a television drama thanks to Andrzej Munk, between 
1961 and 1963, and the friend and colleague Witold Lesiewicz, who 
after his death, in the middle of production, during an automobile 
accident in 1961, continued the production of the film with a group of 
filmmaker friends. Then Aleksander Medvedev wrote a booklet in 
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Russian and Miecyzslaw Weinberg made it a play in 1968. But for 
years the work was banned by the Soviet authorities. The opening 
play, directed by David Pountney, was in Bregenz last summer. 
Theater is a necessity. The orchestra is the symbol of the world: 
there is a total identification of the public, which makes its own a 
reality that has already existed, symbolically placed in the center: at 
that time the space is at the center of the orchestra of the world.82
Given that the social construction of universal values is a social process that 
occurs in steps, at the time that a historical event becomes a cultural thing, 
there is a critical passage to cross, namely, the trauma experienced by the 
victims has to become trauma for the community. This ritual of identifica-
tion, empathy, or compassion helps man in the global society. Martha 
Nussbaum explains that a cultural trauma is built by dramatizing an event: 
to make it tragic essentially means to propose it again with its victims, its 
perpetrators, and its consequences. The representation of trauma in its 
entirety lets the scene be internalized, makes it possible to acquire it and to 
acquire it as a mental habit.83 It is a catharsis that makes it possible: “We seek 
catharsis because our identification with the tragic narrative compels us to 
experience dark and sinister forces that are also inside of ourselves, not only 
inside others.”84 Since among the purposes of tragic representation is that of 
touching suffering, and evil in society, the tragedy itself, the trauma-drama 
for Alexander becomes a kind of moral code that prescribes what should 
not happen. Thus, all those who have internalized the trauma may recog-
nize evil and be able to choose correctly when faced with it:
The project of renaming, dramatizing, reifying, and ritualizing the 
Holocaust contributed to a moral remaking of the (post)modern 
(Western) world. The Holocaust story has been told and retold in 
82 See note 52, above (chapter 2).
83 See Martin L. Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and 
Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Karsten R. Stueber and Hans H. 
Kögler, eds., Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000); Marta Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and 
Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
84 Alexander, Remembering the Holocaust, 33. 
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response not only to emotional need but also to moral ambition. Its 
characters, its plot, and its pitiable denouement have been transformed 
into a less nationally bound, less temporally specific, and more 
universal drama. This dramatic universalization has deepened 
contemporary sensitivity to social evil. The trauma-drama’s message, 
like that of every tragedy, is that evil is inside all of us and in every 
society. If we are all the victims and all the perpetrators, then there is 
no audience that can legitimately distance itself from collective 
suffering, either from its victims or from its perpetrators.85
4.4.2. Trauma Theory: From Cultural Trauma to Universal Value
“From bad to good” and “good from evil” are some expressions that are 
read repeatedly in Alexander about the construction of universal values. 
When Durkheim speaks of culture, he alludes to the norms and social 
institutions that guide the single choices of the individual. When 
Alexander presents the genocide of the Jews as a cultural trauma, he refers 
to the break that a civilization suffers. A society that has been wounded 
clearly suggests that it is vulnerable, in the social structure. So, what was 
wrong in society prior to the Holocaust? More to my point, Europe’s 
democratic system—for example, Weimar Germany—was a political 
reality in progress, characterized by untested democratic reforms. At the 
same time, a particular cultural efflorescence was intersecting with the 
nationalization of masses. Europe saw these masses fighting for liberal 
guarantees, modern entitlements, and rights. The citizenship rights 
requirements dealt with the state-building process, but, this nation- 
formation has not been simple: nations came into being by means of 
bloody and cruel acts, with proper policies lacking or incongruous, and 
saw the collapse of four empires at the end of the Great War. Modernization 
as system of ideas and ideals failed: political theory was turned into 
successful economic policies or democratic governance. By the end of the 
Treaty of Versailles, a common political language was missing, a political 
deal made of reforms that also would lead, ultimately, to a democratic 
85 Ibid., 35.
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“polite” Europe, in peace and without hostility toward the other citizens 
that were considered to be foreign.
For Alexander, once the war ended, what happened to the Jews 
tended to have a series of representations that were called “atrocities,” or 
“man’s inhumanity to man,” but no one said the word “Holocaust”:
In the beginning, in April 1945, the Holocaust was not the “Holocaust.” 
In the torrent of newspaper, radio, and magazine stories reporting 
the discovery by American infantrymen of the Nazi concentration 
camps, the empirical remains of what had transpired were typified 
as “atrocities.” Their obvious awfulness, and indeed their strange-
ness, placed them for contemporary observers at the borderline of 
the category of behavior known as “man’s inhumanity to man.”86
Certainly, in the collective imagination, they were inhumane and brutal 
events. Holocaust survivors were rarely mentioned in interviews with 
their first names or their identities were only sporadically revealed: they 
were instead presented as an indistinct mass. This depersonalization made 
the identification of trauma by the community more difficult and slower. 
As noted by Halbwachs, most prominent among things in rethinking the 
past by a community are interests and projects of the present. Following 
Halbwachs, who died in Buchenwald in 1945, Alexander emphasizes the 
constrained construction of social memory. 
As concerns the victims, it is important to recall that they were often 
subjected, on the part of the Allies, to the same mistreatment suffered 
during the war under the Nazis, as the case of General Patton, reported in 
the New York Times in October 1945 following the inspection by Earl 
Harrison at the behest of President Truman: “American and British 
administrators felt impatient with many Jewish survivors, even personal 
repugnance for them, sometimes resorting to threat and even to punishing 
them.”87 As he noticed, this failed recognition of their status as victims 
depended very much on the Allies’ behavior. For example, it depended on 
86 Ibid., 3.
87 Ibid., 6. See “The Case of General Patton,” New York Times, October 3, 1945, 18.
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the U.S. government policy of establishing national quotas for the immi-
gration emergency plan at the end of the war, when misplaced German 
citizens were the first to be marked in the lists, while the Jewish survivors 
were the last. 
I have spent some time on the sociology of Alexander because it 
explains how post-Holocaust sociology changed during the globaliza-
tion age. Indeed, he does something more: starting from the study of the 
Holocaust, in a sociological way, he provides sociology with fresh 
devices. In this manner, starting from a subfield, substrand, like post-Ho-
locaust sociology, he brings innovation to the discipline in general, 
demonstrating also how the numerous subsections of sociology work 
under globalization. This is evident when Alexander explains how the 
control of the meanings of symbolic production is at the basis of the 
social construction. Who tells of the event, and in what way, builds the 
collective memory that is the constitutive element of the same identity 
and, therefore, in Durkheimian terms, of its cohesion. Alexander 
wonders what would have happened if the Allies had not won the war. 
This is a relevant question, because the Holocaust may never have been 
noted or remembered.
Looking back at Alexander’s method, to become a historical trauma in 
cultural fact, it is essential that the event be identified and marked (Where 
did the event happen? Who were the victims, and who were the perpetra-
tors?) in its entirety. Then it has to be reconstructed as it occurred in order 
to be “told and shown,” in the sense of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schütz.88 
The performance of tragedy is a cultural structure that allows for the giving 
of a name to the suffering, for calculating its weight in time and space, for 
identifying the protagonists-victims (the good) and the antagonists-persecutors 
(the evil). As in the Greek theater, Alexander explicates that the suffering is 
transferred: in light of what Aristotle said, this closeness/distance from the 
88 Cf. Edmund Husserl, “Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen 
Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie,” in 
Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 
1913), accessed September 8, 2012, http://www.freidok.uni-freiburg.de/volltexte/5973/pdf/
Husserl_Ideen_zu_einer_reinen_Phaenomenologie_1.pdf; Alfred Schütz, The Phenomenology 
of the Social World (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967).
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scene transforms the pain, the irreversible end of the tragedy, in τέλος 
(telos), namely, in the end of the drama itself.89 
If, in Greek tragedy, Sophocles wanted to educate the citizens of the 
polis to civic commitment, in the same way Alexander’s spectators, the 
persons of any society, after having identified themselves with the general 
suffering, are called to become actors: they must work to ensure that the 
perceived evil is not repeated. In doing so, they become morally responsible 
and the Holocaust rises to the archetypal, mythical state of evil. The 
tragedy is, therefore, a mental attitude, a method that brings each victim 
to recognize personally within himself his secret identity: in tragedy 
everyone has his own name:
This personalization brought the trauma drama “back home.” 
Rather than depicting the events on a vast historical scale, rather 
than focusing on larger-than-life leaders, mass movements, organi-
zations, crowds, and ideologies, these dramas portrayed the events 
in terms of small groups, families and friends, parents and children, 
brothers and sisters. In this way, the victims of trauma became 
everyman and everywoman, every child and every parent.90
In shedding light on the social origins of this mental reality, Alexander 
seeks to understand what lies behind the social construction of the 
Holocaust and asks what are the “social frameworks of reference,” 
according to Halbwachs, between the two world wars, in Europe and in 
the United States. This is relevant since they prepare its codification at the 
end of the war. Nazism, considered the absolute evil, a symbol of ethnic 
violence, racial, and religious hatred, leads one to interpret the Holocaust 
essentially as a product of Nazism itself. Kristallnacht, for example, in the 
United States engenders reactions of bitter condemnation against a 
dictator and his highest expression of anti-Semitism. This assimilation 
between Nazism and anti-Semitism obviously makes the opponents of 
Nazism the sympathizers of the Jews. The social construction or image is 
89 Alexander, Remembering the Holocaust, 32.
90 Ibid., 38.
The Problem of the Holocaust after 1989 | 345
this: those who fought against the Nazis defended the Jews and were not 
anti- Semitic. Nevertheless, this cultural attitude together with the attitude 
of the Allies deviates from grasping the reality of anti-Semitism and deci-
phering the Holocaust, which is told as a warfare story.91 What matters is 
that this does not help to provide people theoretically with the right 
means, conditions, and so on to recognize the events as they happened.
The conditions for recognition of the Holocaust as genocide and 
for a construction of a cultural trauma missed, because, by the end of 
the war until the 1960s, the image of a democratic America, bearer of 
values and sacrifice in fighting Nazism, was the most prevalent: “The 
goal focused not on the Holocaust but on the need to purge postwar 
society of Nazi-like pollution.”92 The United States was the country 
that further participated in the construction of a new moral order on 
the ruins of the old world without forgetting that in this nonprocessing 
of the Holocaust, anti- Semitism of half a century before played a big 
role. It has meant anti- immigration: when American Jews did not want 
to be reidentified with this old story, they did not want to match again 
their identity with that reality.
To break the ideal of a perfect America that always stands up for any 
democratic cause were the Eichmann trial, Stanley Milgram’s research on 
obedience to authority, which began three months after the beginning of 
the Nazi war crimes trial, and, finally, the study by Christopher Browning 
about the commonplaceness of persons. Thanks to these events, the circle 
of perpetrators was enlarged, putting into question conceptions such as 
radical evil and evil as social. Until that time, Alexander enlightens how, 
for the entire American society, the Nazi Holocaust was a Nazi product 
that had to be placed within precise territorial and temporal boundaries: 
Europe during World War II. It was still not a cultural and universal fact, 
and the Allies fighting against each specter of Nazism were considered 
heroes. However, when in the mid-1960s, the Vietnam War started, the 
fate of the social representation of the Holocaust changed, bringing about 
its universalization. Vietnam showed how the United States was not the 
91 See ibid., 16.
92 Ibid., 27.
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keeper of goodness and not faultless. The suffering and the social evil that 
they caused in Vietnam led to the end of their monopoly on the produc-
tion of symbolic meanings: of the social representation of good and evil. 
Since the United States was committing war crimes, other democratic 
societies did not have any guarantees against the dangers of another mass 
murder. When Alexander writes, “as America became ‘Amerika,’ however, 
napalm bombs were analogized with gas pellets and the flaming jungles of 
Vietnam with the gas chambres,” it is quite clear that the Holocaust was 
taking the form of a trauma returning: a structural aspect of the tragedy.93 
The Vietnam War thus led to rethinking the past of the Allies in the 
1970s, “suggesting that the anti-Semitism of Roosevelt and Churchill and of 
American and British citizens had prevented them from acting to block the 
mass killings.”94 Moreover, another event of deconstruction of the facts and of 
symbolic inversions contributed to rendering the Holocaust universal. Let 
me remember Alexander’s statements. When, on September 27, 1979, the 
chair of the Commission of the Victims of the Holocaust, during construc-
tion work at the Holocaust Museum in New York, underlined that the 
institution had the task of remedying the indifference of the American 
nation to the extermination of the Jews, clearly, a first step toward public 
admission of guilt was taken. This means that they moved towards a broad-
ening of responsibility, that the fault was not only that of the Germans, but 
also of the spectators who did not intervene. For these reasons, an inner 
bridge to a tower whose rooms show artifacts of the camps connects the 
third floor of the museum, filled with images of the death camps. As soon 
as the visitor approaches the bridge, in the middle of the representation of 
evil, one sees a wall photo of Auschwitz-Birkenau, taken by U.S. Air Force 
intelligence on May 31, 1944. As recalled by the ethnographer of the 
museum project, Edward Linenthal, the photo caption states that it was the 
day in which large-scale death of the Hungarian Jews, who had just arrived 
in the camp, was to begin. At the top of the photo, the fourth crematorium 
is visible. This public admission of guilt, first, recalls Arendt’s thought about 
the necessity of public accountability and pardon. The admission of guilt 
93 Ibid., 45.
94 Ibid., 46–47.
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for not taking action against what happened to the Jews (“an artifactual 
indictment of American indifference” for Linenthal; “the effective align-
ment of Allied Armies with Nazi perpetrators” for Alexander) reduces the 
idea of a Nazi specificity of the Holocaust. It meant that the genocide was 
not only the actions of Germans in Europe, and not only a product of 
Nazism in Europe.95 It can be added that it is possible to recognize a lost 
generation if persons who have not been educated to face the past honestly. 
In other words, the violence can be repeated. This introspective catharsis 
on the past, by leading to a recognition of responsibilities, corresponds to 
the moral conscience of which Habermas spoke: publicly admitted, it is the 
basis of political culture. The Vietnam War revealed in which way evil is 
nested in society. For Alexander, the Holocaust becomes the metaphor par 
excellence of the representation of evil, which acts as a bridge between the 
suffering of every age and condition. The obstruction of evil generates the 
universalization of the Holocaust. For example, one can consider expres-
sions like “nuclear holocaust,” the Balkan wars as a “new holocaust,” or the 
term “Kosovocaust” coined by Levy and Sznaider. 
Looking around, the postcommunist world is experiencing a 
museum, ritual, and memorial boom. When Alexander remembers a 
comic strip of Non Sequitur by Wiley that shows a young girl who ignores 
the significance of the number tattooed on the arm of a survivor with 
whom she speaks, he proposes one of the steps of the construction process 
of collective identity. This is more evident especially at the end of the strip: 
the now elderly victim tries to explain that the tattooed number serves to 
remind not only him of what the Holocaust was, but to remind every 
person. The girls asks: “So you kept it to remind yourself about the dangers 
of political extremism?” He answers: “No, my dear. To remind you.”96 
Surely, the representation of the Holocaust differs from country to country. 
It is important to reflect on Israel’s representation of the Holocaust. 
Thanks to Alexander’s lesson, it is possible to understand some points 
better. For instance, in Israel the universalization or cosmopolitanization 
of the Holocaust (going beyond the borders of the Jewish state and the 
95 Ibid., 47.
96 Ibid., 173–74.
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categories of modernity, since that memory no longer belongs exclusively 
to the Jewish survivors arrived in the country) began when the army of 
the Jewish state barely managed to avoid a military catastrophe in 1973.97 
Israel seemed to meet the reality of defeat, of the myth of infallibility of its 
army, or of an always victorious Israel. This loss of importance for the 
military aspect itself and the discrediting of militant Zionism shifted 
attention to suffering in general, highlighting the suffering of Palestinians 
and Israel’s expanding national borders to all victims of every nation. This 
event was reflected in post-Holocaust sociology. It started a sociology that 
thinks, considers, or puts into reflection the tortures of the victims in the 
camps and ghettos, and shows that resistance can be not only active and 
military but also passive and spiritual. 
Important in the consideration of these sociological studies is that 
the cosmopolitanism of the Holocaust, or rather the cosmopolitan 
sociology of the Holocaust, involves the gradual abandonment of the 
typical categories of modernity by which the Holocaust has hitherto been 
studied. This occurred, at least in Israeli society, just at the time that the 
image of one of the major factors of modern national states, the Israeli 
army—one of the two major collective references of Zionism (after the 
kibbutz)—is undermined. In this context, Israeli perception of the 
Holocaust changed: it ceased to be typical of the Jews, by ensuring that all 
human suffering has neither territory nor nation. Its universalization was 
clearer when Alexander recalls as an instance Ronit Lentin’s study on the 
death of Palestinians, during the Lebanon War, told with Holocaust 
notions and images.98
4.5. GENRE STUDIES AND THE JEWISH QUESTION
Up to this point, I have tried to focus on the collective memory and topics 
related to cosmopolitanism. But my interest in Holocaust sociology after 
1989 led me to other topics concerned with the theme. After the collapse 
97 In Weber’s sociology, the monopoly of legitimate violence is a crucial notion: it is at the base 
of the modern state.
98 Cf. Michael Brenner, Breve storia del sionismo (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2003 [2002]); Ilan 
Greilsammer, Il sionismo (Bologna: il Mulino, 2007 [2005]), 99. Let me thank Guido 
Bartolucci for the references. See also note 104, below.
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of the Berlin Wall and the end of communism, Holocaust Studies 
continued to grow, and several approaches raising new questions to/about 
the issue arose. Among the different disciplines approaching the problem, 
without interruptions or reversals, there was indeed Holocaust sociology. 
By the end of the 1970s, the division of sociology into many sociological 
subfields was more evident than previously, because of outside influences 
of different disciplines of the social sciences. The sociology of social move-
ments and of organizations, the sociology of stratification, the sociology 
of religion, and others were born in this period. They were linked to or 
resulted from the turmoil following 1968. In other words, a dissemina-
tion/proliferation of sociology (that coincided with its subdivision into 
multiple subdisciplines) happened along with the development of civil 
rights battles and Vietnam War protest movements. 
As regards post-Holocaust sociology, among the various approaches 
to the destruction of the Jews among the several subfields of sociology, 
stood the sociology of gender. To be more precise, the sociology of gender 
approached the Holocaust theme in 1990s, to the point that we could 
speak of the “post-Holocaust sociology of gender.” We can see this thanks 
to the valuable study by Robin Linden.99 This study is considered the first 
work to break a scholarly taboo, according which the category of gender is 
pointless in the study of the Holocaust (in the sense that it leads only 
toward a banalization of the event). Second, the book shows the trauma of 
some women survivors interviewed by the author.100 It is relevant to stress 
that the method of interviews with the Holocaust survivors is another 
consequence of the division of sociology into several subfields. 
Gender Studies deserve attention in their approach toward the theme of 
the Holocaust. In essence, this field became part of post-Holocaust sociology 
only in the 1990s because of a previous scholarly preconception that the cate-
gory of gender would trivialize the Holocaust. The work published by Renate 
Bridenthal, Atina Grossman, and Marion Kaplan in 1984 was the exception.101 
 99 Robin R. Linden, Making Stories, Making Selves: Feminist Reflections on the Holocaust 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1993).
100 See Ayşe Gül Altınay and Andrea Pető, “Europe and the Century of Genocides: New 
Directions in the Feminist Theorizing of Genocide,” European Journal of Women’s Studies, 
22, no. 4 (2015): 379–85, doi:10.1177/1350506815608325.
101 Cf. Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossman, and Marion Kaplan, eds., When Biology Became 
Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984). 
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However, the taboo was formally broken by Linden, who, thanks to the cate-
gories of postmodernism, also explains the extermination experience of a 
few survivors in Making Stories in 1993, the same year in which the question 
of the banality of evil was reproposed by Fred E. Katz in Ordinary People and 
Extraordinary Evil.102 An additional work, edited by Dalia Ofer and Lenore J. 
Weitzman, explored the better chances women had, compared to men, of 
surviving the Holocaust.103 Especially in the third part of the book, devoted 
to resistance and rescue, and in the fourth section, consecrated to labor and 
concentration camps, the two scholars explain how the division of labor was 
crucial for women’s survival. First, because women, destined for domestic 
work, had been less exposed to the public environment and consequently it 
was easier for them to escape Nazi control; and second, because Jewish 
women, not bearing the mark of circumcision, as men did, were less distin-
guishable from other women and therefore more easily able to mix in secular 
and Christian environments. Above all, Ofer and Weitzman highlight the 
active role of women in resistance organizations, putting aside the stereotype 
according to which they were passive actors or, at most, were supportive to 
the men. Their dealing with the resistance topic contributed to improving 
Holocaust Studies in general. 
Other works with a gender perspective come from Lentin, who 
 examines the role of the Holocaust and its representation in Israeli society, 
and from Wolf, who deals with the slight attention paid to personal care 
within the camp, especially among men, in a survey conducted through 
the personal story of the survivor Jake Geldwert.104
102 Cf. Katz, Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil; Judith T. Baumel, Double Jeopardy: 
Gender and the Holocaust (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1998).
103 See Sheila F. Segal, Women of Valor: Stories of Great Jewish Women Who Helped Shape the 
Twentieth Century (West Orange, NJ: Behrman House, 1996); Dalia Ofer and Lenore J. 
Weitzman, eds., Women in the Holocaust (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Brana 
Gurewitsch, ed., Mothers, Sisters, Resisters: Oral Histories of Women who Survived the Holocaust 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998); accessed September 8, 2011, http://www1.
yadvashem.org/yv/en/education/newsletter/18/couriers.asp; Joan B. Wolf, review of Women in 
the Holocaust, by Dalia Ofer and Lenore J. Weitzman, American Journal of Sociology 105, no. 1 
(1999): 296–97.
104 See Ronit Lentin, Israel and the Daughters of the Shoah: Reoccupying the Territories of Silence 
(New York: Berghahn, 2000); Gerson and Wolf, Sociology Confronts the Holocaust, 29–31.
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Resilience and Courage by Tec also was very important. Dealing with 
Nazi policies and brutalization to which Jews were subjected, Tec 
 photographed the attitudes and reactions of men and women, underlining 
their strategies for survival in the ghetto and the camp. From the reading 
of the text emerges the courageous behavior of women in the camp and 
their alternation in typically male functions. In addition, Tec poses the 
concept of division of labor at the center of her study, not a mere 
 coincidence since this concept by the end of 1980s in sociology had 
become a category of study. As in her previous studies, Tec gives ample 
space to the witnesses, such as Eliszewa/Elza Binder, a twenty-one-
year-old woman, and Juliusz Feuerman, a war veteran and member of the 
Jewish Council with Zionist positions, who gives valuable information 
about the liquidation of the Stanisławów ghetto in Ukraine that began on 
February 23, 1943. Elza Binder started to write her story on December 23, 
1941, and completed it on July 18, 1942, during a reprisal. From her diary, 
it is possible to reconstruct the ghetto conditions. Feuerman’s story is 
slightly different: after the liquidation of the ghetto, in February 1943, he 
was imprisoned along with twenty-two other Jews to finish the work and 
projects of the Gestapo:105
Feuerman remained alive at least until February 1944. While in 
prison, Feuerman wrote several texts intended for his son, Lonek (b. 
1917), which he addressed to Dr. Benedict Lieberman in Nahariya in 
British Mandate Palestine. He smuggled the texts out several pages 
at a time through a friendly Pole who had worked for him before the 
war and was now a Gestapo employee. Lonek survived the war in 
the Soviet Union; when he returned to Stanisławów in search of his 
family, he met this man, who gave him Feuerman’s papers. Lonek — 
now Mr. Arieh Ogen of Bonn, Germany—donated his father’s 
papers to Yad Vashem.106
105 Rachel F. Brenner, “Voices from Destruction: Two Eyewitness Testimonies from the 
Stanisławów Ghetto,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 22, no. 2 (2008): 320, doi:10.1093/
hgs/dcn028.
106 Ibid., 325. 
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Binder’s and Feuerman’s writings are significant, first, because they offer 
a precise description of the work of the Jews in the ghetto or life in 
prison; second, because they account for the behavior of the leaders of 
Gestapo.107
Finally, two very special works complete the framework of post- 
Holocaust sociology of gender. The first is an ethnographic research on 
the collective memory of the Holocaust in Eastern Europe written by Janet 
L. Jacobs in 2004: in the wake of Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological 
studies, and through the categories of genre, genocide, and ethnos, which 
had never been combined together before, she conceives the Holocaust as 
a genocidal phenomenon.108 
The second is the work of Suzanne Vromen, who, in 2008, recon-
structed from interviews the story of several Jewish children saved by 
Belgian nuns.109 According to her reviewer, Alan Berger, it is “a welcome 
addition to the literature dealing with hidden Jewish children and their 
rescuers during the Holocaust. She focused on Belgium, and interviewed 28 
former hidden children (16 women and 12 men); eight nuns and one priest 
who hid them; two surviving members of the Belgian resistance; the 
President of the Association of the Hidden Children; and various persons 
involved in commemorations. The result is a new appreciation of the 
complexity of rescue as well as the lasting trauma of those whose lives were 
saved. Her interviews with the nuns, a group typically omitted from this 
research, is especially significant,” and these precious notes or suggestions 
result from book reviews, perused online and whose importance it has been 
stressed more times.110
107 Some writings attributed to Binder and Feuerman were not written by them, but by other 
comrades. Cf. ibid; Holocaust Encyclopedia, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
accessed September 9, 2011, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007305. 
See Nechama Tec, Resilience and Courage: Women, Men, and the Holocaust (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2003), 336–39.
108 Cf. Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1967); Janet L. Jacobs, “Women, Genocide and Memory: The Ethics of Feminist 
Ethnography in Holocaust Research,” Gender and Society 18 (2004): 233–38.
109 Suzanne Vromen, Hidden Children of the Holocaust: Belgian Nuns and Their Daring Rescue 
of Young Jews from the Nazis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
110 Alan L. Berger, review of Hidden Children of the Holocaust: Belgian Nuns and Their Daring 
Rescue of Young Jews from the Nazis, by Suzanne Vromen, Studies in Christian-Jewish 
Relations 5, no. 1 (2010): 1.
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In essence, the work traces a completely new path in the  reprocessing 
of collective memory, especially since the Jewish children (the saved 
victims) and some women (the righteous) are put at the center of 
 reflection. Particularly, among these women, there are common persons 
accompanying children from their families up to the convents of nuns, 
keeping them hidden, saving them from extermination.111 The  reconstruction 
by Vromen highlights an aspect of resistance underestimated by the 
 sociological literature.112 In telling the manner in which this specific type 
of resistance unfolded, Vromen first identifies the institutions involved, 
namely, the Independence Front and the Jewish Defense Committee, 
and devotes ultimately a part of the work to the hierarchy of the Catholic 
Church. As well stressed by Berger, “Hidden Children of the Holocaust 
also sheds light on the patriarchal nature of the Church.” Indeed, the fact 
that the nuns, as women, were undervalued “had a great impact on 
post-war commemorations,” and “women were sometimes seen as 
 inferior by Church leaders.” This delays their recognition (as righteous) 
for having saved the Jewish children, unlike the immediate recognition 
for priests, men.113 In this sense, as several book reviewers notice, 
Vromen’s piece is relevant. She also highlights how “rescue efforts were 
part of the broader resistance to the Nazi occupation of Belgium,” and she 
stresses “the importance of women in this process.”114 These rescue actions 
constituted a manner of resistance challenging the institutionalized power 
of the higher clergy. What matters is that, thanks to the category of 
“institutionalized and cultural power,” Vromen explains how the Belgian 
nuns saved Jewish children in convents: since in the hierarchy of the Catholic 
Church, they occupied “the lower clergy,” and they could challenge authority 
because they were not subject to controls. Nevertheless, this could have 
happened only in Belgium, in an area that, like France, constituted a 
“Romanic” region—in Hilberg’s words—and not therefore destined to 
111 Although the context is different, see the personal story of Irena Sendler, righteous among 
nations. Accessed September 9, 2011, http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/stories/
sendler.asp. 
112 See Vromen, “Collective Memory and Cultural Politics,” 134, 148–49, 153.
113 Berger, review of Hidden Children of the Holocaust, 2.
114 Ibid. Cf. Vromen, “Collective Memory and Cultural Politics,” 150.
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become an administrative part of the Third Reich.115 It seems that 
Vromen adopts a procedure typical of cosmopolitan memory in giving 
space and voice to the victims of Nazism by using witnesses. In doing so, 
it is possible to discover that the nuns decided, in the name of the right 
to life, not to take the ethnic or religious origins of children into account. 
Vromen underscores that their actions went beyond national borders: 
She was also a nun. Sister she was called, she was a nurse, and I will 
not forget her. She loved the children very much. I remember one 
day I had to undress because I had boils and I was very much 
ashamed. I was afraid that she should see that I am Jewish, so she 
told me: you can undress, and you have nothing to fear from me . . . 
and I adored her. Not only I, all the children.116
Monasteries, the object of the research, were symbolic places, the spaces 
par excellence of Catholicism, which, under the Nazi occupation, housed 
Jewish children in a challenge to the power of the Third Reich.117 In addi-
tion, Vromen explores the baptism question and what happened to these 
children, at the end of the conflict, and what it meant for her to be annihi-
lated twice:
The book is a valuable resource for those wanting to know more 
about the experiences of Jewish children hidden in places that were 
historically and theologically hostile to Judaism. Vromen intelligently 
touches on theological matters in this regard.118
Finally, Vromen accounts for the anti-Semitism in religious circles: she 
discovers the apprehension of nuns who were very friendly and very 
willing to rescue Jewish children, but she also records the behavior of 
 religious people who openly expressed their dislike. Vromen brings to 
115 Cf. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 383.
116 Vromen, “Collective Memory and Cultural Politics,” 138.
117 The appendix contains the names of 52 nuns, of whom 19 were mother superiors who are 
today commemorated by Yad Vashem as “The Righteous Among the Nations,” accessed 
September 9, 2001, http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/index.asp.
118 Berger, review of Hidden Children of the Holocaust, 1.
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light the continuous effort of the mothers superior to convince hesitant 
nuns to protect and hide Jewish children from the Nazis: the thoughts and 
words of these righteous sisters were constantly aiming at understanding 
that God’s desire was not to convert Jewish children to Christianity, but 
simply to save them.119
4.6.  THE POST-HOLOCAUST SOCIOLOGY OF THE  
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Closing symbolically ha-Shoah in the last few years was the research 
activity conducted by Rachel L. Einwohner. At the beginning of the third 
millennium, post-Holocaust sociology, thanks to some sociologists, like 
this scholar, who introduced new concepts or, better, used them in a new 
way, was reinvigorated. And thus sociology in general was updated.
Einwohner can be seen as a pioneering theorist of Jewish resistance 
from the explanations she provides sociology. In September 2000 she 
introduced her ideas at the Noon Lecture and Discussion Series of the 
Jewish Studies Program at Purdue University. In essence, she studied the 
reality of the Holocaust, particularly, the phenomenon of the Jewish resis-
tance, through the concept of social movement.120 In her words: “My 
contribution toward a sociology of the Holocaust is to use research find-
ings from the field of social movements to present a more distinctly 
sociological analysis of Jewish resistance. In fact, I argue that a sociolog-
ical lens proves particularly useful for illuminating the dynamics of Jewish 
resistance, especially the participation in collective resistance.”121 It was a 
turning point, a result of the sociology of political movements, established 
following the trade union movements of the 1980s in Europe and in the 
United States. The need to study the destruction of the Jews with different 
119 Cf. ibid., 1–2.
120 In 2001, her paper was presented at meeting of the Pacific Sociological Association in San 
Francisco, and it was published in AJS in 2003. See Rachel L. Einwohner, “Opportunity, 
Honor, and Action in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943,” American Journal of Sociology 
109, no. 3 (2003): 650.
121 Rachel L. Einwohner, “Availability, Proximity, and Identity in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising: 
Adding a Sociological Lens to Studies of Jewish Resistance,” in Gerson and Wolf, Sociology 
Confronts the Holocaust, 277.
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categories occurred at the beginning of the twenty-first century, at the 
gradual end of the theory of modernity of the Holocaust when, contem-
porarily, the awareness that contributions of some sociologists had 
improved the Holocaust literature in general grew among scholars. In 
effect, this application of concepts related to the theory of social move-
ments, such as social interaction, collective behavior, social group, group 
dynamics, or social construction of group identity, will be fruitful.122
4.6.1. The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising as Social Movement
My discussion focuses on the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 1943, 
the  best-known and perhaps most revered instance of Jewish resistance 
during the Holocaust. I pose two questions about this case: who 
 participated in the uprising, and what was the motive for their actions? In 
doing so, I hope to illustrate just one of the ways that the discipline of 
sociology can contribute to academic analyses of the Holocaust.123
Many questions and issues arise when considering the resistance that 
unfolded in the ghetto or district (Wohnbezirk) of Warsaw. From a sociological 
point of view, its representation as social movement seems to be 
 undoubtedly an innovation.124 Here, I will not reflect on the history of the 
ghetto and episodes of riots and insurrection, since my goal is to spotlight 
how Einwohner’s sociological perspective explains what happened in 
Warsaw in a different mode. Primarily, she debunks the traditional 
122 Cf. Rachel L. Einwohner, “Gender, Class, and Social Movement Outcomes: Identity and 
Effectiveness in Two Animal Rights Campaigns,” Gender and Society 13, no. 1 (1999): 
56–76, http://www.jstor.org/stable/190240; Deborah A. Abowitz, “Bringing the Sociological 
into the Discussion: Teaching the Sociology of Genocide and the Holocaust,” Teaching 
Sociology 30, no. 1 (2002): 26–38. According to the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum in Washington, DC, the resistance took place in about 800 slums in so-called 
Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe, accessed 21 July, 2016, https://www.ushmm.org/search/
results/?q=resistance. 
123 Einwohner, “Availability, Proximity, and Identity in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising,” 277.
124 The Warsaw Uprising is the best documented and most symbolic example of Jewish resis-
tance. Cf. Joseph Kermish, To Live with Honor and Die with Honor!: Selected Documents 
from the Warsaw Ghetto Underground Archives “O.S.” [Oneg Shabbath] (Jerusalem: Yad 
Vashem, 1986); Rachel L. Einwohner, “The Need to Know: Cultured Ignorance and Jewish 
Resistance in the Ghettos of Warsaw, Vilna, and Łódź,” The Sociological Quarterly 50 
(2009): 407.
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 stereotype according to which Jews were “sheep led to slaughter,” which is 
necessary for reframing the event correctly.125 Although Einwohner’s 
choice to represent the Warsaw Uprising as a social movement could 
appear strange (because the classical theory of social movements is based 
on elements that seem to be absent in this uprising), it turns out to be 
strategic in many ways. Starting with the basic definition, social  movements 
are conceived as innovative forms of solidarity. Since they are fluid in 
form, they exist to change preexisting manners of relationship between 
inner members. At the same time, they are thought as actions that clash 
with the existing institutional apparatus, in order to subvert it, by  swapping 
the founding values with those experienced in the group. Thanks to 
Einwohner’s studies (in comprehending the Holocaust) it is possible to 
resume or retrace the main steps of traditional sociology dealing with 
social movements and organizations. For instance, it is possible to come 
back to Marx, referring to social movement at the time that the transition 
from “class in itself ” to “class for itself ” is realized; or to Alain Touraine, a 
classical theoretician of social movements who emphasizes the element of 
conflict.126 Einwohner’s works do not only distance themselves from these 
specifications, but they also rely on fresh elements, resulting from a recent 
line of research that investigates social movements and collective action:127
This case is of substantial importance to the study of social movements 
for two reasons. First, it extends current theory and research to 
125 See Yitzhak Arad, Israel Gutman, and Abraham Margaliot, eds., Documents on the 
Holocaust: Selected Sources on the Destruction of the Jews of Germany and Austria, Poland, 
and the Soviet Union, 8th ed., trans. Lea Ben Dor (Lincoln and London: University of 
Nebraska Press, Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1999), 433–34, doc. 196, Proclamation by Jewish 
Pioneer Youth Group in Vilna, Calling for Resistance, January 1, 1942; and 459–60, doc. 209, 
Proclamation by the F.P.O. Calling for Revolt in Vilna, September 1, 1943; Bauer, Rethinking 
the Holocaust, 119–42; Einwohner, “Opportunity, Honor, and Action in the Warsaw Ghetto 
Uprising of 1943,” 650–65; Havi Ben-Sasson and Shlomit Dunkelblum-Steiner, Resistance: 
Spiritual Resistance, Revolt, Partisans, and the Uprising in the Death Camps (Jerusalem: Yad 
Vashem, 2004), 66, 86.
126 See Touraine, Production de la société; Vincenzo Bova, Solidarność: Origini, sviluppo ed 
istituzionalizzazione di un movimento sociale (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003).
127 Cf. James M. Jasper, The Art of Moral Protest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1997); Einwohner, “Opportunity, Honor, and Action in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 
1943.”
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a new terrain. As scholars are increasingly recognizing the  limitations 
of a research literature based mainly on the study of protest in 
contemporary Western democracies, an analysis of collective 
resistance that took place in a nondemocratic context during 
World War II offers a useful test of the applicability of dominant 
theoretical concepts to a broader range of cases. Second, as stated 
above, this case presents an important challenge to one of the 
explanatory factors offered by these theories; namely, the concept 
of political opportunity.128
Einwohner’s piece shows how the sociological approach is important for 
Holocaust Studies. The phenomenon of resistance that took place in 
Warsaw presents some unusual details for the traditional sociology of 
social movements. Einwohner’s study refers to very recent research, 
which sees Melucci among major representatives and which puts the 
concepts of collective identity and honor at the center of the theory of 
collective action:129
Thus, framing their resistance as a fight for honor may have been 
compelling because, by doing so, the ghetto fighters made a state-
ment about who and what Warsaw Jews were: strong and proud 
people, not the weak “subhumans” portrayed by Nazi ideology. 
Resistance was therefore the enactment of an identity.130
The main ideal type of social movement of which Melucci speaks and to 
which Einwohner refers is based on the concept of the idem feeling, or organic 
solidarity: concepts that evoke the categories of moral and collective 
consciousness of Durkheim. Einwohner deals with the phenomenon of 
Jewish resistance in the Warsaw ghetto through the concept of collective 
128 Einwohner, “Opportunity, Honor, and Action in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943,” 651 
(authors’ in-text citations omitted).
129 Melucci was trained at the school of Alain Touraine. On the concept of “honor,” see Arad, 
Gutman, and Margaliot, Documents on the Holocaust, 315–16, doc. 145, The Last Letter 
from Mordecai Anielewicz, Warsaw Ghetto Revolt Commander, April 23, 1943.
130 Einwohner, “Opportunity, Honor, and Action in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943,” 
668.
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 identity, considered as a moral glue that can hold together individuals and 
encourage them to revolt: “They saw armed resistance as a way to act with 
dignity and honor.”131 
In the Wohnbezirk of Warsaw, collective action was possible due to a 
social context or frame that was based on honor.132 In the wake of 
Horowitz’s and Bourgois’s studies, by “honor,” Einwohner means the 
respect for the law in a society. It is an analytical key that allows her to 
explain the reasons that led to the uprising in the ghetto. In fact, the 
concept of honor itself is based on moral norms, which ensure a common 
idem capable of uniting social actors in an action-resistant milieu.133 This 
means that collective action took place in Warsaw because in the ghetto 
the conditions demanding respect for the law had been established: this 
demand pushed the population of the ghetto to react. Here, the concepts 
of honor and dignity are what Goffman and Schütz call a “motivational 
framework of reference.”134 In contrast with what the classical theory of 
social  movements supports, for which a social movement is born at the 
moment that there are social conditions that pave the way for action (the 
status quo of Alberoni and one that has to be changed to obtain a new 
reality), Einwohner considers other conditions leading the community to 
act, specifically, to resist. 
Following Ian Clark, according to whom these conditions are 
given by incentives of solidarity, or from social situations that press on 
the group, stimulating elements of belonging and identity, Einwohner 
 emphasizes that these incentives in Warsaw (of identity or solidarity) 
were refiled under the form of honor, but political opportunities were 
absent.135 This latter expression refers to all possible forms or relational 
power  abilities able to manage the contradictions that arise from the 
131 Einwohner, “The Need to Know,” 416.
132 See Arad, Gutman, and Margaliot, Documents on the Holocaust, 276–77, doc. 125, Call to 
Armed Self-Defense, from an Underground Publication. 
133 See Ruth Horowitz, Honor and the American Dream: Culture and Identity in a Chicano 
Community (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983); Philippe Bourgois, In 
Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
134 See Schütz, The Phenomenology of the Social World; Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on 
the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (New York: Anchor, 1961).
135 See Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
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relationship between prescriptive time and complexity of action. This 
ability to manage contradictions between power poles in favor of resis-
tance in the ghetto—for example, the Jewish Fighting Organization 
(ŻOB) and the Jewish Military Union (ŻZW)—and outside of it—such 
as the Armia Krajowa (Home Army or Polish Military Underground and 
the Polish government in exile in London)—is equal to zero. This is 
because relationships between the centers of power were lacking. The 
underground Jewish military  organization, ŻOB, was constituted in 
the Warsaw ghetto on August 28, 1942, thanks to the Zionist youth 
movement, which included three pioneering movements: Ha-Shomer 
Ha-Tsa*ir, Dror, and Akiva. Several times the name Dror (“Freedom”) 
appears. It was a left-wing Zionist youth movement, associated politi-
cally with Poalei Zion (“Workers of Zion,” a Zionist party of the Left), 
and Hechalutz (“The Pioneer”), an umbrella organization of commu-
nities for agricultural training. Most of the  underground movements 
and political parties in the ghetto—Zionists, Bund, and the commu-
nists—then joined in October and November 1942 as the underground 
organization of ŻOB. The other clandestine military body, ŻZW, 
prepared by a revisionist movement, did not ever integrate with the 
ŻOB.136 On the basis of this power vacuum, the population of the 
ghetto, in accordance with the principle of opposition theorized by 
Touraine, developed a resisting force, which had as its goal the estab-
lishment of an entity different from other centers of power with 
decision-making power:137
136 Cf. Ben-Sasson and Dunkelblum-Steiner, Resistance, 69–70, 72, 75, 82–83.
137 Ibid., 30, 62; Einwohner, “The Need to Know,” 416; Arad, Gutman, and Margaliot, 
Documents on the Holocaust, 303–4, doc. 139, Call for Resistance by the Jewish Military 
Organization in the Warsaw Ghetto, January 1943; William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, 
“Framing Political Opportunity,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, ed. 
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 275–90; Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, “Caught in a Winding, Snarling 
Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory,” Sociological Forum 14 (1999): 27–54; 
Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and 
Francesca Polletta, Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001); Jeff Goodwin and Steven Pfaff, “Emotion Work in High-Risk Social 
Movements: Managing Fear in the U.S. and East German Civil Rights Movements,” in 
Passionate Politics, ed. Jeff Goodwin et al., 282–302.
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In fact, collective resistance emerged precisely because Jews recog-
nized there was no way out of the ghetto. This awareness helped 
create collective action by allowing a particular motivational frame 
to take hold: one that equated resistance with honor. An analysis of 
this case therefore goes beyond recent discussions of structural and 
perceived opportunity to show how framing processes can facili-
tate collective action even in the absence of  political opportunity. It 
also suggests that some of those  contingencies to which Goodwin 
and Jasper refer can include genocide and the belief among partici-
pants that their deaths are inevitable, contingencies that fit 
Goldstone and Tilly’s concept of threat. Finally, as I explain in the 
conclusion, this case points to the need for empirical research on a 
greater variety of cases—especially those in situations of extreme 
powerlessness—to continue to refine our understanding of the 
emergence of collective action.138
Looking back at the Jewish resistance, one can see in this community 
action an orientation toward a belief of the Weberian ideal type that, in 
this case, coincides with the desire to die with dignity. Furthermore, 
Einwohner enlightens the concept of field of action within which opposing 
factors unfold under the control of Nazi forces. Since the collective action 
in Warsaw occurred by virtue of the absence of a series of political 
 opportunities, one can consider the Weberian concept of social 
 interactions.139 When the society of the Warsaw ghetto realized that there 
were no political opportunities, only then numerous interactions were 
established between the residents of the ghetto; there was a social action 
among inhabitants.140 
The resistance movement in Warsaw was distinct from traditional social 
movements also for other reasons. While traditional social  movements are 
born with clear objectives to be pursued (they are against-societies or  societies 
138 Einwohner, “Opportunity, Honor, and Action in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943,” 654 
(author’s in-text citations omitted).
139 See William A. Gamson, Talking Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
140 The concept is at the basis of social movements theory. In accordance with Latin meaning, 
the verb moveo translates the same sense of Latin ago from which the Italian word action 
originates.
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in nuce aiming at changing the existing status in which they are formed), the 
Warsaw Uprising was instead a movement that did not aim at the overturning 
of the status quo. Actions were purely motivated and oriented towards the 
value of resistance in itself, as an act of dignity and reaction to Nazi evil. Faced 
with the threat and the awareness of being exterminated, only people of the 
ghetto retained the human dignity continuously subtracted through violence. 
In Warsaw to resist meant the ability to reject evil:141
What distinguishes this case from others is not simply that the ghetto 
fighters risked death, but that they believed they were certain to die; 
further, they felt that they would die regardless of their  decision to resist.142
Starting from July 1942, the situation began to plummet due to deportations. 
This factor pushed the inhabitants of the ghetto to redefine their situation and 
to move to the stage of armed resistance. Precipitating factors joined the 
existing social tensions. For Neil J. Smelser’s theory of value-added, these 
elements lead to the breaking of the balance. In other words, the movement of 
resistance arises when collective consciousness and  mobilization arise, by 
changing the status quo of social conflict and redefining the social action: 
If Warsaw Jews had the option of either resisting or continuing to live 
in the ghetto under German occupation, perhaps the uprising would 
not have taken place; indeed, the fact that no collective resistance took 
place before July 1942 supports this conclusion. Yet with an attribution 
of threat so great that they believed their deaths to be inevitable, resis-
tance—framed in terms of an honorable death—became preferred.143
After July 1942, Einwohner explains that an organic action of 
 solidarity unfolded in Warsaw: she elaborates this, following Les règles de 
la méthode sociologique by Durkheim.
141 See Touraine, Production de la société; Pizzorno, Le radici della politica assoluta e altri 
saggi. On right of resistance, see Angela De Benedictis and Valerio Marchetti, eds., 
“Resistenza e diritto di resistenza: Memoria come cultura,” Quaderni di Discipline Storiche, 
15 (Bologna: Clueb, 2000).
142 Einwohner, “Opportunity, Honor, and Action in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943,” 670.
143 Ibid.
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4.6.2. The Conditions of Collective Action
One of the main questions is “why did Jews resist?” after all.144 Einwohner 
asks herself how it was possible that Jews resisted under the Nazi 
 totalitarian power. The term “to resist,” which she essentially translates in 
her vocabulary with “to move” or “to act,” concerns two questions: Who 
resisted? Against whom or what? Obviously the ones who resisted were 
the residents of the ghetto, whose social action had as its goal the 
 fundamental act of resistance in itself. Einwohner explains that “collective 
action need not always require opportunity.”145 The theory she conceives, 
in rethinking the Holocaust, is completely innovative for sociology. This is 
important because some scholars, like her, in reconsidering the Holocaust 
contribute to improving sociological thought in general: “This case 
 therefore illustrates how framing processes can mediate structural 
 conditions to produce collective action in the absence of opportunity. It 
also points to the need for additional research on protest and resistance in 
nondemocratic settings.”146 The resistance in question is form of political 
participation since it presees an adhesion of collective kind.147 In fact, 
social movements constitute a specific type of political participation. 
Einwohner clarifies the success of this collective endeavor (in this way 
Herbert Blumer defines the social movement) through the sociological 
concepts of “availability,” “proximity,” and “identity,” borrowed from the 
Chicago School.148 
Availability is further specified with the concept of activism, which is 
closely linked to that of proximity. Individual activism, thanks to social 
proximity, turns into a social movement. To clarify, when any single resi-
dent of the ghetto felt the need to act, the action of the individual became 
the act of everyone. This was possible because residents shared with each 




147 Cf. Einwohner, “Availability, Proximity, and Identity in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising,” 277; 
Pizzorno, Le radici della politica assoluta e altri saggi.
148 See Herbert Blumer, “Social Problems as Collective Behavior,” Social Problems 18, no.3 
(1971): 298–306.
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small areas, which helped to make them similar, if not identical. How the 
population of Chicago tended to be distributed geographically according 
to social class was well explained in 1925 by Robert E. Park, Ernest W. 
Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie in The City. The authors illustrated 
how it is possible to locate, in the urban space, some natural areas corre-
sponding to social classes of individuals (the spatial distance is used to 
reflect the social distance between individuals belonging to different 
classes). Now, reversing the situation, moving from physical-spatial 
distance to  physical-spatial proximity, we can apply this way of thinking 
to the Warsaw ghetto: in Wohnbezirk physical and territorial proximity 
created bonds of solidarity among persons forced to live crowded together.149 
Thus, the individual activism, due to social proximity, becomes a 
moral solidarity, which leads, in turn, to a social movement: the element 
of identity, the third constituent of a social movement, holds the  individuals 
who participate in resistance actions together. Einwohner’s explanation 
refers to a vast literature that lets identity be the basic concept of the nature 
of social movements and that puts the process of group identity at the 
basis of participation in a movement:
A strong sense of “we” is a necessary component of collective action 
frames or the subjective assessment that make activism possible. Some 
scholars go so far as to suggest that collective action is the enactment 
of identity in that individuals participate in protest because doing so is 
a reflection of who and what they understand themselves to be.150
In short, individual activism, social proximity, and collective identity were 
the concepts defining the dynamics of social action in Warsaw, in which 
women and young people also took part, since, in the ghetto the force of 
moral solidarity canceled gender differences.151
149 In Chicago School theory, physical distance is used to translate the social distance with the 
function of establishing a distance of a moral kind among the residents of the city. Cf. 
Louis Wirth, The Ghetto (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928).
150 Einwohner, “Availability, Proximity, and Identity in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising,” 280 
(authors’ in-text citations omitted).
151 See Baumel, Double Jeopardy; testimony no. 5469.O.3, Yad Vashem Archive, Jerusalem. 
On the role of the couriers, see instead Vladka Meed, On Both Sides of the Wall: Memoirs 
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The memories of Jack Klajman (2000), who was a ten-year-old boy 
in Warsaw in 1941, mention a young female fighter: 
So many courageous young people were taking part in the 
uprising—women as well as men. I remember one of the people 
who dropped into our hideout was a woman who seemed 
 particularly stoic. She was proudly wearing a German helmet. 
I asked her where she got it. “This is a souvenir of a stinking Nazi 
I killed,” she said. “I grabbed his gun and his helmet.” I asked her 
if I could kiss her on her cheek for her bravery. Laughing, she 
granted me permission. I grasped her hand and told her I hoped 
she would survive the war and save that helmet to show her 
 grandchildren one day. I could see the tears forming in her eyes. 
“I don’t think so,” she said. “I don’t think I will ever see that day. 
I’m ready to die any time, at any moment, and I’m happy that I was 
able to be a part of this movement to take revenge on the Nazis.” 
I knew they were preparing for another attack so I wished her well 
and told her to come back in one piece. She never returned.152
Einwohner notices the role played by female couriers moving inside 
and outside the ghetto in providing and obtaining information, 
weapons, food, and so on. They were called kashariyot, from the 
Hebrew Kesher (“connection”), especially because they ran from one 
ghetto to another bringing into contact people in crucial moments so 
that a real link had been established for survival of the Jewish commu-
nity’s identity. In addition, they had the special feature of enduring 
more than the men did under the Nazi terror. Einwohner, in proposing 
from the Warsaw Ghetto (New York: Holocaust Library, 1979); Tzivia Lubetkin, In the 
Days of Destruction and Revolt (Tel Aviv: Beit Lohamei Haghetaot, 1981); Arad, Gutman 
and Margaliot, eds., Documents on the Holocaust, doc. 111, The Girl Couriers of the 
Underground Movement, 239–40; Bronka Klibanski, “In the Ghetto and in the Resistance: 
A Personal Narrative,” in Women in the Holocaust, ed. Dalia Ofer and Lenore J. 
Weitzman, 186, accessed July 17, 2011, http://www1.yadvashem.org/yv/en/education/
newsletter/18/couriers.asp. 
152 Einwohner, “Availability, Proximity, and Identity in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising,” 284, 
with reference to the memoirs of Jack Klajman. 
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this type of social resistance  movement, leads scholars to review important 
topics in sociology.
4.6.3. Leadership Question: Three Cases in Comparison
Who symbolized the power in the Wohnbezirk of Warsaw and in the 
Vilna and Łódź ghettos? Well, if in the first case the resistance was 
planned and realized, in the Lithuanian case, instead, although it was 
prepared, it did not take place. In the third example, then, the resistance 
was not  scheduled and consequently not even established. Faced with 
the three cases, Einwohner tries to develop a theory starting from the 
notions of  leadership and authority:
In many ways, the study of social movements is synonymous with 
the study of leadership. Scholarly accounts of movement activity 
nearly always mention the actions of movement leaders, and most 
of the documents and events that serve as the empirical sites for 
movement analyses bear the imprints of leaders’ decisions. 
Furthermore, although a focus on organizations is still prevalent 
in the research literature, it is often difficult to think of many social 
movement organizations without those groups’ leaders also 
coming to mind.153
From Lenin onwards there was a widespread awareness that a revolu-
tionary movement could not exist without a strong organization of leaders 
capable of guaranteeing continuity. In the light of Weber’s theories, the 
term “authority” means the ability to receive obedience to the orders 
given. But it also means charismatic power when a person exercises above 
all other individuals a certain charisma or charm, which helps the person 
only by grace (χάρις) to find obedience and consent.
153 Rachel L. Einwohner, “Leadership, Authority, and Collective Action: Jewish Resistance in 
the Ghettos of Warsaw and Vilna,” American Behavioral Scientist 50, no. 10 (2007): 1306, 
doi:10.1177/0002764207300160. See Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights 
Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change (New York: Free Press, 1984). Cf. 
Einwohner, “The Need to Know,” 423–25. There is a new sociology of social movements 
based on the category of leadership.
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I would like to evidence how Einwohner in studying the different 
points of these three ghettos is able—and it does not always happen—to 
combine or conjugate the main Holocaust historiography with  sociological 
thought. When she reelaborates the works of Arad, Gutman, Corni, 
Hilberg, and Unger, she demonstrates, in 2000s, that a dialogue between 
history and sociology is possible.154 In addition, the phenomenon of 
 ghettoization analyzed by Einwohner sheds light on the nature and 
 functions of the Jewish Councils: from simple intermediaries between 
Nazi officials and the ghetto populations (they had to provide for the 
recruitment of labor and organization of community), they became a real 
bureaucratic administration, sometimes, as in Warsaw, a municipal hall. 
For example, Czerniaków received the title of mayor. From the time that 
the simple council turned into a bureaucracy responsible for the housing 
problem or for that of public health, it had been constituted as a civil 
service, an apparatus with counselors, also remunerated, which perfectly 
reflected Weber’s model of bureaucracy.155 
Warsaw, always considered as the center of Jewish culture in Europe, 
during World War II went down in history especially for the events that 
occurred in its ghetto and for the forms of resistance that unfolded. On 
the basis of the category of social movement, Einwohner believes that the 
resistance had been prepared and carried out, in the ghetto, thanks to the 
collective action of the resident population.156 
Einwohner gives the name of “authority work” to the coordinated 
center of power that plans armed resistance: organized work that 
confers authority to the resistance group and to ensure its success. The 
positive result of the decision-making power of the ŻOB and of the 
ŻZW was also attributable to the fact that, in the Warsaw Wohnbezirk, 
154 Einwohner, “The Need to Know,” 412–13.
155 Cf. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 234.
156 Cf. Arad, Gutman and Margaliot, eds., Documents on the Holocaust, doc. 101, From a 
Lecture on the Steps Leading to the Establishment on the Warsaw Ghetto, January 20, 1941, 
222–28. See Einwohner, “The Need to Know,” 413: “In Warsaw, small children were most 
likely to be the ones to smuggle food in from outside the ghetto walls (the ‘Aryan side’) 
because they were small enough to slip through holes in the wall and to evade the guards” 
(authors’ in-text citations omitted). 
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the Judenrat leader Czerniaków was not considered a “legitimate” 
authority.157 
In other words, Einwohner focuses her attention on the leadership 
question, a relevant topic in sociology. Since Czerniaków did not enjoy 
consensus within the community, his orders were not heard; consequently, 
ŻOB and ŻZW, the organizations that Einwohner defines as authority 
work in sociological terms, found a wider listening space to organize the 
resistance. Einwohner illustrates how fundamental in the ghetto the role 
of the leader was, and to what extent the possibility of revolt against Nazi 
power depended on him, with the suicide of Czerniaków, when mass 
deportations began in July 1942. From that time, the Warsaw insurrection 
took place and was successful: the decision-making power was going to 
concentrate in the hands of the authority work, which was organizing the 
resistance. Finally, the economic nature of the ghetto based on private 
endeavor ensured the power of the resistance groups. This aspect was not 
secondary since the outputs from the ghetto for work reasons created and 
facilitated communications and relations between the world outside and 
the inside and the resistance organization.158 For the Lithuanian ghetto of 
Vilna, things went differently.159 Although there had been a resistance 
movement capable of planning the action of revolt, a real resistance itself 
never took place: 
As noted earlier, plans for resistance in the Warsaw Ghetto emerged 
in response to the receipt of information from Vilna, where mass 
killings of Jews began in summer 1941. Somewhat ironically, 
however, while the actions of resistance fighters in Vilna were 
central to the emergence of resistance in the Warsaw Ghetto, those 
157 See Einwohner, “Leadership, Authority, and Collective Action,” 1324, see note 4.
158 Cf. Arad, Gutman, and Margaliot, Documents on the Holocaust, doc. 102, The Smuggling of 
Food into the Warsaw Ghetto, 228–29; ibid., doc. 102, The Dilemma of Jewish Self-Help, 232; 
ibid., doc. 107, Ringelblum on Cooperation Between Jewish Political Parties in the 
Underground, 234; ibid., doc. 108, “Oneg Shabbat,” The Jewish Underground Archives in the 
Warsaw Ghetto, 235; Shoshana Baharir’s testimony about the preparations and the Warsaw 
Ghetto Uprising, Testimony no. 5469 O.3, Yad Vashem Archive.
159 See Einwohner, “The Need to Know,” 416.
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same activists were unable to achieve their goal of a sustained armed 
uprising in Vilna.160
The actions of the United Partisans Organization (Fareinikte Partizaner 
Organizatsie, FPO) did not result in a real resistance and did not lead 
to the destruction of the ghetto. The answer lies in the fact that, in 
Vilna, unlike Warsaw, there was a strong leader, Jens Jacob, in charge 
of the council. He was able to counteract resistance actions since he 
believed that the economic and productive activity of the ghetto was 
helpful to the Germans and that, for these reasons, they would not ever 
proceed to a mass murder. For him, the clandestine activities of 
 opposition to the Nazis constituted a clear threat to the life of the Jews. 
His speech of May 15, 1943, about the dangers relating to the introduc-
tion of weapons into the ghetto was clearly significant and shows all 
his disappointment in the manner of operation of the FPO: “From an 
economic point of view the ghetto is very valuable, but if you are going 
to take foolish risks and if there is any  question of security, then I will 
wipe you out.”161
Einwohner explains how, in the case of Lithuania, the authority 
work and charismatic power of the FPO could not substitute for the 
 authoritarian power of the head of the Council.162 As for the ghetto of 
Łódź, in the years 1940–44, it showed a power structure different from 
the previous ones. As Hilberg writes, “measured in its powers to regu-
late and interfere with the life of the inhabitants, the Jewish bureaucracy 
of the Łódź ghetto was probably the most totalitarian of all ghetto 
bureaucracies”:163
The ghetto in Łódź was the first major ghetto in Poland; it was 
established in February 1940 and mostly liquidated by August 1944. 
160 Ibid.
161 Arad, Gutman and Margaliot, eds., Documents on the Holocaust, doc. 205, Address by Gens 
on the Danger of Bringing Arms into the Vilna Ghetto, May 15, 1943, 453–55; cf. ibid., doc. 
206, From an Article in “Ghetto News” on the Importance of Industry and Work in the Vilna 
Ghetto, 455–56.
162 Ben-Sasson and Dunkelblum-Steiner, Resistance, 28–31.
163 Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), 86.
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In contrast, the ghettos of Warsaw and Vilna were more short-lived: 
the Warsaw Ghetto was established in October 1940 and destroyed 
in May 1943, while the ghetto in Vilna lasted from its establishment 
in late August 1941 until its liquidation in September 1943.164
If one looks at the economic life of the ghetto, the totalitarian power of 
leadership was unquestioned. In Łódź, the Jewish Council directly 
managed trade and industry: hence, the dictatorial authority of the 
Council and especially of its head:
While food shortages characterized all three ghettos, hunger 
appears to have been the worst in Łódź, where food smuggling was 
nonexistent and where ghetto leader Mordechai Chaim Rumkowski, 
the Nazi-appointed “Eldest of the Jews,” maintained strict control 
over the meager food rations provided by the Germans.165
In addition, other aspects confirm the authoritarian characteristics of such 
power. As Hilberg noted, the administrative apparatus of the Łódź ghetto 
went even further than its Nazi prototype, its sole judicial office was 
 incorporated in the police.166 Considering that the ghetto was the largest in 
number density, among those near Warsaw, and that it was a kind of 
“holding place” where all the Jews coming from the western regions (Vienna, 
Prague, etc.) arrived, it was normal to find there, among residents, someone 
who had experience of political participation. From this point of view there 
were no differences between the population of the Łódź ghetto and the 
population of those of Warsaw and Vilna: what differed among the activists 
in Łódź and other activists was that the residents of the Łódź ghetto did not 
feel called upon to fight or react against the Nazis.167 
For Einwohner, there are three explanations. First, it is necessary to 
take the type of power present in Łódź into account. Second, it is central 
to remember that the control exercised by the Nazis on the ghetto was 
164 Einwohner, “The Need to Know,” 412. 
165 Ibid., 413 (authors’ in-text citations omitted).
166 See Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 155n118.
167 Cf. Einwohner, “The Need to Know,” 418.
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greater than that exercised in the other two ghettos due to its geographical 
position. The possibilities of organization decreased from the isolation 
produced: “Furthermore, unlike the case in Warsaw and Vilna, it is notable 
that the primary data from Łódź display few claims about genocide, 
suggesting that Jews in Łódź were mostly unaware of the massacres 
happening in other ghettos. This lack of awareness stemmed in large part 
from the ghetto’s relative isolation.”168 And third, it is essential to consider 
carefully the charismatic figure of Chaim Rumkowski, head of the Council:
Rumkowski countered some of their protests with the use of force 
(applied by the ghetto’s Jewish police force) and others with public 
speeches warning of even greater repression from the Nazis if 
factory work was disrupted. For instance, in a speech made at the 
conclusion of a workers’ strike in January 1942, he said, “Had the 
strike attempts that recently took place here come to the attention of 
the authorities, the snow would have been red with blood. . . . I am 
certain that if the ghetto does its work in earnest and does it well, 
the authorities will not take repressive steps.”169
In the wake of Berger and Luckmann’s studies, Einwohner stresses that the 
social construction of reality in Łódź influenced totally the actions of 
individuals: the communication of distorted news avoided armed resis-
tance in the ghetto.170 Despite the skills and ability to organize collective 
action, since several political activists lived in the ghetto, the false building 
of reality prevented residents of Łódź from resisting. Additionally, the 
position of the ghetto, vital for the Reich’s actions, compelled it to endure 
continuous control by Nazi forces: it was completely isolated. The 
 geography of the ghettos was conceived and designed precisely to impede 
communication and common action among individuals: the physical 
distance, under control, generated a kind of moral distance among 
168 Ibid., 418–19.
169 Ibid., 418 (authors’ in-text citations omitted).
170 Cf. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise 
in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1966).
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 individuals. As in Łódź, this favored “incredibility.”171 Thus, individuals 
found it hard to believe the truth, or remain in “ignorance.” Consequently, 
what happened was not recognized. This uncertainty, or, rather, this 
 undefined situation, as in the Łódź community, did not create collective 
action, since, in the community’s imagination, all those social forces 
leading to a revolt were silenced:
A memo written by the members of the Jewish National Committee 
in May 24, 1944, read in part, “Despite our many efforts to make 
contact with the Łódź Jews . . . we have failed to make our way into 
the ghetto. It is an island, totally cut off from the rest of the world.” 
Without knowledge of the killings of Jews elsewhere in Europe, 
Jews in the Łódź Ghetto had no reason to believe that a similar fate 
would befall them; correspondingly, members of the community 
directed their efforts toward surviving the harsh ghetto conditions 
rather than resisting against the Nazis.172
By reading Einwohner’s articles, two important issues arise. The first is 
with the power itself: the different forms of social life and organization 
forms among the residents of the ghetto depended on the kind of power 
exercised in the ghetto. The second issue concerns the power structure: 
personal, as in the case of the chief of the Council, or of a collective nature, 
as in the case of authority work, which organized the resistance.173 Thanks 
to Einwohner, it is also possible to construct mentally a kind of conceptual 
matrix with two crossed variables on the nature of power. On the 
 horizontal axis, there are the power structure (individual/collective) and 
the type of power (charismatic/authoritarian). On the vertical axis there 
are the times starting from which the political opportunities to resist Nazi 
power diminished, that is, from 1942, when the deportations began. 
171 Einwohner, “The Need to Know,” 410.
172 Ibid., 419 (authors’ in-text citations omitted).
173 Cf. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science 
Review 56, no. 4 (1962): 947–52.
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Taking these data into account, one can hypothesize that, in Warsaw, the 
stronger type of power, the one that received obedience to its own 
commands, was charismatic and exercised by the authority work (ŻOB, 
ŻZW, Oneg Shabbat), which allowed for the formation and actions of 
resistance in the ghetto.174 
In Vilna, instead, the kind of power that found greater obedience 
was that of the authority of the chief of the Jewish Council, and, contrary 
to the actions of revolt, his power impeded the real deployment of resis-
tance. Einwohner shows how power exercised in Łódź reveals that 
authoritarian power of the Judenrat and that exercised by the Reich 
coexisted. 
Finally, Einwohner focuses on the relationship between the  structures 
of the territory, or rather on the geographic location of the ghetto, and the 
political regime to which it is subjected. The Third Reich was organized in 
power layers that made it unique. The type of power exercised in the 
ghettos hinged on the geographical location of the ghetto itself. For 
instance, in the case of Warsaw, placed in the general government, the 
influence of the Reich was lower than that in Łódź, a city almost in the 
heart (from a geographical point of view), of the control policy of Nazis, 
since it was located in the Wartheland. Instead, Vilna, located in the 
 territories to the east, belonged to those occupied areas of German 
 influence in which the totalitarian power unfolded mainly in the second 
wave of massacres that began, in the Baltic area, in the autumn of 1941 and 
went on to increase the following year in all occupied territories. Thus, 
while the second was unleashed in the north, the first was still in progress 
at the south. For the Łódź ghetto, its geographical location, in the territory 
of Poland and incorporated into the Third Reich after Germany’s invasion 
in 1939, was fatal, because “the resulting isolation not only contributed to 
the physical suffering of the ghetto inhabitants (i.e., by restricting the 
174 See Avraham Milgram, Carmit Sagui, and Shulamit Imbar, eds., Every Day Life in the 
Warsaw Ghetto, 1941 (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1993), 54–57; Einwohner, “Opportunity, 
Honor, and Action in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943,” 655, see note 4.
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available food supply) but also severely curtailed the transmission of 
information from other ghettos.”175
4.6.4. The Geography of Resistance in Warsaw, Vilna, and Łódz ’
The collective action was not the same in Warsaw, Vilna, and Łódź. 
Einwohner tries to account for this geography of resistance by conceiving 
a new sociological category. In the wake of the studies of Schwartz, 
speaking of structured ignorance, and of Snow and Benford, who speak of 
empirical credibility, she coins the sociological notion of “cultural igno-
rance.”176 This concept was conceived for the occasion of understanding 
the Holocaust, but it is useful for sociology in general. Einwohner empha-
sizes that  resistance was possible in Warsaw and that at the time Jews were 
able to obtain information on the Nazis’ genocidal plans, and only when 
such information had become credible in the collective consciousness.177 
In essence, in the case of Vilna, the action of the chief of the Council 
impeded resistance efforts. Instead, in Łódź (where ignorance about 
 genocidal news was institutionalized, that is, the false news was constructed 
as true to become credible in the public opinion of residents), credence 
was not given to reports regarding massacres: the ignorance became 
value-binding for individuals and slowly turned into a legitimate cultural 
ignorance:
I use these concepts to examine what Jews knew about their situation 
(i.e., the extent to which they knew about the Nazis’ genocidal plans) 
and to explore the role of this knowledge in their decision to resist. 
I find that while ignorance and knowledge help explain action (or the 
lack thereof) in each ghetto, these cases also reveal that “ignorance” has 
cultural as well as structural components. I use these findings to draw 
175 Einwohner, “The Need to Know,” 419 (authors’ in-text citations omitted).
176 Cf. Michael Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure: The Southern Farmers’ Alliance and 
Cotton Tenancy, 1880–1890 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); David A. Snow and 
Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame, Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” in From 
Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movements Research across Cultures, ed. Bert Klandermans, 
Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1988), 197–218.
177 See Einwohner, “The Need to Know.”
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broader implications for future research on social movements and 
collective resistance.178
Structured ignorance is a social process that starts a much more complex 
and serious cultural ignorance. While the first restricts or precludes 
knowledge of the facts to individuals, the second is based on  interpretative 
binding practices that act as rules and intervene on decision-making 
and emotional acting of the same.179 In this way, the flow of the news 
becomes a social phenomenon that is useful to study. In Warsaw, the 
 resistance was only possible because there was knowledge rather than 
ignorance. Collective action in Warsaw did not begin in the fall of 1940, 
when the ghetto was built for the first time: “Notably, these discussions 
began in response to news from Vilna, where mass murders of Jews had 
occurred in the nearby woods of Ponar the previous summer and fall 
and where young activists  were organizing for resistance.”180 The 
 possibility of action started to be discussed only after January 1942, 
namely, when information on the massacres perpetrated in Vilna arrived 
in the ghetto. And the action became concrete from July 1942, when 
deportations from the ghetto began. 
Instead, in the ghetto of Vilna the phenomenon of cultural ignorance 
only led to a plan of resistance since the attitude of the chief of the Council 
triggered the mechanism of noncredibility, of what was not possible:
Interestingly, the news about the massacres in Vilna was not  interpreted 
in the same way by all members of the ghetto  community in 
Warsaw. While young activists in the Warsaw Ghetto argued for 
resistance, older community leaders countered them by saying that 
attempts at collective resistance would only bring greater hard-
ships upon the ghetto community. Describing one community 
meeting at which the topic of resistance was discussed, Vladka 
178 Ibid., 408.
179 See Karen A. Cerulo, Never Saw It Coming: Cultural Challenges to Envisioning the Worst 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Lee Clarke, Worst Cases: Terror and 
Catastrophe in the Popular Imagination (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); 
Einwohner, “The Need to Know,” 410–11.
180 Ibid., 415 (authors’ in-text citations omitted).
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Meed (who became a member of the ŻOB) wrote, “The Jewish 
leaders did not want to assume the responsibility of risking the 
lives of those who still hoped to survive. The prevailing opinion 
still was that no more than, say, 60,000 or 70,000 people would be 
deported and that the rest would survive. Under the circumstances, 
how could anyone find it in his heart to jeopardize the lives of the 
entire Warsaw ghetto for the sake of active resistance? . . . The illu-
sion that one was bound to survive drowned out voices of 
warning.”181
The construction of reality weighs on this past: faced with the existence of 
the facts the power of imagination prevails, in the sense of a false image 
duly constructed by power in force. Escapism was then evident in the 
ghetto of Łódź, where the false construction of reality and false hopes, 
combined with the voice of the head of the Gettoverwaltung, Biebow, were 
more convincing than the army and extreme self-defense. The choice of 
resisting in Łódź was made too late to change the common sense view, of 
which Schütz wrote in 1953—it was too strong among the residents of the 
ghetto to be discontinued: 
Notably, the isolation of the Łódź Ghetto prevented residents 
from obtaining information about roundups and deportations in 
other ghettos. Without being able to pool information with Jews 
in similar circumstances, Łódź residents failed to recognize the 
genocide and therefore failed to launch resistance efforts against 
the Nazis. In contrast, the physical construction and daily 
 operation of the ghettos of Warsaw and Vilna, which made it 
easier for Jews to slip out to the “Aryan side,” were more 
 facilitative of inter-ghetto communication. In accordance with 
the concept of structured ignorance, these structural features 
made it possible for Jews in those ghettos to learn about what 
was happening elsewhere, thereby reducing the ignorance that 
acted as a barrier to collective action.182
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid., 420.
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What it is relevant to stress is that Einwohner’s original interpretations, by 
exploiting better the phenomenon of resistance, renew the sociological 
literature.
4.7. ANTI-SEMITISM IN BRUSTEIN
William Brustein’s Roots of Hate (2003) tackles the question of anti- 
Semitism in an original way: Brustein measures the intensity of the 
phenomenon in time and space. Nevertheless, some of the reviewers of 
the book, especially Jeffrey K. Olick, present some negative critiques of 
the sudden historicity with which the author recounts the events. Brustein 
puts in evidence the huge links among National Socialism, anti-Semitism, 
and the Holocaust. He explains the spread of anti-Semitism, recalling 
Goldhagen’s political and cultural thesis, the modernization theory, the 
scapegoat notion, and the position proposing a strong state.183 
In essence, in the first case, Brustein calls into question the idea of an 
eliminationist anti-Semitism of a long tradition in Germany, which is 
unable to explicate the diverse waves of the phenomenon at different times 
in the history of country. He states that the Holocaust was a direct 
 consequence of Hitler’s rise to power and not an inevitability of history and 
Germanic culture. In other words, it cannot be understood only as an 
outbreak of brutal violence or as a radicalized extreme form of deutsche 
Sonderweg. This challenges the thesis of a German national program that 
considered the Holocaust as the inevitable result of a national pathology by 
which Germans, as prisoners of an atavistic belief, believed the Jews were 
worthy of death. Brustein’s approach to the Holocaust integrates a 
 combination of factors (religious pressures, economic instability, elements 
of racism, political crisis) that degenerated in Weimar Germany, into one 
183 Cf. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners; William I. Brustein, Roots of Hate: Anti-
Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); 
Brustein and King, “Anti-Semitism in Europe Before the Holocaust,” 35–53; Jeffrey K. 
Olick, review of Roots of Hate: Anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust, by William I. 
Brustein, American Journal of Sociology 111, no. 3 (2005): 945–48. Anti-Semitic attitudes 
and behavior reported in “American Jewish Yearbook” and in articles published in the five 
countries mentioned in the years 1899–1939, with events that pertain to the long period 
1870–99, are the basis of Brustein’s study. 
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narrative that enlightens the threshold level of anti-Semitism.184 His 
 sociological method seems to be uncommon: one that cannot be used to 
read the studies linking European anti-Semitism to the modernization 
process, that is, to liberalism and capitalism, which are important factors in 
 political, social, and economic emancipation of the Jews. 
One reason for this is that their social mobility and then the social 
mechanism of competition reinforced feelings of fear and hostility 
resulting in anti-Semitic attitudes and passions among non-Jewish 
 countrymen. Although this theory expounds the growth of anti-Semitism 
after 1870, it cannot account for the changes, sometimes even reductions, 
of levels of anti-Semitism starting from 1890.185 It is not able to explicate 
why anti-Semitism in Europe increased significantly during the decade 
1880–90, fell sharply between 1900 and 1914, and then climbed steeply in 
the early 1920s and in the mid-1930s. Finally, it does not clarify why the 
level of anti-Semitism was higher in Romania and Germany than in 
Britain and Italy. 
With regard to the scapegoat theory, Brustein points out that, in 
times of national crisis, people instinctively seek groups on which to 
transfer anxieties or social concerns. The presence of the Jewish 
 immigrant, dispersed in many countries, was used to solve several 
problems: he became the scapegoat on which to project the contradic-
tions of  modernity. Nevertheless, this theory, by making manifest the 
sociopsychological  irrational pulses of a society in crisis, fails when it 
cannot explain why in certain societies where there were a number of 
Jews, they are not the only victims—other social groups were also 
victims of violence.186 
184 Cf. Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence, 136–48.
185 See Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991); Alberto Martinelli, La modernizzazione 
(Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2004).
186 Cf. Sigmund Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Vienna: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer 
Verlag., 1930); Norbert Elias, Über den Prozess der Zivilisation (Basel: Verlag Haus zum 
Falken, 1939); Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1991). This theory, based primarily on Freudian assumptions, revisits also Elias lesson. The 
civilizing process includes the sublimation of destructive impulses and the progressive elim-
ination of all forms of violence, historically inveterate with the monopoly of legitimate 
violence of the modern nation-state in order to ensure public order and the defense industry.
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Ultimately, Brustein undermines the theory of a strong state proposed 
by Pierre Birnbaum in 1992, according to which anti-Semitism was a 
 reaction of the people against the state imposing the emancipation of the 
Jews. This thesis illustrates well the variation of levels of anti-Semitism in 
several European countries: specifically, it is strongest where the state 
imposed emancipation, as in France and Germany, weak where the 
 emancipation was a gradual phenomenon that started from the bottom 
through society, as in the case of Britain. The weaknesses of the theory, for 
Brustein, concerns the times of anti-Semitism, since Birnbaum does not 
clarify the causes carrying a strong anti-Semitism in France in the period 
1890–1930, within which there was a phase of weak anti-Semitism in the 
years 1904–30.187 
In recent decades the Holocaust question has been addressed by 
many crosscutting topics not always directly related to the Holocaust: for 
instance, it has been studied within the framework of collective memory 
research or migration matters. Namely, there are tendencies of mixing the 
Holocaust with other events in the 2000s. Let me recall that these authors 
and their works were introduced and noticed by Gerson and Wolf in 
2007.188 
4.8. SUMMARY
In this chapter we have seen how post-Holocaust sociology changed 
during globalization. The merits of sociologists studying the phenom-
enon, along with the categories typical to examining the globalization 
process, that is, with the categories going beyond modernity features and 
borders, were examined. We also described the different types of memory, 
the main notion of these years, so that we can now understand the passage 
from a collective memory to a cosmopolitan memory to a sociological 
representation of the Holocaust in society. Readers can see how important 
this is for sociology as academic discipline. The result is a new sociology 
187 Cf. Pierre Birnbaum, Anti-Semitism in France: A Political History from Léon Blum to the 
Present (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Brustein and King, Anti-Semitism in Europe before the 
Holocaust, 37. 
188 See note 7, above.
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of the Holocaust but also, above all, a new sociological thinking related to 
globalization: in other words, sociologists who study the Holocaust 
starting from globalization finish with the study of globalization itself in a 
new sociological way, providing sociology with new approaches. We 
glimpsed at the post-Holocaust sociology of gender in that 1990s and how 
it led to a new reprocessing of categories such as resistance and anti- 
Semitism as consequence of the decadency of the American myth, a 
discourse that has returned in the last decade.
Conclusions:  
The Alleged Delay
This book has tried to fill a gap in the literature of sociology and Holocaust 
Studies. Sociology as a discipline will, I hope, benefit from it: by the 
perusal of the sociological literature, conducted with Internet archives, 
databases, and online academic reviews, using which, to the best of my 
possibilities, it was perhaps possible to rewrite the history of the sociology 
of the Holocaust and, and the same time, sociology itself.
The usefulness of this book is that it questions and puts into  discussion 
the sustained thesis—reaffirmed among scholars at the 2001 conference at 
Rutgers University—of the so-called delay of sociological scholarship on 
the Holocaust. Contrary to the assumption of a delay, I have attempted to 
demonstrate that sociology has not absolutely been on delay. The event of 
the Holocaust and its related themes were not considered by scholars for 
a series of reasons. By sifting sociological works and sources, I have 
discovered—and tried to evidence in the book—that several sociologists 
approached the Holocaust, and not only after 1945, but even during World 
War II itself. The reader will note Parsons’s writings and his entire case 
outlined in Chapter 1. However, for a set of pragmatic reasons, the 
 sociologists who approached the Jewish question were not given credence 
in the academic realm; their writings were unnoticed, as evidenced by the 
works of Neurath, Hughes, or Anti-Semitism by the Frankfurt School. By 
dismissing these primary works that paved the way for a sociology of the 
Holocaust, the scholarship and a sociological tradition on the Holocaust 
is missed.
Indeed, by looking at any paper, nay, by perusing the record paper by 
paper, article by article, I discovered a series of circumstances (political, 
academic, and cultural) that led to this sociological delay and gave rise to 
a tradition of scholars missing in post-Holocaust sociology. The Cold War 
must take precedence among the salient factors: the world lived under the 
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fear of the well-known Red menace, while the pragmatic and functional 
sociology of Parsons, far from Simmel’s interests and qualitative approach, 
enjoyed his fortune in the academy. In the postwar years, political  institutions, 
foundations funding scholarships, research centers, and the same 
academic realm preferred or opted for a-evalutative theories that did not 
put in discussion what happened and did not ask questions about what 
occurred, avoiding in this way a possible change of the status quo or of 
what was wrong in society. This a-evalutative thinking, removed from 
reality, is the opposite of what Arendt called “political thinking” and found 
in Parsons its major exponent and theorist. To some extent, as I have 
attempted to show, Parsons’s theories were politically aroused and 
 generated—they were necessary in the political environment of that 
period. Moreover, Parsons was driven by a set of events, personal and not, 
to elaborating and conceiving an a-evalutative sociology, removed and 
detached from real society: conceptual and suitable for postwar policies.
This does not mean that there were not sociologists who developed 
other, different thoughts in sociology. For example, as stated in Chapter 1, 
Hughes and Sorokin represent some exceptions. They faced a not few 
problems with the power of the academy. However, Parsons’s theories 
worked well and unflinchingly because they were in harmony with the 
contemporary political thought of a pragmatic America and in  accordance 
with interests of foundations funding research in the postwar years. After 
World War II, most research was financed with the aim of combating 
communism—hence, Harvard University established the American 
Russian Research Center, which was active in discovering any source of 
the Soviet threat or useful related information.
It should be remembered that in the postwar years an important link 
between sociology, the science of society, and political life was created, 
and I sketched a brief outline regarding the academic life of Harvard 
University. I repeat, the academy privileged those issues that did not deal 
with certain political or burning questions, namely, that of the eternity of 
evil, supreme evil, or with topics of a moral nature, theorized by the 
Frankfurt School or about which it had speculated. Political and 
 educational institutes or foundations preferred to focus their research 
attention on apolitical themes or those related to a methodological 
research of quantitative kind. There were not a few conflicting positions 
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that rose among scholars with different opinions: for example, between 
MacIver and Lynd within the Department of Sociology at Columbia 
University in 1940s, as seen in Chapter 1.
The question of supreme evil and the eternal evil, echoing Frankfurt 
School thoughts, was shunned for an a-evalutative thinking, which wanted 
to sustain a pragmatic society in the United States, thought to be socially 
mobile, oriented to the individual, and capable of resolving any problem—
this was the spirit after World War II. This led to a rejection of any 
“metaphysics of being,” any scientific philosophy of the spirit. Any topic 
dealing with metaphysical thinking and not with logic was materially 
false, logically not sustainable, and thus without sense. It was necessary to 
reject any metaphysical proposition because it did not offer a solution to 
fundamental problems (the postwar economic crisis, migration, etc.). 
Thus moral and ethical issues concerning eternal evil were not inscribed 
into American pragmatism and in support of the ideology of a perfectly 
functional America, most concerned with avoiding in any way the Red 
menace. Hence, the continuous efforts to finance research and promote 
foundations and collaborators intending to do it, such as the Harvard 
Russian Center. Different discourses were not considered; they were 
simply dismissed. This continued until the limits of American  pragmatism 
emerged in the 1960s, when a series of events of various natures (political 
facts and the cultural order) encountered one another repeatedly 
throughout the era and determined the end of pragmatism. Better still, 
the limits of this theory became visible to all and the paradigm of sociology, 
Parsonsism, and the structural-functional prominence underwent a 
change. The changes came in the years after Stalin’s death in 1953, the 
Thaw era, the Congo crisis of 1960–65, the Six Days’ War in 1967, and up 
to the end of the Vietnam War. At that time, conflict theory in sociology 
in its extreme form led to a revival of the critical theory of the Frankfurt 
School, which after World War II had been abandoned for the sociological 
theories of the time aiming at maintaining the status quo. And even 
history as a discipline was underestimated and was losing importance in 
academics in those years (hence the relevance of the first publication of 
Hilberg’s historical research in 1961).
This book is important because it argues for a presence of post- 
Holocaust scholarship in the postwar years. Therefore, if the thesis of the 
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delay is to be given credence to this day, the delay has to be modified to a 
“intended delay,” especially as it pertains to the timing of publication, as put 
in evidence by the Hughes and Neurath cases and by the unpublished 
Parsons letters. The delay was intended by the academies, universities, and 
funding centers of research. That is, it is possible to speak of a kind of 
delayed memory: Hughes decided to not publish his piece in 1948, even if 
he had taught a course on social movements, referring to National Socialism 
and what came to be known as “Hughes on the Nazis” at McGill University 
in 1930s. There was a delayed memory for scholars who were going to 
approach the destruction of the Jews, and there was a problem inside the 
academy, namely, that of anti-Semitism, a pervasive factor that influenced 
the whole issue.1 First, prejudice denied the authors a chance to examine 
Jewish matters honestly; second, it hindered, at Harvard University, 
academics and scholars in tackling the Jewish question and, specifically, 
the genocide of the Jews. The anti-Semitism harbored in the prewar period 
obstructed scholarly opportunities to stand against Hitler’s regime.
Thus, I hope that this book has challenged us to review the stereotype 
according which Bauman “woke up” post-Holocaust Sociology. By my 
sociological perusal, some works, in particular Hughes’s “Good People 
and Dirty Work,” broke the stereotype of the so-called delay of sociology 
by revealing that Cold War policies had put into brackets the discourse on 
the Holocaust. In other words, sociological research on the extermination 
of the Jews was being written, but out of the limelight. Coming back to 
Hughes’s and Neurath’s studies, they were not published soon after their 
drafting because of conflicts with the political concerns of academy and 
with the interests of private and government funding of research. Or 
publishers were not available, in the case of Neurath, to print such studies. 
The destruction of the Jews was a political issue, and political issues and 
moral matters were not being promoted by the academy, but only topics 
suitable for interests and government policies in favor of a pragmatic, 
functionalist America. To make the issue clearer, I repeat that the climate 
of Cold War created an iron curtain upon the research world: so any 
 argument not dealing with the Red menace—it was a kind of anxiety—was 
1 Halpert, “Early American Sociology and the Holocaust”; Norwood, “Legitimating Nazism.”
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dismissed until the 1960s and after, when a series of events of historical 
and political capacity, and some currents of thought, not only  sociological, 
initiated, at least theoretically, caused a tear in this iron curtain.
WATERSHED EVENTS
Sociological interest in the Holocaust started to come back in the early 
1960s, as shown by my perusal of online reviews, which do not replace or 
supplant paper or printed journals, but support them, permitting us to 
have a wider range for analysis. Without this scientific and scholarly 
 literature available online, I couldn’t have written this book. After 
analyzing sociological texts, private writings, and letters, it is evident that 
some studies, such as The German Universities and National Socialism 
(1937) by Hartshorne or Anti-Semitism conducted by the Frankfurt School 
in 1944–45, were unnoticed: they have largely been forgotten, even by 
many scholars of the field. Small wonder that the above disinterest 
 coincided with the end of the functionalism era in sociology. It is important 
to sum up events or circumstances that led to the demise of functionalism 
America in the 1960s.
First and foremost, I have mentioned the Eichmann trial of 1962, 
which strongly focused attention on the question of evil: starting from 
that event, one can continuously ask how people and a society become 
evil. The Eichmann process put on the scene the banality of evil, echoing 
the importance of moral issues and how important it was that humankind 
use its faculty of thinking. In this book, I have explained that the banality 
of evil notion was invented and utilized in 1948 by a sociologist, Hughes, 
and then used again by Hughes in 1962, and by Arendt in the same year. 
Since then many scholars, such as Michael T. Allen and James Waller, have 
used it.2 Additionally, the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report 
on the Banality of Evil by Arendt, first in serial form in 1962 and then in a 
book in 1963, and the earlier release in the United States in 1961 of the The 
Destruction of the European Jews by the historian Hilberg broke  definitively 
the scholarly silence on the Holocaust.
2 See note 201, above (chapter 1).
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To put an end to the delayed memory in sociology were the Six Days’ 
War (Milhemet Sheshet Ha Yamim) and the Jewish philosopher 
Fackenheim’s theories. Jews feared another Holocaust in 1967. Fackenheim 
recalled scholars and thinkers to the task of addressing and tackling the 
question of supreme evil. Two years later, in 1969, the philosopher stated 
that “the Nazi Holocaust is totally present, contemporary, and non- 
anachronistic. The passage of time has brought it closer rather than 
moving it farther away.”3 The question of the moral issue, abandoned 
after World War II in favor of a functionalist and pragmatic sociology, 
now returned. The fallacies of American functionalism emerged at that 
time: the AGIL paradigm of Parsons did not sufficiently work anymore, as 
it did during the postwar years when his theory was useful for sustaining 
the political ideas of a government principally worried about preventing 
and avoiding a communist takeover. Indeed, the Six Days’ War shifted the 
attention onto what occurred to Jews during World War II. And again 
another conflict, that of Yom Kippur War in 1973, and the military victory 
for Israel led to a more proper and open approach to the Holocaust. 
Moreover, the near military defeat for Israel focused attention on the 
theme of spiritual and not armed resistance. It meant that a strong army 
started to lose importance in favor of more peaceful endeavors. In this 
period, I do not know if it is a pure coincidence, I could not verify, in 
Poland an important sociological text, and eyewitness account, by 
Pawełczyńska, not related to armed resistance, appeared, in a time that 
scholars were not yet discussing resistance and while the theme was 
unknown.
To point out the limits of American pragmatism and the end of the 
American positivistic remnants of the 1920s–30s were the years of the 
Vietnam War (1954–75) and its tremendous human cost. This war, called 
by the Vietnamese the “War against the American to Save the Nation,” saw 
U.S. combat units introduced in 1965 and reached the worst human costs 
in 1969. One may read between the lines the fallacy of the choices in favor 
of a functionalist America. Evidence for this was clear at the end of the 
3 Debóra Dwork and Robert Jan van Pelt, Holocaust: A History (New York: W. W. Norton, 
2003), 386n38, 428.
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war, with the defeat of the United States and the nonaligned movement 
established in 1961 in Belgrade. Pragmatism, first, and functionalism, 
after, did not lead to anything good. Faced with the victims of Vietnam, 
there was a rethinking: this time on the side of the victims. The attention 
moved towards real problems that led humankind to reflect and ask: What 
comes now? The military strategy of containment was going to be 
reviewed. In the meanwhile, there were also the social earthquake of the 
civil rights struggle in the early 1960s and the 1968 movements for an 
America free and civil to pave the way in the addressing the question of 
evil. The writings by the sociologist Sorokin and philosopher Fackenheim 
reported the attention on the eternal evil, an undervalued issue in the 
postwar years because of the Cold War.
Without the perusal of well-qualified online reviews, several  sociological 
studies mentioned in the book would be forgotten. If this approach is used 
by scholars in the future, readers will be able to deal with post-Holocaust 
sociology in a more specific way: this book aspires to inaugurate a  sociological 
scholarship able to retrace post-Holocaust sociology country by country 
and in the language of the country  considered. I smile at the prospect.
Cui prodest? I hope this book can be a kind of sociological key to 
rethinking the Holocaust using sociological tools. It is appropriate now to 
divide the sociologists who have distinguished themselves for their 
researches on the Holocaust, at least into two large types of researchers: 
sociologists “of the first hour,” namely, those who from Hitler’s rise until 
the crisis of modern society used in their works, although in different 
ways, similar analytical categories, and those “of the last hour,” belonging 
to the age of globalization and tending to coin new concepts after having 
approached and combined more theories.
In the first group, the studies of Heberle, Merkl, and Lipset are 
 especially significant: working at different times, they were standing for 
the way in which, starting from the idea of “political group” (Politischer 
Verband), to analyze the Nazi regime. Then, let me add to this group 
Shils and Janowitz, who investigated instead—on the basis of the concept 
of “primary group”—the characteristics and influence of German 
 militarism. It is also possible to include in this group Moore and Bauman: 
starting from conditions of alienation and discomfort of the working class, 
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these scholars addressed the issue of social suffering, conceiving the 
Holocaust as an evil product resulting from interpersonal  relationships 
in a context in which the economic or political power failed to allocate 
resources.
In the second group, it seems that the framework of research has been 
constantly progressing and, in recent years, particularly innovative. This is 
the case, for example, of Allen, who, in 1997, in describing the importance 
of bureaucracy in genocidal action, refers to both “white-collar”—the 
middle class of which Mills spoke—and blue-collar workers, manual 
labors. On the occasion he introduces the category of the “grey-collar 
worker,” workers who practice a dirty job, gray and ordinary, which 
substantially consists in the administration of the death.
Following the studies of Schwartz about “structured ignorance” and 
of Snow and Benford on “empirical credibility,” the scholar Einwohner 
instead has recently conceived the notion of “cultured ignorance,” alluding 
to the negative effects that the lack of knowledge of the facts has upon 
society when this ignorance becomes part of the culture. Moreover, 
Einwohner and Pawełczyńska developed a new conception of Jewish 
resistance. Einwohner goes against the traditional theories of sociology in 
presenting the resistance as a social movement and organization, typical 
concepts of sociology, examining three historical cases: Warsaw, Vilna, 
and Łódź. Pawełczyńska, in proposing her original theory of resistance, 
allows us to significantly enrich our knowledge about the forms of  spiritual 
resistance, Amidah.
Finally, Levy and Sznaider have prompted research into new  directions, 
presenting the Holocaust as a social representation of absolute evil.
On the one hand, tracking the status of sociology, as a discipline and as 
an academic corpus, when faced with the extermination of the Jews, meant 
having a particular device to reinterpret and reread the  phenomenon of the 
Holocaust, on the other hand, such an approach might make the same geno-
cidal event an analytical tool with which to retrace post- Holocaust sociology. 
This signifies that, in the light of the phenomenon of the Holocaust, 
it has been possible to reformulate the history of sociology, by perusing 
unknown texts, and even now unreleased (for instance, the writings of 
Parsons on National Socialism and his “mysterious” letters), by using 
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ignored categories (such as “rationalization of terror,” designed  precociously 
by Gerth in 1940), or improperly attributed to scholars different from the 
original ones: the concepts of the “banality of evil” and “total institution” 
developed by Hughes, for example, were assigned to Arendt and Goffman, 
respectively.
There was a need for an editing or a correction of some stated  theoretical 
points. Hence, I hope my study provides motivations and incentives for 
scholars to engage in new research that brings scholars back into the 
archives. We need more work on this kind of research: because only by 
entering into the archives, only by rereading, to some extent, of some papers 
or “missing letters,” only through a critical analysis of texts, it is possible to 
get close to an in-depth truth.
Now, since, in the beginning of this work there was a question: Is it 
necessary to determine if Modernity and the Holocaust really was the 
first or only work that led sociologists to reflect on what had happened 
to the Jews of Europe? Hence, the perusal of the entire sociological liter-
ature with key concepts recalling or related to the destruction of the 
Jews, not driven by concentration camp phases, as stated many times in 
the book and explained by Hilberg in The Destruction of the European 
Jews or by David Cesarani. Thus, the preliminary question was if there 
were, before Bauman, other sociologists who, with specific categories of 
discipline, had approached the genocidal phenomenon. Traverso, in 
1997, in his Histoire déchirée4 wrote of the indifference of intellectuals 
faced with the  extermination of the Jews. With regards to sociology, this 
assertion is not at all proper (or it deserves to be reformulated), in the 
same way in which it is quite incorrect to speak of “sociological silence.” 
Disagreeing with what several authors argued in the conference of 2001, 
I state that sociology was not delayed in studying the Holocaust. 
Kirchheimer, Hartshorne, Neurath, Hughes, and Parsons were among 
the first to denounce the Nazi socialist reality and the risks to which it 
would lead.
They were muses who “did not listen” or were “nonaligned,”  sometimes 
“silent,” despite their innovative analysis in respect of the sociological 
4 Cf. Traverso, Auschwitz e gli intellettuali.
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tradition.5 The writings that have remained unnoticed for years or buried 
in the archives are not few—those of Hartshorne and Parsons, for 
example—as long as other scholars have not unearthed them more or less 
randomly. This happens behind the policies of objectivity and neutrality 
dictated by the contingency of the times—of World War II, first, and of 
the Cold War, after.
Sociologists have long been hindered in spreading their opinions on 
what they saw. However, these sociologists were perhaps the only ones 
who, as privileged observers of society, and representatives of elite thought, 
had the tools and knowledge necessary to disclose the great catastrophe 
that would be unleashed on European society at the end of the long 
process that began with the fall of the Old Regime and led the West to 
trigger the continuous process of national integration. When this process 
of integration, in the shadow of imperialism, was broken, negating the 
possibility of a balanced and peaceful coexistence among different nations, 
it also broke the development of the “bonds of organic solidarity,” of a 
political or economic nature.
On March 6, 1927, in Vilsbiburg, Hitler stated that “when the nations 
are in a state of necessity, they do not refer to legal rights. One question 
arises: Does a people have the right to conquer the land and the land that 
it needs?”6
Thus, if “rethinking” the genocide of the Jews means to do justice to 
the facts, through the sociological discourses and practices typical of the 
discipline, this book has aimed at inviting us to rethink how  antimodernist 
ideas, the idea of the nation, and the myths of the Aryan race and blood 
were met with technological progress on German soil. In a passage from 
The Seventh Million, Tom Segev expresses better towards which truths a 
scholar has to tend:7
5 See note 70, above (chapter 1).
6 Neumann et al., Il nemico tedesco, 458. For Hitler’s speech, see Völkischer Beobachter, 
March 8, 1927, quoted in Hitler’s Words, ed. G. W. Prange (American Council on Public 
Affairs, 1944), 17.
7 Cf. Enzo Traverso, ed., Insegnare Auschwitz: Questioni etiche, storiografiche, educative della 
deportazione e dello sterminio (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1995). Tom Segev, The Seventh 
Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust (New York: Henry Holt, 2000).
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On the way to Auschwitz one of the teachers read a few lines from 
Viktor Frankl’s Man in Search of Meaning into the bus’s loudspeaker. 
Frankl was much quoted during the trip; the Viennese psychiatrist 
had survived Auschwitz. “It seems that man is able to endure 
suffering, humiliation, fear, or anger thanks to the image of a loved 
one that he preserves in his heart,” Frankl wrote, “or thanks to reli-
gion or a sense of humor, or even thanks to a glance at the people 
imprisoned with him, or thanks to his belief that in the end all will 
be well.”8
But, according to Segev, Frankl had not discovered the sense of life in 
Auschwitz, as his publisher wanted the reader to believe, but long before 
being arrested. The sufferings of Auschwitz, however, had demonstrated 
the validity of his theory.9
8 Ibid., 496–7.
9 See ibid. The reference is to Segev, “Is It Worth Living?” Haaretz (supplement), June 11, 
1981, 12–14.
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